Radical pluralism, classificatory norms and the legitimacy of species classifications

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2018.11.002Get rights and content

Highlights

  • The paper presents an argument for radical pluralism of legitimate classifications.

  • The paper rejects an objection to this argument that relies on shared classificatory norms.

  • The paper argues that local decisions about the aims of classification co-determine the legitimacy of classification.

Abstract

Moderate pluralism is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. Despite its popularity, various authors have argued that it tends to slide off into a radical form of pluralism that is both normatively and descriptively unacceptable. This paper looks at the case of biological species classification, and evaluates a popular way of avoiding radical pluralism by relying on the shared aims and norms of a discipline. The main contention is that while these aims and norms may play an important role in the legitimacy of species classifications, they fail to fend off radical pluralism. It follows from this that the legitimacy of species classifications is also determined by local decisions about the aims of research and how to operationalize and balance these. This is important, I argue, because it means that any acceptable view on the legitimacy of classification should be able to account for these local decisions.

Section snippets

Pluralism and the legitimacy of classification

Pluralism, which I will take to be the claim that there are multiple legitimate classifications of a particular domain, is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. It has been defended for individuals (Wilson, 1999), genes (Waters, 2006), race (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2003), and populations (Gannett, 2003) among many other things. Its appeal lies mostly in its fit with scientific practice; it simply happens to be the case that in many biological subdisciplines, scientists

World-based classification and radical pluralism

The previous section pointed out why radical pluralism poses a threat to philosophical views on the legitimacy of classification. This discussion provides a useful starting point to characterize the difference between moderate and radical pluralism. This is important, as one might worry that this difference is somewhat arbitrary, and consequently not philosophically interesting. The discussion above suggests that pluralism is only attractive if we retain the ability to make sense of scientific

Classificatory norms to the rescue

The previous section argued that if we take the world as the only factor determining the legitimacy of species classifications, then radical pluralism inevitably follows. Slater points out that while this argument may hold, there is an easy response here for the moderate pluralist. He writes that

[t]he moderate pluralist contends not merely that different classification systems are possible – this is obviously true – but that among those different possibilities, a number of them are legitimate

The multiple aims of taxonomy

Ereshefsky (2001, p. 183) investigates important texts by leading taxonomists, and concludes that there is surprising agreement in taxonomy about the ‘single overall aim’ that guides species classification. Together with a limited set of low-level norms, Ereshefsky argues, these aims lead to a tempered pluralism. Arguing against Ereshefsky's conclusion, this section shows that none of the three requirements for classificatory norms to constrain radical pluralism are met. It follows that shared

Local decisions determine the legitimacy of classification

The previous sections have argued that radical species pluralism threatens for any view that makes the legitimacy of classification only dependent on the world and shared classificatory norms. Fortunately, the arguments in this paper also suggest what is missing from such views: local decisions. Local aims of research and decisions concerning the operationalization and balancing of these aims also shape the outcomes of species classification. It follows that any philosophical view that aims to

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the no criterion argument for radical species pluralism and argued that because taxonomy has many goals and ways of operationalizing these goals, this radical pluralism cannot be avoided solely by relying on classificatory norms. This implies that in addition to relying on the world and classificatory norms, taxonomists involved in species delimitation also rely on local decisions concerning these aims and norms. This means that any philosophical view on the legitimacy

Conflicts of interest

None.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/14/Pool/5) and by the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO; research project 3H160214). I would like to thank Tim Lewens, Jacob Stegenga, Hardy Schilgen and Nick Jardine for very helpful and much appreciated feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I also want to thank three anonymous reviewers for their particularly helpful suggestions.

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