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Conceptual fallacies in subjective probability

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Abstract

Subjective probability considered as a logic of partial belief succumbs to three fundamental fallacies. These concern the representation of preference via expectation, the measurability of partial belief, and the normalization of belief.

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  1. Technical University Delft, Postbus 5050, 2600 GB, Delft, The Netherlands

    Roger M. Cooke

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  1. Roger M. Cooke
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Cooke, R.M. Conceptual fallacies in subjective probability. Topoi 5, 21–27 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137826

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00137826

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