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Eros Corazza, Kepa Korta, Frege on subject matter and identity statements, Analysis, Volume 75, Issue 4, October 2015, Pages 562–565, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv073
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Abstract
In formulating the puzzle about cognitive significance in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Frege rejects the approach he suggested in the Begriffsschrift on the ground that if the utterance of a sentence of the form a = b (e.g. ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’) is understood as ‘a’ and ‘b’ referring to the same object (i.e. they are co-referential) we lose the subject matter. In this note, we will show how Frege’s concerns can be understood and circumvented.
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