Abstract
In this essay, I examine those versions of hylomorphism that attribute to form a very strong explicative role. According to them, form is both the source of new emergent powers and expression of the finalist structure of organisms. The main aim of this essay is to show that these two aspects do not holdup because the form only exercises a structural function, but does not exert an autonomous explanatory function. The form only allows the material components to develop those powers that are not manifest in themselves, outside the configuration that forms as structure gives them. If the higher faculties of the human mind are really emergent over the neurophysiological ones, hylomorphism cannot explain it. As a consequence, hylomorphism does not have the resources to oppose materialism, on the one hand, and dualism, on the other.
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Notes
On this, see Koons (2014), 151: “A staunch hylomorphism involves a commitment to a sparse theory of universals and a sparse theory of composite material objects, as well as to an ontology of fundamental causal powers. Faint-hearted hylomorphism, in contrast, lacks one or more of these elements. On the staunch version of HM, a substantial form is not merely some structural property of a set of elements—it is rather a power conferred on those elements by that structure, a power that is the cause of the generation (by fusion) and persistence of a composite whole through time”. Among the faint-hearted hylomorphists, Koons counts authors such as B. Williams, K. Fine, M. Johnstone and K. Koslicki. Staunch hylomorphists include M. Rea, A. Marmodoro, D. Oderberg and Koons himself. De Haan (2017) also considers W. Jaworski as a supporter of strong hylomorphism.
In Aristotle, these two aspects are profoundly connected, since the Aristotelian hylomorphic theory represents the point of convergence between the theory of form and matter and the theory of the four causes. Aristotle claims in fact that natural phenomena—included the biological—can be explained through four causes: material, formal, efficient and final. Now, the material and the formal cause coincide with matter and form. The final cause is: “the end . . . what something is for” (Physics II, 3, 194 b30–5; Charlton 1970, 29). And later he adds: “What a thing is, and what it is for, are one and the same, and that from which the change originates is the same in form as these” (Physics II, 7, 198 a25; Charlton 1970, 38). These passages clearly express the deep nexus among the four kinds of cause and, in particular, the coincidence between the form as formal cause and the form as final cause. On this see also Williams 1986.
For Koons (2017a), 2 the materialist says: “All genuine causal explanation has as its ultimate basis (its complete metaphysical ground) the spatial and kinematic arrangement of some fundamental particles (or arbitrarily small and homogenous bits of matter) with specific intrinsic natures. All genuine explanation is wholly ‘bottom-up’”. As regards the dualist and the hylomorphist respectively, Koons (2017a), 3 states: “The dualist accepts the total bottom-up determination of the material world by the microphysical but then adds non-physical agencies to the world, while the hylomorphist denies total bottom-up determination in the first place. Thus, the dualist must add new fundamental forces or energies, in the form of vital forces or mind/body interactions, while the hylomorphist can accept a causally closed material world, universally governed by a few physical forces. The hylomorphist simply denies that all fundamental causal powers are to be found at the microphysical level. Instead, some material organisms (human beings) bear fundamental causal powers of a fundamentally bio-teleological and rational-intentional kind”.
For a more precise description, see Prosperi (2011).
A supporter of the metaphysical foundation of the distinction between matter and form could perhaps reply to this thesis by claiming that the metaphysical reasons of the ontological autonomy of form with respect to matter lie at a different level from the physical; therefore, it is not legitimate to follow the dictates of current physics in order to deny the trustworthiness of the classical hylomorphist doctrine. But, in my opinion, we need to avoid a series of misunderstandings on this issue. If one supports a strong thesis of independence between metaphysical reasons and physical reasons and, as a consequence, a sort of incommensurability between physics and metaphysics is assumed, there cannot be any commonalities between the two disciplines. Physics and metaphysics would say different things about material reality—supposed at least that material reality is a common subject of investigation. But, then, it is necessary to assume a coherent stance: the classical hylomorphic theory cannot be put forward in order to explain the physical properties of the different levels of material reality, among which emergent powers are prominent. By contrast, it can be argued that the independence between metaphysical and physical reasons is only partial, that is, that both contribute to explaining the properties of physical reality, each starting from different points of view —either the point of view of proximate causes or that of first principles. But, then, the metaphysical reasons, on the one hand, and the physical ones, on the other, must be judged on the basis of their actual capacities to explain emergent properties. The thesis I share is the second one, and it is precisely for this reason that I consider it legitimate to maintain that the classical hylomorphic thesis is not adequate to explain those phenomena of physical reality that are currently explained by modern science.
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Corradini, A. Hylomorphism: a Critical Analysis. Acta Anal 34, 345–361 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-00378-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-00378-6