Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in MetaethicsThe central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In Morality in a Natural World, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism that can accommodate the normativity of morality. Moral naturalism is often thought to face special metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems as well as the difficulty in accounting for normativity. In the ten essays included in this volume, Copp defends solutions to these problems. Three of the essays are new, while seven have previously been published. All of them are concerned with the viability of naturalistic and realistic accounts of the nature of morality, or, more generally, with the viability of naturalistic accounts of reasons. |
Contents
Section 1 | 55 |
Section 2 | 58 |
Section 3 | 87 |
Section 4 | 93 |
Section 5 | 99 |
Section 6 | 113 |
Section 7 | 145 |
Section 8 | 153 |
Section 11 | 212 |
Section 12 | 230 |
Section 13 | 249 |
Section 14 | 251 |
Section 15 | 270 |
Section 16 | 274 |
Section 17 | 284 |
Section 18 | 309 |
Section 9 | 203 |
Section 10 | 204 |
Section 19 | 321 |
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action Allan Gibbard amoralist argue argument Audi authoritative normativity authoritative reasons autonomy capital punishment chapter conceptual truth context Copp deny disagreement Earthlings and Twin entails epistemic error theory ethical naturalism example explain express expressivism expressivist fact Gibbard given grades of normativity Gyges Horgan and Timmons idea identity implicature implies instantiation intuition kind means metaethical metaphysical moral beliefs moral claims moral judgment moral knowledge moral naturalism moral necessities moral predicates moral properties moral realism moral reasons moral standard moral terms moral theory Moral Twin Earth morally required natural property naturalist naturalized epistemology ostensive definition painful death proposition Philosophical plausible policies principle proposal question rational person realist-expressivism relevantly self-evident self-governing self-grounded reason self-interest semantic intentions semantics sense sentence Shafer-Landau society-centered theory speaker standpoint strongly a priori synthetic moral synthetic proposition t-right term wrong thesis things being equal true truth conditions Twin Earthlings University Press values standard verdicts
Popular passages
Page 35 - In order to arrive at a correct decision on the first part of this question, it is necessary to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good...