Abstract
This paper defends an account of cosmopolitanism as a corrective virtue of the sort endorsed by Philippa Foot. In particular, it argues that cosmopolitanism corrects a common and dangerous tendency to form overly strong identifications with political entities such as countries, nations, and cultures. The account helps to unify the current heterogeneous collection of cosmopolitan theories, as is illustrated by a discussion of the cultural cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron, and the political cosmopolitanism of Simon Keller. The account also helps distinguish cosmopolitans from their critics, most of whom share the cosmopolitan’s commitment to respect for human rights: for example, liberal patriots, liberal nationalists and liberal culturalists.
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Notes
The extreme wideness of the ‘universalism’ interpretation is also what allows some theorists to suggest that we might reconcile cosmopolitanism and patriotic/nationalistic commitments. But the very same wideness robs these views of much of their interest. See the views criticized in Weinstock (2012).
For example, Foot (2002a, 10) suggests that “the desire to be put upon and dissatisfied, or the unwillingness to accept good things as they come along” is a common tendency in human nature, and that correctives to those desires count as virtues.
See Furia (2005) for some surprising facts about the distribution of cosmopolitan attitudes in different regions of the world, and among members of different socioeconomic groups.
See Waldron (2003) for a wonderful description of how cultural materials and artifacts are disseminated, appropriated, and transformed.
This section will contrast cosmopolitanism with patriotism understood as a particular kind of loyalty to one’s country. Quite similar arguments could be constructed that apply to loyalty to one’s nation. What distinguishes a nation from a country is that a nation may lack its own state, since it may share a territory and political institutions with other nation(s). As Margaret Moore (2009, 383) puts it, ‘The object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together’.
In support of Keller’s claim, consider cases of conflicts between two countries: the citizens of each country typically have different views of the facts and different moral assessments of the situation. And these views will tend to favor the official position of their country.
Keller cannot claim that ‘deep inside’ they must have been tempted to deceive themselves without simply treating his theory as irrefutable. In fact, Keller (2007, 79) mentions the possibility of clear sighted patriots.
See also Ypi (2013) for a distinct argument that cosmopolitanism is essentially political.
However, I deny that in order to exercise cosmopolitan virtue the focus of one’s political activities must necessarily be international or directed at foreign countries. Stephen Nathanson holds that all cosmopolitans are committed to building global institutions, and he argues that cosmopolitanism is consistent with both virtuous and vicious behavior. However, his understanding of cosmopolitanism only characterizes a subset of cosmopolitan theories (2007). It should be clear that the corrective aspect of cosmopolitan virtue means that one’s allegiance to any type of institution (local, national or global) will be contingent on its being considered beneficial overall. Of course, one may have deeply mistaken views, but, as Foot (2002a, 14–18) points out, virtues need not always operate as virtues. Conjoined with idiocy (to adapt a phrase of J. S. Mill’s), any disposition can lead to bad consequences.
In my view, it is a mistake to suppose that cosmopolitan attitudes towards political entities such as one’s country will induce a similar ‘corrective’ effect on personal relationships to family members and friends, leading to implausibly impartial attitudes.
One might also argue that cosmopolitanism undermines valuable cultural traditions. But in this latter context the objection is less compelling, because the constantly shifting nature of culture makes it hard to know what loyalty to culture could be, as distinct from loyalty to the people who share it. Moreover, the shared cultural practices of a people unavoidably incorporate elements from many distant sources, and this fact also makes the demands of loyalty to culture hard to conceptualize. See Callan (2005b) on the moral permissibility of voluntary separation from one’s culture.
This Humean story appeals only to the existence of social mechanisms that generate approval or disapproval of traits, and does not rely on other elements of Hume’s theory of the virtues.
One exception here is MacIntyre (1995), who famously argued that patriotism is a virtue that often leads one to act in ways that conflict with universalistic morality. He argues that patriots can be critical of their country only when they see that its policies betray central values of the traditions of that very country. The problem with MacIntyre’s argument is that it presupposes that morality has a particularistic nature and that a non-communal morality is in fact incoherent. It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue against this particular view.
For example, it also fits easily with Martha Nussbaum’s (1996) early defense of cosmopolitanism, which advocated taking a critical stance towards the cultural practices of one’s own country and those of others, and was deeply suspicious about patriotic and national loyalty as well. In more recent work, Nussbaum (2012) claims that patriotism has an important motivational role that supports social justice. But she still argues that there are dangerous tendencies in patriotism and advocates the use of critical thinking to tame them.
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Acknowledgments
For helpful comments, many thanks to Frances Bottenberg, Joshua Gert, Heather Gert, Win-chiat Lee, Yena Lee, Gary Rosenkrantz, two anonymous reviewers, and an audience at the 7th annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress. This paper was written during a sabbatical leave granted by the College of William and Mary, for which I am also grateful.
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Costa, M.V. Cosmopolitanism as a Corrective Virtue. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 999–1013 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9711-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9711-z