Abstract
I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events. I also attempt to rebut arguments against the possibility of functionalist accounts of conscious experience and qualia.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baars, B. (1988),A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Block, N. (1978), ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in W. Savage, (ed),Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science IX, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 261–326.
Chalmers, D. (1993),A Theory of Consciousness, University of Indiana dissertation.
Cole, D. (1984), ‘Thought and Thought Experiments’,Philosophical Studies 45, 431–444.
Gole, D. (1990), ‘Functionalism and Inverted Spectra’,Synthese 82, 207–222.
Cole, D. (1991), ‘Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity’,Synthese 88, 399–417.
Cole, D. (1993), ‘Statutory Definitions of Death and the Management of Terminally Ill Patients Who May Become Organ Donors after Death’,Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 3, 145–155.
Cole, D. (in press), ‘The Causal Powers of CPU's’, in Eric Dietrich, ed.,From Thinking Computers to Virtual Persons, N.Y.: Academic Press.
Dennett, D. (1978), ‘How to Change Your Mind’,Brainstorms, Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, pp. 300–309.
Dennett, D. (1991),Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little Brown Co.
Dretske, F. (1988),Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. (1993), ‘The Possibility of Artificial Intelligence’, address to Society for Machines and Mentality, Atlanta, GA.
Fodor, J. (1990),A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (1991), ‘Replies’, in B. Loewer and G. Rey, eds.,Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 255–319.
Jackendoff, R. (1987),Consciousness and the Computational Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Leibniz, G. (1965),Monadology, written circa 1714, translated by P. Schrecker Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Levine, J. (1983), ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 354–361.
Lycan, W. (1987),Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lycan, W. (1993), ‘The Hegemony of Representation’, presented at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Atlanta, GA.
Millikan, R. (1984),Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Putnam, H. (1975). ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”, inMind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam H. (1981),Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ryle, G. (1949),The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson.
Searle, J. (1980), ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’,Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417–458.
Searle, J. (1994), ‘Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Science’,Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13, 585–642.
Searle, J. (1992),Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schweizer, P. (1994), ‘Intentionality, Qualia and Mind/Brain Identity’,Minds and Machines 4, 259–282 (this issue).
Shoemaker, S. (1975), ‘Functionalism and Qualia’,Philosophical Studies 27, 291–315.
Shoemaker, S. (1981), ‘Some Varieties of Functionalism’,Philosophical Topics 12, 93–119.
van Gulick, R. (1988), ‘A Functionalist Plea for Consciousness’,Philosophical Review 97, 149–188.
Vendler, Z. (1972),Res Cogitans, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953),Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cole, D. Thought and qualia. Mind Mach 4, 283–302 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00974195
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00974195