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An argument against Aristotelian universals

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Abstract

I provide an argument against the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. The argument consists in a set of five jointly inconsistent assumptions. As such, the argument can be used to argue in favour of other conclusions, such as that exemplification is no relation or that plausible principles concerning ontological dependence or grounding do not hold.

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Notes

  1. For recent discussion about the relationship between grounding and dependence, see Schnieder (2017).

  2. The principle that relations are grounded in their relata should be clearly distinguished from the principle that relations are existence entailing: if aRb, then both a and b exist.

  3. As regards this principle and the next two ones, see Bolzano (1810), Correia (2005), Rosen (2009), Schnieder (2011).

  4. Brackets are here introduced for ease of reading.

  5. See Schnieder (2017) and Rydéhn (2018).

  6. For example, Mulligan (2006) holds that (This chair exemplifies redness) is grounded in (This chair is red).

  7. See Vallicella (2002) and Orilia (2016) for a discussion of such difficulties.

  8. Thanks to an anonymous referee for making this point.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Franz Berto, Fabrice Correia, Anna Marmodoro, Kevin Mulligan, Paolo Natali, Francesco Orilia, Jan Plate, Thomas Sattig, Jonathan Schaffer, Benjamin Schnieder, Alex Skiles, Alberto Tassoni, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments.

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  1. University of Italian Switzerland, Via Buffi 13, 6900, Lugano, Switzerland

    Damiano Costa

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Costa, D. An argument against Aristotelian universals. Synthese 198, 4331–4338 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02345-z

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