Abstract
Skeptical arguments from dreaming deny that we can know that we are awake. This denial lacks initial credibility to many of us. Often it seems easy to know. A brief reflection seems sufficient. How might the reflection enable us to know? Berislav Marusic offers a plausible answer. The answer is that we can take note of certain phenomenal qualities that are present only when we are awake. The present work argues that there are no such qualities. The final section gives a different account of the knowledge.
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Notes
The gist of this evidence can be noted quickly enough to account for the impression that our knowledge of being awake is often available on brief reflection.
I am grateful for numerous helpful comments from two anonymous reviewers for Philosophical Studies.
References
Conee, E. (2019). Extraordinary Skepticism. In K. McCain (Ed.), The mystery of skepticism: New explorations (pp. 128–160). Brill.
Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (2004). Making Sense of Skepticism. In E. Conee & R. Feldman (Eds.), Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology (pp. 277–306). Oxford University Press.
Marusic, B. (2016). Asymmetry arguments. Philosophical Studies, 173, 1081–1102.
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Conee, E. Things dreamt: a response to Berislav Marusic. Philos Stud 179, 2419–2427 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01771-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01771-5