Abstract
I respond to Selinger and Mix (Selinger, E. and Mix, J. 2004. On interactional expertise: Pragmatic and ontological considerations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 145–163), concentrating on their charges that Collins (Collins, H. M. 2004a. Interactional expertise as a third form of knowledge. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 125–143) underrates the importance of interactional expertise as an expertise sui generis and that the paper fails to analyse the idea of embodiment sufficiently holistically, misleading treating the ‘body’ as no more than the linear sum of its parts.
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Collins, H. M. 1990. Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Collins, H. M. 2000. Four kinds of knowledge, two (or maybe three) kinds of embodiment, and the question of artificial intelligence. In: J. Malpas and M. Wrathall (eds), Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, vol. 2, pp. 179–195. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Collins, H. M. 2004a. Interactional expertise as a third form of knowledge. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 125–143 (this issue).
Collins, H. M. 2004b. Gravity's Shadow: The Search for Gravitational Waves. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Collins, H. and Evans, R., Murdoch, J., Speers, T., Cole, S. and Gorman, M. Expertise (manuscript in preparation).
Collins, H. M. and Kusch, M. 1998. The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Selinger, E. and Mix, J. 2004. On interactional expertise: Pragmatic and ontological considerations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 145–163 (this issue).
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Collins, H. The trouble with Madeleine. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3, 165–170 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000040823.21983.19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000040823.21983.19