Radical pluralism, classificatory norms and the legitimacy of species classifications
Section snippets
Pluralism and the legitimacy of classification
Pluralism, which I will take to be the claim that there are multiple legitimate classifications of a particular domain, is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. It has been defended for individuals (Wilson, 1999), genes (Waters, 2006), race (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2003), and populations (Gannett, 2003) among many other things. Its appeal lies mostly in its fit with scientific practice; it simply happens to be the case that in many biological subdisciplines, scientists
World-based classification and radical pluralism
The previous section pointed out why radical pluralism poses a threat to philosophical views on the legitimacy of classification. This discussion provides a useful starting point to characterize the difference between moderate and radical pluralism. This is important, as one might worry that this difference is somewhat arbitrary, and consequently not philosophically interesting. The discussion above suggests that pluralism is only attractive if we retain the ability to make sense of scientific
Classificatory norms to the rescue
The previous section argued that if we take the world as the only factor determining the legitimacy of species classifications, then radical pluralism inevitably follows. Slater points out that while this argument may hold, there is an easy response here for the moderate pluralist. He writes that
[t]he moderate pluralist contends not merely that different classification systems are possible – this is obviously true – but that among those different possibilities, a number of them are legitimate
The multiple aims of taxonomy
Ereshefsky (2001, p. 183) investigates important texts by leading taxonomists, and concludes that there is surprising agreement in taxonomy about the ‘single overall aim’ that guides species classification. Together with a limited set of low-level norms, Ereshefsky argues, these aims lead to a tempered pluralism. Arguing against Ereshefsky's conclusion, this section shows that none of the three requirements for classificatory norms to constrain radical pluralism are met. It follows that shared
Local decisions determine the legitimacy of classification
The previous sections have argued that radical species pluralism threatens for any view that makes the legitimacy of classification only dependent on the world and shared classificatory norms. Fortunately, the arguments in this paper also suggest what is missing from such views: local decisions. Local aims of research and decisions concerning the operationalization and balancing of these aims also shape the outcomes of species classification. It follows that any philosophical view that aims to
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the no criterion argument for radical species pluralism and argued that because taxonomy has many goals and ways of operationalizing these goals, this radical pluralism cannot be avoided solely by relying on classificatory norms. This implies that in addition to relying on the world and classificatory norms, taxonomists involved in species delimitation also rely on local decisions concerning these aims and norms. This means that any philosophical view on the legitimacy
Conflicts of interest
None.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/14/Pool/5) and by the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO; research project 3H160214). I would like to thank Tim Lewens, Jacob Stegenga, Hardy Schilgen and Nick Jardine for very helpful and much appreciated feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I also want to thank three anonymous reviewers for their particularly helpful suggestions.
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