Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and LanguageThis provocative study exposes the ways in which Wittgenstein's philosophical views have been misunderstood, including the failure to recognize the reductionist character of Wittgenstein's work. Author John Cook provides well-documented proof that Wittgenstein did not hold views commonly attributed to him, arguing that Wittgenstein's later work was mistakenly seen as a development of G. E. Moore's philosophy--which Wittgenstein in fact vigorously attacked. He also points to an underestimation of Russell's influence on Wittgenstein's thinking. Cook goes on to show how these misunderstandings have had grave consequences for philosophy at large, and proposes that a more subtle appreciation of linguistic philosophy can yield valuable results. |
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analytic reductionism answer appear argument behavior behavioristic believe bodies Bouwsma Cartesian skepticism chair chapter claim common sense concept of criteria conceptual scheme criterion criticism describe dismiss dualists empiricism empiricist example exist experience expression external world fact form of words G. E. M. Anscombe G. E. Moore G. H. von Wright give grammar guage Ibid idea interpretation Investigations language-game later lectures logical look Ludwig Wittgenstein Malcolm meaning meant methodological doubt mind misleading Moore's neutral monism noises ontology Ordinary Language Philosophy pain passage phenomenalism phenomenalist philo philoso philosophical problems philosophical skepticism phrase physical objects post-Tractatus proposition question Ramsey's maxim realist reason reductionist rejecting rules Russell Russell's sense-data sense-impressions sentence simply solipsism someone sophical sort sounds speaking Standard Ordinary Language stein substitution method talking theory tion toothache Tractatus understand verified Wittgen Wittgenstein says Wittgenstein thought Wittgenstein's Metaphysics writes