KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN
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IDEA AND INTUITION

On the Perceptibility of the Platonic Ideas in the Thought of Arthur Schopenhauer

Promotor: Professor William Desmond

Dissertation presented to fulfill the requirements for the degree of Doctor (Ph.D.) in Philosophy

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For

My Grandfather

and for all those who lent a helping hand,

Your signatures are eternally engraved upon this work.

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NOTE ON REFERENCING

The following abbreviations are used for the referencing of Schopenhauer's works:

W1: The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1

W2: The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2

PP1: Parerga and Paralipomena, Volume 1

PP2: Parerga and Paralipomena, Volume 2

PSR: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

WN: On the Will in Nature

BM: On the Basis of Morality

FW: Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will

ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ᾽
ἕκαστα· καὶ ἀντίκειται ταῦτ ἀλλήλοις.

Aristotle

Introduction

In this dissertation, I examine the perceptibility of the Platonic Ideas in the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer.[1] This is of course a surprising interpretation, given what is usually considered the antithesis of the matter within Plato's own thought. For him, the Ideas are generally understood as *imperceptibly* intelligible entities, the knowledge of which we obtain on the basis of a process of rational dialectic. Thus in the *Timaeus*, Plato refers specifically to Ideas or Forms (ἰδέα, εἶδη) that: "we cannot perceive (ἀναίσθητα) but only think of (νοούμενα μόνον)", opposing these to all things within the visible world which are said to be: "apprehended by belief involving perception (δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως)". (*Timaeus* 51e-52a) Point in fact, for Plato such Ideas seem quite imperceptible.

Of course, Schopenhauer's basic interpretive perspective here departs from his metaphysics of the will (*der Wille*). In light of this, the Ideas now appear as aesthetic phenomena arising on the basis of this more primordial ground. They become the subject of art and the artist, i.e., the genius, and in Schopenhauer's many descriptions of

[1] Schopenhauer states this throughout his works, e.g., "knowledge of the Ideas is necessarily knowledge through perception (*nothwendig anschaluch*), and is not abstract (*nicht abstrakt*)." (*W1*, p. 182); "Plato's *Ideas* are in every way perceptible (*anschauliche*)". (*W1*, p. 488); "Plato rightly founded the whole of philosophy on knowledge of the doctrine of Ideas, in other words, on the perception (*auf das Erblicken*) of the universal in the particular." (*W2*, p. 475)

these, it becomes quite evident that they are to be understood as perceptible.[2] As Cheryl Foster in her article, "Ideas and Imagination", rightly points out:

> Schopenhauer turns the hierarchy of Plato topsy-turvy: the Idea is glimpsed in nature by the genius, at the level of what Plato terms the 'visible world,' and is filtered 'downward' into images, which subsequently direct the ordinary intellect 'upward' to apprehension of the Idea. Schopenhauer's apprehension remains perceptual, while Plato reserves a grasp of the Ideas for intellection, a grasp that must pass through logical and mathematical reasoning before reaching enlightenment.[3] (Foster 2006, p. 232)

So it would seem, at least from an initial glance at matters, that Schopenhauer's interpretation is at odds with Plato's own analysis of the Ideas. In view of this, it will be important to consider here both the question of Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Ideas from the perspective of his *own* thought, as well as the question of why it is that he should think Plato to have interpreted the Ideas *similarly*.

These initial points lead then to another. A number of scholars (e.g., Magee 1983, Hamlyn 1980, Fox 1980, Heine 1966) tend to assume that regardless of his

[2] As an example of this, Brian MaGee in his biographical work, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, states: "But whereas our common everyday perception of objects gives us the commonsense knowledge of appearances which is communicated in everyday speech, and our perceptions of the relations between such things is what develops into rational thought, and this in turn into science—both of which take place and are communicated in concepts—our direct perception of Platonic Ideas gives us knowledge of the timeless, universal realities behind the world's ephemeral surfaces, and this knowledge, not communicable in concepts, is embodied and communicated in works of art." (Magee 1983, p. 168)

[3] Foster further point outs that: "It is this emphasis on perception which ultimately differentiates Schopenhauer's approach to the Ideas from that of Plato. In Plato's *Republic*, the trajectory of the Ideas follows a distinct line of progression, beginning at the lowest level of *images*, where copies of physical reality are taken to be the actual world…These stages of cognition remain in the realm of belief or opinion rather than in the realm of truth, however, and only when one progresses from perception to intellection can one begin to grasp more stable levels of reality." (Foster 2006, p. 231) This interesting notion of Schopenhauer's turning Plato 'topsy-turvy' will be taken up more thoroughly in section 3.1.

interpretation, Schopenhauer's appropriation of the Platonic Ideas is something of a *deus ex macchina* appearing within the theatrical play of his thought as a whole. I argue on the contrary, that Schopenhauer really requires the Ideas in order to account for such things as difference and plurality in light of the unity of the will.[4] So although there is truth to such criticisms, the significant matter here isn't really the fact that the Ideas are artificial additions, but rather of the manner in which their appropriation leads to a number of subsequent ambiguities within the context of Schopenhauer's thought as a whole. So again, in view of the discussion of their perceptibility, it will also be quite important to deal with the question of the ambiguous relation of the Ideas to other *kinds* of knowledge.[5]

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[4] Other notable scholars such as Neeley (2000, p. 125) and Chansky (1988, pp. 68-69), tend to agree with this latter position. Christopher Janaway in his book, *Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy*, summarizes the general problematic of the Ideas quite succinctly: "The Ideas have an uneasy position within Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Unlike Plato's Forms they are explicitly not the objects of pure thought or reasoning, but of perceptual contemplation. Plato would have found this shocking and incomprehensible. They are not the thing in itself, but they are the 'most adequate objectification' of the thing in itself in the world of phenomena. Like concepts they are general rather than particular, but unlike concepts they are supposed to be real, existing in nature prior to perception. The thing in itself is as such strictly unknowable, but by using those senses which normally suffice only to present to us the world of spatio-temporal particulars, in the absence of the laws of connection that govern empirical knowledge, we can be acquainted with the Ideas, which are as near to the thing in itself as we can come. In Kantian terms, the Ideas are thus required to repose somewhere between appearance and thing in itself, and it is deeply uncertain whether there is any such location for them to occupy. Furthermore, Schopenhauer never really explains how, in contemplating a particular object, I become equated with a general Idea." (Janaway 1989, p. 277)

[5] Remarkably, regarding this as well as the previous question, there is little direct discussion to be found among scholars. This is perhaps due to the fact that many scholars tend to deal with the metaphysics and aesthetics of Schopenhauer's Ideas, oftentimes to the neglect of their systematic epistemological function. Douglas McDermid thus rightly points out the fact that: "Despite an encouraging revival of scholarly interest in Schopenhauer, his epistemology has yet to attract the sort of searching critical scrutiny that his metaphysics, aesthetics, and moral philosophy have all received in recent years." (McDermid 2002, p. 209) To offer but one further illustration of this point, regarding Schopenhauer's significant criticism of the synthetic method of geometry (cf. *W1*, §15; *W2* §13; *PSR*, §39), I have been able to locate only *one* article dealing with this topic directly (Radbruch 1988), despite the fact that it is of such *crucial* importance to the manner in which he methodologically accounts for the nature of the Ideas themselves. My own article on the subject, "The Euclidean Mousetrap: Schopenhauer's Criticism of the Synthetic Method in Geometry", to be published in the Journal of Idealistic Studies, coupled with this dissertation, is an attempt to ameliorate this rather unfortunate fact.

Schopenhauer believed that both Plato and Kant confused the nature and difference between the concept (*Begriff*) and the Idea (*Idee*), as well as concept and intuition (*Anschauung*) respectively. In his magnum opus, *The World as Will and Representation* (*WWR*), he notes that although: "Idea and concept have something in common (*Obgleich Idee und Begriff etwas Gemeinsames haben*)", they are yet quite distinct. He then goes on to state that:

> I certainly do not mean to assert that Plato grasped this difference clearly (*diesen Unterschied rein aufgefaßt habe*); indeed many of his examples of Ideas and his discussions of them are applicable only to concepts. (*W1*, p. 233)

From a different perspective, he reiterates a similar criticism with respect to Kant, stating that he neglects to account for empirical perception, and really: "nowhere clearly distinguished knowledge of perception (*anschauliche*) from abstract knowledge (*abstrakte Erkenntniß*)." (*W1*, p. 430) According to the former we obtain *intuitive* knowledge of the world, whereas according to the latter, we abstract and conceptualize it. Had Kant properly distinguished these two kinds of knowledge, he may well have avoided any subsequent confusion regarding these, and further recognized that the true and really only viable path beyond speculative philosophy is through the *will in nature*, on the basis of which the Platonic Ideas are discovered through perception. Kant's own error here is thus linked to his inheritance of a philosophical tradition grounded in the confusion of these various kinds of knowledge available for human thought and thinking. As Schopenhauer indicates: "Since scholasticism, really in fact since Plato and Aristotle, philosophy has been for the most part a *continued misuse of universal concepts* (*fortgesetzter Missbrauch allgemeiner Begriffe*)". (*W2*, pp. 39-40) Hence, the tradition never

completely saw the distinction between such concepts and intuitions, and subsequently between intuitions and the Ideas themselves.

The heart of the problem then and the focal point of Schopenhauer's criticism, is really the fact that both philosophers, and to a large extent the tradition which follows from them, tend to emphasize indirect, abstract, and conceptual knowledge (through reason or *Vernunft*) either to the neglect or even explicit rejection of direct, intuitive, aesthetic, and indeed *perceptual* knowledge (through understanding or *Verstand*), obtained on the basis of empirical experience.

Plato was really the first (cf., the *Republic*, *Phaedo*, *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Timaeus*) to divide the world into two distinct parts, which he referred to as the visible (ὁ τόπος ὁράτος) and intelligible (ὁ τόπος νοητός) realms respectively. He further gave priority of *being* to the latter, thereby reducing the former to a subsidiary and relative *becoming* on the basis of it. To this extent, Plato paves the way for an Idealism wherein reason or intelligibility become primary, for now the world as we see it is reduced to a semblant appearance (φαινόμενον), i.e., an imitation (μίμησις) and likeness (εἰκών) based upon the higher intelligible and quite *imperceptible* realm.

Some two millennia after Plato, Kant would follow with transcendental Idealism. Although the results which he would arrive at were certainly distinct from those found in Plato, akin to his predecessor, Kant also unwittingly gives primacy to the intelligible over the perceptible, inasmuch as the entire edifice of his philosophy subsists in a consideration of *indirect* and reflected knowledge through the abstractions of reason. So although Schopenhauer will eventually attempt to mediate the thought of these two masters of the Idea and of Idealism, one of the major differences now becomes the fact that he, in antithesis to them, gives primacy to the more primordial and inner movements of appetite, desire, volition—the Will, as thing-in-itself (*das Ding an sich*). Consequently, what we refer to as thought, thinking, consciousness, mind, reason,

intelligence, etc., are all now rendered subsidiary to this will, are in fact manifestations on the basis of it.[6]

The Will lies immanent to nature, and the nature which we 'see' is nothing more than an illusion, i.e., a transcendental reality cast upon the world by the inner cognitive forms of empirical perception inherent to the subject. In order to obtain true knowledge of the world (which for Schopenhauer means knowledge of the thing-in-itself as will—the metaphysical ground of being), it is necessary to peer through the veil of Maya, to gaze into the depths of perception in the attempt to discern its true content.[7] In doing so, we discover the Platonic Ideas which arise immanently through the will and yet transcendent to phenomena. In effect, the Ideas are *perceptible*.

Understanding how this is the case, requires deciphering precisely what Schopenhauer means by perceptible as *anschaulich*. Certainly, one cannot apply it with the same meaning equally for both Plato and Schopenhauer. This is due to the fact that Schopenhauer's understanding of perception (*Anschauung*) holds specific *transcendental* undertones, as I have noted.[8] For Schopenhauer then, *what* I perceive is fundamentally linked to the *way* in which I perceive. My perception of a tree, of the 'Idea of a tree', and

[6] Günter Zöller notes that Schopenhauer's inversion (specific to the concept of the 'self') actually runs counter to the philosophical tradition as a whole, that is to say: "The basic disagreement between Schopenhauer and the philosophical tradition on the self concerns the standard identification of the self, as the core of the human being, with the intellect (understanding, reason) or the faculty of cognition. On Schopenhauer's account, the intellect is neither the sole nor necessarily the main factor of the self. In addition to the rational side or aspect of the self, Schopenhauer countenances an altogether different essential feature of the self, which he designates as *will*." (Zöller 2006, p. 18)

[7] Regarding this obvious reference to eastern thought, Kai Hammermeister states in his book, the German Aesthetic tradition that: "Schopenhauer also calls the multitude of representations by the name of *Maya*, the term that in Hindu philosophy signifies the veil of appearance behind which the truth of existence, namely, the oneness of all beings, is hidden. With this, he becomes one of the nineteenth-century philosophers who is most influenced (at least in his terminology) by the discovery of the *Upanishads* by the romantic generation". (Hammermeister 2002, p. 115)

[8] David Hamlyn further remarks that: "*Anschauung*, the word which is translated as intuition in Kant's case, sometimes tends to be translated as 'perception' in the case of Schopenhauer; this is fair enough to the extent that it brings out what is involved in perceptual representations, though it can introduce oddities in other contexts. It remains true that where knowledge is direct in Schopenhauer's philosophy, that knowledge does amount to a form of intuition, whatever other differences obtain." (Hamlyn 222, p. 50)

of spatial and temporal relations, although *methodologically* different, are yet tied together through their relation to the way in which I intuit the world in the first place. Schopenhauer thus brings together these various senses of the word into a singular meaning. Perceptible thus refers to the cognitive determination of my empirical experience of the world. As he states in the first volume to *Parerga and Paralipomena*:

> *Transcendental* is the philosophy that makes us aware of the fact that the first and essential laws of this world that are presented to us are rooted in our brain (*Gehirn*) and are therefore known *a priori*. It is called *transcendental* because it *goes beyond* the whole given phantasmagoria to the origin thereof.[9] (*PP1*, pp. 82-83)

So the world of empirical experience is simultaneously the world based upon our inner cognition of it. This necessarily means that anything which we come to know on the basis of this world, i.e., anything perceptible (*anschaulich*), is grounded first and foremost upon the *intuitive* forms of the subjective apparatus of cognition. Within a transcendental context then, the interpretation of Plato's Ideas as perceptible now starts to make some sense. Determining how it is that the Ideas may be understood as perceptible (*anschauliche*) within Plato's own thought (from Schopenhauer's perspective), would thus require identification of the inherent ambiguities and relationship between sense-perception (αἴσθησις) and the methodological interpretation of higher knowledge (e.g., διάνοια, νόησις) as such. Within this context,

[9] Of course, Kant would have never agreed with such a conception of 'transcendental', which largely depends upon Schopenhauer's interpretation of the nature of empirical perception (cf. Chapter 2). Thus F.C. White rightly points out that the epistemological foundations laid down in Schopenhauer's first work, *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, tend toward a strange kind of materialism, visibly: "Side by side with its fundamental assertion that the everyday world consists of representations, the *Fourfold Root*, contains a materialist theory of mind, asserting that the mind is identical with the brain." (White 2006, p. 65)

what is taken as 'perceptual' within Platonic thought, becomes intuitively grounded for Schopenhauer, and the lines of separation between the perceptual and the imperceptible, would mark the bridge between the intuitive and the conceptually abstract.

In the first chapter then, I deal with a number of those considerations initially pointed out above. I attempt to answer the question of whether or not Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Ideas as perceptible (*anschauliche*) finds consistent ground within the context of Platonic thought. In this sense, the first chapter involves a consideration of Platonic thought from the perspective of Schopenhauer's interpretive approach with respect to perception, as cognitively determined on the basis of transcendental Idealism. I argue that Schopenhauer's basic reading of Plato is as a kind of 'confused' rationalist, that is to say, for him, Plato sees the value of the intuitive (i.e., rational perplexity of sensual data, recollection on the basis of perception, the 'images' of mathematics, the 'unhypothetical', the 'sight' of the Good), but yet constantly emphasizes a logical approach in describing this knowledge.[10]

The inherent problem of course, according to Schopenhauer, is grounded upon Plato's initial confusion of concepts with Ideas. In fact, this entire dissertation, although revolving around the discussion of the 'perceptibility' of the ideas, is also fundamentally concerned with methodology. That is to say, Schopenhauer reads Plato *methodologically* as an (again confused) abstract rationalist, which although falling short of Plato's actual intentions, yet leaves a certain opening to a more Platonic path—through intuition.[11] So

[10] In fact, throughout this dissertation the reader will note the fact that Schopenhauer incessantly appropriates concepts from previous thinkers while interpreting them lightly and freely within the context of his own thought. There is then a certain eclecticism with respect to Schopenhauer's use of the philosophical tradition. Thus for example, Charles S. Taylor points out that: "In borrowing the term 'Idea' from Plato Schopenhauer does much the same as he does with Kant; he reconstructs Plato according to his own plan." (Taylor 1988, p. 49)

[11] That is why, for example, Schopenhauer's criticism of the method of synthesis in Euclidean geometry (cf. section 2.9) becomes such an interesting analogy. The method of synthesis applied by Euclid in the *Elements*, offers something of a mirror to the Platonic emphasis upon logical confirmation of our knowledge of Ideas, which are yet *already* known on an intuitive basis.

in spirit, Schopenhauer thinks Plato got things right. Methodologically, however, Plato is confused.

Despite this fact, as will be seen throughout this work, Schopenhauer actually (and unwittingly) posits what he oftentimes criticizes in Plato, that is, Ideas which yet *require* rational abstraction, and even an amalgamation of abstraction and intuition (which he criticizes in Kant). So in the end it is really Schopenhauer, and perhaps not Plato, who tends to confuse things. All of this will be thoroughly considered throughout this present work.

In the second chapter, I turn next to a consideration of the metaphysical, or more properly speaking, the epistemological foundations of Schopenhauer's thought. Despite the fact that Schopenhauer interprets the Ideas from the perspective of transcendental philosophy, he yet believed that the knowledge we obtain through these objects is metaphysical in a Platonic sense. Of course, the will is essential here since Schopenhauer argues that through it, we come to a knowledge of the thing-in-itself, and that on the basis of its objectivity, the Platonic Ideas arise. In consequence of this, through the Ideas, we also obtain metaphysical knowledge. How this is at all possible requires a study of Schopenhauer's theory of empirical perception, i.e., of his (1) interpretation of transcendental Idealism (and how this differs from Kant); of his (2) analysis of the will as thing-in-itself; of the (3) manner in which perceptually *intuitive* knowledge arises on the basis of representation (*Vorstellung*); and of the (4) distinction of this from *abstract* or conceptual knowledge. The final (5) point dealt with in this chapter is that of the limitations of conceptual knowledge, which thus paves the way to the Platonic Ideas.

Proceeding from there, in the third chapter of this work, I discuss Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Platonic Ideas. As will be seen, the Platonic Ideas have a consistent, though somewhat ambiguous, place within the context of Schopenhauer's thought as a

whole. This will be seen first of all in relation to the problem of accounting for the *plurality* of objects perceived within the representational world (as *mere* phenomena), which yet arise on the basis of what Schopenhauer characterizes as a *singular* will. Consequently, the Platonic Ideas serve as the necessary mediating bridge between the world of will and representation.

Within this chapter, I further discuss the important point that for Schopenhauer, although the Ideas offer a certain degree of metaphysical knowledge, this knowledge is yet limited, for stripped of the forms of space, time, and causality, the Ideas are still representations determined on the basis of the subject. In consequence of this, a *camera obscura* always stands between the world and the thing-in-itself—even at the level of the Ideas. This rather puzzling result will be further considered in the final chapter. Another point considered is the distinction between Ideas and concepts. In order to properly understand the Ideas, it is necessary to understand that which the Idea is not, properly speaking. Inasmuch as Schopenhauer criticizes Plato on this point, I there discuss the manner in which the views of these two philosophers differ.

Having distinguished Ideas and concepts, I turn to Schopenhauer's account of the perceptibility of the Ideas. The Ideas are discovered as perceptible inasmuch as they arise through representation in an *aesthetic* way. To this extent, I initially characterize the Ideas as 'aesthetic intuitions', although as will be pointed out in the last chapter, there is an apparent *abstract* character to the Ideas which Schopenhauer seems to indicate (though would, of course, expressly deny). Finally, I consider the relationship of the Ideas to both art and philosophy.

In the fourth chapter, a number of ambiguities regarding Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Ideas will be brought into full relief. In the first place, the most important question brought out within this dissertation is that regarding the precise *nature* of the Ideas themselves. Although Schopenhauer divides Ideas from both concepts and intuitions (further criticizing Plato and Kant), in accounting for their

perceptibility, he yet forges an entirely new kind of 'abstract-intuition'. The Ideas are found to have both intuitive as well as abstract dimensions, serving as universals inherent to particular things while yet being sensuously or rather, aesthetically perceptible. So in the end, a certain inconsistency regarding that which Schopenhauer criticizes and later affirms, reveals itself.

A further problem is discovered regarding Schopenhauer's attempt to mediate Idea and Idealism. In doing so, Schopenhauer must necessarily make use of two very distinct kinds of φαινόμενα within his thought, i.e., perceptible objects which take on the very paradoxical nature of being both semblances (in Plato's sense) and mere appearances (in Kant's sense). The problems inherent to this approach are there discussed.[12]

Finally, Schopenhauer's pessimism will here receive some level of discussion in light of the fact that it tends to lead him into the kind of abstract rationalism, which he decries in both Plato and Kant, as well as the German idealists. On the one hand, there is Schopenhauer's description of the contemplation of the Ideas (the methodology of art or genius) coupled with freedom from the will, in consequence of which the subject becomes a strange, somewhat paradoxically conceptualized object. Finally, and on the other hand, there are the deeper ambiguities brought out on the basis of Schopenhauer's final epiphany of human knowledge through the annihilation of the will. The consequence of this will be recognizable through the fact that the metaphysical

[12] William Desmond offers an initial indication of the nature of Schopenhauer's mediation of Plato and Kant, while pointing out the essential problem and difference: "Schopenhauer offers a peculiar melding of Kantian and Platonic factors: on one side, there is the legacy of a 'subjective idealism,' on the other side, that of a form of 'objective idealism' – since here the Platonic Idea is not just the objectification of the individual will but of the Will itself, considered as an ontological origin. Both Plato and Kant are philosophers in which the powers of *logos* or reason seem to reign supreme. Further what is original is also seen in the light of *logos* or reason. With Plato we make intelligible sense of being by reference to the Ideas, with Kant with reference to reason, whether theoretical reason in the complex synthesis constituting our scientific knowledge of phenomena, or practical reason in its autonomous determination of the moral law, or reason in its regulative projection of Ideas with respect to anticipated totality." (Desmond 2009, p. 4)

basis of Schopenhauer's thought as a whole and through the will itself, becomes quite inadequate, conceptualized, and even nominalistic.

CHAPTER 1

Plato and the Primacy of Intellect

1.1. Platonic rationalism

> [I] confess that, next to the impression of the world of perception, I owe what is best in my own development to the impression made by Kant's works, the sacred writings of the Hindus, and Plato.[13] (*W1*, p. 417, S. 533)

In the above quoted passage from Arthur Schopenhauer's, *The World as Will and Representation*, it is quite interesting to note that he mentions only *three* influences upon his thought which reverberate around a singular theme—the world of perception. Schopenhauer believed that Plato was the first within the western philosophical tradition to understand the *true* character of the perceptible world: that it subsists essentially in a state of generation and destruction or simply becoming; that what we perceive through it are nothing more than mere copies and imitations of something other to it; and last, that its being is at best described as 'relative' to that something. Much later, Kant would develop upon Plato's initial insight, revealing the *clearer* truth that the 'way' we perceive the world is fundamentally dependent upon 'how' we perceive it. This realm of becoming is in actuality a world of appearances determined *a priori* by human cognition which both colors what we see, while simultaneously casting a shadow over the true reality of that which we cannot see. Schopenhauer's own philosophical development would then follow directly upon these views: for him, the

[13] "[I]ch bekenne, das Beste meiner eigenen Entwicklung, nächst dem Eindrucke der anschaulichen Welt, sowohl dem der Werke Kants, als dem der heiligen Schriften der Hindu und dem Platon zu verdanken."

inner nature of what we cannot see is fundamentally will. Finally, in Hindu philosophy, Schopenhauer found confirmation of these views within a tradition having a deep historical reach and encompassing the far greater proportion of humanity.[14]

Such revealing confessions as the above, are often hard to come by within the history of philosophy. Usually one is left to guess at the teachers and notions which helped to form the minds of the masters. Other times, one is left to surmise from indirect evidence and testimony. So Plato confesses a similar debt in his dialogues, and Aristotle in his criticisms, albeit indirectly. Arthur Schopenhauer's above admission, however, is as direct as it gets, and yet he speaks not merely of influence, but even more of impression (*dem Eindrucke*). For him philosophy is akin to science, and this means that it involves systematic and comprehensive development throughout history of the expression of truths, whereby each generation, standing upon the shoulders of the previous, is able to more clearly express the same truths understood before only

[14] In general I will omit the discussion of Hindu philosophy within this present research for the stated reason that it represented more a *confirmation* of Schopenhauer's philosophy than an influence. Schopenhauer himself states: "If I wished to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I should have to concede to Buddhism the pre-eminence over the others. In any case, it must be a pleasure to me to see my doctrine in such close agreement with a religion that the majority of men on earth hold as their own, for this numbers far more followers than any other. And this agreement must be yet the more pleasing to me, inasmuch as in my philosophizing I have certainly not been under its influence (*nicht unter ihrem Einfluß gestanden habe*). For up till 1818, when my work appeared, there were to be found in Europe only a very few accounts of Buddhism, and those extremely incomplete and inadequate, confined almost entirely to a few essays in the earlier volumes of the *Asiatic Researches*, and principally concerned with the Buddhism of the Burmese." (*W2*, p. 169) This view is further confirmed by Brian Magee: "What happened is that, working within the central tradition of Western philosophy – before all else continuing and completing, as he believed, the work of Kant – he arrived at positions which *he then almost immediately discovered* were similar to some of the doctrines central to Hinduism and Buddhism. The discovery came as a revelation, and throughout his subsequent writings he made play with the parallels. But the relationship is not one of influence." (Magee 1983, p. 15) It should, however, be noted that some scholars disagree with this view. For example, Moira Nicholls points out that Schopenhauer's understanding of the knowable character of the thing-in-itself seems to undergo a change as a result of the influence of Hindu and Buddhist thought: "For in Schopenhauer's later works, while he still asserts that in ordinary introspective consciousness we have direct awareness of the will as thing-in-itself, there are also passages in which he withdraws from this claim. Instead he maintains that ordinary introspective consciousness yields knowledge of phenomena alone, and only mystics and those who have denied the will are aware of reality stripped of its phenomenal forms." (Nicholls 2006, p. 196)

obscurely. A fundamental point to be understood from the above considerations is then the fact that Schopenhauer consider his own work as both a continuation of his predecessors as well as a correction and clarification of those truths only half-stated or cached in ambiguities.[15]

I have entitled this chapter "Plato and the Primacy of the Intellect" with an express purpose in mind. This serves to highlight both the relationship as well as distinction between Plato and Schopenhauer from the context of the latter's interpretation. Simply put, Plato gives primacy to 'intellect', loosely interpreted within the context of his division of the world into a visible and intelligible realm, whereby priority of being is accorded to the latter over the former. On the other hand, for Schopenhauer the visible world is seen as the foundation through which a more primordial, irrational, unconscious source gives rise to mind, or reason, or intellect, or whichever term best expresses the innermost nature of consciousness which gives rise to knowledge of the world.[16] As Schopenhauer himself states in his essay, *On the Will in Nature*:

> For, up to my time…*will* and *intellect* (*Wille und Erkenntnis*) had been regarded as absolutely inseparable, nay, the will was looked upon as a mere operation (*bloße Operation*) of the intellect, that presumptive basis of all that is spiritual. Accordingly wherever the will acted, knowledge must have been its guide… (WN, p. 35-36)

[15] Thus William Desmond in his work, *Art, Origins, Otherness: Between Philosophy and Art*, states that Schopenhauer's acknowledgement of: "his profound debt to Kant (and Plato, also)", is certainly "not without some correction and criticism." (Desmond 2003, p. 134) Indeed, Schopenhauer manifestly attempts to bring together, that is, to merge the Platonic Ideas with Kant's transcendental Idealism.

[16] Thus Ian Hammermeister states that: "By making the body the privileged site of cognition, Schopenhauer reverses the hierarchy of body and intellect that had characterized the Western philosophical tradition…reverses the traditional metaphysical hierarchy of the West in which reason took first place and will, understood as desire, was secondary." (Hammermeister 2002, pp. 114-115)

According to Schopenhauer then, not only does Plato give precedence to the *wrong* metaphysical ground (intellect instead of will), but also consequent to this, he believed that Plato and the tradition which follows after him (up even into Kant) are led into confusion regarding the nature and knowledge of that which accords to the two separate faculties of reason (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*), regarding which, Schopenhauer states:

> Therefore, although what is essential to reason (τὸ λόγικον, ἡ φρόνησις, *ratio, raison, Vernunft*) was, on the whole and in general, rightly recognized by all the philosophers of all ages, though not defined sharply enough or reduced to a point, yet, on the other hand, it was not so clear to them what the *understanding* (νοῦς, διάνοια, *intellectus, esprit, intellect, Verstand*) is. (*W1*, pp. 521-522)

The importance of highlighting the difference between Plato and Schopenhauer's quite distinct interpretations of the metaphysical ground of being, is that it will help to clear the way for an understanding of Schopenhauer's rather puzzling remark that the Platonic Ideas are perceptible (*anschauliche*). For although Plato will offer numerous accounts within his dialogues which would seem to testify against this view, Schopenhauer yet argues that even *for* Plato himself, the Ideas were considered perceptible. Making sense of this seeming contradiction is then important if any consideration of Schopenhauer's Ideas are to be made. For indeed, as a preliminary to the question of *how* the Ideas become perceptible within Schopenhauer's thought, it is first of all important to consider *why* it is that Schopenhauer should consider Plato as having argued similarly, despite what seems obvious evidence to the contrary.

For initial insight into the matter, to be thoroughly discussed in this chapter and the implicit results felt throughout subsequent chapters, it will be seen that for

Schopenhauer, Plato's essential error, as I have noted in the introduction, resulted from a confusion of concepts with Ideas. For Schopenhauer, Plato first of all fails to see (due to no fault of his own) that the physical world is constituted by our transcendental activity, and in rightly identifying the 'relativity' of its being, he thus *rejects* the content of (intuitive) knowledge possible through it. Plato thereby rejects knowledge of the Idea, since for Schopenhauer these metaphysical entities are understood as arising *through* the visible world, that is, through perception. In consequence of this, Plato turns to the one thing that is left to him, that is, to abstractions of the world on the basis of reason, and hence to concepts (*Begriffe*). In this sense, Plato will attempt to obtain the Ideas abstractly and hence 'imperceptibly', whereas the Ideas can really only be intuited on the basis of perception.[17]

Reaching the limits of the concept, Plato then makes an *ascent* beyond the concept itself and thereby attains (or perhaps re-attains) the Idea through an intuition. In effect, for Schopenhauer, Plato is actually making a *descent* from abstract knowledge back into the Idea arrived at intuitively on the basis of perception. So in this sense, Schopenhauer's Ideas are really what Plato refers to in his account within the sixth book of the *Republic* and the ascent to the 'unhypothetical' principle lying at the end of the fourth section of the divided line.[18]

All of this will be thoroughly discussed in what follows. At present and in consideration of the above points, I turn now to a number of brief introductory remarks

[17] Interestingly, the view discussed here is further confirmed on the basis of Schopenhauer's account of the nature of philosophy, which indeed follows such a path from Idea into concept. (cf. section 3.9)

[18] The influence of Schopenhauer's epistemological perspective (perhaps through Nietzsche) can be seen in a number of the more modern phenomenologists. For example, Gadamer and Heidegger both seem to follow this sense of knowledge as grounded within the intuitive 'seeing' of things as opposed to the rational abstracting of this. Thus, Dorothea Frede points out for Heidegger that: "the modes of being of the occurrent, the ready-to-hand, being-with, and being-oneself do not seem to form a meaningful whole. Nor do they form a unity if one looks at the corresponding kinds of understanding in which they are grounded: theoretical understanding, practical concern, solicitude, and the many ways of comportment towards one's own self. All these modes of comportment are, as Heidegger explains, different kinds of '-sights,' different kinds of 'enlightenment' about the world." (Frede 1993, p. 63)

with regards to the chapter theme of Plato and the primacy of intellect, which should help to focus this discussion. In light of this, an interesting point to start with is the relationship and influence of the early Greek 'physicists' upon the development of Plato's peculiar form of rationalism.

The ancient Greek physicists are often hailed as the impetus around which western thinking departs. Indeed, one of the main distinctions often made between ancient 'primitive' civilizations and those more advanced, is the manner in which each handles and interprets the various natural phenomena inherent to the world around them. Of course, there isn't any real defining line which one might use to precisely separate the one from the other, however, one helpful distinction is that between the use of religious and poetic myth (μῦθος) or alternatively rational explanation (λόγος), for the interpretation of things. To be more precise, among the ancient Greek physicists, rational explanation through *logos* was often coupled with an interest in nature (φύσις) and the causes inherent to it. Of course, even here it is difficult to obtain a sharp delineation, for among later thinkers such as Plato, specific mythological elements often appear within his dialogues as well.[19] Despite this fact, as early as Thales (c. 600 BCE), this newer rational, or more specifically 'scientific' tendency, is seen to emerge.[20]

[19] A.A. Long points out in his article, "The Scope of Early Greek Philosophy", that: "Neither Parmenides nor Empedocles (nor Plato, for that matter) disavows all use of mythology, and theology is an important element in the thinking of Xenophanes and Heraclitus". (Long 1999, p. 9) Despite this fact, rational explanation is certainly quite essential to Plato, and even finds expression in Heraclitus, (c. 500 BCE) , for example: "It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word (τοῦ λόγου), and to confess that all things are one". (translation, Burnet 2005) A.A. Long goes on to point out that: "Heraclitus is quite explicit about the kind of account he intends to give: it is to be an account that 'explains' and 'distinguishes' each thing. Trading on the multiple meanings of the word *logos* (discourse, account, reckoning, measure), he comes as close as the current resources of his language allow, to saying that he will give a 'rational' and systematic account of all things." (Long 1999, p. 13)

[20] Sarah Broadie further spells out this early tension within Greek thought in her excellent article *Rational Theology*, stating that: "there can be no doubt that the identity at some level of description between divine reality and the subject matter of natural science shaped the course of early Greek philosophy in fundamental ways." (Broadie 1999, p. 206)

Regarding the nature and development of this division, Glenn Most in his article on, "The Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy", states that:

> As far as we know, Aristotle was the first author to distinguish terminologically between what he called *mythologoi* and *theologoi* on the one hand and *physikoi* or *physiologoi* on the other. On his view, the former group were really storytellers, poets narrating myths about heroes and gods, and any views about the nature of the world that might be extracted from their works were incidental, obscure, and philosophically uninteresting; the latter group, beginning with Thales, were engaged in basically the same kind of investigation of the physical world as Aristotle himself was and, even though their theories were, unsurprisingly, deficient in comparison with his own, nonetheless they were philosophically serious...[21] (Most 1999, pp. 332-333)

It is first of all worth noting that in the above description, Aristotle is said to distinguish essentially between mythology and theology (*mythologoi*, *theologoi*) and what might appropriately be termed physics (*physikoi*, *physiologoi*). This is an important point, since among the early Greek physicists, as I have noted, rational explanation is generally defined within the context of an emphasis upon empirical phenomena, and thus the account of the causal sources at work within nature (hence the term *physio-logos*).[22]

[21] Regarding this, Aristotle states in his *Poetics* that: "Even if a theory of medicine or physical philosophy be put forth in a metrical form, it is usual to describe the writer in this way; Homer and Empedocles, however, have really nothing in common apart from metre; so that, if the one is to be called a poet, the other should be termed a physicist rather than a poet." (1147b17-20)

[22] A.A. Long suggests of early Greek logos, that it actually contained five senses: "Giving an account of all things that is (1) explanatory and systematic, (2) coherent and argumentative, (3) transformative, (4) educationally provocative, and (5) critical and unconventional – with such a formulation we can encompass the general project of early Greek philosophy without anachronism and with respect for its diversities of emphasis, method, and specific content." (Long 1999, p. 13) Edward Hussy also further states of *logos* that: "It basically meant 'what is said,' that is, 'word' or 'story'; however, even in ordinary

Among later philosophers such as Socrates, the real relevance and influence of the early Greek physicists is seen then, not so much in terms of their interest in nature, but rather in the fact that they attempt through their studies to give a rational account or explanation (λόγος) of things. With Socrates, an essential difference arises which distinguishes him from these early thinkers. There is an explicit change of tendency. Socrates now turns *away* from nature and inward in exploration of more *intelligible* matters relating to mind (νοῦς), and more specifically, to ethical matters of the soul (ψυχή). Thus in the *Phaedo*, Socrates (or perhaps Plato) there narrates this change of heart, as it were, stating that:

> When I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science (περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν), for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it exists. (*Phaedo* 96ab)

He would soon, however, become disillusioned with such attempts to explain nature, coming to the conclusion that these investigations made him even more 'blinded' to knowledge than he was before. Fortunately, he encountered a philosopher who changed his entire outlook on the world, as he goes on to state:

> One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind (νοῦς) that directs and is the cause of

Greek speech it had rich ramifications of meaning. It had acquired the secondary senses of 'mathematical ratio,' and more generally 'proportion,' 'measure' or 'calculation'; in a further extension from these senses, it appears by around the time of Heraclitus in compounds with the sense of 'right reckoning,' or 'reasonable proportion'." (Hussy 1999, p. 91)

everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all.[23] (97c)

This new orientation is identifiable in terms of Socrates' characteristic method of cross-examination or *elenchus* (ἔλεγχος), wherein a 'definition' (λόγος) for such ethical matters as 'justice' and 'wisdom' is sought. The larger change is that whereas the early Greek physicists sought a rational account of the causes inherent to specifically physical and empirical phenomena, Socrates now, continuing the tradition of the rational account, begins to look beyond physics into matters pertaining to the intelligible and eternal soul.[24]

With the advent of Platonic philosophy, the stage had already been set through Socrates for emphasis upon rational explanation accompanied by a significant de-emphasis upon empirical interest and observation.[25] Plato would, however, take matters

[23] A.E. Taylor further explains: "The disappointment, Socrates says, confirmed his opinion that he was 'no good' (ἀφυὴς ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα) at natural science, and must try to find some way out of his 'universal doubt' by his own mother-wit, without trusting to 'men of science' each of whom only seemed to be able to prove one thing that all the others were wrong. His description of the 'new method' reveals it to us at once as that which is characteristic of mathematics. It is a method of considering 'things' by investigating the λόγοι or 'propositions' we make about them. Its fundamental characteristic is that it is deductive. You start with the 'postulate' or undemonstrated principle, which you think most satisfactory and proceed to draw out its consequences or 'implications' (συμβαίνοντα), provisionally putting the consequences down as 'true,' and any propositions which conflict with the postulate as false (100a)." (Taylor 2003, p. 201) It is to be noted that Taylor here translates the Greek ὑποθέσις incorrectly as 'postulate', although he understands and interprets this correctly as 'hypothesis'. Postulates and hypotheses, although similar, are yet quite distinct. (cf. Heath 1956, pp. 117-123)

[24] So although having a rationalistic inclination, it is to be noted that Socrates had always the deeper ethical dimensions at heart. Thus Paul More notes that: "We may be certain that beneath the irony of Socrates, deeper than his questioning of popular phrases and his search for precision of definition, lay a power of very positive teaching and a direct appeal to the conscience, in his own way and at his own time, which smote the heart even of such a worldling as Alcibiades to the quick, and shall never cease to vibrate in the hearts of living men." (More 1917, p. 11) In light oft his, More goes on to note that: "The efforts of various scholars to escape the Socratic Paradox by representing him on the one hand as a pure rationalist or on the other hand as a pure mystic are equally untenable." (ibid., p. 12)

[25] Thus Aristotle remarks in the *Metaphysics* that Plato: "having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in

one step further than his teacher, eschewing to a certain degree interest in *specifically* ethical matters, and turning toward more metaphysical considerations as they pertain directly to a generalized intelligibility (νοῦς). Of course, Plato still retains a keen interest in offering an account (λόγος) of such intelligible matters. The specific elements of consideration become, however, unquestionably determined on a basis which includes the *deliberate* neglect of the physical world, which is seen as nothing more than a pit stop, as it were, or gateway for erotic desire (ἔρως) which points toward and even aids the soul in its quick ride along the racetrack of the relativity of the physical and perceptible world into the eternal being of the imperceptible and intelligible.

Early Greek thought with its emphasis upon nature (φύσις) coupled with rational explanation, undergoes a change of tendency with the Socratic interest in offering definitions for soul (ψυχή) and its virtues, and in turn, this tendency transforms into a characteristically distinct form of Platonic rationalism wherein intelligibility (νοῦς) coupled with rational explanation (λόγος) is henceforth emphasized.[26] This is then, the

these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind—for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing." (987b1-7)

[26] Schopenhauer's interpretation of Plato as a kind of abstract rationalist, as I here describe it, is succinctly described in the first book to his *Parerga and Paralipomena*. Here states that: "In Plato we find the origin of a certain false dianology that is put forward with a secret metaphysical intention, namely for the purpose of a rational psychology of a doctrine of immortality attaching thereto. It afterwards proved itself to be a deceptive doctrine of the toughest vitality, for it prolonged its existence throughout the whole of ancient, mediaeval, and modern philosophy, until Kant, the crusher of everything, finally knocked it on the head. The doctrine, here referred to is that rationalism of the theory of knowledge, with a metaphysical ultimate aim. It may briefly be summarized as follows. What knows in us is an immaterial substance, fundamentally different from the body and called soul; the body, on the other hand, is an obstacle to knowledge. Hence all knowledge brought about through the senses is deceptive; the only true, accurate, and sure knowledge, on the other hand, is that which is free and removed from all sensibility (thus from all intuitive perception), consequently *pure thought*, i.e. an operation exclusively with abstract concepts." (*PP1*, p. 43) Of course, it is worth noting that akin to Socrates, Plato isn't strictly speaking an abstract rationalist, as Schopenhauer's interpretation would seem to imply. There are, rather, deep ethical underpinnings throughout his work, the least of which being the Forms or Ideas. So for example, John M. Cooper states that: "Plato's *Republic* theory can be seen as a stage in the progression from Socratic rationalism to the Aristotelian theory that moral virtue is an interfusion of reason and desire—reason having the truth about the ends of life and how to achieve them, and desire embodying these truths so

essential perspective from which Schopenhauer both understands and interprets Plato and the Ideas. According to Schopenhauer, Plato gives *primacy to mind*, intelligibility, and imperceptibility, whereas in fact, what he should have recognized from the start is that mind and visible reality are but subsidiary manifestations on the basis of the more fundamental metaphysical ground of the will. Despite this fact, Schopenhauer also considers Plato as having himself argued for the 'perceptibility' of the Ideas. There is then a specific tension identifiable within Platonic thought and from Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective, between reason and understanding, the perceptible and the imperceptible.

1.2. Plato's rejection of intuitively perceptual knowledge

The discussion from the previous section helps to highlight the fact that one of the more significant differences between the philosophy of Plato and Schopenhauer (and Kant as well) is the manner in which each philosopher deals with knowledge through and on the basis of sense-perception or simply perception (αἰσθησις and *Anschauung*).[27] For it

that the person habitually wants just the things that reason says are worth pursuing." (Cooper 1998, p. 28) Finally, A. Cook points out that: "Οὐσία then, wherever it is found, will be endowed with two qualities which are ἐναντιώτατα ἀλλήλοις, namely: (i) with στάσις, in which case we have νοῦς; (ii) with κίνησις, in which case we have ζωὴ and ψυχή…we note that the *Parmenides* dealt with only one side of the truth. It regarded οὐσία as the subject and object of νόησις, without taking into account any lower intellectual faculty, such as that of γνῶσις or λογισμός. The *Sophist* warns us against persisting in such neglect. It bids us to observe that the supreme νοῦς of the *Philebus* is not only a νοῦς, but also a νοητὸν ζῶον—and that the ideal νοήματα of the Parmenides are not only νοήματα, but also νοητὰ ζῶα—inasmuch as every νοῦς, whether supreme or subordinate, is forced by the necessary nature of its own οὐσία to pass out of its tranquil ἀπάθεία into the ποιήματα and παθήματα of animation. Thus by emphasizing the fact that, *wherever* pure thought is found, there will its shadow the lower mental phase be found also". (Cook 1895, pp. 20-23)

[27] I deliberately intermingle the two very distinct meanings of *aesthesis* and *Anschauung* in order to point out the fact that we are dealing with Schopenhauer's interpretation of the matter. From this context, *aesthesis* as sense-perception, is criticized from the context of being cognitively determined by the forms of the subject. When Plato rejects perceptual knowledge, he thereby rejects the intuitive basis of knowledge. Intuition (*Intuition*, *Anschauung*) and the perceptual world (*der anschaulichen Welt*) are integrally related within Schopenhauer's thought, as will be seen in the second chapter.

is in fact Plato's *rejection* of the intuitively grounded knowledge obtainable through perception which leads to the subsequent decision that the highest kinds of knowledge must be imperceptible, rational, intelligible, etc. On the other hand, as a result of Schopenhauer's *emphasis* upon perception as the ground of knowledge, the conclusion is arrived at (in contradistinction to Plato) that what is most fundamental to the senses, including feeling, desire, and volition, makes up the innermost kernel of reality; and that intelligence, reason, logical explanation, etc., are but secondary and subsidiary manifestations on the basis of (as well as in service to) this more primordial ground.

Each philosopher follows then a separate path regarding knowledge, and this is traceable up into knowledge of the Ideas, which are thereby shaded by this earlier decision. Plato's Ideas are described as imperceptible but yet have an intuitive basis, which I hope to reveal within this chapter. On the other hand, for Schopenhauer, 'intuition' implies understanding (i.e., νοῦς, διάνοια, *intellectus, esprit, intellect, Verstand*), which further implies perceptibility. This will serve then as the essential perspective from which Schopenhauer's interpretation of the perceptibility of the Ideas finds some ground for confirmation. Understanding this important distinction requires first (1) a consideration of the grounds for Plato's denial of knowledge on the basis of sense-perception, (2) of the rather precarious position which this gives to mathematics and the demonstration of its objects, and (3) of how the Ideas stand to resolve the 'problem' of knowledge in a rational manner, while yet appealing to more intuitive foundations. This present section and the two sections which follow (sections 1.2-1.4) deal generally with the first point. Sections 1.5-1.7 deal with the second point. Finally, sections 1.8-1.9 deal with the third point.

Regarding the first point, the discussion of the problem of knowledge on the basis of perception is found foremost within Plato's *Theaetetus*. Within this dialogue, Plato there argues that on the basis of the senses, it is simply impossible to obtain any genuine and lasting knowledge of things. The stated conclusion follows that if

knowledge is to be obtained at all, then we must look for it *beyond* the empirical and perceptible world. True knowledge is imperceptible.

Turning to the dialogue itself then, it begins with a discussion of the specific problem of identifying the nature of knowledge, i.e.: What is knowledge? One of the first views proposed is then the notion that: "knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is nothing other than perception (αἰσθησις)". (151e) This is ascribed to Protagoras and his statement that man is: "the measure of all things".[28] According to this view, a cold wind is only so inasmuch as it appears (φαίνεται) cold, and such an appearing is said to be nothing other than its perception (αἰσθανέσαί ἐστιν). Appearing is then accorded to the essential nature of the perceptual, the being of which is further said to subsist in a state of flux, that is, of change and constant transition. Plato further reveals that the above considered view has been held by most of the wise men of the past (generally the physicists, with of course the exception of Parmenides), including Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and is even indicated in Homer who states that all things are the offspring of flux and motion.[29]

Plato then goes on (156b-157a) to describe the nature of perception according to this view. Perception is said to involve the mutual interaction of two kinds of component motions (τὸ κίνησις): that of the active (δύναμιν) and the passive (πάσχειν). The first is understood as that motion which *acts* upon the senses. It is the object of perception (τὸ αἰσθητόν) itself, i.e. the heat-bearing qualities of fire, the sound-bearing qualities of the sea, the color and scent-bearing qualities of a rose. The passive motion on the other hand involves the receptive apparatus of the senses of the body, i.e. the physical eyes, ears, nose, etc. Finally, the combination of these motions is precisely what yields an actual perception: a sight, a sound, a smell. For example, through the *active* motion of the heat-bearing qualities of fire taken together with the passive motion of the physical

[28] «πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον»
[29] «πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως» (*Iliad*, xiv. 302)

sense of touch, this interaction yields the perception referred to as 'heat' or 'warmth'. This further explains how, for two different persons, the same thing can be perceived differently (i.e., a cold wind for one feels warm to another); for although the perceived itself remains the same (fire is fire), its perception among different people can likely differ. Accordingly, man becomes the measure of all things. Indeed, but can that which is so measured, be considered knowledge?[30]

The main criticism (182d-183c) which Plato states for this Protagorean theory of perception is that inasmuch as all these actual 'perceptions' of things subsist in a state of flux and motion, to that extent does knowledge become impossible. The inherent notion behind this criticism is the fact that knowledge must therefore be more permanent and enduring than what is given through or on the basis of the senses. If knowledge is to exist at all, then it cannot reside within the manifold flux of the senses. Consequently, it is necessary to look *beyond* empirical and perceptible being for knowledge, to some other, possibly higher existent reality.

I will avoid the other later proposals offered for knowledge within the *Theaetetus*, since they are inconsequent to the present discussion. What is most important to note is that after rejecting knowledge through the senses, Plato states that in the final analysis, something like a single Idea (ἰδέα) or soul (ψυχή) must be identified wherein all these perceptions of the empirical world are said to converge (συντείνει), and through which, we are finally able to actually: "perceive all that which is perceptible".[31] (184d) Plato is

[30] Regarding Plato's rejection of knowledge through perception, Elizabeth Laidlaw-Johnson notes in her article, "Plato's Epistemology", that: "Plato reveals much about the nature of knowledge in his refutations of the thesis that knowledge is perception. We discover that to apprehend perceptual belief or knowledge one needs objects common to more than one sense and that the difference between the subject of true belief and the subject of knowledge is that one who knows apprehends the reason for the truth of what he knows. This apprehension requires one to apprehend being. We also discover that perception is not sufficient for knowledge." (Laidlaw-Johnson 1996, p. 84)

[31] «αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά » Plato's use of this term, of perceptions as converging within us, would seem to indicate a tentative acceptance of the earlier Protagorean theory of perception, with however the later additions of the intelligible world and the soul as the seat of perception. Gregory Vlastos notes that Plato's epistemological doctrine essentially: "…restricts knowledge to cognitive encounters with immaterial, supersensible, eternal objects, entailing that even a true physical theory could not qualify as

thus distinguishing between the mere *sensation of things* within the bodily sense-organs and the point wherein these sensations converge and are *perceived* within the soul itself. Without the soul as the focal point, perceptions are said to become simply appearances (φαινόμενα) which converge within us (ἐν ἡμῖν) as though within wooden horses (ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις). In other words, unless there is something wherein these appearances converge and unite, the content of perception is empty, and all knowing must thereby cascade into the flux of becoming. From this, Plato concludes that: "knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is to be found not in the experiences (ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν) but in the process of reasoning (ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ) about them". (186d)

Plato's conclusion here is then quite significant from the context of the larger discussion. Knowledge through perception is rejected in favor of the *process of reasoning* about such knowledge, that is, about our *experiences*. But what are such experiences? What does such knowledge amount to? Doesn't our knowledge on the basis of empirical perception account for the by far richer, more powerful and virulent side of what we consider experience? Does it not reveal feeling and desire, texture, color, shape, change, and a multitude of other variances and differences? Even more, do we not see beauty among its shapes, not hear beautiful sounds echoing within the vast chasm of the world? This is then Schopenhauer's objection. Plato has rejected what is essentially most real to the world, for he has rejected perception and experience in favor of reasons and processes. In effect, for Schopenhauer, Plato has rejected the intuitive in favor of that which is abstracted on the basis of the intuitive. Plato is therefore arguing that secondhand, reflected things, are the truly real.

What we see here is then a tendency in Plato, to reject a more intuitive and empirical approach to knowledge (as seen in Schopenhauer) in place of a rational, logical path. In fact, this leads Plato into a very specific, important, and quite famous

knowledge, but only as true belief, since what physics purports to describe and explain is material, sensible, flux." (Vlastos 1975, p. 94)

problem. If I cannot see something, then how do I know if or when it is there? This is of course Meno's paradox, stated within the dialogue which bears his name, that is: "How can we seek what we do not know?" (*Meno*, 82) Plato has rejected perceptual knowledge and knowledge through experience. He therefore leaves us without a stepping stone, as it were, to ascend to any other principle. If knowledge must lies beyond the perceptible, as Plato suggests, then how do we obtain it, for evidently, it cannot be seen?

Plato responds to this in two separate but related ways. On the one hand, certain sense-perceptions induce a kind of rational perplexity (ἀπορία) within the soul, thereby *inspiring* further inquiry into the ground of this perplexity. On the other hand, rational perplexity can also *stir* recollection (ἀνάμνησις) within the soul, of knowledge once known (perhaps in a previous lifetime), but now forgotten. What is then interesting about these two separate, though obviously related paths to knowledge, is that although both lead to rational inquiry, they are each initiated upon perception as the ground from which such an interrogation becomes possible at all. In consequence of this, although Plato certainly rejects knowledge through perception, he yet recognizes the relationship or even dependence of higher knowledge upon a perceptual, more 'intuitive' ground.

1.3. From intuitive perception to rational perplexity

If knowledge doesn't arise through perception, then where is it to be found? Plato's response to this is through the hypothesis of an imperceptible intelligible world lying beyond experience. But precisely how we get from the visible world of perception to an invisible world of intelligibility which is never actually 'experienced', is really a problem. Indeed, how can we obtain knowledge of that which we cannot see, hear, or touch? One such initial response to this problem is found in book VII of the *Republic*.

There Plato (through the mouth of Socrates) discusses and recommends counting (mathematics) as a subject for every warrior's education within the city.[32] Unfortunately, he complains, most people tend to use (χρῆσθαι) this art incorrectly. What then is the proper application of it? Plato goes on to state that counting is useful for drawing (ἑλκτικῷ) the soul towards being (πρὸς ούσίαν). (523a) Is Plato arguing, despite previous rejections of knowledge through experience, for a more intuitive foundation for inquiry into higher rational knowledge? As the discussion proceeds, it will be seen that such a foundation is indeed, quite necessary.

Plato therefore goes on to divide all our perceptions (ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν) into two distinct kinds. On the one hand he says, there are those perceptions which have no real power to draw the soul toward being, which: "don't invoke (οὐ παρακολοῦντα) the understanding (τὴν νόησιν) to look into them (εἰς επίσκεψιν)". (523b) These he distinguishes from those which *do* invoke or exhort (διακελευόμενα) the soul. This is an interesting point. Here he speaks of the difference between invoking and non-invoking perceptions. Even more, he relates the quality of the former to the understanding (νόησις). Evidently, the understanding is being related to a more intuitive ground, inasmuch as certain perceptions are said to invoke or even inspire the understanding within the soul, to seek higher knowledge. But what kind of knowledge does the understanding now seek on this basis? This then, becomes the interesting point, which further confirms what was said in the previous section (i.e., in the *Theaetetus*).

In the first place, what does Plato offer as the basis for distinguishing these two kinds of perceptions? From there, he goes on to state that among those perceptions

[32] Regarding the purpose of mathematical education, Christopher Gill in his article, *Plato and the Scope of Ethical Knowledge*, states that: "In the educational programme of the *Republic*, one of the roles of mathematics is to develop the capacity for abstract thought; and on some interpretations, that is the full extent of its role." (Gill 2004, p. 7) So from the outset, Plato's educational program can be seen to have a rational tendency.

which do not lead the soul into further inquiry, that is, which are not invoking, they: "don't depart (μὴ ἐκβαίνει) into opposite perceptions (εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν) at the same time (ἅμα)." On the other hand, the other kinds do depart (ἐκβαίνοντα) into opposite perceptions simultaneously, and he refers to these similarly as invoking (ὡς παρακαλοῦνται), stating that such perceptions act in such a way that:

> —whenever sense-perception (ἡ αἴσθησις) doesn't declare one thing any more than its opposite (τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ), no matter whether the object striking the senses is near at hand or far away (εἴτ᾽ ἐγγυθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν). (523c)

As an explanation for this, Plato refers to the fingers of the hand, stating of these that whether near or far away, there is nothing for perception which doesn't compel (οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται) further inquiry, since, using the example of the sense organ of sight (ἡ ὄψις), there is nothing which suggests: "to it that a finger is at the same time the opposite of a finger."[33] (523d) Plato is here pointing out that for the soul, most of the perceptions of the world are quite commonplace, as the perception of the hand and fingers, a plant and its reflection in water. There is nothing initially paradoxical about such perceptions which should lead to any desire to extend inquiry beyond them, at least not on the basis of the hand or fingers themselves—whether near or far away. Were the world to be limited to such perceptions, it is questionable, given even the existence of an imperceptibly intelligible realm, whether higher knowledge would or could arise at all. For what would stir the soul into inquiry in the first place (e.g., recall Meno's paradox)?

[33] The word here for 'suggest' is ἐσήμηνεν, from σημαίνω, which refers to hinting at, a showing by a sign, an indicating. Apparently, for Plato things in the world offer suggestions—hints for the soul—which compel it more deeply into inquiry into the nature of things.

There must then be certain perceptions which do compel the soul into inquiry. According to the above statements, such invoking perceptions would then be those which depart into *opposite* perceptions, and thus *hint* at something else. He offers an example of this, stating that for our sense organs, things are sometimes perceived as one thing and other times as another. For example, a man can appear tall before a dog, yet small before a tree. Such perceptions as these latter kind, are consequently perceived: "not as separate but as confounded (οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον)." (524c) Recalling the discussion of perception in the *Theaetetus*, it should be kept in mind that there Plato stated that in the final analysis, it is within the soul wherein perceptions converge. Here in the *Republic*, when Plato states that the senses perceive such things as hot and cold or hard and soft, not as separate but as confounded, it is the soul itself which he again refers to, i.e., stating that in the final analysis the soul becomes perplexed (τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν) regarding the meaning of what these conflicting sensations are telling it. (524a) Summing up, Plato states that as a result of those perceptions which he calls invoking:

> The soul would then become perplexed (ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν), would look for an answer (ζητεῖν), would stir up its understanding (κινοῦσα ἐν εαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν), and would ask what the one itself is (καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν τί ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν). (524e)

So within this context, there is a slight difference regarding the orientation of understanding (νοῦς). Previously, Plato suggested that certain perceptions stir up the understanding. This time the perceptions seem first to relate to the soul, which is said to become perplexed, and then the soul is said to stir up the understanding into inquiry into what the 'one' is, hence, into some 'entity' lying beyond perception itself. There would seem to be then a certain degree of ambiguity between precisely where the

understanding resides in relation to the soul and perception, and vice-versa. Perhaps this offers confirmation of Schopenhauer's view that philosophy historically was uncertain as to the nature of understanding? Regardless of whether this is true or not, the main point which may be obtained from the above, is that there is a very definite relationship stated here between perception as a kind of 'intuitive' ground which serves to stir the soul into inquiry.

Of course, the above account would depart from the perspective of Schopenhauer's own interpretation of matters. I suspect that for Plato himself, such an 'intuitive' ground would be given a rather negative determination.[34] In other words, the actual perception or intuition doesn't cause the soul to become perplexed, but rather something *about* the intuition which reminds the soul of something else, perhaps once known but now forgotten. This of course leads to Plato's other response to Meno's paradox in terms of the theory of recollection (ἀνάμνησις), the discussion of which I consider in the section which follows. In general, the main notion to be gathered from this present section is the fact that a perceptually intuitive ground, even if rejected must yet, and at the very least, serve as a *point of departure* for higher rational knowledge.[35]

[34] Although there are other dimensions inherent to Platonic thought which reveal a much more positive determination regarding the relationship between the intuitive and the abstract. Rational perplexity (*aporia*), recollection (*anamnesis*), and the eros for the Good, are some of the examples which will be here considered. Another example is Plato's sense of wonder (*thaumazein*), which although similar to rational perplexity, seems to be more related to eros, or the sense of being struck by beauty or a wonderment of the senses into interrogation of higher knowledge. So in the *Theaetetus*, after a brief discussion regarding the nature sense-perception, the young Theaetetus notes that: "Oh yes, indeed, Socrates, I often wonder (θαυμάζω) like mad what these things can mean; sometimes when I'm looking at them I begin to feel giddy", to which Socrates replies: "I dare say you do, my dear boy. It seems that Theodorus was not far from the truth when he guessed what kind of person you are. For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering (θαυμάζειν): this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else." (155cd) Knowledge arising through wonder and perplexity on the basis of empirical experience can also be seen in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (982a30-b20). There Aristotle first states that wisdom is a kind of knowledge attributable to the wise (ὁ σόφος), and is in general that which is known for the sake of itself (τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἱρετὴν), entailing a having or grasping of things in their entirety (ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην), i.e., the universal. Such knowledge is what Aristotle calls both the most knowable (ἐπιστητὰ) and the first principles and causes (τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια) of things.

[35] This discussion also highlights the problem of the "one and the many" and their mediation for knowledge, hence the Idea as universal.

1.4. From rational perplexity to intuitive recollection

Turning now to the second sense in which Plato responds to Meno's paradox, it is seen that this serves as a kind of development upon the basis of the former. Once again it will be discerned here, perhaps even more thoroughly, that a perceptual and intuitive basis serves as the point of departure for higher imperceptible and rationally determined inquiry. Although Plato discusses the theory of recollection within such dialogues as the *Parmenides* and the *Phaedo*, I will turn to the specific discussion of the *Meno*, for a number of reasons. In the first place, regarding the present subject matter, Schopenhauer discusses this dialogue, and hence more certainty regarding his interpretation of Platonic recollection on the basis of this dialogue may be obtained. In the second place, in the *Meno*, the discussion of higher knowledge departs once again on the basis of mathematics and specifically geometry, the subject of which offers a number of interesting points which relate to Schopenhauer's own account of mathematics and his criticism of Platonic methodology, which incidentally serves to highlight his interpretation of the Ideas.

In the first place, Schopenhauer in the *WWR*, makes explicit reference to the theory of recollection found within Plato's dialogue the *Meno*. He thus states:

> From the fact that we can of ourselves state and define the laws of relations in space, without needing experience to do so, Plato inferred (*Meno* [81 D], p. 353, *Bip.*) that all learning is merely a recollecting. Kant, on the contrary, inferred that space is subjectively conditioned, and is merely a form of the faculty of knowledge. How far, in this respect, Kant stands above Plato! (*W2*, p. 32)

The general meaning of the above statement will be understood following the discussion of Schopenhauer's theory of empirical perception in the second chapter. The important point to understand for now, is that Schopenhauer is here relating Platonic recollection to Kant's transcendental delineation of the *a priori*. From this context, not only does Schopenhauer relate these two views, but he seems also to consider the latter as both a development upon the basis of the former, as well as a superior achievement in terms of truth. So from a historical standpoint, Schopenhauer considers Kant's *a priori* (which is then interpreted within his own thought) as consistent with Platonic recollection.

So Plato will resolve the problem of knowledge (the paradox) through a play upon memory and metempsychosis, i.e., the belief in the pre-existence of the soul and its passage into subsequent lives. His solution is essentially that the soul *already* had knowledge of the Ideas during some prior existence, but forgot them at birth. Although perception doesn't offer knowledge, it can yet be obtained through the soul's recollection of that which it had previously known but forgotten, and in consequence of this, the paradox is resolved. Accordingly, what is required of perception, if anything, is just this sense of 'stirring' up the soul's memories. How this is accomplished, of course, requires some explanation.

Turning to the dialogue of the *Meno* itself, there the nature of recollection (ἀνάμνησις) is introduced in relation to Socrates' discussion with Meno himself, whereupon a slave boy, said to be ignorant of geometry, is introduced for purposes of demonstration.[36] Socrates goes on to show how we 'recollect' knowledge on the basis of

[36] For Plato, 'memory' here serves as an analogy to something much more fundamental. Within Greek thought, memory was attributed to the goddess *Mnemosyne*, and later found expression among the sophists and rhetoricians who used and applied *mnemonic* techniques for the memorization and recitation of long speeches. In the *Republic*, memory is seen as an essential attribute required for any philosopher, and Aristotle in the first book to his *Metaphysics* would later consider memory a condition for all experience and learning. So Plato's choice to resolve Meno's paradox through the *analogy* of memory, indeed through recollection of the *Ideas*, is certainly not a coincidence. His use of this theory should however be looked upon with reserve, as but a 'likely' account. Thus in the *Meno*, Socrates states: "I do

an example, that is, through the slave boy's developing understanding of a geometrical problem. The problematic is presented as follows. Given two squares, one double the size of the other (X and 2X in the illustration below), the boy is asked to determine the relationship between the lengths of their sides (Y and Z): (82cd)



In questioning the boy as to the length of the side of the larger square, the boy is initially found to fall into immediate error, indicated by his response: "Obviously, Socrates, it will be twice the length." (82e) In other words the boy believes that Z = 2Y. This is based upon the false conjecture: "that a figure double the size is based on a line double the length". (83a) Through further demonstration, Socrates shows the boy precisely wherein his judgment regarding the two squares becomes problematic, in consequence of which when further questioned, the boy now responds: "By Zeus, Socrates, I do not know (ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα)."[37] (83e) This response, as Socrates explains, is an indication that the boy has made progress in recollection. (84a) Before the slave boy was unaware and experienced no problem regarding what he thought he knew, but now, he is said to be perplexed (ἀπορεῖν) and numb (ναρκᾶν). (84b) An interesting

not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it." (86b) Harold Tarrant in his book, *Recollecting Plato's Meno*, thus relates *ananmnesis* to a kind of tool for instruction and teaching, which certainly implies a more intuitive ground, as he states: "To recollect…we need a different kind of prompting, a prompting that must derive from this world of our immediate experience. We must 'be reminded' of something, and in most cases this will surely come through the process usually interpreted as teaching and learning. Being reminded of a single truth through the so-called teaching process, prepares us for the discovery of other truths on our own." (Tarrant 2005, p. 47)

[37] For the entire process by which the slave boy is led into perplexity, see *Meno* 83a-84b.

statement, for it relates to what was seen in the previous section, although made much more explicit. I will discuss this after what follows.

At this point, the boy is now taken progressively through a number of logical steps until he reaches the actual solution to the problem itself (84d-85b):



The length of the side of a square double the size of another is then based upon the diagonal of the smaller, viz., the Pythagorean theorem. Once the slave boy 'sees' this new construction, he is then able to identify the proper relationship, and thus states that the solution is essentially obtained through the: "line that stretches from corner to corner of the four-foot figure". (85b) From the above process, Socrates concludes that the boy, who initially had mere opinions regarding the nature and relationship between these squares, has now come to the correct answer, without anyone instructing him, through (85d): "recovering the knowledge out of himself (*ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην*)". This recovery of knowledge is then referred to as recollection (*ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν*). Indeed, it is a recollection of knowledge which, if not acquired in this present life, must have been learned at some other time.[38] (86ab)

[38] Regarding Plato's theory of recollection, A.E. Taylor notes: "It must be observed that it is not a theory of 'innate ideas,' or 'innate knowledge,' in the popular sense of the words. We are not supposed to bring any actual knowledge into the world ready-made with us. On the contrary, we are said to 'have learned' truth but to have lost it again, and we have to recover what we have lost. The recovery requires a real and prolonged effort of steady thinking; what 'recollection,' or more accurately 'being reminded,' does for us is to provide the starting point for this effort. In the *Phaedo*, this is illustrated by the way in which chance 'associations' will start a train of thinking, as when the sight of an absent friend's belongings or his portrait sets us thinking of the friend himself. The main emphasis thus falls not on the Orphic doctrine of pre-existence and re-incarnation, which Socrates professes to have learned from poets and priests, but on the function of sense-experience as suggestive of and pregnant with truths of an intelligible order which it does not itself adequately embody or establish. And the philosophical importance of the doctrine is not that it proves the immortality of the soul, but that it shows that the acquisition of knowledge is not a matter of passively receiving 'instruction,' but one of following up a personal effort of thinking once

So recollection certainly proceeds a step further in the intuitive direction than what was seen in terms of perplexity on the basis of invoking perceptions discussed in the previous section. In the first place, akin to invoking perceptions, the slave boy was found to enter into perplexity in a quite similar manner. There is, however, a specific difference. Socrates points out that something within perception now confounds what the boy thought he knew, indeed, of what the boy had a mere opinion of. Although this was unstated in the previous section, it was certainly implied, for indeed, in order to compare one perception with another, one would certainly have to have a 'memory' of the previous. Thus, I remember that I am larger than a dog, and now see that the tree is taller. I thereby become confused or perplexed.

The theory of recollection then goes a step further. The rational perplexity of the soul merely answers the question of how from perception (the knowledge of which is rejected) one can make initial 'contact', as it were, with higher knowledge. In the previous section, the soul is only said to stir up its understanding and seek higher knowledge on the basis of confounding perceptions. With recollection, however, Plato is suggesting that the soul doesn't just seek, but *recalls* actual knowledge as such. The interesting further point about this 'recall' is the fact the recollection now points once again to an intuitive ground. Indeed, memory bears a passive sense of immediacy, and this is related to Schopenhauer's own sense of intuition through understanding, and even more essential, of the direct nature of insight into the Idea on the basis of the imagination and the power of contemplation. On the other hand, for Schopenhauer, 'reason' is generally seen as much more active, indirect, and reflective power.

So within the context of Schopenhauer's thought, the *Meno* points out a very interesting relationship between intuitive perception, rational perplexity, and intuitive recollection. The implication here which I wish to draw out for the reader's attention, is

started by an arresting sense-experience." (Taylor 2003, pp. 136-137)

that Plato is making a passage from an intuitive ground (in perception) to a rational ground (in perplexity), and once again back into an intuitive ground (through recollection).[39] This is then precisely what I pointed out in the first section, which as will be seen, will be repeated once again in Plato's description of the methodology of knowledge according to the divided line. It is to be noted here and everywhere else within this chapter, that this discussion of Plato is interpretively based upon Schopenhauer's thought, and thus the implications I draw here are only *derivative* to Platonic thought as such. In no way, do I wish to suggest that for Plato or according to Platonic thought in and of itself, this is precisely what is occurring. Rather, the explanation here offers a general confirmatory analysis of Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Platonic Idea.

1.5. The divided line of intuition and abstraction

The separation between the perceptible and the imperceptible is distinctly made in the sixth book of the *Republic* and Plato's discussion there of the 'divided line', and this offers some very fruitful considerations for the relationship between intuitive perceptual knowledge and rational abstract knowledge, from the perspective of

[39] Taylor further offers a number of remarks regarding Plato's theory of recollection which highlight this present discussion rather nicely, particularly in relation to concepts and intuitions—and Schopenhauer's Ideas serving to mediate the two (cf. section 4.3). He thus suggests that: "One should note several things about the way in which the doctrine of the 'forms' is introduced into this argument. For one thing we see that there is no room for the theory for 'innate ideas' in the strict sense of the word, and that there is no question of a knowledge acquired independently of experience. The whole point of the argument is that we should never be 'put in mind' of the 'forms,' but for the suggestion of the senses. Again, the most important feature of the process of 'being reminded' is that sense-perception suggests standards to which they do not themselves conform. The same visual sensations which suggest the notion 'straight' to me, for example are the foundation of the judgment that no stick is perfectly straight. The 'form' is thus never contained in, or presented by, the sensible experience which suggests it. Like the 'limit' of an infinite series, it is approximated but never reached. These two considerations, taken together, show that the theory does full justice to both parts of the Kantian *dictum* that 'percepts without concepts are *blind*, concepts without percepts are empty'." (Taylor 2003, p. 188)

Schopenhauer's thought. In the *Republic* then, Plato there first divides the world into a visible (ὁ τόπος ὁρατός) and intelligible realm (ὁ τόπος νοητός) respectively, adding a subsequent division to each part, thereby producing four distinct sections. (509d) Before turning to a description of each, it is worth noting that Plato will speak of the initial larger division between the visible and the intelligible as a division between becoming (γένεσις) and being (οὐσία), whereby the former (the visible as such) is said to be an imitation or likeness (εἰκόνα) of the intelligible.[40] (*Timaeus*, 28b-29a)

In the *Republic* then, starting at the lowest level in the first section of the visible realm, Plato first identifies images (εἰκόνα), giving examples of these in terms of shadows and reflections of things in a mirror or water. (509e) These lowest kinds of entities, serve as the image for entities within the next and higher section of the visible realm, viz., actual sensible things (τὰ αἰσθητά) which are mirrored by shadows and reflections, i.e., actual trees, rocks, and animals within the world. (510a) Making the transition from the sensible to the intelligible, Plato states of the latter that:

> In the one subsection, the soul, using as images (ὡς εἰκόσιν) the things that were imitated (μιμηθεῖσιν) before, is forced (ἀναγκάζεται) to investigate from hypotheses (ἐξ ὑποθέσεων), proceeding not to a first

[40] Cornford remarks regarding this division that: "The first premiss lays down the Platonic classification of existence in two orders. The higher is the realm of unchanging and eternal being possessed by the Platonic Forms. This contains the objects of rational understanding accompanied by a rational account (μετὰ λόγου), namely, the discursive arguments of mathematics and dialectic which yield a securely grounded apprehension of truth and reality. The lower realm contains 'that which is always becoming', passing into existence, changing, perishing, but never has real being…The application of this premiss tells us that the visible world—the object of physics, as distinct from mathematics and dialectic—belongs to the lower order of existence." (Cornford 1997, p. 24) John Burnet further points out that this Platonic division takes its origin from the Pythagoreans wherein it represented a way of dealing with certain mathematical ambiguities, as he states: "The fateful doctrine of two worlds, the world of thought and the world of sense, in fact originated from the apparent impossibility of reconciling the nature of number with continuity (τὸ συνεχές) as the Eleatics called it, or the unlimited (τὸ ἄπειρον) as the Pythagoreans said. There was something in the latter that seemed to resist the power of thought, and it was inferred that it could not have true reality (οὐσία), but was at best a process of becoming (γένεσις)." (Burnet 1950, pp. 89-90)

> principle (οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν) but to a conclusion (ἐπὶ τελευτήν). In the other subsection, however, it makes its way to a first principle that is unhypothetical (ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον), proceeding from a hypothesis (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) but without images used in the previous subsection (ἄνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων), using forms themselves (εἴδεσι δι᾽ αὐτῶν) and making its investigation through them. (510b)

I will discuss the nature of these two kinds of progressions in the sections which follow. For now, it is sufficient to note that Plato refers to the former path (within the intelligible) as akin to the methodology of the geometers and related sciences, referring to it as reason or *dianoia* (διάνοια). (511ab) In relation to this section, *dianoia* generally deals with mathematical entities (τὰ μαθηματικά) intermediate between Ideas and sensible things. On the other hand, Plato refers to the latter path as akin to the method of consideration referred to as understanding or *noesis* (νόησις), of which the science of dialectic (διάλεκτος) applies itself in coming to a knowledge of the Ideas (ἰδέα).[41] (511c) Plato further proceeds to classify and illustrate the basic interrelation among these various sections, stating:

> Thus there are four such conditions in the soul, corresponding to the four subsections of our line: understanding (νόησιν) for the highest, thought (διάνοιαν) for the second, belief (πίστιν) for the third, and imaging (εἰκασίαν) for the last. Arrange them in a ratio, and consider that each shares in clarity (σαφηνείας) to the degree that the subsection is set over shares in truth (ἀληθείας). (511e)

[41] Regarding this method, Schopenhauer remarks that: "In Plato we find many examples of this beautiful artifice of genuine dialectic." (*W2*, p. 121)

The general notion here is that with regards to truth, the highest subsection is seen as sharing in the highest degree of truth, and as one descends downward along the line, from the intelligible to the visible, to that extent, does this share in truth diminish. So on the one hand, there is the larger distinction between the intelligible and the visible, such that Plato will conclude, that the higher intelligible is to the lower: "as the opinable is to the knowable".[42] (510a) Looked at from the bottom up then, one can thus consider entities within each lower subsection as essential imitations (εἰκόνα) of those immediately following it. Therefore, the lowest iconic images become imitations of original sensible entities. This lower realm is furthermore itself an imitation of the intelligible realm itself.[43] Finally, the relationship between the lower visible realm and the two higher sections within the intelligible is such that *dianoia* stands intermediate between (μεταξύ) opinion and *noesis*. (511d) In reverse, *noesis* stands at the highest point, *dianoia* following it, which stands between *noesis* and the entire visible realm. Within the visible, there is then belief or conviction (πίστις), and following it imaging or conjecture (εἰκασία). The line itself is illustrated below:

[42] «ώς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν» Regarding the relationship between sensible entities and the forms, Mary Margaret McCabe states her essay, "Plato's Individuals": "Plato proposes, then, that there are two sorts of things: forms and particulars. And he thinks that the difference between the two can be characterized as the difference between ones that are also many (particulars) and ones that are just one (forms). But he thinks that for two reasons. First, he supposes that particulars are many because they possess an indeterminate number of properties, and that all those properties can reasonably be described as parts of the particular…Second, particulars are especially many because they are subject to the compresence of relational and evaluative opposites…Forms, conversely, are meant to explain the compresence of opposites, and so cannot suffer from it. It seems, moreover, that they cannot suffer from any pluralization at all—they are just one, in contradistinction to the indefiniteness of any particular. So characterized as one and many, a form is an austere individual (just one), and a particular is a general individual (one and many)." (McCabe 1999, p. 97)

[43] Regarding the relationship between sensible entities and mathematics, Taylor points out that: "In all the sciences the objects we are really studying are objects which we have to think but cannot see or perceive by any of our senses. Yet the sciences throughout direct attention to these objects, which are, in fact, forms, by appealing in the first instance to sense." (Taylor 2003, p. 290)



The importance of the divided line and the above illustration is the fact that it highlights the relationship between the perceptual and intellectual within Platonic thought. From the perspective of Schopenhauer, this may be correspondingly referred to as a relationship between *intuitive* and a*bstract* knowledge, and I will base my interpretation of the line upon this latter sense.

In accordance with Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective then, the above divided line is essentially based upon a misunderstanding of both the essential nature of empirical reality, as well as the kinds of knowledge that are possible. For Schopenhauer reality is transcendental in its empirical character. Consequently, our intuitions into sensible entities, their images, and their foundation, represents now the real starting point for knowledge of the world inasmuch as the subject becomes its centerpiece.[44] The basis of knowledge is thus rooted within the understanding (*Verstand*) of the subject. It is only after the fact of understanding and on its basis that we form communicable abstract concepts about the world—through reason (*Vernunft*). This secondhand

[44] The lowest level of reflections and images (τὰ εἰκόνα) would be considered by Schopenhauer as simply an aspect of sensible things (τὰ αἰσθητά). The imagination (εἰκασία) would then be akin to understanding as grasping images of sensible things, and to a certain extent, it even refers to the understanding in grasping the Ideas (ἰδέα) themselves. This latter sense will be explored in more detail within the final chapter of this work, since Schopenhauer's discussion of the matter, although important, is quite ambiguous.

knowledge is then a mere reflection of the intuitive knowledge obtained through understanding. The difference is akin to someone who witnesses an actual event, and someone who only knows about it by hearsay.

In this sense, Platonic *dianoia* and *noesis* represent actually a confused admixture of what we fundamentally acquire through the understanding and then reflect upon through reason. That is why, as was seen in section 1.1, Schopenhauer related both of these methods to the understanding as *Verstand*. In essence, for Schopenhauer the fundamental ground of our knowledge of mathematics and the Ideas are just as intuitive as our knowledge of 'red' and 'this tree'. The difference depends largely upon how the subject initially makes contact with this knowledge. I will discuss this in more detail in the sections which follow, as well as in the second chapter.

1.6. Dianoetic intuitions

I turn now to a consideration of the lower section of the intelligible realm and Plato's characterization there of the method of *dianoia*. Within this section, the soul is said to obtain a kind of knowledge of mathematics, and the nature and manner in which Plato suggests that mathematicians proceed in their demonstrations offers ample fruit for this discussion, particularly in relation to Schopenhauer's own views on the matter.

Recalling then the discussion of *dianoia* in the previous section, Plato was there seen to suggest that this method proceeds generally on the basis of 'images of things that were imitated before'. According to the divided line then, the things imitated before must refer to either sensible entities or iconic images or both. At the very least, this must imply a perceptually intuitive foundation. In order to clarify this matter, it is first of all important to understand the precise nature of what Plato refers to as hypothesis (ὑποθέσις), and secondly of the manner in which mathematicians makes use of such

images through hypotheses. Regarding first hypothesis, Plato goes on to state in the *Republic* that:

> I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize (ὑποθέμενοι) the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, as if they knew them (ὡς εἰδότες). They make these their hypotheses (ὑποθέσεις) and don't think it necessary to give any account of them (οὐδένα λόγον), either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone. And going from these first principles (ἐκ τούτων δ'ἀρχόμενοι) through the remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement (τελευτῶσιν).[45] (510cd)

So in accordance with the above passage, mathematicians begin at starting points taken as principles (ἀρχαί), which are however understood only in a qualified sense. The geometer doesn't actually have knowledge of *why* the principle is at it is. Rather, he simply posits the principle as an assumption, and from there proceeds to his

[45] Plato reiterates this in a similar manner in the *Meno*, stating that a geometer given the problem of: "whether a specific area can be inscribed in the form of a triangle within a given circle", would proceed by stating: "I do not yet know (οὔπω οἶδα) whether that area has that area, but I think I have (οἶομαι ἔχειν), as it were, a hypothesis (ὑπόθεσιν) that is of use for the problem". The geometer then proceeds by hypothesizing a geometrical relationship in the form of *if* such and such a relation is posited, and this results, *then* it may be determined: "whether something is impossible (ἀδύνατον) or not". (*Meno* 87ab) Regarding the hypotheses of science, Nicholas White states in his book, *Plato on Knowledge and Reality*, that: "Plato's notion of science, of course, is intimately bound up with his notion of knowledge, and therefore with his contention that there can be knowledge, strictly so-called, only concerning Forms. From this perspective, it is disciplines such as geometry that seem to him most worthy of sustained philosophical attention, and accordingly it is upon geometry itself that he turns his most direct scrutiny… In the first place, he takes geometers to task for relying on unsupported assumptions (or axioms) for which they are unable to provide any grounds. In the second place, he maintains that it is a fault of their procedures that they rely on sensible figures such as those drawn in the sand, whereas what they should be talking about are not those sensible figures but rather certain geometrical entities which are apprehended, not by the senses, but by the mind." (White 1976, p. 96)

demonstrations.[46] Such principles within mathematics and according to discursive thought, are thus understood as *assumed*, that is, as *hypothetical*. So hypothesizing refers to the practice of laying something down or positing an assumption as a principle, without really knowing what that principle entails. It thus involves the positing of an unknown, following which the geometer proceeds to prove or demonstrate his conclusion through revealing the logical consistency among the interrelated parts of any problem or theorem (e.g. in the Pythagorean theorem, showing that the sum of the squares of the sides of a right triangle are consistent with the square of the hypotenuse). Offering merely hypothetical principles, knowledge within mathematics must necessarily be insufficient and hence derivative upon a higher, more thoroughly grounded form.[47]

Having understood the nature of hypothesis, the question then resumes: precisely what are these principles which are assumed or hypothesized? Are these images? Are these abstractions of images? Fortunately, Plato does offer some insight into the issue itself. Further along in the *Republic*, Plato enters into a deeper description of the

[46] Paul More further explains this method: "Students of arithmetic and geometry, it is there said, assume the odd and even forms, the three kinds of triangles, and the like as universally admitted hypotheses which need no proof, and from these proceed to demonstrate whatever problem they have in view. They use, indeed, visible figures in these demonstrations, but in reality their concern is with the absolute square, for instance, or the absolute diagonal, which exist in the understanding alone and of which the diagrams drawn by them are only symbols. This procedure belongs to the intelligible sphere of knowledge, although in it the soul cannot rise to first principles but is obliged to cling to hypotheses, employing for this purpose the intellectualized figures of those material objects of which the shadowy reflections (in the lowest of the four divisions) are the field of conjecture. Such is the sphere of geometry and the other mathematical sciences." (More 1917, p. 211)

[47] A.E. Taylor notes the general weakness of mathematics and its method according to Plato: "Further, all through his reasoning the geometer or arithmetician 'depends on certain postulates' (ὑποθέσεις) of which he 'gives no account' (λόγοι), such as the 'postulate' that every number is either odd or even, or that there are just three kinds of angle." (Taylor 2003, p. 291) Taylor further goes on to note that: "The geometer's 'results' in the end rest on a tacit agreement (ὁμολογία) between himself and his pupil or reader that the question whether his assumptions are justifiable shall not be asked. In strictness we cannot call the results 'knowledge' so long as the assumptions from which they have been deduced are thus left unexamined (vii. 533c)." (ibid.) Samuel Scolnicov further points out that: "In the third section of the Divided Line, in the *Republic*, is an opinion-like cognition of the Forms, not adequately justified. It is an indirect apprehension of the Forms, which, in a way that remains to be explained, turns into direct apprehension by being given a *logos*." (Scolnicov 2004, p. 4)

relationship between the 'images' of mathematics which the geometer thinks about, and those which he might draw in the sand for purposes of illustration. He thus states:

> Then you also know that, although they use visible figures (τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι) and make claims (τοὺς λόγους) about them, their thought (διανοούμενοι) isn't directed to them but to those other things (ἐκείνων) that they are like (ἔοικε). They make their claims for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw (οὐ ταύτης ἣν γράφουσιν), and similarly with the others. These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows (σκιαὶ) and reflections in water (ἐν ὕδασιν) are images (εἰκόνες), they now in turn use as images (ὡς εἰκόσιν), in seeking to see these others themselves (αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν) that one cannot see except by means of thought (ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ). (510de)

The above passage requires some elucidation. The first part states that geometers essentially, "use visible figures and make claims about them". So one might think of Socrates in the *Meno*, drawing a large square on the ground before the slave boy, and then asking him questions about it. Plato is here pointing out, which he states in the line which follows, that Socrates, in drawing the square and making claims about it, isn't thinking (διάνοια) about the drawn-square itself, but rather about certain things or images that are apparently *like* the drawn square. This seems evident enough, for indeed, we may speak of numbers and triangles and circles without actually drawing these. Plato then goes on to state that they make claims about squares themselves and diagonals themselves. Although Plato is explicit here that "squares themselves" don't refer to the actually drawn image, it is a question as to precisely what 'image' Plato is referring to.

Regarding this point, Plato is notoriously ambiguous, and indeed, there has been much historical debate over the precise nature of mathematics within Plato's thought, i.e., as to whether he considered these purely *as* Ideas (e.g. the Idea of Number), or whether he also posited mathematics as intermediary between the Ideas and sensible entities as well. The latter view was at least Aristotle's interpretation of the matter. For example, in his *Metaphysics* (987b15-20), Aristotle there states that Plato hypothesized the existence of *three* distinct although related kinds of entities: the Ideas (ἰδέα), sensible things (τὰ αἰσθητά), and finally mathematical entities (τὰ μαθηματικά) as intermediate (μεταξύ) between the two. From the Ideas, the elements (τὰ στοιχεῖα) of all other things are said to arise. Thus the Ideas of Great and Small become the principles (ἀρχάς) of matter (ὕλην), and the Idea of the One (τὸ ἕν), the principle of being and existence (οὐσίαν). He further goes on to state that the Ideas become the elements of mathematical entities (τὰ μαθηματικά) themselves through participation (κατὰ μέθεξιν). In consequence of this, the various numbers (τοὺς ἀριθμούς) arise through participation with the Great and the Small with the One.

As to whether Aristotle's interpretation of the matter is correct or a misrepresentation of Plato's views, is left to the historical debate to decide.[48] Fortunately, the issue here is understanding Schopenhauer's interpretation of the matter, and to that extent Plato's own views on mathematics are to a certain extent derivative upon this. Accordingly, the above Aristotelian view seems to have been taken by Schopenhauer as the standard interpretation, for indeed, Schopenhauer references Aristotle regarding the matter explicitly, stating:

[48] The precise nature of mathematical entities, as to whether they function as actual universals or are more akin to *intelligible particulars*, must forever remain something of an open question, which I therefore leave aside. Frederick Copleston's explanation of the nature of mathematical entities (if we are to accept Aristotle's interpretation) seems more or less accurate: "A natural interpretation of Aristotle's remarks in the *Metaphysics* is that, according to Plato, the mathematician is speaking of intelligible particulars, and not of sensible particulars, nor of universals." (Copleston 1955a, p. 157)

> The alleged inscription over the Platonic lecture-room, Ἀγεωμέτρητος μηδεὶς εἰσίτω, of which the mathematicians are so proud, was no doubt inspired by the fact that Plato regarded the geometrical figures as intermediate entities between the eternal *Ideas* and particular things, as Aristotle frequently mentions in his *Metaphysics*…In the same way we are told that he regarded geometry as a preliminary exercise, by which the mind of the pupils become accustomed to dealing with incorporeal objects. (*W2*, p. 131)

Taking Aristotle's interpretation of mathematical entities in Plato as the definitive view for Schopenhauer, it is then evident that mathematics as intermediate entities, would be precisely what Schopenhauer will later understand as intuitive knowledge which arises on the basis our *a priori* forms of time (arithmetic) and space (geometry). In consequence of this, *dianoia* is thereby primordially an intuitive process for Schopenhauer which is then related to the understanding, with however one exception. When Plato above speaks of 'images of things that were imitated before', for Schopenhauer this means that Plato is speaking precisely of concepts which arise through rational abstraction on the basis of originally intuitive knowledge.

This is an interesting perspective, for indeed Plato speaks of geometers as making claims (τοὺς λόγους) about visible figures which relate to images within their understanding. Incidentally, as was seen in section 1.1, Schopenhauer linked λόγος to the faculty of reason as *Vernunft*. So the basic conclusion to be drawn here is that with respect to mathematics, Plato is first of all describing an intuitive process based upon the understanding, i.e., the original images upon which geometers base their hypotheses. Secondly, with regards to making claims about these images, Plato is referring to concepts, through reason, abstracted on the basis of these images. The

method of *dianoia* is then something of an amalgamation of both reason (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*) according to Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective.

This is certainly a difficult matter. In order to make this point more clear, I offer a discussion in the next section regarding the Platonic tendency (according to Schopenhauer's view) to offer a rational or logical confirmation of essentially intuitive knowledge. In the chapter which follows, I further consider Schopenhauer's specific criticism of methodology within Euclidean geometry, which is seen to relate essentially back to Plato and the confusion between reason and understanding as exemplified in the method of *dianoia*.

As a preliminary to that discussion, the point is worth noting that for Schopenhauer, intuitive knowledge is a form of self-confirmation. It is unnecessary to rationally account for the fact that I *see* a tree. Mathematics is then quite similar. Despite this fact, Plato demands rational confirmation for intuitive knowledge within mathematics, and in consequence of this, Schopenhauer will argue that Plato thereby loses contact with the essential *raison d'être*, that is, the sufficient reason inherent to the entity in question. All of this will be thoroughly considered in what follows.

1.7. Rational confirmation

Before turning to a discussion of the nature and methodology of the Ideas within Platonic thought, I should like to backtrack one step in order to discuss an important consequence regarding the method of *dianoia* in relation to the knowledge of mathematics. This subject will be discussed again later (cf. sections 2.9), in relation to Schopenhauer's criticism of the method of synthesis in Euclidean geometry. As will be seen, Schopenhauer there recommends the alternative method of analysis as more fitting to knowledge of mathematics which, he considers, has an essentially intuitive foundation.

As a preliminary to this discussion, and in brief, the two methods of analysis and synthesis were utilized by the ancients for purposes of geometrical demonstration. Analysis involves the practice of reducing a theorem into the principles upon which it is essentially based. It is an *intuitive* method for Schopenhauer, a method pertaining to the understanding (*Verstand*). On the other hand, synthesis involves demonstration through a process of relating the parts of a theorem in an attempt to reveal their inner logical consistency. In consequence of this, synthesis is viewed by Schopenhauer as largely a method of *abstraction*, and hence of reason (*Vernunft*). With the former, the geometer moves from the unknown (hypothesis) to a known as self-evident intuition (a principle). With the latter, the geometer moves from an unknown (hypothesis) to a conclusion (logical consistency). Evidently, the latter method of synthesis appears quite similar to Plato's own method of διάνοια in mathematics whereby the geometer was said to hypothesize a principle (an unknown assumption), and from there proceed logically to a demonstration of the consistency of its conclusion, for which reason it is said that: "they arrive in full agreement (τελευτῶσιν)".

Given Schopenhauer's interpretation of synthesis and analysis, an interesting starting point for the discussion is the fact that both Diogenes Laertius and Proclus separately testify that it was Plato who: "was the first to explain to Leodamas of Thasos the method of solving problems by analysis (τὴν ἀνάλυσιν)". (Diog. L., iii.24) This is a very interesting statement, for it generally states the view that mathematics for Plato involves *essentially intuitive principles*. This would seem to follow Schopenhauer's own philosophical perspective on the matter, however, it is questionable as to whether Plato himself considered mathematics in this way. Indeed, did Plato really discover analysis?

Scholars such as John Burnet (1950) and Thomas Heath (1956 and 2006) separately argue that both Diogenes as well as Proclus were quite mistaken on the matter. They suggest that these early commentators were referring rather to Plato's later

development of the alternative method of division (διαίρεσις), in such dialogues as the *Sophist*, the *Statesmen*, and the *Philebus*. Regarding this latter method, Burnet explains:

> The method is this. The thing to be defined or classified is first referred to its genus, and then, by a series of dichotomies, the genus is divided into species and sub-species. At each division we ask to which of the species it gives us the thing to be defined belongs, and that is divided once more, the "left-hand" species being left undivided as irrelevant to our purpose. The definition is found by adding together all the species "on the right-hand side." (Burnet 1950, p. 220)

Division thus involves a movement through subsequent segmentations or partitions of a genus into its species, which it follows ever more precisely until the definition sought has been sufficiently identified. Such a method, however, would seem to be only indirectly related to analysis. Indeed, given the various methods which Plato recommends and puts into practice within his dialogues, it isn't surprising that confusion should result regarding their nature and interpretation. It is furthermore worth noting that both dialectic and division are *kinds* of analysis (as leading to a principle), although neither specifically applicable to geometry.[49]

The roots of this confusion may possibly be traced back to the influence of Plato and the Academy upon methods *already in practice* among the ancient geometers at the time. In this sense, it would seem that later Greek commentators, in confusing the origins, intermixed the methods of Plato and the geometers together. For example in his *Commentary* on Euclid, Proclus states:

[49] Although other scholars, perhaps rightly, disagree with this view. (cf. Rosen 2002 and 1999)

> Nevertheless certain methods have been handed down. The finest is the method which by means of *analysis* carries the thing sought up to an acknowledged principle; a method which Plato, as they say, communicated to Leodamas, and by which the latter too is said to have discovered many things in geometry. The second is the method of *division*, which divides into its parts the genus proposed for consideration, and gives a starting-point for the demonstration by means of the elimination of the other elements in the construction of what is proposed, which method also Plato extolled being of assistance to all sciences.[50] (Heath 2006, pp. 291-292)

In the first place, it is notable that Proclus' above stated method of analysis patterns the method of *noesis* seen in Plato's description of the highest subsection of the divided line in the *Republic*. Thomas Heath offers some interesting remarks in relation to this point in his *History of Greek Mathematics*, stating:

> But, analysis being according to the ancient view nothing more than a series of successive reductions of a theorem or problem till it is finally reduced to a theorem or problem already known, it is difficult to see in what Plato's supposed discovery could have consisted: for analysis in this sense must have been frequently used in earlier investigations. (*ibid*.)

[50] Proclus, *On Eucl*. i. p. 211, 19-23 ed. Friedlein. Schopenhauer offers a number of subtle and oftentimes disdainful remarks regarding Proclus, particularly in relation to his having adopted most of the errors of Platonic philosophy (and thus mirroring Hegelian abstract philosophy): "Yet even Plato has very frequently take upon himself to use this subtle argumentation, and, as mentioned already, Proclus, after the manner of all imitators, carried this fault of his prototype much farther." (*W2*, p. 86)

Heath further goes on to cite Hippocrates of Chios, a geometrician predating the Academy, as having used analysis in his own investigations. Evidently then, the nature of analysis used by the early geometers was both in practice prior to Plato, and was furthermore quite distinct from the manner and nature of 'dialectic' as proposed by him in such dialogues as the *Republic*. Heath further goes on to point out that:

> Proclus' language suggests that what he had in mind was the philosophical method described in the passage of the *Republic*, which of course does not refer to mathematical analysis at all; it may therefore well be that the idea that Plato discovered the method of analysis is a misapprehension. (*ibid*.)

If these ancient commentators have made a mistake, then what was the basis of their confusion? Furthermore, if Plato is not to be rightly attributed with having discovered dialectic, then what influence, if any, might he have had upon ancient Greek geometry. Regarding these points, Heath continues:

> But analysis and synthesis following each other are related in the same way as the upward and downward progressions in the dialectician's intellectual method. It has been suggested, therefore, that Plato's achievement was to observe the importance from the point of view of logical rigour, of the confirmatory synthesis following analysis. (*ibid*.)

There are many interesting points conveyed in this passage. In the first place, although Plato certainly applied the method of analysis in some form, it is evident enough that he wasn't the inventor of this method. Geometers prior to his time utilized analysis, and even the Pythagoreans were said to have been accustomed to the practice of the method

of apagogic (*reductio ad absurdum*), of itself a kind of analysis. (cf. Burnet 1950, p. 219) The second and more significant point is that although Plato is not to be credited with the discovery of analysis, his emphasis upon 'logical rigor' and the 'confirmatory synthesis' followed by analysis, must certainly have played an integral part in influencing later geometers.[51] This last point is substantiated most notably among the renowned author of the *Elements* and student at Plato's Academy, i.e., Euclid himself. In consequence of this, Burnet states that: "Book XIII of Euclid…is in a pre-eminent sense the work of the academy", and then concludes (confirming Heath's view):

> It follows that what Plato did was at most to formulate the method [of analysis] more clearly, and very probably to show the necessity of supplementing analysis by synthesis in order to secure that all the intermediate steps discovered by the analysis are reciprocal…Each analysis given in Euclid is immediately followed by the corresponding synthesis. (Burnet 1950, pp. 219-220)

The emphasis then upon offering logical, or more specifically, *rational confirmation* through synthesis following the initial analysis, seems to be the essential and very significant influence of Plato and the Academy.[52] The tendency of Plato to emphasize

[51] Regarding this, Nicholas White further points out that for Plato: "Once geometry is purified, two other things become possible. First, it becomes possible to give a *logos* or 'account' of the objects that it assumes exist (533b-c, e-534c), in the sense of a definition of them. Second, it is likewise possible to demonstrate, on the basis of statements of dialectic, the purified analogues of the statements which geometers have heretofore had to take for granted." (White 1976, p. 98)

[52] It also served as the starting point for what would later develop into a kind of modern mathematization of reality, as William Desmond points out: "Do we find a temptation to *ontological tyranny* over being that is other to us? In modernity we do find a subtle change in rapport with the ethos of being. This becomes less a *metaxu* charged with ambiguous signs of what transcends us – qualitative tokens in nature itself, and in human nature, of what exceeds the measure of nature and human nature, be it called the Good or God. The *metaxu* tends to be more and more flattened into a neutral medium of human power. This stripping from the given world of the qualitative charge of value in early modernity is clearly bound up with a project of mathematical objectification and technological manipulation." (Desmond 2004, pp. 108-

the rationally abstract over the intuitive, was seen in a number of instances within the previous sections.[53]

As a further and final point, Burnet offers confirmation of the view that Plato was essentially influenced by the early Greek tendency toward 'rationalism', as he suggests: "The Megarics considered it their business to 'throw' (καταβάλλειν) sensations and appearances and to trust reasoning alone. That goes without saying in an Eleatic".[54] (Burnet 1950, pp. 230-231) The need for rational confirmation is thus echoed in Plato's preliminary conclusion in the *Theaetetus* (looking to the 'process of reasoning' as opposed to the experience itself), and is furthermore seen in the later conclusion within this dialogue (which I have not explored) that knowledge is essentially: "true belief with an account (μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι)".[55] (201d)

For Schopenhauer, this tendency to emphasize rational confirmation of *intuitively* grounded knowledge is the essential heart of his criticism of Platonic philosophy. Schopenhauer further offers a number of points which run parallel to Burnet's account previously mentioned above. Schopenhauer states that:

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[53] Although it is worth noting, the fact that Schopenhauer may indeed have certainly misunderstood (i.e., not only misinterpreted) the precise nature of Platonic methodology.

[54] Some scholars argue, in fact, that it was rather the Greek geometers who were influential upon Plato's understanding of *dianoia* and hypothesis. For example, Michael Beaney states that: "The influence of Greek geometry, and of the method of analysis, in particular, is evident in Plato's introduction of the method of hypothesis, described and applied in the *Meno* (86e-87b), and discussed further in the *Phaedo* (100a-101d). Just as in geometrical analysis, the idea is to 'hypothesize' some supposedly prior proposition (e.g. that virtue is knowledge) by means of which the proposition under consideration (e.g. that virtue comes from teaching) can be demonstrated." (Beaney 2007).

[55] There is considerable debate as to whether in the final analysis Plato actually accepts or rejects this view. According to one interpreter: "There are a significant number of other passages where something very like Theaetetus' claim (D3) that knowledge is 'true belief with an account' is not only discussed, but actually defended: for instance, *Meno* 98a2, *Phaedo* 76b5-6, *Phaedo* 97d-99d2, *Symposium* 202a5-9, *Republic* 534b3-7, and *Timaeus* 51e5. So it appears that, in the *Theaetetus*, Plato cannot be genuinely puzzled about what knowledge can be. Nor can he genuinely doubt his own former confidence…If he does have a genuine doubt or puzzle of this sort, it is simply incredible that he should say what he does says in 201-210 without also expressing it." (Chappell 2005)

> The Eleatics first discovered the difference indeed often the antagonism, between the perceived, φαίνομενον, and the conceived, νοούμενον, and used it in many ways for their philosophemes, and also for sophisms. They were followed later by the Megarics, Dialecticians, Sophists, New Academicians, and Sceptics; these drew attention to the illusion, that is, the deception of the senses…It was recognized that perception through the senses was not to be trusted unconditionally, and it was hastily concluded that only rational thinking established truth…this rationalism, which arose in opposition to empiricism, kept the upper hand, and Euclid modeled mathematics in accordance with it. (*W1*, p. 171)

Indeed, Plato also 'throws' out appearances in rejecting knowledge through perception, and thereby establishes 'rational thinking' for truth. In consequence of this, he incessantly seeks confirmation of intuitive knowledge both within mathematics and to a certain extent with respect even to the Ideas, as will be seen.

So there are two essential points to be taken from this discussion together with the previous section. The first is that Plato's interpretation of the method of *dianoia* is discovered to be highly ambiguous from Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective. There is uncertainty as to whether Plato, in speaking of mathematical entities and the method of *dianoia*, refers to images abstracted from sensible things, or to images abstracted from Ideas, or simply to intermediaries (Aristotle's interpretation) subsisting between sensible things and the Ideas. Given Schopenhauer's interpretation as following the third possibility, the point now becomes that Plato uses concepts to confirm the nature of entities originally non-conceptual. Mathematical demonstration thereby becomes Plato's wax museum.

This is the essential meaning (and second point) of what was described within the third section of the line whereby the geometers, following the positing of hypotheses

now proceeded by: "going from these first principles (ἐκ τούτων δ'ἀρχόμενοι) through the remaining steps", after which, "they arrive in full agreement (τελευτῶσιν)." This entails a 'rational confirmation' of intuitively grounded knowledge, through a process of synthesis. According to this method the geometer, after positing conceptual hypotheses which arise on the basis of intuitions, then attempts to demonstrate the validity of these on an *abstract*, logical, rational basis. For Schopenhauer, this is explicitly superfluous, indicating a misunderstanding within Platonic thought regarding the nature of understanding and the manner in which reason relates to it.[56] On the other hand, the correct method for the geometer would be that once he posits his hypothesis (on a conceptual basis), he would now simply trace this concept back to the original intuition upon which it arose and was based. It doing so, he would receive the 'why' of the concept in question, since he has now revealed its ground of being. There is then no real 'confirmation' taking place. Rather, it is as simple as pointing out something within our perceptual horizon, and saying: "*This* tree".

1.8. Intuiting the Ideas

So the path Plato takes with mathematics, which proceeds from intuition to confirmation through concepts, finds an analogy with the Ideas themselves. In this case, however, Plato is seen to at least understand the nature of the Ideas much more precisely, this time proceeding from intuitions to concepts and *back* to intuitions. He thereby recognizes the intuitive foundation of the Ideas, but mistakes their proper

[56] Indeed the method is 'superfluous' but not 'false'. The method of synthesis works, that is, it proves the truth or falsity of the entity, but does so only on a 'logical' basis. For Schopenhauer, what it fails to do is to show the reason 'why' the entity is at it is. Synthesis shows the fact 'that' it is, and it does so on a logical basis. Such entities, however, being essentially intuitive, require an intuitive foundation for their demonstration. In this sense, analysis becomes the proper method, and synthesis as a rational confirmation, is seen as a superfluous road for demonstration. I discuss this more thoroughly in section 2.9.

ground. This is based upon the fact that he originally rejects intuitive knowledge through perception, moving directly into the abstract and conceptual (through dialectic), and when he once reaches the limits of this, he descends back to the ground of the Idea intuitively founded upon a perceptual basis. This is of course viewed from Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective, which I now explain.

Returning then to the divided line, Plato suggests there that in relation to the method of *noesis*, the procedure is to depart on the basis of an hypothesis which has no image, but is rather an Idea (ἰδέα) or Form (εἶδος).[57] There are two points which may be determined in relation this: (1) Plato's description of *noesis* is seen to involve (as in *dianoia*) a combination of Schopenhauer's sense of reason (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*).[58] So again there seems to be a certain degree of confusion here. (2) The second point is that it is precisely with *noesis* that the question of the perceptibility or imperceptibility of the Forms finds clear elaboration.

From Plato's initial description of the divided line, it would seem that the Forms, being hypotheses having *no images* related to them, are precisely the antithesis of what

[57] I will use the term Form (τὸ εἶδος) for the present discussion of the upper section of the divided line. As to whether there is really a difference between Idea (ἰδέα) and Form (εἶδος), is a matter which has been long debated. To offer one possible direction, P. Pesic in his article, *Seeing the Forms*, states that: "The derivation of εἶδος and ἰδέα has long been known. From the Indo-European root *vid-* comes the Sanskrit *veda* (to know), the Greek root ϝιδ- found in verbs like ἰδεῖν, the Latin *video* (which preserves the initial 'w' sound of ϝιδ-, as does the archaic English word *wot*), and our word *vision*. As a noun derived from ἰδεῖν, Homer uses εἶδος to describe 'Alkestis, loveliest [εἶδος ἀρίστη] of the daughters of Pelias' (*Iliad* 2.715), she of the best εἶδος, the best looking. Likewise, Hector taunts Paris for his 'beauty and εἶδος [ἤ τε κόμη τό τε εἶδος],' (3.55) his handsome physique." Pesic further goes on to distinguish εἶδος from ἰδέα, stating: "Thus, εἶδος initially denoted something strongly physical and sensual, as in 'good looks,' in contrast to the abstract connotations of the Latinate word 'form.' In Plato's *Charmides*, εἶδος means especially the naked form of a beautiful person, the object of a lover's inflamed gaze (154d-e, 155d). By contrast, ἰδέα would not be used for this nakedness. Like our word 'Idea,' ἰδέα suggests something more mental than does εἶδος. Though our word 'Idea' implies a Lockean mental privacy (as in 'my Idea'), Plato's word ἰδέα is public, open, transparent, denoting a quality visible to all (as in 'the ἰδέα of even numbers')." (Pesic 2004, pp. 1-2)

[58] Indeed, as Cheryl Foster points out: "for Schopenhauer, Ideas have nothing to do with abstract intellection, nor is their revelation entirely limited to the province of philosophical genius. Ideas are grasped even by the ordinary intellect, not through perception of particular entities in the physical world but through images rendered on the basis of them, rendered by the hand of real genius." (Foster 2006, pp. 231-232)

one might look for with regards to a perceptible entity. This point becomes even more significant through a passage which is found at the end of the sixth book of the *Republic*, wherein Plato once again describes the nature of *noesis*, further elaborating upon his previous statements. He states that:

> It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles (οὐκ ἀρχὰς) but truly as hypotheses (ὑποθέσεις)—as stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything (μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τήν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών). Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion (ἐπὶ τελευτὴν) without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms (εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς) themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms.[59] (511bc)

On the basis of these Forms the dialectician is seen to make a quite *rational* progression, without appealing to sensory (intuitive) images of any kind, both upward in an ascent to what is referred to as an 'unhypothetical' first principle, and back downward through the Forms to a conclusion. There is an interesting distinction and yet relationship here between what was seen with *dianoia* and what is now seen here in terms of *noesis*. With *dianoia* the method proceeded upon hypotheses *based upon images*,

[59] Paul More further contrasts *dianoia* with *noesis*, stating of that latter that: "In contrast with this is the higher sphere of the intelligible (the highest of the four divisions). Here, reason starts indeed with hypotheses, as it does in science, but uses them merely as a point of departure for its ascent into a world that is above hypothesis, and so mounting climbs to the first principle of all (the Good). This is the world of knowledge and true being contemplated by dialectic (that is, ethical dialectic, as shown in Plato's practical illustrations, though he does not here so qualify it), a clearer and purer world than that of the sciences so-called. The activity of the mind concerned with geometry and its cognates is properly termed understanding and not reason (the higher reason, or intuition), as falling between opinion and reason." (More 1917, pp. 211-212) It is interesting that More equates *noesis* with reason while further coupling this with intuition, for indeed it stands in stark contrast to Schopenhauer's own consideration of the matter. This only reveals the subsequent confusion regarding these methods as well as the nature of reason, understanding, abstraction, and intuition.

and from there, it led to a conclusion. In *noesis*, however, the method proceeds through hypotheses which have *no images* directly related to them, and interestingly, this method is said to ascend to an 'unhypothetical' principle. But what precisely is this principle?[60]

In accordance with Schopenhauer's interpretive stance, it must be nothing more than an actual Idea (ἰδέα) itself, that is, the Idea through intuitive perception. Before turning to this, it is seen that Plato further states of intellection that it may now proceed from the unhypothetical back down the trail to a conclusion (ἐπὶ τελευτὴν), of which Plato specifically remarks: "without making use of anything visible at all". This is interesting because it mirrors, to some extent, what Schopenhauer will state of the nature of philosophy (cf. section 3.9) wherein the Idea, as obtained through intuitive perception, is then communicated universally (and imperceptibly) through abstract concepts.

The explanation of the above is then the following: Plato initially rejects the intuitive foundation of perceptual knowledge, as I have suggested.[61] In consequence of this, he begins first with mathematical intuitions, which for Schopenhauer are essentially intuitions arrived at on the basis of the understanding (*Vernunft*) in accordance with the subject's cognitive forms of time and space. From there, Plato

[60] A.E. Taylor offers a fine description of the relationship between Plato's two intellectual methods as well as the nature of the unhypothetical: "Such a science would differ from the sciences in vogue in two ways: (1) it would treat the initial postulates of the sciences as mere starting-points to be used for the discovery of some more ultimate premises which are not 'postulated,' but strictly self-luminous and evident (ἀνυπόθετα), a real 'principle of everything,' and when it had discovered such a principle (or principles), it would then deduce the consequences which follow; (2) and in this movement no appeal would be made to sensible aids to the imagination, the double process of ascent to the 'starting-point of everything' and descent again from it would advance from 'forms by means of forms to forms and terminate upon them' (vi. 511b-c). In fact, we may even say that 'dialectic' would 'destroy' (ἀναιρεῖν) the postulates of the existing sciences (τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, vii. 533c), that is, it would deprive them of the character of ultimate postulates by showing that so far as they are not actually false, as they may turn out to be they are consequences of still more ultimate truths." (Taylor 2003, pp. 291-292)

[61] Again, the reader is to be reminded that here the Platonic distinction between sense-perception (*aesthesis*) and intellectual intuition (*noesis*) is intermingled (whether right or wrong) in Schopenhauer's sense of *Anschauung*, to be more fully discussed in the following chapter.

proceeds directly into rational abstraction (concepts), wherein confirmation of mathematical entities is given on the basis of synthesis. At this point, Plato further abstracts from these mathematical concepts themselves (which were the 'intermediaries' of things), and refers to the remainder as Forms.[62] I will discuss this secondary abstraction more thoroughly in section 2.8 in terms of Schopenhauer's analysis of concepts *in concreta* and *in abstracta*. As a preliminary to this, concepts abstracted directly on the basis of an intuition are referred to as concepts *in concreta*. Concepts further abstracted from concepts *in concreta*, are then referred to as concepts *in abstracta*.

So according to Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective, the Forms of which Plato speaks within the initial ascent of *noesis* are really concepts *in abstracta* (perhaps as abstractions on the basis of mathematical concepts). Plato then proceeds further upward on the basis of these Forms through a process of dialectic until he reaches a kind of *terminus*. For Schopenhauer, Plato has in effect simply reached the furthest abstraction

[62] This of course follows from Schopenhauer's naïve interpretation of Plato as a kind of confused abstract rationalist. In contradistinction to this, A.E. Taylor points out that Plato's dialectical approach to the forms is yet *inconsistent* with abstract rationalism. Taylor explains: "Thus, so far, we may say that what the *Republic* calls 'dialectic' is, in principle, simply the rigorous and unremitting task of steady scrutiny of the indefinables and indemonstrables of the sciences, and that, in particular, his ideal, so far as the sciences with which he is directly concerned goes, is just that reduction of mathematics to rigorous deduction from expressly formulated logical premises by exactly specified logical methods of which the work of Peano, Frege, Whitehead, and Russell has given us a magnificent example…But the 'reduction of all pure mathematics to logic' is only a part, and not the most important part, of what the *Republic* understands by 'dialectic.' Such a unification of the sciences as the *Republic* contemplates would require a combination of the reduction of mathematics to logic with the Cartesian reduction of the natural sciences to geometry. When the task was finished, no proposition asserting 'matter of fact,' devoid of internal necessity, should appear anywhere among the premises from which our conclusions are ultimately drawn. The first principles to which the dialectician traces back all our knowledge ought to exhibit a self-evident necessity, so that science would end by transforming all 'truths of fact' into what Leibniz called 'truths of reason.' This involves a still more significant extension of the range of 'science.' It implies that in a completed philosophy the distinctions between value and fact, *essentia* and *esse*, *So-sein* and *Sein* are transcended. The man who has attained 'wisdom' would see that the reason why anything is, and the reason why it is what it is, are both to be found in the character of an *ens realissimum* of which it is self-evident that it is and that it is what it is, a self-explanatory 'supreme being.' This is why dialectic is said to culminate in direct apprehension of 'the good' as the source of both existence and character. The thought is that all science in the end can be transformed into a sort of 'algebra,' but an algebra which is, as Burnet says, teleological." (Taylor 2003, pp. 293-294)

away from perception, the most emptied of all *in abstracta* concepts, such as the 'absolute', 'infinite', 'just', 'virtue', etc., and from there, Plato makes an 'ascent' to the unhypothetical. In effect, for Schopenhauer, such an ascent is really a *descent*, and what this means is that Plato has attained the Idea, through perception, although quite indirectly. For Schopenhauer, it would have been much more efficient had Plato simply cut to the chase, as it were, and turned the understanding (νοῦς, *Verstand*) toward perceptible things, penetrating directly into these. Had he done so, he would have seen that the Idea and the unhypothetical lying at the end of the dialectical trail, are really one and the same. Furthermore, he would have recognized that the so-called 'Forms' contained within the dialectical trail are really concepts *in abstracta*.

As will be seen, aside from the main interpretive difference here, within the movement back downward along the dialectical trail from the unhypothetical principle, Plato assumes again 'Forms' having no visible images and hence concepts *in abstracta*. For Schopenhauer on the other hand, after intuiting (contemplating) the Ideas, the philosopher would proceed directly to their description through concepts *in conctreta*, that is, concepts which speak directly about the Ideas themselves. So there is a specific difference here between Plato and Schopenhauer regarding this point which certainly cannot be mediated, even from an interpretive perspective. As a final point, it has at least been confirmed that although the nature of the unhypothetical is somewhat mysterious, and I will speak of this more fully in the next section, it is evident enough that the Forms within dialectic are without doubt imperceptible and invisible. For Schopenhauer, these must be considered as nothing more than concepts *in abstracta*.

Despite this fact, this doesn't create a problem for Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Ideas, since, as will be seen, he generally bases this upon Plato's notion of both the 'unhypothetical' as well as the 'Idea of the Good' (discussed in the next section).[63] The

[63] As a preliminary to this discussion, it is worth noting that Platonic *noesis* embraces higher *ethical* knowledge, which further points toward this sense of an intuitive foundation (in Schopenhauer's sense). Thus Paul More points out that: "Under the higher division of 'knowledge,' as distinguished from

larger difference then, from this interpretive perspective, is that of the nature of philosophy itself. Although both philosophers seem to interpretively agree that philosophy finds its foundation on the basis of the unhypothetical (as Idea or not, perceptible or imperceptible), for Schopenhauer genuine philosophy would make strict use of concepts *in concreta* for its description, whereas according to his interpretation, Plato intermingles both these as well as concepts *in abstracta* in his analysis of the Ideas. This is then fundamentally linked to Plato's confusion between concepts and Ideas themselves. Despite this, as is evident from the interpretation, Schopenhauer believes that Plato yet gets the Ideas right.

1.9. The beautiful 'sight' of the Idea

The above discussions offer very broad considerations regarding the perceptibility of the Ideas and the manner in which Schopenhauer's perspective may well find confirmation within Platonic thought. The results are, however, admittedly interpretive. I assume a number of points for Platonic thought which Schopenhauer may well not have agreed upon. Accordingly, in order to find a more solid foundation for this, I turn to two final 'naïve' considerations which help to further confirm the above considerations, based upon the assumption that Schopenhauer may well have misunderstood and thereby misrepresented Platonic thought. The first is then based upon the simile of the Good with the Sun in the *Republic*. The second is based upon the relationship between the Good, Beauty, Eros, and Wisdom in the *Symposium*.

Regarding the first point (1), in the *Republic*, prior to his description of the divided line, Plato poses the consummating question regarding the education of the rulers of the

'opinion,' are embraced two fields: one of mathematical forms and the corresponding faculty, or understanding; the other of ethical experiences and the faculty corresponding to these, which, among its various appellations, is called by precisely the same term, 'knowledge,' as that under which both of these spheres are subsumed." (More 1917, p. 210)

state, as he suggests: "What is the most important and appropriate subject for them to learn?"[64] (504d) It is then stated that such a subject must lie at the end and goal (ἐπὶ τέλος) of all training. The initial conjecture and answer to this question is that it is the 'Idea of the Good' which must be the most important subject.[65] (505a) But, why not the Good itself?

When Socrates is pressed about the matter, he responds that he is simply unable to answer the question, and even more that in the very attempt: "I'll disgrace myself and look ridiculous by trying." (506d) He suggests: "So let's abandon the quest for what the good itself is for the time being". Finally, in excusing his own (seeming) incapacity to describe the Good, he offers an alternative, as he goes on to state: "But I am willing to tell you about what is apparently (φαίνεται) an offspring (ἔκγονός) of the good (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) and most like that (ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ)."[66] (506e) As a means of illustrating this, Socrates makes use of the 'simile of the Sun'. Using the comparison of darkness and ignorance in relation to sight and truth, he states that the Sun is not sight itself, but is the: "cause of that which is seen and of (the ability of) sight itself".[67] (508b) Analogously, when the soul turns the inner 'eye' of the intellect to the sight of truth, as with the eyes of the body and the light of the sun, it is able to see.[68] (508d) Thus the

[64] «τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος;»

[65] «ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα»

[66] This point may offer further indication of the fact that even regarding the nature of the Good, Plato seems to think that 'knowledge' (which is essentially intuitive) requires rational confirmation. Thus regarding the desire for the Good, G. Rawson points out that: "The desire without method is insufficient, because true belief is not knowledge…'Giving an account' requires the 'hypothetical' and 'dialectical' method of systematic tests for consistency and consequences, once one has some true beliefs to rely upon…Thus is the Good a cause of knowledge: because true belief becomes knowledge when made 'stable' by giving an account through the dialectical method, the Good as supreme and guiding object of desire makes possible the recognition of increasingly more adequate hypotheses on the way to knowledge of the Good." (Rawson 1996, pp. 110-111)

[67] «ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν... αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης»

[68] A similar analogy between 'sight' and wisdom is seen in relation to Plato's description of the philosopher. Thus it is said that since the philosopher loves wisdom, then he or she must desire this in its entirety (οὐ τῆς μέν, τῆς δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάσης). (475b) Philosophers are therefore described as: "those who love the sight of truth (Τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἦν δ' εγώ, φιλοθεάμας)." (475e) This notion of 'sight' and 'seeing' in relation to the 'phenomenon of love' was fundamental to Greek thinking, as Max Scheler

Good is akin to the Sun, and in relation to its light, he concludes likewise: "That which grants truth to things known and the power to know is the Idea of the Good".[69] (508e)

Here then in the above description and 'simile of Sun', the Idea of the Good is directly compared to the light and 'sight' of the Sun. It may well be that Schopenhauer took this literally. In all other cases, Plato is emphatic that one does not 'see' the Idea as one sees say a 'tree' or a 'rock' in the visible realm. Yet Plato draws an analogy between the eyes of the body which see the light of the Sun and the 'eyes' of the soul which see the Idea of the Good. Regardless of whether this serves as an analogy and nothing more, the fact is that there is a definite non-abstract, non-discursive, non-rational sense in which knowledge of the 'Idea of the Good' as the 'light of the Sun' arises. If the 'Idea of the Good' is then taken as identical or similar to the unhypothetical lying at the end

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points out: "Even though Plato, in the *Symposium* for example, establishes great differences in value between the various kinds of love, in Greek eyes the whole phenomenon of 'love' belongs to the domain of the senses. It is a form of 'desire,' of 'need,' etc., which is foreign to the most perfect kind of being. This view is the natural corollary of the extremely questionable ancient division of human nature into 'reason' and 'sensuality,' into a part that is formative and one that is formed." (Scheler 1998, pp. 63-64)

[69] «Τοῦτο τοίνον τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δὺναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν φάθι εἶναι·». Regarding the nature of the Idea or Form of the Good, A.E. Taylor explains: "in the *Republic* we learn that there is a 'Form of Good' which is to the objects of knowledge and to knowing itself what the sun is to visible objects and to sight. This is then further explained by saying that the sun both makes the colours we see and supplies the eye with the source of all its seeing. In the same way, the 'good' supplies the objects of scientific knowledge with their being (οὐσία) and renders them knowable. And as the sun is neither the colours we see nor the eye which sees them, so the 'good' is something even more exalted than 'being.' Later on, we find that the sciences form a hierarchy which has its culmination in the actual apprehension of this transcendent 'good.' Now, since it is assumed in the *Republic* that scientific knowledge is knowledge of forms, the objects which are thus said to 'derive their being from the good' must clearly mean the whole body of the forms. The 'good' thus holds a preeminence among forms, and strictly speaking, it might be doubtful whether we ought to call it a 'form' any more than we can call the sun a colour. At least, all the other forms must be manifestations or expressions of it." (Taylor 2003, p. 286) Gerasimos Santas further elaborates: "the theory of the Form of the Good asserts that the Form of the Good is the formal cause of all the other forms having their ideal attributes, or that all the other Forms have their ideal attributes by virtue of participating in the Form of the Good. The ideal attributes of all the other Forms are proper attributes of the Form of the Good; or, the Form of the Good consists in the ideality of the Forms. So conceived, each Form other than the Form of the Good is the best object of its kind, and it is such by virtue of participating (fully) in the Form of the Good." (Santas 1988, pp. 45-46)

of the dialectical trail, then Schopenhauer's analysis of Plato's Ideas, would find some degree of confirmation, albeit, from an interpretive standpoint.

The second point (2) is Plato's description of the Good in the *Symposium*, and the manner in which Wisdom is there discussed within the context of both Eros and Beauty. From this perspective, the Ideas are rendered perceptible within the context of the 'Beauty of Wisdom'. This relationship between Wisdom and Beauty is in fact one of the more important points to consider, for as will be seen later, in Schopenhauer the perceptibility of the Ideas has a primordially *aesthetic* dimension which renders them perceptible.

Turning to the Symposium, it is seen that the nature of love or desire is there expounded metaphorically through the account of the daemon Eros (Ἔρως). I pass over the earlier speeches which have no direct relevance for this investigation, and begin with the concluding part of Socrates' discussion with Agathon, which leads directly to the speech of Diotima.[70] I will highlight the general characteristics which are said to pertain to Eros in relation to this speech. The main characterization of Eros (1) is that he is essentially a kind of daemon which subsists between (μεταξὺ) certain states of existence. This is due to the fact that he is said to be the son of the gods of both Plenty

[70] A.E. Taylor points out the fact that: "To all intents and purposes, we shall not go wrong by treating the 'speech of Diotima' as a speech of Socrates." (Taylor 2003, p. 225) Although I leave out all discussion of the other speakers of Plato's *Symposium*, the speech of Eryximachus is perhaps worth mentioning. Indeed, Eryximachus the physician outlines a much more naturalistic interpretation of Eros which hearkens later to Schopenhauer's will in nature. A.E. Taylor points out that Eryximachus gives: "emphatic assent to the distinction between a good and a bad Eros, but protests against looking for the effects of these contrasted forces exclusively in the souls of men. - They can be traced everywhere in the structure of the universe, no less than in the human organism. This may be illustrated from medicine. The healthy and the diseased constituents of the body have both their 'cravings'; there are wholesome appetitions and morbid appetitions." (Taylor 2003, p. 217) Taylor further notes that: "The 'good Eros' is exemplified by those scales in which a really cultivated taste takes pleasure, the 'bad' by those which tickle the fancy of the vulgar." (*ibid*., p. 218) Although the above description of Eryximachus' speech is certainly a far cry from Schopenhauer's will, there are yet identifiable congruities between the two. For indeed, along with Eryximachus, Schopenhauer considers will as fundamental to all things, both to human inner cravings as well as the cosmic "structure of the universe". There is furthermore an ethical congruity in the sense that Schopenhauer likens 'good' will to the refined contemplation of the Ideas (as objectifications of the will) among genius—whereas 'bad' will is akin to the common man caught within the baser service to the will.

and Poverty (Πόρου καὶ Πενίας υἱὸς), and is therefore endowed with both of their natures.[71] (203c) As such, he is described as having a love for something (τινῶν), while yet simultaneously lacking (ἔνδεια) the objects of his desire.[72] (201a) Regarding knowledge itself, Eros is said to subsist (2) between wisdom (σοφία) and ignorance (ἀμαθία), and is thus a lover of wisdom or a philosopher (φιλοσοθός).[73] (202a-203d) That Eros is a lover further implies something *about* wisdom which makes it desirable. The third point (3) is thus arrived at that what Eros really desires as a philosopher is the Beauty of wisdom. (204a-c) Still, Beauty must imply something even more fundamental, that is, something which serves as its source.[74] (204d) The final

[71] Schopenhauer's sense of the will and indeed the 'will-to-live', radically differs from Platonic eros. Thus William Desmond points out that: "Schopenhauer has philosophical eyes only for lack; and if there is *poros* (resource), it is merely instrumental to negotiating provisionally with the infinite hydra of lack. Will has lost its memory of the archaic trace of divine festivity that slumbers in the sources of Platonic eros. It must topple away into emptiness." (Desmond 2003, p. 150)

[72] «ὁ Ἔρως πρῶτον μὲν τινῶν, ἔπειτα τούτων, ὧν ἂν ἔνδεια παρῃ αὐτῷ» Thus David Halperin writes: "The Platonic *eros*, then, refers in the first instance not to love but to sexual attraction. There are, however, many ways of interpreting the intentionality of sexual desire, and here the evidence indicates that Plato's outlook was radically different from that of most of his contemporaries. In Greek *eros* originally meant any longing capable of satisfaction, and for Athenians of Plato's day *eros* still retained the sense which it, or its ancestor, possesses in the conventional Homeric phrase, αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἕντο ('when they had expelled their *eros* of food and drink'). In other words, even when the Greeks had largely transferred the operation of *eros* to the more specialized arena of personal relations, they continued to understand it by analogy with hunger and thirst: throughout the classical period *eros*—and sexual desire in general—is treated by our sources as one of the necessities, or innate compulsions, of human nature. (Halperin 1998, p. 70)

[73] «φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητὴς καὶ πόριμος, φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου» Thus C.D.C. Reeve states that: "A philosopher is ruled by the desires in reason. He most wants the pleasure of learning and knowing the truth." (Reeve 1988, p. 37)

[74] «Ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν· τί ἐρᾷ;» Regarding this point, David Halperin writes: "Plato provisionally agrees with his contemporaries, then, in regarding *eros* as a response to the stimulus of visual beauty, but he strenuously disagrees with them about the nature of the experience. Such is the point of Diotima's crucial and much-neglected distinction between the object and the aim of erotic desire: 'Eros is not for the beautiful, Socrates, as you suppose.' 'What is it, then?' 'It is for birth and procreation in the beautiful' (206e)." (Halperin 1998, p. 84) He then goes on to point out that: "The purpose behind Diotima's refusal to call *eros* a desire *for* the beautiful *tout court* is to avoid the otherwise inescapable implication that erotic desire *aims* at the *possession* of beautiful things…Diotima has to find a way of communicating to Socrates that beauty, though related in some fashion to the true aim of *eros*, does not exhaust the purpose of erotic desire; it is not the solution to the problem of erotic intentionality but an invitation to further inquiry." (*ibid*., p. 86)

determining point (4) is made that it is the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) which is the object of this desire.[75] (204e)

There are a number of significant considerations which derive from the above four points. Foremost among these is the fact that Plato is positing a relationship between the Good and the desire for the Good through the Beauty of wisdom. The progression here is that (1) Eros is said to subsist between ignorance and wisdom and (2) thus desire's wisdom (as a philosopher). Wisdom is Beautiful. Eros thus (3) desires the beauty of wisdom. Finally, this desire finds its source within the Good. So Eros in desiring beauty within wisdom, fundamentally (4) desires the Good. If the Ideas are then taken as a part of wisdom itself, it would follow that they are also desirable inasmuch as there is a sense of Beauty which accords to them.[76] I will not stretch the

[75] Accordingly, τὸ καλόν is here replaced with τὸ ἀγαθόν, and in doing so, Eros becomes essentially a lover of good things (τὰ ἀγαθά), for indeed one who obtains goods things will be said to have a good and prosperous fortune and destiny (εὐδαίμων). (204e) With the previous points taken together, it is finally concluded that inasmuch as the possession of good things brings happiness, to that extent: "love wants to possess the good forever" (ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀεί). (206b) A.E. Taylor colorfully describes this aim of eros: "What is it that, in the end, is the object of the heart's desirous longing? Good, or in still plainer words happiness (εὐδαιμονία). All men wish happiness for its own sake, and all wish their happiness to be 'for ever.' (Weh spricht, Vergeh! Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit.)" (Taylor 2003, p. 227)

[76] Plato is then akin to a 'metaxological' philosopher, as William Desmond points out, which entails essentially a: "philosophy as seeking a logos of the metaxu, an intelligible account of what it means to be between or intermediate." (Desmond 2003, p. 21) In light of this, Schopenhauer really rejects metaxological thinking. For him, 'logos' becomes now an impoverishment of our knowledge. What is left is then a kind of dark 'between' of the striving and suffering will through which 'genius' penetrates directly into knowledge of the Ideas on the basis of contemplation. Schopenhauer thus considers Plato as having *seen* this very primordial kind of knowledge (through the perceptibility of the Ideas), but as having then departed from this ground and now *emphasizing* rational account through logos. For Schopenhauer, this becomes Plato's essential mistake. Despite this fact, Desmond seems to be pointing out the fact that Platonic thought really transcends such a narrow delimitation of knowledge and reality in light of Schopenhauer's rather naïve distinction between 'what I see and intuit' and 'what I account for'. For a more thorough discussion of this point and of metaxological philosophy in general, see Desmond (1995). William Caldwell also offers a number of insightful remarks on this point: "A great defect of Schopenhauer's is that he did not fully grasp the truth—which is as old as the *Theaetetus* of Plato —that knowledge consists in the union of conception and perception." (Caldwell 1896, p. 169)

analogy here too far for Plato, but rather look at Schopenhauer's interpretation of the matter.[77]

Turning to Schopenhauer then, I ask a simple question: What becomes of the above structure if one replaces point (4) with Eros itself? This might sound paradoxical, for indeed now Eros desires itself, yet this is precisely what Schopenhauer will be seen to do. Indeed, Schopenhauer replaces the Good with Eros *through* will.[78] But the will is quite different from the Good. There is nothing *primordially* intelligible about the will. It doesn't stand beyond the visible realm, and thus there is nothing strictly transcendent to it. The will is rather fundamentally volitional and immanent to nature. But yet, Schopenhauer retains both wisdom as well as the beautiful. If one then considers wisdom in the *Symposium* as relating to the 'Idea of the Good' in the *Republic*, then some interesting things happen with respect to Schopenhauer's interpretation. In effect, now

[77] Other scholars have already pointed out the relationship. Thus A.E. Taylor further brings the eros for Beauty (and the Good) in the *Symposium* together with form of the Good in the *Republic*, further pointing out this sense of the *unhypothetical* (the Beautiful, the Good) as lying beyond science itself (hence reason and abstraction), indeed, as almost 'revelatory' or 'visionary'. He thus states that: "As in the *Republic*, the study of the separate sciences leads up to the supreme science of 'dialectic' or metaphysics, in which we are confronted with the principles on which all other knowing depends, so here also Socrates describes the man who is coming in sight of his goal as 'descrying one single science' of Beauty (210d7). And in both cases, in the final moment of attainment, the soul is described as having got beyond 'science' itself. Science here passes in the end into direct 'contact,' or, as the schoolmen say, 'vision,' an apprehension of an object which is no longer 'knowing about' it, knowing propositions which can be predicated of it, but an actual possession of and being possessed by it. In the *Republic*, as in the *Symposium*, the thought is conveyed by language borrowed from the 'holy marriage' of ancient popular religion and its survivals in mystery cults. Here it is 'Beauty' to which the soul is mated; in the *Republic* it is that good which, though the cause of all being and all goodness, is itself 'on the other side of being'." (Taylor 2003, pp. 230-231) Taylor further goes on: "We must not, of course, especially in view of the convertibility of the terms καλόν and ἀγαθόν which is dwelt on more than once in our dialogue, be misled into doubting the absolute identity of the 'form of good' of the *Republic* with the αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν of the *Symposium*. The place assigned to both in the ascent to 'being and reality' is identical, and in both cases the stress is laid on the point that when the supreme 'form' is descried, its apprehension comes as a sudden 'revelation,' though it is not to be had without the long preliminary process of travail of thought, and that it is apprehended by 'direct acquaintance,' not by discursive 'knowledge about' it. It is just in this conviction that all 'knowledge about' is only preparatory to a direct *scientia visionis* that Socrates reveals the fundamental agreement of his conception with that of the great mystics of all ages." (*ibid*.)

[78] This isn't merely an interesting parallel. To be discussed in the conclusion, Schopenhauer's analysis of the will as thing-in-itself and yet as phenomenal (through knowledge of it), holds interesting parallels with Plato's own notion of the Good and the 'Idea of the Good', as will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

the beauty of the Idea becomes that which is desired, and as will be seen, this is precisely what Schopenhauer will suggest.

How then does such an Idea become perceptible? The Idea is like the Sun, which now, no longer stands transcendent to the visible world. It is rather immanent within things. So for Plato, the Beauty of wisdom was 'seen' only apparently (φαίνεται) on the basis of a transcendent and imperceptible source. On the other hand, for Schopenhauer the Beauty of wisdom, being the aesthetic phenomenon of the Idea, is *really* perceptible on the basis of an immanent source, yet veiled by the apparent (*Vorstellung*).[79] This then will be seen to be Schopenhauer essential interpretation of the perceptibility of the Ideas. I perceive the Ideas *through* the covering, that is, through my representation (*Vorstelling*), through the veil of Maya.

This is then the quintessential interpretation of the perceptibility of the Platonic Idea according to Schopenhauer's thought. It is, however, the naïve perspective, for it departs from what is considered a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of Plato (which is certainly possible). Although the latter is more precisely the case, it is hoped that the previous sections, taken together with this present section, sheds some light upon the fact that Schopenhauer had very good grounds for interpreting the Ideas as he does, and furthermore, for believing that Plato, had he understood matters more clearly, would have likely agreed with him.

Having indirectly answered the question of the perceptibility of the Ideas within the context of Platonic thought, this chapter comes now to its conclusion. In the chapters which follow, I turn to a thorough consideration of the manner in which Schopenhauer's Ideas arise on the basis of will, of how these differ from concepts and subjective intuitions, of how they serve to mediate the singularity of the will with the plurality of phenomena, of how they enter into representation, of their perceptibility,

[79] To this extent, Schopenhauer's Idea is both immanent and transcendent to things. (cf. section 3.5) Plato's Ideas are, however, always transcendent. They reside within the intelligible realm, standing as patterns upon which visible things are modeled and copied, as Plato relates in the *Timaeus*.

and finally, of precisely wherein Schopenhauer's essential philosophical error resides.

CHAPTER 2

On the Direct Path to Knowledge

2.1. Kant's indirect path

> What I have in view in this Appendix to my work is really only a vindication of the teaching I have set forth in it, in so far as in many points it does not agree with the Kantian philosophy, but actually contradicts it. Yet a discussion thereof is necessary, for evidently my line of thought, different as its content is from the Kantian, is completely under its influence (*unter dem Einfluß*), and necessarily presupposes and starts from it.[80] (*W1*, pp. 416-417; S. 533)

Although Schopenhauer confesses a debt of influence to both Plato and Kant, with the latter philosopher he goes one step further in the above passage—admitting contradictions between his own thought and the renowned teacher of transcendental philosophy.[81] For anyone familiar with both Kant and Schopenhauer, the most obvious

[80] I should like to take a moment or two to remind the reader of the connection and order between this chapter and the previous. In the previous, the general discussion focused upon Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Ideas. The basic question was whether Schopenhauer's sense of the Ideas as perceptual might find any grounding in light of Plato's thought as a whole. It was seen there that a number of ambiguous points presented themselves within Platonic thought, i.e., that between sensation and rational perplexity, recollection, the various intellectual methodologies, the unhypothetical, and the Good, which offers some grounding for Schopenhauer's interpretation. In this present chapter, I now turn to a consideration of the foundations of Schopenhauer's epistemology. I consider here Schopenhauer's notion of empirical perception, of representation and the grounding of the will, as also of the nature of intuition and abstraction.

[81] In his book, *On Schopenhauer*, Jack Odell remarks upon Schopenhauer's general interpretive perspective regarding both Kant as well as Plato, as he states: "According to Schopenhauer, the Kantian view is that the epistemological forms of knowledge, namely space, time, and causality, belong only to

contradiction would seem in general to be the latter's admission of metaphysics on the basis of both will and Idea. In consequence of this, it would be quite misleading to suggest that Schopenhauer is either a Kantian or Platonic philosopher. Although Schopenhauer considered Hegel's philosophy as something of the complete antithesis to his own, there are yet deep undercurrents which connect these two thinkers inasmuch as each make very liberal use of both Platonic as well as Kantian elements, while still developing upon and departing from the original teachings of these masters.[82] Even more interesting is the fact that with Schopenhauer it may be suggested that through his adaptation of transcendental Idealism together with the Idea, his thought really begins with Kant but ends upon more Platonic grounds. Within this present chapter then, I consider the manner in which Schopenhauer's thought first initiates and departs from Kant, that is, from the perspective of his critical appropriation of transcendental Idealism. From there, I show the manner in which this departure leads to more Platonic grounds, albeit in a radically different way, through Schopenhauer's identification of Kant's thing-in-itself with the will. As will be seen, one of the more essential points which distinguish Schopenhauer's thought is his understanding of the sharp distinction and yet relationship between abstract and intuitive knowledge. This is an important distinction, for it serves to both sever

representations, and not to the thing-in-itself. For this reason plurality and change belong only to the will's objectified phenomena. Plato, on the other hand, is viewed by Schopenhauer to have maintained that the empirical world—the world of beds, tables, etc.—has not true reality, it is always becoming. Its constituents are not objects of knowledge. For Plato, only that which is real can be known. Ultimately, Kant and Plato are saying the same thing, namely, that the phenomenal world is meaningless without Kant's thing-in-itself or Plato's Ideas to give it meaning." (Odell 2001, p. 62)

[82] Thus Andrew Bowie in his book, *Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas*, points out that: "Kant himself says that he is drawing the limits of knowledge to make space for religious faith, but it is now pretty clear that the modern world has been unable to fill that space. In the philosophy of J.G. Fichte, F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F Hegel, known as 'German Idealism', which begins in the 1790s, the space is often filled with aspects of what Kant proposes which are given a more emphatic status than Kant himself thinks possible. Fichte, for example, will make the activity of the I the source of the world's intelligibility in a way that Kant rejects. Development of some of these thinkers ideas will be germane to Schopenhauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche, who, though, reject many of the central philosophical contentions of German Idealism." (Bowie 2003, p. 17)

Schopenhauer's thought from Kant, while simultaneously tying it to the Platonic Idea, albeit, in a radically different way.

One of the more concrete remarks regarding Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective is found within the first book to the *WWR* wherein he relates his own thought to both that of Kant as well as Plato.[83] In this passage, Schopenhauer there states that *according to Kant*:

> Time, space, and causality are not determinations of the thing-in-itself (*des Dinges an sich*), but belong only to its phenomenon (*Erscheinung*), since they are nothing but forms of our knowledge (*Formen unsern Erkenntniß*). Now as all plurality and all arising and passing away are possible only through time, space, and causality, it follows that they too adhere only to the phenomenon, and by no means to the thing-in-itself. But since our knowledge is conditioned by these forms, the whole of experience (*Erfahrung*) is only knowledge of the phenomenon, not of the thing-in-itself; hence also its laws cannot be made valid for the thing-in-itself. What has been said extends even to our own ego (*unser eigenes Ich*), and we know that only as phenomenon, not according to what it may be in itself. (*W1*, pp. 170-171)

At hindsight, the above remarks seem entirely in the spirit of Kantian philosophy. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* (*CPR*), Kant certainly separated the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself, and also argued that our perceptual knowledge of the world is conditioned on the basis of the subject. There are, however, a number of stated points in the above passage which certainly do not par well with Kant's original understanding of matters. In the first place, Schopenhauer offers no reference to the categories of perception which

[83] I discuss this section again and in reference to Plato in section 3.2.

formed an essential basis to Kant's original transcendental approach. Instead, Schopenhauer speaks of the 'forms' of perception. But what are these forms? Are they forms which result from the categories of Kant, or are they different? If different, then how if at all, does this difference affect Schopenhauer's interpretation and above elaboration of Kantian philosophy? So Schopenhauer's account of Kant will thus likely be seen to again (as with Plato) be largely based upon his own interpretation of his thought. Understanding the characteristic nature and interpretation of transcendental Idealism within Schopenhauer's thought thus requires a consideration first of the manner in which he critically appropriates Kantian philosophy.[84]

In light of this present task and investigation, the most significant critical examination of Kantian philosophy is found within the context of an *Appendix* which appeared in subsequent editions to the first book of Schopenhauer's *WWR*. Within this rather extensive addition, Schopenhauer offers a number of very illuminating remarks regarding what he considers to be essential errors inherent to Kant's thought. For this present discussion, the most important of these may be summed up in three points: (1) Kant starts with indirect as opposed to direct knowledge, in consequence of which he eventually (2) confuses the nature of intuitive and abstract knowledge, which thereby leads to a (3) false deduction of the thing-in-itself. In what follows, I will discuss these three points, showing the manner in which each leads into the next, and how from the last, Schopenhauer's own thought definitively departs from Kant's own. Starting with the first and fundamental error then, Schopenhauer states in this *Appendix* that:

[84] Such critical applications can also be found interspersed throughout Schopenhauer's works. Thus in his essay, *On the Basis of Morality*, Schopenhauer there devotes a chapter discussion to a survey and criticism of Kantian ethics. Again, in his later, largely more aphoristic and supplementary works, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, Schopenhauer offers further clarifications (*Erläutungen*) on Kantian philosophy within the context of a short history, and further discusses the schism (*Skizze*) between the two schools of Idealism and Realism, wherein Hume, Locke, Kant, and even Fichte and Hegel figure into the discussion.

> An essential difference between Kant's method and that which I follow is to be found in the fact that he starts from indirect (*mittelbaren*), reflected knowledge (*reflektirten Erkenntniß*), whereas I start from direct (*umittelbaren*) and intuitive knowledge (*intuitiven*).[85] (*W1*, pp. 452-453)

So for Schopenhauer, Kant and Plato would be quite similar in their rejection of intuitive knowledge on the basis of perception, although their stated reasons for this would be quite different.[86] For Plato, the visible world was understood as an imitation of the more eternally real intelligible world, and in consequence of this he dismisses the possibility of knowledge according to the former and in favor of the latter. On the other hand, Schopenhauer considers Kant as having *neglected* empirical experience, rather than intending to reject it explicitly. In light of this, Schopenhauer quotes the initial declaration in the *Prolegomena to Future Metaphysics*, wherein Kant states that:

[85] Schopenhauer further notes in the first book to his *Parerga and Paralipomena* that: "I may mention, as a special characteristic of my philosophizing, that I try everywhere *to go to the very root of things*, since I continue to pursue them up to the ultimate given reality. This happens by virtue of a natural disposition that makes it well nigh impossible for me to rest content with any general and abstract knowledge that is therefore still indefinite, with mere concepts, not to mention words. On the contrary, I am urged forward until I have plainly before me the ultimate basis of all concepts and propositions which is at all times intuitive. I must then let this stand as the primary phenomenon, or, if possible, I still resolve it into its elements, but in any case I follow out to the utmost the essential nature of the matter." (*PP1*, p. 131) Regarding this matter, Brian Magee states that according to Schopenhauer: "He thought Kant must be wrong in believing that the deepest knowledge and understanding which are available to us in this phenomenal world take the form of conceptual knowledge, for everything that actually exists in it is uniquely particular, and concepts cannot deal with the uniquely particular. Percepts, however, do – indeed, concepts about the world outside ourselves have content only in so far as they are derived from, and can be cashed back into, percepts. The deepest knowledge and understanding which are available to us are to be found in unique perceptions, and although these cannot be communicated by concepts they can, nevertheless, be communicated: by works of art." (Magee 1990, pp. 17-18)

[86] That is to say, whereas Kant rejects intellectual intuition into the thing-in-themselves, Plato certainly does not (although he confuses such intuitions with concepts—according to Schopenhauer's view).

> The source of metaphysics cannot be empirical at all; its fundamental principles and concepts can never be taken from experience, either inner or outer. (*Prol.*, §1)

For Schopenhauer, such a starting point is an essential *petitio principii*, for Kant is essentially assuming the very conclusion (that metaphysics isn't empirical) which he sets out in the premises, rather than endeavoring to first prove that this is so. In simple terms, Kant begs the question. Is metaphysics really the, "science of that which lies beyond the possibility of experience"? (*W1*, p. 426) True or not, for Schopenhauer the initial step would have required that Kant first interrogate experience so as to determine whether or not such a science might be found through it. If following such an interrogation, all manner of metaphysics were discovered to be impossible on the basis of experience, Kant would then be permitted to quite confidently declare the same thing which he only assumes above. As Schopenhauer himself states:

> In truth, however, the matter stands thus: The world and our existence present themselves to us necessarily as a riddle. It is now assumed, without more ado, that the solution of this riddle cannot result from a thorough understanding of the world itself, but must be looked for in something quite different from the world…namely by means of inferences (*Schlüssen*) from universal principles (*allgemeinen Sätzen*) *a priori*. (*W1*, p. 427)

Akin to Plato, Kant gives primacy to the 'intellect', although in a different way. He starts with indirect, reflected knowledge, looking to universal principles (i.e. abstract concepts) about the world, rather than turning to a consideration of the direct and quite

intuitive content of the world obtainable on the basis of experience.[87] Kant thus turns first to reason (*Vernunft*), and from there, offers his critique. Regarding what Kant *should* have first done, Schopenhauer states the following:

> [I] say that the solution to the riddle of the world must come from an understanding of the world itself; and hence that the task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source (*Hauptquelle*) of all knowledge.[88] (*W1*, p. 428)

In consequence of this initial error, Kant is thereby led into a number of problems regarding both the nature of knowledge and even more fundamentally, the nature and proper ground of the thing-in-itself.

2.2. The confusion of concepts and intuitions

In neglecting empirical experience, Kant passes over any real comprehensive account of the manner in which our knowledge of the world arises initially on the basis of the

[87] Regarding this point, Paul Guyer notes that: "At least part of the reason why Schopenhauer could develop a philosophy that is so close to and yet so far from Kant's is a fundamental difference in their methodologies…Schopenhauer thought that he could employ a more straightforward method of the scrutiny of experience itself, a method much more akin to the empiricism of Hume before him and of phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl after him, and thought that such a direct scrutiny of our experience shows that we have in fact not one but two ways of comprehending it: through our representation of the spatial, temporal, and causal relations of objects, on the one hand, and through our own capacity for willing, on the other." (Guyer 2006, p. 94)

[88] Schopenhauer makes his criticism of Kant's indirect method more explicit (in relation to ethics), particularly in terms of my own discussion (cf. section 2.9) on methodology, in his essay *On the Basis of Morality*. He there states that: "From a given system of metaphysics assumed to be true, we should reach on the *synthetical* path the foundation of ethics, in which way the foundation itself would be built up from below and ethics consequently would appear firmly supported. On the other hand, since the problem has made it necessary for ethics to be separated from all metaphysics, there is nothing left but the *analytical* method, which starts from facts either of external experience or of consciousness." (*BM*, pp. 42-43)

sense organs, only to be later translated into the representation of cognitive perception. In other words, Kant's initial error leads him into the inevitable result that: "he gives no theory of the origin of empirical perception".[89] (*W1*, p. 445) For Schopenhauer, had Kant *first* interrogated empirical experience, he would have recognized that every perception of an object in the world always assumes the subject as its basis. In this sense, it is contradictory to speak of 'objects' lying *beyond* the sensible world. In other words, Kant would have recognized the transcendental law of: "No object without a subject".[90] (*W1*, p.434) Regarding this point, Schopenhauer states that:

> It is merely an error of Kant (as is shown in the Appendix) that he did not reckon among these forms, before all others, that of being-object-for-a-subject (*Objekt-für-ein-Subjekt-seyn*); for this very form is the first and most universal of all phenomenon, i.e., of all representation. (*W1*, p. 174)

Kant was correct in arguing that perception is essentially cognitive, being based upon *a priori* principles. He nevertheless failed to see, since he failed to interrogate experience, that the primordial form of the representation (*Vorstellung*) of the world within perception, subsists as a co-subsistence of subject and object. Within this context, an

[89] "daß er keine Theorie der Entstehung der empirischen Anschuung giebt". Schopenhauer seems to have slightly overstated matters. Indeed, Kant certainly does offer a theory of empirical perception within his *Critique of Pure Reason*. There Kant will go on to suggest that in relation to sensibility there arises the: "capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects", referring to the resulting intuition consequent to it as "empirical". (A34/B20) In yet another passage, he suggests that both intuitions as well as concepts can be looked at as either "pure or empirical" depending upon whether we take sensation into account or not. When sensation is thus taken into account together with the combined effect of intuitions and concepts, the result leads to an empirical perception. When not, we obtain merely the *a priori* forms of perception. (A51/B75) So Schopenhauer would have been more correct to have stated that although Kant offers a theory of empirical perception, he yet confuses its essential nature.

[90] "Keine Objekt ohne Subjekt". Of course Kant would have recognized some sense of this, inasmuch as it is fundamental to the transcendental approach as such. In light of this, William Desmond refers to Schopenhauer's thought specifically as a kind of 'subjective Idealism', that is: "Schopenhauer is a *subjective Idealist* for whom there is no object without a subject." (Desmond 2003, p. 135)

'object-it-itself' is a contradiction in terms, and yet Kant will assume the very thing. Thus in the introduction to the *CPR*, Kant there distinguishes between two faculties inherent to human cognition, stating:

> [There] are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstand*), through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought. (A16/B30)

For Schopenhauer, such a description is inherently false, and inevitably leads to a number of further problems within Kant's thought. In the first place, as suggested above, 'objects' can never arise directly through sensibility. Rather, first the sensation (*Empfindung*) of the world must pass through the brain wherein this datum is then intuited on the basis of the understanding (*Verstand*), and only after which does it become an actual representational object (*Objekt*) of perception.[91] Such an object is then an object-for-the-subject, not in-itself, since it has already been determined on the basis of the understanding, and thus translated from unformatted sensations into formatted intuitions. Kant's account of objects as 'given' to us through sensibility is expressly false according to Schopenhauer.

So this initial and quite simple error, that Kant neglects empirical experience, is seen to lead to a number of significant problems. One of the more significant of these regards the nature and kinds of knowledge possible on the basis of cognition itself. Kant will go

[91] Regarding this point, Vojislav Bosickovic states in his article, "Schopenhauer and Kant on Subjectivity", that: "Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer believes that the subject's grasp of the objective is 'built into' his sensory perception of objects, a process that Schopenhauer calls intuitive perception. It is not triggered by any temporal sequences, i.e., successions, be they grasped as irreversible by the subject or not. Sensation, claims Schopenhauer, cannot give objects to the subject unless he has assumed an external cause to account for his sensations as effects. That is, the subject's sensations give rise to *objects* in virtue of his positing an external cause for the former." (Bosickovic 1996, p. 36)

on in the *CPR* to ascribe to sensibility a 'receptivity of impressions' (*die Rezeptivität der Eindrücke*), stating again that through this, objects are given to us, and further referring to the impression rising through it as representation (*Vorstellung*). He then goes on to describe the nature of understanding, stating that in relation to this faculty there arises a 'spontaneity of concepts' (*Spontaneität der Begriffe*). The understanding is thus considered a kind of intuitively reflective faculty, where yet concepts are essentially: "thought in relation to the representation". In this sense, the nature of understanding involves a sense of intuiting representations which arise through sensibility while simultaneously creating concepts about them. He concludes from this that:

> Intuition (*Anschauung*) and concepts (*Begriffe*) therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition (*Erkenntnis*), so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. (A50/B74)

So Kant intermingles both intuitions and concepts, for indeed each are shown to be interdependent upon the other.[92] Schopenhauer considers the entire above process as a very confused account of the nature of cognition. The two most significant problems for him are then the fact that (1) objects never arise directly through sensibility, and (2), the understanding is an essentially *intuitive* faculty, and can then therefore never produce concepts as Kant suggests. In effect, Schopenhauer isolates objects from sensibility and

[92] Paul Guyer sees Schopenhauer's analysis of Kant here as arising from a fundamental interpretation on the basis of his own conception of consciousness in general. He thus writes: "That is, when Kant distinguishes intuitions and concepts and says that we have no cognition of objects unless we combine the two, Schopenhauer takes him to be saying that we are separately *conscious* of both intuitions and concepts and are then *conscious* of combining them into a cognition of objects that in turn represents a further state of consciousness, clearly distinct from the prior states and especially from the initial state of intuition. Thus, he concludes, Kant does not recognize that the initial state of consciousness, which Schopenhauer identifies with perception, is already cognition of objects." (Guyer 2006, pp. 115-116)

sharply distinguishes concepts from intuitions. He further believes that he has very good reasons for doing so.[93]

According to Schopenhauer, the intermingling of concepts with intuitions can only mean that Kant must inevitably bring 'thinking into perception' (*das Denken in die Anschauung*), and alternatively, 'perception into thinking' (*das Anschauen in das Denken*).[94] (*W1*, p. 439) Schopenhauer bases this conclusion upon two points. First, the character of perception can *never* be discursive, which therefore excludes all manner of rational, abstract, or concept-development from its character. Perception is therefore essentially intuitive, interpreted in the barest sense as a passive receptivity of things within the mind. Yet Kant intermingles the understanding as intuiting representations and spontaneously producing concepts. This leads however to the very serious problem, noticed by many critics of Kant's *CPR*, that in bringing thinking into perception, Kant thereby reduces the world to the kind of immaterialism seen in Berkeley's analysis of *esse est percipi*. Schopenhauer is quick to note this, for he believes that Kant himself recognized the problem and sought to avoid it in subsequent editions, as he suggests:

[93] Douglas McDermid further explains: "Schopenhauer draws a sharp distinction between perception proper and mere sensation. He regards the latter as raw material for the former. Sensation, he insists, occurs entirely 'under the skin' (WWR II: §4, 38); it is a mere matter of my sense organs being stimulated or affected, of a change in my body apprehended only under the form of inner sense, that is to say, time… Perception, in contrast, can yield knowledge of the external world and is therefore objective, inasmuch as it purports to represent objects or states of affairs *outside* the subject by presenting things under the forms of space and time (and not time alone, as in sensation)." (McDermid 2002, p. 212)

[94] Schopenhauer further elaborates upon this point suggesting that: "Kant, however ascribes the objects themselves to *thinking*, in order thus to make experience and the objective world dependent upon the *understanding* (*vom Verstande*), yet without letting the understanding be a faculty of *perception* (*ein Vermögen der Anschauung*)." (*W1*, p. 443)

> Without doubt this is mainly why, in the second edition, he suppressed the principal Idealistic passage previously referred to, and declared himself directly opposed to Berkeley's Idealism.[95] (*W1*, p. 435)

A second consequence follows then upon the first. In ascribing to the understanding a conceptual function, Kant thereby brings 'perception into thinking'. In intermingling intuition with conception, Kant *taints* the universal with the particular, and in effect all manner of thinking: "loses its essential character of universality and abstraction (*der Allgemeinheit und Abstraktion*), and, instead of universal concepts, receives as its object individual things".[96] (*W1*, p. 439) In other words, the universal and particular mingle in such a way as to render all discursive knowledge impossible. Such a terrible confusion is fundamentally based upon Kant's indirect methodological approach, of his subsequent neglect of empirical perception, and the further fact that he: "has nowhere clearly distinguished knowledge of perception (*anschauliche*) from abstract knowledge (*abstrakte Erkenntniß*)". (*W1, p. 431*)

[95] And thus also worked out a refutation of such Idealism (cf., the second edition to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*). Christopher Janaway further points out that: "Kant's claim to superiority over Berkeley can be summarized as follows. Kant's account provides for a constitutive criterion of the objectivity that can be achieved by our representations. It does so by (*a*) relying on nothing external to the realm of representations themselves, and (*b*) seeking those a priori rules which must govern the experience of any subject. Berkeley, on the other hand, faces the dilemma either of making objectivity depend solely on contingent facts about our minds (which Kant thinks deprives it of its right to be called objectivity at all), or of seeking his criterion beyond representations in the realm of the thing in itself. The latter option makes objectivity transcend our minds altogether, unless we add the purely 'mystical' notion of an insight into the divine. Kant makes objectivity both accessible to our minds without any mystical intuition, and independent of our own particular subjective constitution." (Janaway 1989, p. 65)

[96] Schopenhauer's conclusion here is quite interesting. In sharply distinguishing between concepts (as abstract) and intuitions, Schopenhauer will be seen to later bring this original distinction back together in his rather confused description of the knowledge of the Ideas. I will discuss this problem in more detail in section 4.3.

2.3. Determining the proper ground of the thing-in-itself

So according to Schopenhauer, these initial confusions eventually lead Kant into error on the basis of the indirect path which he pursues within the *CPR*. Having turned first to indirect knowledge as opposed to the direct knowledge obtainable through experience, Kant now faces the problem of accounting for the existence of the thing-in-itself on the basis of the phenomenon. For Schopenhauer, this is quite impossible, and any such attempt must lead into considerable problems. Yet Kant will attempt to do precisely this, and inevitably contradicts the essential principles inherent to transcendental philosophy. For according to these principles, empirical perception must be determined *a priori*, and this means that objective causality as such can only be spoken of *relative* to phenomena themselves. As Schopenhauer points out:

> Kant bases the assumption of the thing-in-itself, although concealed under many different turns of expression, on a conclusion according to the law of causality, namely that empirical perception (*die empirische Anschauung*), or more correctly *sensation* in our organs of sense (*die Empfindung in unsern Sinnesorganen*) from which it proceeds, must have an external cause. (*W1*, p. 436)

Kant implicitly states as much through a number of passages within his *CPR*. Indeed, he will often discuss the transcendental 'object' lying beyond experience, as well as the 'object-in-itself' of the categories, and in other cases, offer the ground of the world or human freedom on the basis of a sophistical distinction regarding the 'character' of causality.[97]

[97] Regarding this point, Kant states in the *CPR* that: "All our representations are in fact related to some object through the understanding, and, since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding thus relates them to a something, as the object of sensible intuition: but this something is

A more substantial example of Schopenhauer's point may be seen in relation to Kant's solution to the third antinomy and the 'Idea of Freedom' in the second part to the *Doctrine of Elements* in the *CPR*.[98] This is important inasmuch as it offers a concrete account of Schopenhauer's criticism while further revealing the precise point at which his own thought departs on the basis of the will as thing-in-itself. Kant argues that from the perspective of the subject, the law of causality may be looked upon as having a twofold 'character', depending upon how we consider the effects of our own actions within the world. On the one hand, the subject's actions appear causally through their 'empirical' character: "through which its actions, as appearances, would stand through and through in connection with other appearances in accordance with constant natural laws". (A539/B567) Thus, when I throw a ball, I recognize that the ball which was once in my hand is now in the air, and infer that the bodily motion of throwing the ball was the cause of it. On the other hand, our actions may also be looked upon causally from a different perspective, that is, from their 'intelligible' character, and in this sense the subject sees itself as: "the cause of those actions as appearances, but which does not stand under any conditions of sensibility and is not itself appearance." (*ibid.*) So in this

to that extent only the transcendental object." (A250) He further goes on: "appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word 'appearance' must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility." From this Kant concludes: "Now from this arises the concept of a noumenon…" (A252) Although Kant would eventually remove this statement from subsequent editions, the matter stands as relevant in terms of Schopenhauer's own interpretation, which is essentially based upon the assumption that the first edition of the *CPR* was the *correct* edition.

[98] Schopenhauer considers Kant's fourth antinomy to be a mere extension of the third: "The fourth antinomy, as I have said already, is according to its innermost meaning tautological with the third." (*W1*, p. 507) Furthermore, regarding Kant's 'Ideas of Reason', Schopenhauer notes: "But the name *Ideas* is very unfortunately chosen for these three ostensibly necessary productions of pure theoretical reason. It was forcibly taken from Plato, who denoted by it the imperishable forms that, multiplied by time and space, become imperfectly visible in the innumerable, individual, fleeting things. In consequence of this, Plato's *Ideas* are in every way perceptible, as is so definitely indicated through the word he chose, which could be adequately translated only through things perceptible and visible. Kant has appropriated it to denote what lies so far from all possibility of perception that even abstract thinking can only half attain to it." (*W1*, p. 488)

sense, looking at the ball in the air, the subject may infer its 'intelligible' basis; that it was his own inner act which caused the ball to be thrown, and more specifically, his own 'will' lying at the source of this.

According to Schopenhauer, it is then the general spirit of this solution which is at work within Kant's resolution of the problem of identifying the ground of phenomena. For in doing so, Kant must essentially deduce the thing-in-itself: "through the conclusion that the phenomenon, and hence the visible world, must have a ground or reason, an intelligible cause, which is not phenomenon". (*W1*, p. 502) In other words, Kant assumes that the phenomenal world as object of perception may be ascribed to an 'intelligible' cause in much the same way as my inner act of will may be ascribed to the intelligible cause of the ball which is thrown. Yet this is explicitly false, for as Schopenhauer has already pointed out, one can never ascribe causality to *anything* lying beyond phenomenal objects themselves. Objectivity always implies subjectivity as its ground.

In virtue of his method then, Kant has essentially locked himself within the subjective-objective relationship, and as Schopenhauer points out: "on the path of the representation we can never get beyond the representation". (*W1*, p. 502) So according to Schopenhauer, in attempting to 'deduce' the ground of phenomena or the thing-in-itself on the basis of the law of causality, whether taken in its 'intelligible' character or not, Kant really achieves this only: "by means of an inconsistency".[99] (*W1*, p. 422) The inconsistency here, although implying the assumption of an 'object-in-itself' as the ground of phenomena, is really linked to Kant's attempt to deduce the thing-in-itself on the basis of a rather sophistic turn in relation to the law of causality.

The above criticism aside, what Kant fails to achieve through his deduction of the thing-in-itself, and what is implied in the attempt, is precisely the point wherein Schopenhauer's own interpretation becomes significant. For through the very

[99] "*sondern mittelst einer Inkonsequenz*"

assumption of a distinction between the empirical and intelligible character of causality, Kant paves the way for the possibility of the thing-in-itself as arising on the basis of the freedom of the will (*abritrium liberum*). Thus, later in the critique, Kant will return to a consideration of the nature of the ground of both the phenomenon as well as of our own actions within it, specific to morality. He suggests that on the basis of the intelligible character of our actions (i.e. throwing the ball), we generally obtain a knowledge of the freedom of the will. Such a knowledge offers, however, only a practical kind of knowing of, "what ought to be done", and this is to be distinguished from the knowledge of, "what does happen", obtained through the empirical character of things, that is, through causal relations in nature. (A802/B830) In consequence of this, Kant concludes that causality through freedom can be, "proved through experience", for indeed: "We thus cognize practical freedom through experience, as one of the natural causes, namely a causality of reason in the determination of the will". (A803/B831)

This is a very significant conclusion, since despite his errors, Schopenhauer believed that Kant at least pointed the way to the true relationship between the phenomenon and thing-in-itself, as he states of Kant:

> He did not recognize the thing-in-itself directly in the will (*nicht direkt im Willen das Ding an sich*), but made a great and original step towards this knowledge, since he demonstrated the undeniable moral significance of human conduct to be quite different from, and not dependent on, the laws of the phenomenon, to be not even capable of explanation according to them, but to be something directly touching the thing-in-itself. (*W1*, p. 422)

Schopenhauer further states that regarding this 'practical will' only derivatively discussed in Kant: "In general this is the point where Kant's philosophy leads into

mine, or mine springs from his as its parent stem."[100] (*W1*, p. 501) He further goes on to suggest that the correct path which Kant should have taken would have been, "the plain, open procedure", that is: "to start from the will, to demonstrate this as the in-itself of our own phenomenon, recognized without any mediation". (*W1*, p. 505)

So whether or not Schopenhauer's critical interpretation is true to Kant's thought or not, it certainly offers a very concrete indication of the difference between his own thought and that of his teacher. This is easily spelled out in three points: (1) Kant starts with indirect reflected knowledge, Schopenhauer starts with direct intuitive knowledge; (2) Kant confounds concepts within intuitions, Schopenhauer (will be seen to) divides them; finally (3) Kant derives the thing-in-itself inconsistently on the basis of the law of causality, yet rightly infers a different source for morality and willing. Schopenhauer appropriates Kant's inference and supplies this as the essential foundation of the phenomenon itself.[101]

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[100] In this sense, Andrew Bowie states that: "Kant bequeaths a fundamental question to modern philosophy. How much is what the world is taken to be determined by the data we receive from the world and how much is it a product of the actions of the human mind? Any answer to this question will be likely to locate the foundation for knowledge either more on the side of the world or more on the side of the subject." (Bowie 2003, p. 38) Schopenhauer's answer to Kant's question is really that such knowledge is based upon subject and object as united into a single Idealistic view. William Desmond further notes that Schopenhauer's acceptance of knowledge of the thing-in-itself is quite similar to that of Hegel: "Contra Kant, Schopenhauer says we can know the *thing in itself*. Interestingly, he here agrees with Hegel who says even more loudly that the thing in itself is the most easily known. But the difference between them is crucial. In knowing the thing in itself, for Schopenhauer we know the Will, which we cannot absolutely know, in the sense of entirely encapsulating it in a system of concepts. The knowing is first in the intimacy of our own sense of will; then the intimacy of will is known as the energy of a source of being that, as more original than the intellect, can never be mastered by the latter. Something remains beyond, even while acknowledged. The rational concept, while needed, betrays something about the intimate knowing of the will itself. By contrast, when Hegel says we know the thing in itself, he asserts the superiority of thought over any resistant otherness. Thought is just that power that overreaches both itself and its other; thought can overreach the other because the other is itself nothing but thought, the two are the same. This is just what is denied by Schopenhauer in his doctrine of Will. The Will as the other of thought *is* the other of thought. Instead of the Hegelian overreaching of the other of thought, it is the other way round. It is the dark origin that overreaches thought, for thought is a derivative of this origin, an emergence from a ground beyond thought." (Desmond 2009, p. 7)

[101] Douglas McDermid actually points out a fourfold relationship between Kant and Schopenhauer which yet highlights their differences, as he says: "Schopenhauer agrees with Kant on four key points, but in such a way as to render the differences between them all the more striking. First, both reject empiricist

Before turning to Schopenhauer's account of the will as thing-in-itself, there is one final interesting point to consider in terms of the analogous methodology of both Kant and Plato. That is to say, both philosophers are to be distinguished from Schopenhauer inasmuch as he starts from the direct path of experience, whereas they generally initiate from indirect reflected knowledge. Indeed, although Plato certainly first interrogates experience (i.e. *Theaetetus*), he yet rejects any intuitive foundation in consequence of an overemphasis upon the need for *rational confirmation*. He thereby heads straightaway into indirect rational (conceptual) knowledge, attempting from there to reach the Ideas through dialectic. Upon reaching the limits of the concept, Plato then departs from it, and returns *back* to the primordial ground of perception, making a 'descent' into intuition and the unyhpothetical.

With Kant, this is really the same approach, although from a slightly different angle. Kant now first *neglects* any interrogation of experience, starts with indirect conceptual knowledge, deduces the universal (i.e. conceptual) *a priori* principles of cognitive perception, and from there reaches the limits, as it were, of his own critique. In order to avoid immaterialism, he must now attempt to define the *ground* of the phenomenal representation of the world, but he simply cannot do this without either departing from his own methodology, making a 'descent' back into intuitive perception, or contradicting the stated conclusions of his own critique. Kant, however, chooses the path of contradiction, but yet through this, Schopenhauer himself is led to an

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foundationalism. But, whereas Kant attacks the Given, Schopenhauer (lamentably) does no such thing. Second, both see the activity of the understanding as a precondition for perception, but Kant's conception of that faculty differs from that of Schopenhauer, who drops all but one of the former's twelve categories and insists that the understanding's sole function is to apply the law of causality. Third, both reject skepticism, but Schopenhauer does not accept the critique of the Cartesian doctrine of epistemic priority that Kant offers in his refutation of idealism. Fourth, both endorse transcendental idealism, but Schopenhauer rejects both Kant's deduction of the thing-in-itself and his claim that the thing-in-itself is absolutely unknowable." (McDermid 2002, p. 229)

alternative, more viable path directly through perception, on the basis of the practical will, as he himself states:

> Now what Kant teaches about the phenomenon of man and his actions is extended by my teaching to *all* the phenomena of nature, since it makes their foundation the will as thing-in-itself.[102] (*W2*, p. 174)

2.4. The formal and empirical representation

Before turning to an account of the nature of the will itself, it is first of all necessary to consider both the manner in which Schopenhauer, following Kant, attempts to 'derive' the will on the basis of representation, and second, of his important distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge. As will be seen, the primary elements of Schopenhauer's theory of empirical perception (and how this differs from Kant) are as follows: (1) Although sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) receives and determines the datum of the senses according to its own *a priori* forms of space and time, representations (and alternatively, objects) are not to be spoken of in relation to it alone. (2) Representations are the result of the combined effect of sensibility and understanding (*Verstand*). (3) The understanding does not contain pure concepts or categories, but is essentially intuitive. (4) The understanding serves one function—to unite the forms of space and time beneath its own form of causality; and only after this subsequent union, is the representational object produced, and hence the empirical perception of the world is 'cognized'. I explain the entire process in what follows.

[102] Schopenhauer is here referring to the statement of Kant, *Prolegomena* §53: "It is true that natural necessity will attach to all connection of cause and effect in the world of sense, yet, on the one hand, freedom is conceded to that cause which is itself no phenomenon (although forming the foundation of the phenomenon). Hence nature and freedom can without contradiction be attributed to the same thing, but in a different reference; at one time as phenomenon, at another as a thing-in-itself."

So although for Schopenhauer sensibility and perception differ, they are yet mutually related and indeed quite important for our resulting cognitive representation of the world. According to Schopenhauer's view, all our experience of the empirical world is first of all limited by an impassible barrier separating the original datum of the world which passes through the physical sense-organs, from the final perception of this having now passed through the intellectual apparatus of the brain (*Gehirn*), as Schopenhauer suggests: "The senses are merely the brain's outlets through which it receives material from outside (in the form of sensation); this material it elaborates into the representation of perception."[103] (*W2*, p. 26) On account of this, the most that can be known about the content of sense datum is simply the fact *that* I sense, for here there is a relation to the will. A bright light *pains* the eye. A putrid scent *repulses*. Beyond this original 'pathological' content, we obtain no further direct knowledge of the world beyond perception—nor can we deduce its existence on the path of the phenomenon.

The resulting representation (*Vorstellung*) of the world for the subject, is then attributed by Schopenhauer to the combined effect of sensibility (*Sensibilität*) and understanding (*Verstand*).[104] With respect to sensibility, the conscious subject is able intuit the datum of the world in two ways, as Schopenhauer states: "Our knowing consciousness (*erkennedes Bewußtsein*)…manifests itself as outer and inner sensibility (*als*

[103] F.C. White notes that regarding Schopenhauer's own account of empirical perception: "Two prima facie disastrous consequences follow from this materialist account of the intellect and perception. One, already made plain, is that when Schopenhauer asserts all elements of perception to be subjective, he must now be taken to mean that, being bodily, they are located within the perceiver's body. But this entails that all sensory date presented to the intellect are bodily and therefore cannot play the role of formless data required of them. The other consequence, more embarrassing in the light of Schopenhauer's strictures on traditional metaphysicians, is that the intellect, because it is identical with the brain, is a real object. It follows from this that, like the other real objects, the intellect is created by the intellect. It is cause sui." (White 2006, pp. 73-74)

[104] Schopenhauer states: "It is therefore the Understanding itself which has to create the objective world; for this world cannot walk into our brain from outside all ready cut and dried through the senses and the opening of their organs. In fact, the senses supply nothing but the raw materials which the Understanding at once proceeds to work up into the objective view of the corporeal world, subject to regular laws, by means of the simple forms we have indicated: Space, Time, and Causality." (*PSR*, p. 61)

äußere und innere Sinnlichkeit [Rezeptivität])".[105] (*PSR*, p. 30) Through the first, this original datum is determined according to the subject's outer sense of space, whereas through the latter, this datum is subsequently determined according to the inner sense of time. Following the application of these two forms upon all the sense datum of the world, the understanding then applies its own form of causality, thereby uniting time and space beneath itself. Schopenhauer in one fell swoop discards the categories of perception so essential to Kant's own account, simplifying the entire structure of transcendental philosophy. On the basis of understanding alone, as uniting time and space through causality, Schopenhauer believed that the representation of perception is thereby accounted for, as he states:

> It is therefore the understanding itself which has to create the objective world; for this world cannot walk into our brain from outside all ready cut and dried through the senses and the opening of their organs. In fact, the senses supply nothing but the raw materials (*den rohen Stoff*) which the understanding at once proceeds to work up into the objective view (*die objektive Auffassung*) of the corporeal world, subject to regular laws, by means of the simple forms we have indicated: space, time, and causality.[106] (*PSR*, p. 61)

[105] Schopenhauer relates the subject's inner and outer senses to time and space respectively. He thus states: "That time and space belong to the *subject*, are the mode and manner in which the process of apperception is carried out in the brain, has already a sufficient proof in the absolute impossibility of thinking away time and space, whereas we very easily think away everything that appears in them." (*W2*, p. 33)

[106] Schopenhauer goes on in this passage to indicate that in consequence of this: "*Demnach ist unsere alltägliche empirische Anschauung eine intellektuale*". (*ibid*.) Schopenhauer's reduction here is of course to be distinguished from Kant's 'Table of Categories', which was in general divided into four parts, that on quantity, quality, relation, and modality, which further included subsequent subdivisions into such aspects as unity and plurality, possibility, subsistence, etc. (cf. *CPR*, A80/B106) So in this sense, Schopenhauer is certainly both borrowing from Kant while simplifying this rather complicated structure, whether rightly or wrongly.

In further distinguishing between the forms of time and space on the basis of sensibility from the form of causality within the understanding as uniting these, Schopenhauer's 'edification' of Kant's thought here, leads to two very important consequences: (1) every complete representation yields a formal and empirical part; (2) although the formal part of representations offer essentially *a priori* knowledge of time and space, the subject may yet look at the former (time) from its *a posteriori* character, and from this perspective, the subject obtains direct access, through experience, into the thing-in-itself—without appeal to causality. In what follows, I consider Schopenhauer's first sense of the initial distinction between formal and empirical representations. The second sense will be considered in more depth in the section which follows, as indeed it serves as the entire foundation of Schopenhauer's account of the will as the foundation of representation.

So Schopenhauer will go on to argue that the representation (*Vorstellung*) of perception, as the result of the combination of sensibility and understanding, is divisible into essentially two parts, that of the formal and the empirical.[107] Regarding the latter empirical part, Schopenhauer goes on to state that:

> The first class of objects possible to our representative faculty, is that of *intuitive, complete, empirical* representations (*der anschaulichen, vollständigen, empirischen Vorstellungen*). They are *intuitive* as opposed to mere thoughts, i.e. abstract conceptions (*abstrakten Begriffe*); they are *complete*, inasmuch as, according to Kant's distinction, they not only contain the formal, but also the material part of phenomena; and they are *empirical*, partly as

[107] Unlike Kant—although to a certain extent 'matter' does appear as the determinant. Thus regarding the two sources of cognition (sensibility and understanding), Kant states in the *CPR* that: "Both are either pure or empirical. Empirical, if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein; but pure if no sensation is mixed into the representation. One can call the latter the matter of sensible cognition." (A51/B75) For Schopenhauer this is of course unacceptable, since sensation and hence object is never immediately related to our actual perception of things. According to his own theories then, matter has no direct relation to sensation, but rather to causality, and thus the understanding as uniting space and time.

> proceeding, not from a mere connection of thoughts, but from an excitation of feeling (*einer Anregung der Empfindung*) in our sensitive organism, as their origin, to which they constantly refer for evidence as to their reality: partly also because they are linked together, according to the united laws of Space, Time, and Causality, in that complex without beginning or end which forms our *Empirical Reality*. (*PSR*, p. 31)

Schopenhauer offers a number of interesting qualifications regarding the empirical representation. In the first place it is responsible for *complete* empirical reality, that is for things given within a space-time continuum as determined by the law of causality through the understanding. Such representations contain the entire matter, as it were, of the empirical world. He further refers to these as intuitive, indeed as the result of the intuitive function of the understanding. He mentions also a very interesting point: empirical representations have no relation to thoughts, they are *not* abstract conceptions. This is quite significant as it stands in direct antithesis to Kant's own view wherein understanding was referred to as giving rise to a 'spontaneity of concepts'. According now to Schopenhauer's account of the matter, the empirical representation arises through the intuitive operation of understanding as uniting space and time beneath causality, but he yet denies to it any relation to abstract, rational, conceptual thinking. Schopenhauer's characterization of the intuitive nature of the understanding therefore serves as the basis for his distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge. Indeed, what serves as the foundation for abstract knowledge, if not understanding? I will discuss this separate faculty of reason (*Vernunft*) in section 2.6.

For now, empirical intuitions represent for us all our knowledge of the world as it stands in causal relations. Accordingly, my perception of a tree is intuitive and complete, and so too my perception of the greenness of its leaves, and the movement of its branches in the wind. Even more, my perception of light, gravitation,

electromagnetic forces, indeed all of the fundamental forces of nature caught within the flux of change, arise for knowledge on the basis of my empirically complete and intuitive representation of the world. The empirical representation thus serves as the basis for empirical science, as I will discuss in section 2.8.

Schopenhauer further goes on to distinguish the formal from the empirical within the representation itself. As to how these are distinguishable within knowledge, I will discuss in section 2.7, in relation to Schopenhauer's account of sufficient reason. For now, it is sufficient to point out that whereas the empirical may be said to be comprise complete representations, the formal entails precisely what the name implies—the formal element of the representation. Moreover, Schopenhauer relates these to our intuitions into the forms of time and space inherent to the representation. Regarding this, Schopenhauer states that:

> It is the formal part (*der formale Teil*) of complete representations—that is to say, the intuitions (*Anschauungen*) given us *a priori* of the forms of the outer and inner sense, i.e. of Space and Time—which constitutes the Third Class of Object for our representative faculty. (*PSR*, p. 153)

So Schopenhauer once again identifies yet another source of intuition, although this is now understood as our *a priori* intuition into the being of time and space. According to this, we receive a quite distinct kind of knowledge from what was seen in relation to empirical representations. Being formal and *a priori*, knowledge (and hence science) according to these must be correspondingly formalized. Schopenhauer identifies in relation to these first arithmetic as the basis of our *a priori* intuitions into the form of time; and second geometry, as the basis of our *a priori* intuitions into the form of space. All our knowledge of mathematics is thus accountable on the basis of such intuitions,

the former through temporal succession (*Sukzession*) and the latter through spatial coexistence (*Nebeneinandersein*), as Schopenhauer states:

> Time and space are so constituted, that all their parts stand in mutual relation, so that each of them conditions and is conditioned by another. We call this relation in space, position (*Lage*); in time, sequence (*Folge*). (*PSR*, p. 154)

According to the above account, Schopenhauer's theory of empirical perception is first of all based upon the distinction between the raw datum of the world as it comes to stimulate and be impressed upon the sense organs and the eventual *perception* of it following the union of space and time through causality within the understanding. Accordingly, perception has an essentially cognitive or *intellectual* character, and empirical reality as we perceive it, is inherently *transcendental*. Unlike Kant, however, Schopenhauer refers to this entire process as *intuitive*, removing all manner of conceptualization and abstraction from understanding itself. According to these two faculties then, he accounts for both the cognitive and transcendental nature of empirical perception as well as the manner in which we obtain knowledge intuitively on the basis of the formally and empirically intuitive representation of the world.

2.5. The two paths to knowledge

Determining the precise point at which we obtain knowledge of the thing-in-itself on the basis of the phenomenal representation of the world is now the task of this present section. For Schopenhauer then, the correct starting point which Kant should have taken is the will, but where is this to be identified? Setting aside indirect conceptual knowledge for the moment, it is seen that on the road of perception there are really two

separate paths that the subject may follow for knowledge. In explaining these, Schopenhauer uses the example of our knowledge of our own body, as he states:

> To the subject of knowing (*Dem Subjekt des Erkennens*), who appears as an individual only through identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is given in intelligent perception (*in verständiger Anschauung*) as representation (*Vorstellung*), as an object among objects, liable to the laws of these objects. But it is also given in quite a different way, namely as what is known immediately (*umittelbar Bekannt*) to everyone, and is denoted by the word will (*Wille*)…The action of the body is nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e., translated into perception. (*W1*, p. 100)

The first phenomenal path through which we obtain knowledge of the body as directly perceived within causal relations has already been explained. But how do we obtain immediate knowledge of the will on the basis of this second and alternative metaphysical path? How does the subject obtain knowledge of its own body as willing? For Schopenhauer, immediate knowledge is obtainable on the basis of a very personalized kind of knowing, available only within the confines of the inner self-conscious experiences of the subject, as he states:

> [T]he sole object of the inner sense is the knower's own will. Time is therefore the form by means of which self-knowledge becomes possible to

> the individual will, which originally and in itself is without knowledge.[108] (*W2*, p. 36)

This is a very peculiar sense of knowing and certainly requires some explanation. In the first place, Schopenhauer goes on to suggest that such self-knowledge: "manifests itself in time alone, never in space, and as we shall see, even in time under an important restriction (*Einschränkung*)." (*PSR*, p. 165) It is important to note, that although Schopenhauer limits self-knowledge of willing to the experience of time, the subject is yet able to *infer* from this that its experience of objects through the outer sense of space is intimately related to this same ground. In other words, the knowledge of self as willing serves as the ground for the knowledge of will as inherent to the phenomenal appearance of objects (including the body as object) within space.

Regarding self-knowledge however, there is yet a further limitation. For although we certainly experience ourselves as willing, we are nonetheless quite blind to something else about this experience. As Schopenhauer says, the conscious subject: "knows itself exclusively as *willing*, but not as *knowing*", and from this he concludes that:

> Even self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*) therefore is not absolutely simple, but, like our consciousness of all other things (i.e. the faculty of perception), it is subdivided into that which is known and that which knows. (*PSR*, p. 165)

[108] Schopenhauer further elaborates upon this point in his *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will* that: "But obviously the *objects* of willing, which determine the act of will, lie outside the limit of *self-consciousness*, and are in the consciousness *of other things*. Only the act of will itself is *in* self-consciousness, and we are asking about the causal relation between those outside objects and this act of will…as long as the act of will is in the process of coming about, it is called *wish*; when complete it is called *decision*; but that it is complete is first shown to self-consciousness itself by the *deed*, for until then the decision is changeable." (*FW*, pp. 14-15)

Schopenhauer thus follows Kant's restriction of the Cartesian 'cogito', i.e., my experience of the self is divided into two parts on the basis of what is given in experience and what lies prior to experience, as Schopenhauer points out:

> Starting from knowledge, we may assert that 'I know' is an analytical, 'I will,' on the contrary, a synthetical, and moreover *a posteriori* proposition, that is, it is given by experience—in this case by inner experience (i.e., in Time alone). In so far therefore the Subject of volition (*das Subjekt des Wollens*) would be an Object for us. Introspection (*unser Inneres blicken*) always shows us to ourselves as *willing*.[109] (*PSR*, p. 168)

Despite this limitation, the subject yet obtains knowledge of the thing-in-itself inasmuch as it may now affirm the knowledge of self as willing *through time*. Such knowledge arises on the basis of experience, and hence, is thoroughly *a posteriori*. It further serves as the foundation for metaphysical knowledge of objects *within* the world. Schopenhauer further remarks in his essay, *The Will in Nature*, that the will is essentially: "the ultimate substratum of every phenomenon…which has entered the region of representation", and that it is further, "perceived in the cognitive form of Space." (*WN*, p. 33) Of course, what I *perceive* of the will in this case, are its *effects* within space and time as united by causality. I may nevertheless infer from my direct experience of willing (through time), that this same will, which is certainly the ground of my own objective bodily acts, is simultaneously the ground of all these other objective manifestations.[110]

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[109] In other texts he confirms this view of our knowledge of self as willing (opposed to knowing): "Further, it is not *a priori*, like merely formal knowledge, but entirely *a posteriori*". (*W2*, p. 196)

[110] How does the subject know that the will inherent to his own inner acts is identical to that revealed objectively and phenomenally in objects? The simple answer is through the understanding and the *a*

There is then a nuanced although significant difference between Kant's elaboration of the empirical and intelligible character of things from which he deduces the thing-in-itself on the basis of causality, and Schopenhauer's own grounding of the phenomenon on the basis of the thing-in-itself through the inner self-experience of willing through time. This was seen in Schopenhauer's distinction between the two ways or paths to knowledge of the body. On the one hand, the subject obtains knowledge of the perceptible body according to the law of causality as uniting space and time, and thus, on the basis of the empirical character of things. On the other hand, the knowledge of the self as willing, from which I infer the knowledge of the will within my outer sense of objects within space, is certainly akin to the intelligible character of things, but here the law of causality *does not apply*. In this latter instance, the subject's inner experience of willing arises *prior* to the application of the causal law, applying merely to time alone. So in this way and in antithesis to Kant, Schopenhauer believed that he offered both the metaphysical ground of phenomena (through will as thing-in-itself) and furthermore, that he revealed this correctly and consistently, that is to say, *prior to* the law of causality.

There is one final point that will require consideration. It is mentioned by Schopenhauer above that knowledge of the self as willing manifests itself in time alone "under an important restriction (*Einschränkung*)". The first restriction was seen in the fact that the subject was able to know itself *only in time*, and only *as* 'willing', yet never 'knowing'. There is, however, a very important and fundamental second restriction. By

priori nature of causality. Schopenhauer states in his *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will*: "All *changes* that occur in given objects in the real external world are therefore subject to the law of *causality*, and thus always occur as *necessary* and inevitable, whenever and wherever they occur. – To this law there can be no exception, for the rule holds *a priori* for all possibility of experience. But as regards its *application* to a given case, we have merely to ask whether we are dealing with a *change* of a real object that is given in external experience." (*FW*, pp. 24-25) So there is a certain degree of circularity to Schopenhauer's extension of the will present in self-consciousness and the will as recognized in objective phenomenal objects. The knowledge of will as well as the law of causality being subjective, I merely extend that subjective law to objective objects and discover that they are all inherently related to the same ground.

virtue of the form of time, precisely that which the subject knows of its own willing is thereby limited within experience. On the one hand, what I experience of the will is certainly the will as it is, pure and unblemished. On the other hand, as known on the basis of time, my knowledge of will is thereby determined *phenomenally* through time. I thus know the will successively within each moment, yet never in its entirety.[111] The consequences of this last latter restriction will be explored later.

For now, the positive results of Schopenhauer's analysis here entails a fundamental grounding of the phenomenon on the basis of the subject's inner experience of willing through time. The thing-in-itself arises for knowledge directly within experience, through will. In consequence of this fact, the study of being qua being, the science of metaphysics, previously delimited by Kant to speculative philosophy, becomes once again entirely possible.

2.6. The abstract representation

Schopenhauer's theory of empirical perception, of the nature of intuitive knowledge on the basis of the formal and empirical representation, and of the grounding of the phenomenon through the subject's inner experience of willing as thing-in-itself has

[111] As a preliminary to this point, Christopher Janaway states that: "the thing in itself appears here not quite naked but covered by the very thinnest of veils…my experience of my own acts of will is subject to the form of time alone, not those of space and causality. It belongs, as he said in *On the Fourfold Root*, to inner sense…He is, it seems, prepared to concede that strictly speaking it is impossible to have knowledge of the will as thing-in-itself—to try for such knowledge is to demand something contradictory." (Janaway 1989, pp. 196-197) Janaway further elaborates upon this point in another text, stating that for Schopenhauer: "(1) he assumed that the Kantian division between appearance and thing in itself was an ontological one; (2) he assumed that for Kant the thing in itself was the causal ground of phenomena. Now it would be wrong to see Schopenhauer as claiming knowledge of the thing in itself *so conceived*. He competes with Kant rather by offering a rival conception of the thing in itself which rejects both of these features. The Schopenhauerian thing in itself, inasmuch as it is knowable in philosophical reflection, is the *essence* of the world of appearance, not in any way its cause. And it is the essential *aspect* of that same world of appearance, not any thing of a distinct ontological kind. Schopenhauer's project is to render 'meaningful' what is otherwise a cryptograph: to decipher our *experience* and the world it reveals to us." (Janaway 2006a, pp. 165-166)

already been discussed. I will further discuss the manner in which will gives rise to consciousness and representation itself in the next chapter, for there it is expressly Idea which becomes the main subject matter. For now, I turn to a full characterization of a very different kind of knowledge separable from both will as well as intuitive representation. This is a knowledge which Schopenhauer expressly points out that both Kant and to a certain extent even Plato confused. It is abstract knowledge through the concept.

So it was seen that Schopenhauer distinguished all complete representations into a formal and empirical part, and that despite this division, he yet refers to each separately as *intuitive*. Schopenhauer will further go on to describe and distinguish from such intuitive representations an entirely different kind, one which he considers non-intuitive, non-perceptual, and which offers a quite indirect and mediated kind of knowing. As Schopenhauer states at the beginning of his *WWR*: "The main difference between all our representations is that between the intuitive (*Intuitiven*) and the abstract (*Abstrakten*)." (*W1*, p. 6) The remaining discussion in this chapter will focus upon the *abstract* half of the representation, of the universal concept (*Begriff*) through it, of its relationship to intuitive knowledge as its ground, and finally, of the kinds of knowledge made possible through it.

For now, I turn first to a discussion of the more positive conclusions in relation to knowledge through the concept. For Schopenhauer, although he considers abstract knowledge in itself a rather impoverished kind of knowing, he nonetheless considers concepts as *necessary* to the communicability of knowledge, standing in a direct relation to the word or *logos*, and hence to language and the sciences. As a result of this, we require concepts for logic and mathematics, the physical and biological sciences, and even in philosophy (as well as poetry for other reasons), which as will be seen, represents a very special case and a peculiar kind of knowledge.

Although Schopenhauer fundamentally believed that the true content of knowledge arises on the direct basis of experience, it is interesting that he yet considered *abstract* and *indirect* knowledge as the distinguishing characteristic of humanity over the mere animal. Schopenhauer believed that inasmuch as conscious perception is required for such menial tasks as eating, grooming, mating, the building of nests, hunting, bathing, etc., to that extent *all* animal life endowed with 'consciousness', from the simplest ant to the most complex mammal, require some degree of understanding (*Verstand*). Certain species of bats thus require the construction of space, time, and causality for movement on the basis of sonar; ants and similar insects through feelers. For other insects, multiple eyes serve the same purpose, implying some level of understanding within, serving the purpose of structurally representing the world to their consciousness for matters of movement.

So although both human and animal have a share in understanding for purposes of intuiting and perceiving the environment, human beings alone are privileged with a separate, distinct faculty which enables them to *reflect* upon the original and direct content of their knowledge obtained on the basis of perception. This separate faculty Schopenhauer refers to as reason (*Vernunft*), of which he suggests that the sole function of this faculty subsists in the: "formation of the concept (*Begriff*)." (*W1*, p. 39) Yet if concept formation really accounts for the entire functionality of reason, then one must really wonder why it is that the addition of this faculty should really make such a difference between human and animal. The real importance of reason, however, isn't limited to concept formation in and of itself, but rather the fact that through this power, we obtain the further ability to now *mediate* between conceptually abstract and perceptually intuitive knowledge.[112] As a result of this power, which Schopenhauer

[112] Regarding knowledge itself, Schopenhauer states that: "This consists in the ability to carry over into abstract consciousness (*abstrakte Bewusstsein*) correctly and exactly what is known in perception (*anschauliche Erkannte*); and judgment accordingly is the mediator (*die Vermittlerin*) between understanding and reason." (*W1*, p. 64)

refers to as the power of judgment (*Urteilskraft*), we are thereby enabled to draw distinctions among the many perceptible things, to identify similarities among differences and differences within similarities, to make decisions and thus determine ourselves ethically, and finally, to determine truth and falsity.[113] The capacity to abstractly *reflect* upon the content of perceptible and intuitive knowledge is thus the cornerstone of what we consider a truly human nature. Through the faculty of reason, we are able to form concepts on the basis of the content of perceptible experience, and possessing now two very distinct kinds of knowledge, intuitive and abstract, the human mind may weigh the one (judge) in accordance with the other. Regarding this, Schopenhauer states of the process of abstraction itself that:

> The only essential distinction between the human race and animals, which from time immemorial has been attributed to a special cognitive faculty peculiar to mankind, called *Reason* (*Vernunft*), is based upon the fact that man owns a class of representations which is not shared by any animal. These are *conceptions* (*Begriffe*), therefore *abstract* (*abstrakten*), as opposed to *intuitive* (*anschaulichen*), representations, from which they are nevertheless derived. (*PSR*, p. 114)

[113] Regarding the nature of judgment, Schopenhauer states that: "The faculty of judgment is accordingly the mediator between intuitive and abstract knowledge, or between the understanding and the reason." (*PSR*, pp. 121-122). Schopenhauer's view here is evidently influenced by the empiricists, particularly Locke, as he himself points out, "Locke's very great merit" in the fact that: "he insisted on an investigation of the *origin of concepts*, and thus led back to what is *perceptive* and to *experience*." (*W2*, p. 40-41) Certainly Schopenhauer's notion of judgment departs from Kant, though differently. Thus Kant notes in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that among the logicians judgment is often referred to as: "the representation of a relation between two concepts." (B141) He then goes on to explain that a judgment involves a more fundamental relation between the understanding and the imagination, noting that: "a judgment is nothing other than a way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception." (B141/142) Although Schopenhauer rejects Kant's sense of the 'unity of apperceptions', he yet retains this sense of judgments as a kind of mediating power between the imagination and the understanding. Between the two, somehow, the Ideas further emerge. For further discussion see chapter 4.

Through concepts then, as abstract representations formed on the basis of the faculty of reason, we obtain universal knowledge of the many particular things intuitively perceived within the world. Through these, the many and the various entities within the world shed their inessential characteristics, and only the essential is retained yielding such concepts as 'tree' and 'fruit', 'animal' and 'reptile'. Consequently, Schopenhauer refers to these specifically as, "universal concepts (*universalia*)."[114] (*W2*, p. 192) Such concepts are furthermore properly characterized as *universalia post rem*, as will be understood more thoroughly in chapter 3, following their differentiation from Ideas. Concepts are abstractions formed *after the fact* of things.

Another very essential aspect of concepts is the fact that they are *expressed*, that is to say, we communicate our concepts through words, and to that extent, abstraction is understood by Schopenhauer as related to our capacity for language itself. It is thus only through the fact that the human being possesses reason (*Vernunft*, *logos*) and the ability to abstractly form concepts, that all discursive thinking, logic, and language becomes at all possible, as Schopenhauer indicates:

> Thus language (*die Sprache*), like every other phenomenon that we ascribe to reason, and like everything that distinguishes man from the animal, is to be explained by this one simple thing as its source, namely concepts, representations that are abstract not perceptive, universal not individual in time and space. (*W1*, p. 40)

[114] In his description of abstract concepts, Schopenhauer here draws from the deep well of both Aristotelian as well as Medieval philosophy, as he himself points out: "The aims of all the sciences may, indeed, in the last resort, be reduced to knowledge of the particular through the general; now this is only possible by means of the *dictum de omni et nullo*, and this, again, is only possible through the existence of conceptions. Aristotle therefore says: ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῶν καθὸλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν (*absque universalibus enim non datur scientia*). Conceptions are precisely those *universalia*, whose mode of existence formed the argument of the long controversy between the Realists and Nominalists in the Middle Ages." (*PSR*, pp. 119-120) I will bring up this very interesting topic, particularly in relation to the influence of Aristotle upon Schopenhaeur's understanding of abstraction, in the fourth chapter.

Concepts and indeed the faculty of reason itself become the defining line which thereby distinguishes human beings from animals, granting us the power of *universal* knowledge, judgment, truth, and in consequence of this, ethical deliberation (*Wahlentscheidung*).[115] I turn now to a discussion of the nature and kinds of knowledge that we may obtain as a result of our capacity to form concepts—which will also indicate their limitations.

2.7. Conceptual knowledge and sufficient ground

It is worth noting that Schopenhauer's epistemological views were first developed in relation to a question raised in his doctoral dissertation published in 1813 (republished in subsequent editions throughout his life) under the title: *On The Fourfold Roots of The Principle of Sufficient Reason*. Within this work, Schopenhauer there argued that all our rational and abstract knowledge of the world is both *derivative* upon and *traceable* back to our original intuitive experience of the world. These original sources of our experience are however quite diverse, and reason, in formulating its concepts, tends to be rather indifferent to this fact. As Schopenhauer states: "*abstract* (*Abstrakte*) knowledge often unites many different kinds of *intuitive* (*Intuitive*) knowledge into *one* form or *one* concept (*einen Begriff*), so that they are no longer distinguishable (*zu unterscheiden*)." (*W1*, pp. 481-482) So that which seems qualitatively the same according to abstract knowledge, is oftentimes quite different when traced back to its intuitive ground (e.g.

[115] The topic of ethics in Schopenhauer's thought extends beyond this present investigation. For a brief insight into the matter, however, it is seen that ethical decision itself, although made possible through the faculty of reason, concept formation, and hence the power to reflect upon intuitive knowledge, is yet (as with all things) primordially dependent upon the will. From this context then, although for Schopenhauer we may certainly reflect upon the various motives for our action, in the end, it is really the most powerful motive which wins, as he states: "We see that, in virtue of the addition of abstract or rational knowledge, man has the advantage over the animal of an *elective decision*, which, however, simply makes him the scene of conflict of motives, without withdrawing him from their control." (*W1*, p. 301)

concepts of 'cylindrical' and 'tree'). Schopenhauer thus argued that the content of all our abstract knowledge must therefore be related back to its *proper* intuitive ground. The unity and differentiation of these various sources within reason is what Schopenhauer refers to as the principle of sufficient reason (*principium rationis sufficientis*).[116] On the basis of this principle, in relating all our abstract knowledge back to its proper intuitive ground, we obtain what he refers to as the sufficient reason, the *raison d'être*, the 'why' of our knowledge. It is then the principle of sufficient reason which serves as the focal point through which these various roots are identified, and conceptual knowledge on account of this, receives a proper foundation within and on the basis of intuitive perception.[117]

Schopenhauer within this text will further go on to suggest that there are actually *four* sources or roots (*Wurzeln*) as he calls them, from which all our rational and abstract knowledge of the world originally arises. I have already discussed these sources separately in previous sections. There is in the first place the intuitive representation as divided into the (1) formal and (2) empirical. There is also the (3) will as its appears within our experience phenomenally through time. Finally there is (4) reason itself and the concept which, since Schopenhauer considers this also representation, albeit of an abstract as opposed to intuitive kind, to that extent must it also be *object* for the subject. It is then on the basis of these four distinct roots that we initially 'abstract' all our concepts of the world. Having a concept of something, is however, insufficient for knowledge. Following Plato, Schopenhauer believed that we must also offer an *account* of our knowledge, yet it is here that these two philosophers are seen to significantly

[116] Regarding which, Schopenhauer uses the interpretation of Christian Wolff: "*Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam non sit*. Nothing is without a reason for its being." (*PSR*, p. 5)

[117] F.C. White further points out the relationship between sufficiency and necessity in Schopenhauer's thought. He states that: "*Necessarily* all changes, all instances of truth, all mathematical properties, all actions, have reasons, and these reasons are *sufficient* for their consequents – that is, they *necessitate* them. For example: *necessarily*, if a change E occurs, there is a reason for E, namely, a cause C. Pari passu, C is sufficient for E; that is, C *necessitates* E." (White 2006, p. 65)

differ. For whereas Plato emphasized rational confirmation of our knowledge which ascended to an unhypothetical (which for Schopenhauer must be an intuitively grounded) principle, Schopenhauer on the other hand requires that all rational knowledge itself be simply traced back to its suitable intuitive ground (*Grund*).[118] In what follows, I will offer a brief description of each of these four roots and the manner in which abstract knowledge in relation to them, obtains its sufficient ground.

There is thus first and foremost our intuitively complete, *empirical* representations of the world. In relation to this root, we obtain such concepts as 'matter', 'rock', 'red', 'light', 'gravity', 'energy', etc., to name a few. Furthermore, through this root, as I have suggested, empirical science finds its foundations. Such empirical knowledge requires, however, that we obtain the sufficient ground for each concept we hold within reason. In thereby tracing these concepts back to our original intuitions on the basis of the empirical representation, we thereby trace these concepts to their 'ground of becoming' (*der Grund des Werdens*), as the product of space and time united by causality within the understanding. In doing so we obtain the *principium rationis sufficientis fiendi* for such concepts. (*PSR*, p. 37) In thus tracing every such abstract concept back to this root within becoming, we further obtain the 'why' for our knowledge.[119] To offer a simple

[118] Thus for Plato and through dialectic, the thinker is said to progress through 'forms' which, until reaching a certain limit, he 'ascends' to the unhypothetical. For Schopenhauer, what is actually necessary here is simply the mere 'descent', back into perception, back into the original intuition from which our conceptual knowledge first arose. From this perspective then, whereas reason and hence logic proves most essential to Platonic methodology (i.e., dialectic demands the use logic), with Schopenhauer, logic becomes here quite superfluous and even useless.

[119] Schopenhauer's distinction here between the 'why' and the 'that' of knowledge finds its origin in Aristotle. Thus Aristotle states in the *Posterior Analytics* that: "The science which is knowledge at once of the fact and of the reasoned fact [the why], not of the fact by itself without the reasoned fact, is the more exact and the prior science."(*ana. post*., 87a30) E. Michelakis notes that Aristotle's remarks here in the *Analytics*, entails a distinction of knowledge: "based on whether or not the knowledge gives the causes (τῶν αἰτίων τὰς ἀποδείξεις). There is a science which knows the reasons for the facts and another which knows only the facts. The first is mathematical science (ἐπιστήμη τοῦ διότι), and the second is empirical science (τῶν αἰσθητικῶν εἰδέναι)." (Michelakis 1961, p. 11) This is a very interesting point, since indeed, Schopenhauer generally confers such knowledge to the Ideas. In light of this, both mathematics as well as science would only give us knowledge of the fact of things, though in actual demonstration of these facts, we may seek the sufficient ground (the 'why'), which isn't a why at all, but according to transcendental

example, if I ask the question: "From whence does my knowledge of the concept of 'tree' arise?", I need merely look to such and such objects within my intuitive and empirical representation of the world for confirmation. No further rational account need be given.

The second root which Schopenhauer accounts for is then the formal part of the intuitive representation. In relation to this, he identifies the 'ground of being' (*der Grund des Seins*) as the formal determination of the inner and outer senses in relation to space and time.[120] In tracing such concepts properly back to this ground, we thereby obtain the 'why' for this knowledge, that is, the *principium rationis sufficientis essendi*. (*PSR*., p. 154) The entire content of mathematics is based upon this root, and in tracing such concepts back to this, we furthermore demonstrate the validity of this knowledge. In other words, our knowledge of mathematics, in antithesis to what was seen within Platonic thought in terms of the method of synthesis, requires no further rational confirmation when once such concepts (as 'square', 'line', 'two', etc.) have been traced back to their original intuition on the basis of the ground of being, and hence the formal and intuitive representation of space and time.

Turning then to our knowledge of the will, Schopenhauer identifies yet a third root. On the basis of this, we form such concepts as 'want', 'desire', 'need', 'intention', etc., and in tracing these concepts back to our original intuitions, we discover the inner 'ground of action' (*Grund des Handelns*) on the basis of our knowledge of willing through experience.[121] (*PSR*, p. 171) For knowledge then, this ground serves to supply

idealism, simply a fact that the thing is. For the why, this requires Ideas. So again, it is seen that even with Aristotle, Schopenhauer interprets his words according to his own meaning and use.

[120] How does one obtain the sufficient reason for space which seems to be continuous throughout? That is to say, how does my knowledge of one part of space find sufficient grounding? For Schopenhauer, each separate part of space is sufficiently determined in context with another. F.C. White explains: "[T]he geometric properties of any given part of space have as their sufficient reason the geometric properties of some other part or parts of space." (White 2006, p. 80) In consequence of this, there is a seeming circularity involved in Schopenhauer's account of sufficiency here.

[121] Schopenhauer alternatively refers to this as the 'law of motivation' (*Gesetz der Motivation*).

the *principium rationis sufficientis agendis*, and thus accounts principally for the effects of our actions within the world on the basis of motives.[122] The ground of action is thereby foundational to such sciences as ethics, psychology, politics, sociology, and indeed, to any science wherein human motivation plays an essential role. It is furthermore principal to our knowledge of the action of things within the world, although indirectly. To a certain extent as well, this ground serves as a basis for metaphysical knowledge inasmuch as we infer from our own knowledge of the will that such things as natural forces, plants, and animals all operate on the basis of this same principle, and hence through fundamental, urges, stimuli, and impulses. Yet this knowledge comes to us only indirectly, as I have suggested, and thus to a certain extent, although we can *infer* the source of their movement, the actual origin of things within the world as dispersed into causal relations remains for us *qualitas occultae*, that is, as unknown.[123] In order to obtain the actual source of these phenomenal entities within the world, it is necessary for us to penetrate beyond their appearances, being dispersed within causal relations, into the principle itself. This however is only possible on the basis of the Platonic Idea, which I will consider later.

For now, I turn to the last and fourth root in terms of concepts relating to the abstract representation through reason. Regarding this root, Schopenhauer states that such concepts are always traceable back to their 'ground of knowing' (*der Grund des Erkennens*) within reason itself, and that through this we obtain the *principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi* for our knowledge. It is in accordance with this root that the principle of sufficient reason is itself said to be grounded, and through which it: "asserts

[122] Regarding this Schopenhauer states: "Thus the effect produced by the motive, unlike that produced by all other causes, is not only known by us from outside, in a merely indirect way, but at the same time from inside, quite directly, and therefore according to its whole mode of action." (*PSR*, pp. 170-171)

[123] Accordingly, Schopenhauer states that: "Thus we see mechanical, physical, chemical effects, as well as those brought about by *stimuli*, in each instance follow from their respective causes without on that account ever completely understanding the process, the essential part of which remains a mystery to us; so we attribute it to qualities of bodies, to forces of nature, or to vital energy, which, however, are all *qualitas occultae*." (*PSR*, p. 170)

that if a judgment is to express knowledge of any kind, it must have a sufficient reason: in virtue of which it then receives the predicate *true*."[124] (*PSR*, p. 124) So this fourth root doesn't relate to our concepts of things as such, but rather to concepts on the basis of their relations to other concepts or even to intuitions, and hence to judgments. As Schopenhauer states:

> [T]hinking does not consist in the bare presence of abstract concepts in our consciousness, but rather in connecting or separating two or more of these conceptions under sundry restrictions and modifications which logic indicates in the theory of judgments (*der Lehre von den Urteilen*). (*PSR*, pp. 124-125)

So reason as the center of concept formation further serves as the focal point through which logic, judgment, and truth arises. It is furthermore said to serve as a ground through which we relate certain truth valuations. Understanding how this occurs, requires a brief consideration of Schopenhauer's fourfold notion of truth.

There are then four distinct kinds of truths which Schopenhauer refers to as logical (*logische*), empirical (*empirische*), transcendental (*transzendentale*), and metalogical (*metalogische*) respectively. In the first place, the judgments that the "The leaves of the that tree are green" and "John is a farmer" have a distinct kind of truth, traceable back to the original content of our intuitively empirical representation of the world. In consequence of this, such a judgment is said to result in an *empirical* truth.[125] Truth and

[124] Regarding this predicative nature of truth, F.C. White explains that: "Truth, Schopenhauer accordingly asserts, is a relational property: if a judgment is true, it is based upon something other than itself, upon an external ground or reason." (White 2006, p. 78)

[125] Schopenhauer further remarks that: "A judgment may be founded upon a representation of the first class, i.e. a perception by means of the senses, consequently on experience. In this case it has *material truth*, and moreover, if the judgment is founded *immediately* on experience, this truth is *empirical truth*." (*PSR*, p. 126)

falsity here would furthermore depend upon whether one's judgment adequately or inadequately corresponded to the actual intuitive content to which the judgment refers.

The judgment that "All triangles have eight legs" would certainly be false when any attempt is made to trace it back to its proper ground. In the first place both 'triangle' and 'eight legs' are obtained on the basis of quite distinct grounds. In order to assert this truth, the judgment would either have to refer to the *empirical* truth that: "All spiders have eight legs", or it would have to refer to a quite different kind of truth, which would state that: "All triangles have three interior angles". In this latter case, the judgment is said to result in a *transcendental* truth, as asserted on the basis of our *a priori* forms of time, space, and causality.[126]

There is then a third and distinct kind of truth which Schopenhauer refers to as *metalogical*. This truth is said to relate to the formal conditions of thinking inherent to the inner structure of reason.[127] According to this, the judgment that "A is A" or that "A is not B" would entail a *metalogical* truth as relating to the formal conditions of our thinking. It therefore serves as the basis of the science of logic itself.

The last among these which I now discuss are *logical* truths obtained whenever a judgment has for its ground (its sufficient reason) another judgment. These last kinds of truth are quite important, for in fact they serve as the basic distinction between Schopenhauer's methodologically direct approach to knowledge on the basis of the will, in antithesis to both Kant and Plato. A deduction arrived at on the basis of a syllogism, for example, finds its truth value on the basis of such judgments. Consider then the following syllogism:

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[126] Regarding this kind of truth, Schopenhauer states: "The forms of intuitive, empirical knowledge which lie within the understanding and pure sensibility may, as conditions of all possible experience, be the grounds of a judgment, which is in that case synthetical *a priori*. As nevertheless this kind of judgment has material truth, its truth is *transcendental*; because the judgment is based not only on experience, but on the conditions of all possible experience lying within us." (*PSR*, p. 127)

[127] In terms of metalogical truth, Schopenhauer notes that: "Lastly, a judgment may be founded on the formal conditions of all thinking, which are contained in the Reason; and in this case its truth is of a kind which seems to me best defined as *metalogical truth*." (*PSR*, p. 127)

(1) All farmers use a shovel.

(2) John is a farmer.

(3) Therefore, John uses a shovel.

In the first place, both judgments (1) and (2) are both empirical truths, since both refer to knowledge obtained on the basis of empirical representations (i.e., every farmer I 'see' uses a shovel at some time, and so I form my first judgment; further, I 'see' John working in the field and call him a farmer). According to Schopenhauer, inasmuch as the final judgment (3) arises on the basis of the initial judgments (1) and (2), to that extent must it be a *logical* truth.[128]

It is then in relation to this latter sense of logical truth that we are now prepared to understand the precise manner in which we obtain the 'ground of knowing'. Considering the above syllogism, were one to seek to determine the ground of the final judgment (2) that "John uses a shovel", it would be found that this arises primarily through a logical progression of judgments, i.e., that John is a farmer, that all farmers use shovels, etc. In consequence of this, the ground of the *final* judgment is essentially rooted in *knowing* itself.

So this is a very interesting conclusion for Schopenhauer since it is really foundational to his entire methodological approach. Indeed, if the matter is considered thoroughly, particularly from the perspective of what was seen in relation to Plato, then it becomes evident that for Schopenhauer, the entire content of *rational confirmation* is identifiable through logical truths as traceable to a ground in knowing. In this sense, both Platonic dialectic as well as the Platonically influenced method of synthesis in geometry are really methodologies which attempt to confirm knowledge *on the basis of*

[128] Schopenhauer remarks that: "A judgment may have for its reason another judgment; in this case it has *logical* or *formal* truth." (*PSR*, p. 124)

logical truths and the ground of knowing, and in this sense, they offer really derivative kinds of knowledge. For this reason then, according to Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective, Plato considers mathematics (rightly) as offering a rather inadequate kind of knowledge and furthermore finds its necessary to make the final ascent into the unhypothetical—and hence back into what Schopenhauer considers an essentially intuitive and quite perceptible ground. In this latter instance, that would be the Idea.

2.8. Science and the impoverishment of the concept

I turn now to the immediate results of Schopenhauer's analysis of abstract knowledge and sufficient reason, for it leads to some very important conclusions regarding knowledge itself. According to Schopenhauer, in relation to the four roots from which we draw all our knowledge of the world, there would result four branches of knowledge: mathematics, logic, empirical science, and metaphysics, or what I will hitherto refer to as philosophy (as a special case). All of these various sciences become for us knowledge inasmuch as we form abstractions on the basis of intuitive experience, and hence in relation to these various branches, Schopenhauer identifies the concept with the universal. Mathematics and logic are purely formal, as arising in relation to *a priori* knowledge. The two latter sciences require however the addition of experience, and are thus *a posteriori*, philosophy again representing a special case. I will proceed here with a consideration of these various sciences in order of their intellectual worth, i.e., from the most impoverished to the richest kind of knowledge which they offer, thus starting first with logic, wherein relations between concepts are found to be the end in itself, and arriving finally with philosophy, wherein concepts are seen to be insufficient for the account of the true nature underlying separate phenomena—thus necessitating a knowledge of the Ideas, on the basis of the root of the will.

Turning first to logic, Schopenhauer states that this science has for its sole problem: "the combination of concepts as such, the ground of knowledge as organon." (*W1*, p. 28) Inasmuch as concepts represent universal generalizations on the basis of the particular within perception, to that extent Schopenhauer believed that they obtain a range or sphere (*Sphäre*) of things which are contained beneath them. (*W1*, p. 42) Thus the concept 'animal' would contain within its sphere such concepts as 'horse', 'dog', and 'cat', but exclude such concepts as 'angle' and 'fire'. The various properties of the relations among concept spheres further gives rise to the formal structure of logic, and as a result, judgments are made possible.[129]

Turning immediately to mathematics, this science is seen to be quite similar to logic, being also an *a priori* science. It is however very much distinct from this former science inasmuch as our original intuitions into mathematics arise from a separate ground. Indeed, logic always arises in relation to the *formal* structure of reason and hence the ground of knowing as such. Mathematics, on the other hand, arises on the basis of the formal representation and hence through the being of time and space. We formulate abstract and universal concepts on the basis of this intuitive ground, geometry arising as the abstraction of coexistent spatial relations (*Nebeneinandersein*), arithmetic and algebra as the abstraction of temporal succession (*Sukzession*). (*PSR*, pp. 153-157) Inasmuch as such a science is inherently *a priori*, based upon our cognitive representations of time and space, to that extent and akin to logic, mathematics is also an impoverishment of knowledge. Through mathematics we obtain such concepts as 'triangle', 'square', 'number', 'two', etc., and indeed we may both apply mathematics to the sciences and to practical living, but in terms of knowledge as such (things-in-themselves), Schopenhauer believed that mathematics was inherently limited.

[129] An in depth discussion of Schopenhauer's theory of logic is unnecessary and extends beyond the present interest.

Again, Schopenhauer's view here certainly serves both to relate as well as to contrast with Plato, who as was seen, thought that mathematics offered a subsidiary form of knowing, while yet the actual entities themselves ('oneness', 'triangle') related back to the Ideas. For Schopenhauer, in point of fact, there are *no Ideas* for mathematical entities, which is obvious enough based upon the fact that he relates this science to the ground of being on the basis of the intuitive representation of time and space.

Turning directly to empirical science, this branch of knowledge deals strictly with objects as they arise in relation to the empirical part of the representation. So whereas the sciences of logic and mathematics have *a priori* objects for their consideration, the empirical (or natural) sciences have *a posteriori* objects as their proper ground. Such sciences include physics, astronomy, mechanics, hydraulics, thermodynamics, optics, biology, chemistry, and in general any aspect of nature in relation to its phenomenal appearance within the representation as determined by relations of time and space *united* by causality.

Despite the obvious benefit of the knowledge we obtain through such empirical sciences, inasmuch as this knowledge touches upon only the *limit* of phenomenal entities, to that extent it never actually penetrates into the heart or source of their inner existence. Such a science looks merely to 'relations' among things, accounting for the manner in which each arises and departs.[130] Like logic and mathematics, the empirical sciences are thereby similarly impoverished from the perspective of the account of being *qua* being.

An important point worth noting, however, is the fact that for Schopenhauer, what really accounts for 'scientific' knowledge as such, isn't simply the capacity to form

[130] A view reminiscent to Plato's Cave allegory where the prisoners are said to play a game requiring cleverness and prediction of the next phenomenon to arise upon the Cave wall. Like Plato, Schopenhauer thought that scientific acuity was at best an astute cleverness, since it remains always within representation, relations, i.e. dreams and shadows upon a wall. Great ability in science and mathematics is perhaps best describe as virtuosity, though never Genius. I personally disagree with this view.

abstractions based upon intuitive knowledge, since indeed all human beings are capable of this, but rather a 'science' really entails the: "task of obtaining a *complete* knowledge (*die Vollkommenheit einer Wissenschaft*) in the abstract about some species of objects". (*W1*, p. 63) So whereas for common knowledge we often speak about and wonder over such things as the outside temperature, the changes of the moon's phases, or of the logical 'correctness' of an argument, it is only when an attempt is made to *formulate* the content of such knowledge into a single and complete account, e.g., into a system of meteorology, astronomy, or logic, that an actual science results.

An immediate consequence of this is the fact that the nature of 'certitude' necessarily changes on the basis of Schopenhauer's account of scientific knowledge. Traditionally, certitude found a significant place within the sciences. An 'account' was generally considered accurate insofar as it produced the conviction (*convictio*) that it was universally valid for all particular cases for the same phenomenon. Hence gravity accounts for the falling of the apple from the tree, and with it the *certitude* arises that for all cases, given an apple upon a tree and the appropriate gravitational directional force, it will fall in precisely the same way. The empirical sciences therefore sought the highest *degree* of certitude possible in relation to phenomena.

On the other hand, for Schopenhauer, certitude really finds no place within science at all. Rather, one can only speak of having properly 'grounded' one's knowledge or not. In other words, in virtue of the correct relationship between abstract and intuitive knowledge, I obtain certitude to perfection. So when I say that an apple falls through the force of gravity, my knowledge of this is neither more nor less certain. Rather, I simply know this on account of the knowledge obtained about gravity intuitively on the basis of empirical perception. It is therefore quite improper to speak of degrees of

certitude. Rather, one can only speak of the greater or lesser *clarity* of perception and *distinctness* of one's concepts.[131] In this sense, both truth and error become possible.

To offer an example, the astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) rightly argued that the earth rotated around the sun, thus dispelling older inaccurate geocentric views. Yet Copernicus also argued, erroneously, that this rotation was circular. In bringing this into abstract knowledge, and making his calculations on the basis of the systematic astronomical data since then obtained, one may well argue that Copernicus was able to determine the rotation of the earth to a greater *degree* of certitude. For Schopenhauer, however, what this really means is that Copernicus merely understood with greater clarity what was only understood obscurely before. In finally drawing out his calculations he doesn't do so with greater certainty, but rather, more distinctly than previous astronomers.[132]

Although the difference here may seem nuanced, it is important to keep in mind Schopenhauer's general belief that abstract knowledge is really grounded within the intuitive. From this perspective then, the notion of 'certitude' departs from the traditional tendency to emphasize rational confirmation, whereas Schopenhauer's sense of clear and distinct knowledge (thus echoing Descartes) implies the subject as central, and hence the will as ground. As Schopenhauer points out:

> [T]he aim of science is not greater certainty (*Gewißheit*); for even the most disconnected single piece of knowledge can have just as much certainty;

[131] Hence Schopenhauer states: "Only perceptions, not concepts, are really *clear* (*klar*); concepts can at best be *distinct* (*deutlich*)." (*W2*, p. 65)

[132] Regarding this notion of 'certitude' in the sciences, Schopenhauer further points out in the second book to his *Parerga and Paralipomena*: "Every *demonstration of a truth* is a logical deduction of the asserted proposition from one already settled and certain—with the aid of another as second premiss. Now that proposition must either have itself direct, more correctly original, certainty, or logically follow from one that has such certainty. Such propositions of an original certainly that is not brought about by any proof, constitute the fundamental truths of all the sciences and have always resulted from carrying over what is somehow intuitively apprehended into what is thought, the abstract." (*PP2*, p. 22)

> its aim is rather facility (*Erleichterung*) of rational knowledge through its form and the possibility, thus given, of completing such knowledge. (*W1*, p. 64)

With empirical science, knowledge remains once again, as in the formal sciences, at the level of representation, although in this case it deals with empirical phenomena as determined by causal relations, as I have stated. However, brought into the conceptual and abstract, both formal and empirical grounds provide knowledge of the *universalia* of phenomena *post rem*, since indeed one must first intuit and perceive this ground, and only then universally conceive it. So both the formal and empirical sciences really add very little to our knowledge of the thing-in-itself. For that, it is necessary to turn to the inner *source* which gives life to the various forces of nature themselves.

Before concluding this section, I would like to offer a few remarks regarding what Schopenhauer considers an essential impoverishment of knowledge on the basis of concepts and in relation to the various sciences themselves. The nature of concepts are here generally seen as offering a knowledge of the *universalia post rem*. This is seen to apply to all the major sciences. On the basis of the intuitive ground of the formal and empirical representation, human reason formulates concepts *post rem*, i.e., after the fact of things, and these concepts represent a kind of universal generalization of the various particulars within this experience. If at this point all were said and done, then Schopenhauer would likely stand upon the same ground as Kant from the perspective of Idealism. On the other hand, if the ideality of the world were removed, then Schopenhauer's theory of universals would quite easily be reduced to either conceptualism or simply nominalism. Although Schopenhauer is able to initially avoid such a conclusion on the basis of the Platonic Idea, as will be seen, he yet falls into nominalism in the manner in which he characterizes the will and Idea as arising *through representation*.

For now, a quick reflection upon Schopenhauer's adoption of both transcendental Idealism coupled with the Idea easily reveals why he considered the sciences as offering an impoverished kind of knowledge. In the first place, it is to be recalled that Schopenhauer emphasizes knowledge through experience—since this really becomes our only road and access to the thing-in-itself (as will). Accordingly, inasmuch as the concept is but a: "copy or repetition of the originally presented world of perception", and thus qualifiedly subsists as, "representations of representations", to that extent must the sciences, which express relations among an *Ideal* world through such concepts, be quite inadequate with respect to any account of the *authentic* nature of being itself. (*W1*, p. 40)

The formal sciences, as representing nothing more than a conceptual account of *a priori* objects, are thereby even further removed from this rich ground of experience, and in bringing these abstractly into knowledge, Schopenhauer suggests that: "We therefore spin them entirely out of ourselves." (*W2*, p. 121) Logic is even lower on the scale than mathematics, since this science examines relations within reason itself. Schopenhauer thus states that such a science of logic: "can never be of practical use", being a mere, "knowing in the abstract what everyone knows in the concrete". (*W1*, p. 45) So too with mathematics, although certainly having greater extension and application (particularly for empirical science itself), being yet formally given on the basis of the *a priori* forms of space and time, its knowledge is thereby quite derivative. Finally, the empirical sciences, although offering a by far richer account of the world, inasmuch as these are still focused upon an examination of natural *phenomena*, to that extent are such sciences again quite poor, since they examine and conceptually account for relations among these, rather than penetrating into their inner source.[133]

[133] So although Schopenhauer, on the basis of the will, essentially reverse Platonic ontology (wherein the intelligible realm was seen as primary), he ironically retains the old Platonic hierarchy of knowledge, wherein science and mathematics are considered lower rungs on the ladder to true knowledge. One of the larger differences between these two philosophers is of course the fact that whereas Plato extols logic

An interesting point arises in relation to that science which studies being itself, that is, philosophy. Philosophy depends upon conceptual knowledge for a number of reasons, i.e., it must form truth judgments, communicate its knowledge, etc. Evidently, like the other sciences, must not philosophy too represent an impoverishment of knowledge? I will answer this question more thoroughly in the next chapter, following the discussion of the Ideas. For now, one final point to consider in relation to the present theme is the question of whether it is possible to create a philosophy *solely* limited to concepts (i.e. neglecting experience)? To a certain extent, this was already seen in relation to Schopenhauer's criticism of both Plato and Kant. Still more, however, this applies to Hegel and the German Idealists. Indeed, Schopenhauer's dislike of Hegel was renowned. Thus his essay, *On the Basis of Morality*, submitted to the Royal Danish Society in 1849, was rejected, among other reasons, with the following words:

> Finally, we cannot pass over in silence the fact that several distinguished philosophers of recent times are mentioned in a manner so unseemly as to cause just and grave offense. (BM, p. 216)

Perhaps the Society may have been right on this point (Schopenhauer refers to Hegel there as a "clumsy and senseless charlatan" [*ibid*. p. 80]). Despite this fact, Schopenhauer *believed* that he had good reasons for such distaste. Considering Hegel and the Idealists, the possibility of a philosophy grounded upon 'concepts' perhaps exists, but precisely what *kind* of knowledge you obtain through this, is really the question to consider.[134]

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and its use (e.g. dialectic and even division), Schopenhauer tosses this science into the paper shredder. Another point is that whereas with Plato, mathematics served as an instrument for education, as helping to guide the mind into the intelligible, for Schopenhauer this science serves precisely the opposite effect. Indeed, Schopenhauer's belief in the perceptibility of the Ideas necessarily leads him to reject any such usefulness accorded to 'abstract' mathematics. He even goes so far as to state that the genius, i.e., the one who is able to 'see' the Ideas, will have a characteristic: "disinclination for mathematics". (*W1*, p. 189)

[134] Despite Schopenhauer's disdain for Hegel, there are yet deep similarities between these two philosophers. Both philosophers seemed to be equally contemptuous of *purely* conceptual knowledge

One manner of considering this is seen in relation to Schopenhauer's distinction between concepts *in concreta* and *in abstracta*. (*W1*, p. 41) The former refer to concepts which have a direct relation to their ground within experience. Accordingly, in looking to the Ideas themselves and attempting to communicate them, the philosopher would necessarily make use of such concepts *in concreta*. Hence, he speaks of the inner nature of 'tree' or 'man'. So this would certainly represent one approach, but there is another. On the other hand, the philosopher might ignore the content of experience, ignore the Ideas, and start instead from concepts themselves, perhaps *in concreta* through science, or even worse, *in abstracta* concepts. These latter concepts however always arise on the basis of the former (the latter of which arise on the basis of experience). Indeed, they are nothing more than mere abstractions of abstractions. So in this case, the philosopher now grounds his philosophy and speaks of such things as 'virtue', 'absolute', 'beginning', 'relation', etc. In light of such a philosophy founded upon concepts *in abstracta*, Schopenhauer remarks that:

> For the most special concept is almost the individual and thus almost real; and the most universal concept, e.g., Being (the intuitive of the copula) is scarcely anything but a word. Therefore philosophical systems, keeping within such very universal concepts without descending to the real, are scarcely anything but a mere idle display of words.[135] (*W2*, p. 64)

with respect to the Ideas, however, Hegel seems to have followed Kant's interpretation of reason and understanding wherein concepts and intuitions are somewhat confounded. Thus, for Hegel, although the Ideas aren't *purely* abstract concepts, they are yet conceptual in a way which Schopenhauer would deny. William Desmond points out that: "For Hegel the great art work is a concrete universal, and like Schopenhauer, he is critical of the abstract concept. This is but a subjectivistic construction of *Verstand*, or the analytical intellect. Hegel's *Begriff*, his true concept, is referred to *Vernunft*, or synthetic reason. Here the universality of Hegel's Ideas finds its home." (Desmond 2003, p. 146) Despite his denial of conceptual knowledge to the contemplation of the Ideas, it will be seen later, that Schopenhauer yet affirms this both in terms of his description of our knowledge of these, as well as in his account of philosophical knowledge as such.

[135] In effect, Platonic dialectic must be similarly rejected, as I have noted in previous sections. As a final point on this matter, F.C. White notes that: "Further, given that all reasons constituting grounds of true

Based upon the above distinction and from the perspective of the impoverishment of conceptual knowledge, Schopenhauer's rejection of such an *in abstracta* philosophy should be evident enough. Keeping in mind the fact that Hegel, for example, almost entirely neglects the results of Kantian Idealism (according to Schopenhauer—which was something of a mortal sin), together with Hegel's peculiar application of dialectic ("sham wisdom" [c.f. footnote to *W1*, p. 223]) which initiates *from the concept* of the 'Absolute' (viz., the most emptied of all concepts), to that extent does one begin to understand (right or wrong) why Schopenhauer should hold such antipathy for this philosopher. Hence Schopenhauer, after a short historical discourse on the nature of reason as a faculty of 'abstract representation' states that:

> It would not be necessary to mention such things, were it not by reason of the tricks and farces that have been played in the last fifty years with the concept of *reason* by all the philosophasters of Germany. For with shameless audacity they wanted to smuggle in under this name a wholly false and fabricated faculty of immediate, metaphysical, so-called supersensuous knowledge. (*W2*, p. 68)

For Schopenhauer then, such hocus-pocus should *never* be considered philosophy at all. It rather represents the highest impoverishment of knowledge possible, worse even than logic, since this latter science at least refers to *something*. Abstract philosophy stands, however, in complete antithesis to the inner perceptual content toward which

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judgments are themselves representations, consisting of judgments, real objects, or forms of the intellect, all inferences from judgments to reasons, or from reasons to judgments, lead merely from representations to representations. In particular, deductive reasoning, the rationalist's would-be ladder of ontological ascent, remains within the domain of judgments and therefore of representations." (White 2006, p. 79)

true intuitive philosophy and the *true* intuitive philosopher must first turn to and contemplate. It is then only following such a contemplation, that the philosopher now makes use of concepts.

2.9. The intuitive nature of mathematical demonstration

In his earlier doctoral dissertation (the *PSR*), amidst the discussion of the nature of mathematics and demonstration, Schopenhauer states that: "It is generally the analytic method that I desire for the expounding of mathematics, instead of the synthetic method Euclid made use of." (*W1*, p. 73) Although in the previous sections it was seen that mathematics arose on the basis of the formally intuitive representation of space and time, there is nonetheless an important analogy between Schopenhauer's understanding of the 'analytic' nature of geometrical demonstration and the methodology of genius in contemplation of the Ideas. Indeed, both methods will be seen to be characteristically 'analytic' in nature having essentially 'intuitive' grounds (albeit in a different way), and both stand to oppose more rationalistic approaches to similar entities in question, found within, for example, Platonic thought. Through consideration of Schopenhauer's criticism of the method of 'synthesis' in Euclidean geometry then, the nature of contemplation of the Ideas and the manner in which this differs within Platonic thought will, hopefully, be made all the more clear. Indeed, Schopenhauer's discussion of contemplation is oftentimes somewhat obscure, for he never really describe *how* the process itself comes about, stating only the fact that such a things occurs—and only for certain very privileged people. The reader is then left to ponder this mystery quite on his own. On the other hand, regarding mathematics, Schopenhauer is much more specific, and inasmuch as an analogy is found to hold between the two (i.e., methodology in mathematics and the Ideas), to that extent a

consideration of the clarity of expression in the former, should certainly be of benefit in attempting to understand the obscurity of expression in the latter.

In the first place, although I have briefly spoken of the nature and methods of 'synthesis' and 'analysis' as applied by the ancient Greek geometers (cf. section 1.7), I have yet to offer a comprehensive account of the matter. In the second place, and as will be seen, Schopenhauer's interpretation of these methods is slightly different. The best description of these two methods in their original form is to be found in the account provided by Pappus of Alexandria in his *Collections*. There, regarding first analysis, Pappus states:

> Analysis then takes that which is sought as if it were admitted and passes from it through successive consequences to something which is admitted as the result of synthesis: for in analysis we assume that which is sought as if it were (already) done (γεγονός), and we inquire what it is from which this results, and again what is the antecedent cause of the latter, and so on, until by so retracing our steps we come upon something already known or belonging to the class of first principles, and such a method we call analysis as being solution backwards (ἀνάπαλιν λύσιν). (Heath 1956, p. 138)

Analysis thus proceeds from an unknown, stated as an hypothesis, to a known or first principle. This stands to contrast the method of synthesis, which is said to proceed in precisely the opposite direction, viz., from a known (first principle or something already proved) to an unknown, as Pappus goes on to state:

> But in synthesis, reversing the process, we take as already done that which was last arrived at in the analysis and, by arranging in their natural order

> as consequences what were before antecedents, and successively connecting them one with another, we arrive finally at the construction of what was sought; and this we call synthesis.[136] (*ibid.*)

It should first of all be kept in mind that these two methods were often used conjointly for the solution of the same problem (cf. Heath 1956 and 2006; Burnet 1950). To take the example of the Pythagorean theorem, one might attempt to prove this theorem (as Euclid does) through synthesis, that is, by demonstrating the inner consistency of the triangle on the basis of logical relations between squares and parallel lines constructed on its basis. On the other hand, one might demonstrate the same theorem through analysis, that is, through a process of reducing the right triangle into its more fundamental principles, which would then once again reveal the validity of the triangle itself.

The basis of Schopenhauer's critique follows from his belief that determining the proper root, as he called this, from which we derive all concepts of reason is of essential importance for knowledge, for in doing so we obtain the sufficient reason or *raison d'être* for each thing. The point to understand, as I have discussed, is that Schopenhauer argued, following Kant, that we have immediate *a priori* access into mathematical entities as ultimately tied to the way in which we perceive the world. This access is direct, that is to say, it is intuitive. In bringing such intuitions into conceptual knowledge, a process of abstraction is involved, resulting in a 'distancing', so to speak,

[136] Although I have discussed the question of whether Plato discovered analysis, it is worth noting that the this method seems to have been in practice within the Platonic school itself. Thus Aristotle in the *Nichomachean Ethics* remarks that: "Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles (οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς). For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, 'are we on the way from or to the first principles?' " (*E.N.*, 1095a30) Regarding this remark, Michelakis notes that: "In Book I of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, where methodological questions are discussed, Aristotle points out the difference between arguments that start from first principles and those that lead to first principles. Thus he distinguishes the analytical from the synthetical method of knowledge." (Michelakis 1961, p. 9)

from the original and immediate ground of this knowledge. The effect of this is that in now attempting to prove any geometric theorem, two roads become accessible. On the one hand, one might follow the path of reason (*Vernunft, logos*), of logical consistency, and thus of rational confirmation through *convictio*. This is the traditional path of the ancient geometers, and was seen quite explicitly in relation to Plato's method of *dianoia* and hypothesis within mathematics. It is furthermore that path which Schopenhauer refers to as synthesis.

There is then an alternative path which Schopenhauer refers to as: "an analysis of the process of thought in the first discovery of a geometrical proof".[137] (*W1*, p. 73) This latter path involves a *departure* from reason back to the original intuition through which knowledge of the entity first arose. This is the path of intuition—of *cognitio*.[138] So both the ancient rational and what might perhaps be referred to as Schopenhauer's intuitive path, may certainly lead to a *correct* demonstration. The difference, however, is that whereas the former demonstrates through logical relations *that* the thing is so, the latter leads back to the ground of the thing in question, and thus reveals also *why* it is so. This path is fundamentally related to what was seen in the previous sections in terms concepts being traced back to their intuitive ground, wherein they receive their sufficient reason. The path of intuition, of *cognitio*, is such that it leads back to the original ground of our intuition into being. It reveals the sufficient reason for the thing in question—the *raison d'être* of the entity.

Contained within Schopenhauer's criticism of the method of synthesis in Euclid is a criticism of the Platonic methodology as such, particularly of the method of *dianoia* in the third section of the divided line. According to this method, the geometer was said to proceed through hypothesis (as an assumption), logically to a conclusion. For

[137] "einer Analyse des Gedankenganges bei der ersten Auffindung einer geometrischen Wahrheit"

[138] Regarding these two paths Schopenhauer states: "For proof by indicating the reason of knowledge only effects conviction (*convictio*), not knowledge (*cognitio*): therefore it might perhaps be more correctly called *elenchus* than *demonstratio*." (*PSR*, p. 159)

Schopenhauer, such a process, in emphasizing a logical and hence more rational approach to demonstration, thereby loses touch, so to speak, with the entity itself. The explicit lesson to be learned here, to be carried over into Schopenhauer's account of the perceptibility of the Ideas, is that, wherein ontology undergoes a change, methodology must likewise follow and adapt. Indeed, mathematics as now grounded within our formal representation of the world, such entities are therefore essentially *a priori*, and our knowledge thus intuitively based.

As a side point it is worth noting that analysis, according to Schopenhauer's sense of an intuition into the ground of the entity, was never explicitly in practice among the ancient geometers themselves. For them, with only the primary, more simple theorems, would such an intuitive approach by followed in consequence of the axioms of geometry taken as self-evident.[139] For more complex theorems, however, the ancients simply resolved the problem into previously proved theorems, of themselves demonstrated on the basis of a synthesis.[140] With Schopenhauer, on the other hand, *every* geometrical theorem, if it is to produce the 'why' of the entity in question, must be traced back to the original intuition upon which it is founded and first arose.

[139] This point follows, despite the fact that the ancients accepted on an intuitive basis a limited number of primary indemonstrable principles or axioms. (cf. Heath 1956) Schopenhauer was well aware of this fact, as he states of Euclid: "Only his axioms is he compelled to leave resting on immediate evidence; all the following geometrical proofs are logically proved, namely, under the presupposition of those axioms, from the agreement with the assumptions made in the proposition, or with an earlier proposition, or even from the contradiction between the opposite of the proposition and the assumptions, or the axioms, or the earlier propositions, or even itself. But the axioms themselves have no more immediate evidence than any other geometrical proposition has, but only greater simplicity by their smaller content." (*W1*, p. 74)

[140] Consequently, the first principles referred to by Pappus are certainly not the Ideas in Plato's sense, but rather a broader interpretation entailing the elements (στοιχεῖα) of Geometry. These included the primary definitions, axioms, and postulates upon which the science is based, *as well as* theorems and problems already demonstrated. Some of these elements are indemonstrable, such as the axioms, whereas others, such as the definitions, are necessarily added as the basic foundations integral to the science itself (e.g. points and lines in geometry, numbers in arithmetic). Although the more fundamental elements as well as subsequent propositions are all set forth in the way in which Plato indicates in the *Republic* and the *Meno*—mathematicians hypothesize these elements without really having knowledge of their nature—the treatment of these and the nature of first principles tends to follow more Aristotle's account and discussion of them and the sciences. See for example Aristotle's *Anal. post.* i. sections 2, 6, 10 for an in depth discussion of the nature of hypothesis, postulates, and definitions.

Accordingly, not only the primary axioms are taken as self-evident and indemonstrable, but as Schopenhauer suggests:

> I am persuaded that it might be brought to evidence in every theorem, however complicated, and that the proposition can always be reduced to some such simple intuition." (*PSR*, p. 161)

In consequence of the above points, Schopenhauer's understanding and criticism of geometrical demonstration (which is seen to apply equally to arithmetic for the same reasons [cf. *W1*, p. 75]) involves an implicit rejection of the Platonic methodology wherein indirect rational confirmation as opposed to the direct knowledge obtainable on the basis of an intuitive ground, is sought. So although Schopenhauer would agree with Plato that through mathematics we really receive only impartial knowledge of the world, he would necessarily disagree with the notion that the proper methodology of mathematics is to proceed from hypothesis synthetically to a conclusion. Rather, for Schopenhauer, inasmuch as mathematics is intuitively based upon the *a priori* ground of empirical perception, to that extent demonstration itself must proceed ultimately back to this *intuitive* ground.

The best way to gauge Schopenhauer's intuitive approach to mathematics is through consideration of his criticism (in the *PSR*) of Euclid's demonstration of proposition 16, found in the first book of the *Elements*.[141] In light of this criticism and by way of example, Schopenhauer offers an alternative proof through his own method of analysis. I reproduce both proofs here in full for the reader's consideration:

[141] For a more detailed discussion of this subject matter in relation to Euclid's demonstration of the Pythagorean theorem, I refer the reader to my essay to be published in the *Journal of Idealistic Studies*, entitled: "The Euclidean Mousetrap: Schopenhauer's Criticism of the Synthetic Method in Geometry".

Proposition 16. *In any triangle, if one of the sides be produced, the exterior angle is greater than either of the interior and opposite angles.*



Let ABC be a triangle, and let one side of it BC be produced to D; I say that the exterior angle ACD is greater than either of the interior and opposite angles CBA, BAC.

Let AC be bisected at E, and let BE be joined and produced in a straight line to F; let EF by made equal to BE, let FC be joined, and let AC be drawn through to G. Then, since AE is equal to EC, and BE to EF, the two sides AE, EB are equal to the two sides CE, EF respectively; and the angle AEB is equal to the angle FEC, for they are vertical angles. Therefore the base AB is equal to the base FC, and the triangle ABE is equal to the triangle CFE, and the remaining angles are equal to the remaining angles respectively, namely those which the equal sides subtend; therefore the angle BAE is equal to the angle ECF. But the angle ECD is greater than the angle ECF; therefore the angle ACD is greater than the angle BAE. Similarly also, if BC is bisected, the angle BCG, that is, the angle ACD, can be proved greater than the angle ABC as well. Therefore, etc. Q.E.D. (Heath 1956, pp. 279-280)

The most obvious point ascertainable from the above demonstration is that Euclid first proceeds through construction of lines and triangles, and then, on the basis of their mutual relations (as well as previously proved theorems within the *Elements*), essentially confirms his hypothesis logically and by way of consistency. The theorem has certainly been shown to be true. There can be no doubt about this. But what really has Euclid shown? If the reader reviews and understands the proof thoroughly, it

becomes more and more evident that any inner conviction of the truth of the proposition which has been obtained, yet leaves us with a certain dissatisfaction. It leaves the feeling that the *ground* of the truth of the theorem has been lost beneath a play of logical relations, that indeed, it remains hidden or even concealed. Even more, according to Plato and the method discussed in the third section of the divided line, the geometer simply *cannot* reveal such a ground, for here one is dealing essentially with conclusions based upon mere hypotheses which are *assumed*.

This then becomes the essence of Schopenhauer's criticism, which although directed at Euclid, indirectly falls upon the shoulders of Platonic thought and its emphasis upon rational confirmation. Euclid's proof is certainly true. It offers, however, nothing more than "logical certainty" (*W1*, p. 72) through demonstration on the basis of the "ground of knowing". (*PSR*, p. 161) If the reader recalls the discussion of Schopenhauer's four roots of the principle of sufficient reason, it was there seen that mathematics was based rather upon the 'ground of being'. Accordingly, in demonstrating according to the logical 'ground of knowing', Euclid's proof necessarily leaves a, "disagreeable impression", for indeed an improper ground has been appealed to for its proof. (*PSR*, p. 164) Regarding this point, Schopenhauer thus states that:

> This explains why this sort of geometrical demonstration, while it no doubt conveys the conviction that the theorem which has been demonstrated is true, nevertheless gives no insight as to *why* that which it asserts is what it is. In other words, we have not found its reason of Being; but the desire to find it is usually then thoroughly roused. (*PSR*, p. 159)

For Schopenhauer then, there is a much better way of demonstrating the above proposition. Indeed, the method of analysis which he reveals for this, offers a very practical example of the manner in which the *why* of the thing, its ground of being, can

in fact *be* revealed. Thus Schopenhauer offers his own 'analytic' proof of proposition 16 in the *PSR*. He begins:

> My demonstration of the same proposition would be as follows…
>
> 
>
>
> For the angle BAC to be even equal to, let alone greater than, the angle ACD, the line BA toward CA would have to lie in the same direction as BD (for this is precisely what is meant by equality of the angles), i.e., it must be parallel with BD; that is to say, BA and BD must meet (reason of being), and must thus do the contrary of that which would be required for the angle BAC to be of the same size as the angle ACD.
>
> For the angle ABC to be even equal to, let alone greater than, the angle ACD, line BA must lie in the same direction toward BD as AC (for this is what is meant by equality of angles), i.e., it must be parallel with AC, that is to say, BA and AC must never meet; but in order to form a triangle BA and AC must meet and must thus do the contrary of that which would be required for the angle ABC to be of the same size as ACD. (*PSR*, p. 163)

The proposition is thus proved—intuitively. This time, Schopenhauer reveals *why* it is that for any triangle, in producing any of its sides, the exterior angle should always be larger than the interior and opposite angles. In doing so, rather than appealing to reason, that is, to logical consistency for his proof, he appeals to our inner intuitive knowledge of triangles as such. On the basis of such knowledge, it becomes self-evident that line BA toward CA can never lie in the same direction as BD, for then the triangle would collapse; and yet this is precisely what the opposite angle BAC would require, if

it is to be equal to or larger than ACD. He then repeats this same procedure for the other interior angle ABC, and thus by a *reductio ad absurdum* on the basis of our *intuitive* knowledge of the triangle, the proposition is proved.

The reader who carefully reflects upon these two examples will see that there is a very large distinction between Euclid's proof of proposition 16 by way of synthesis, and Schopenhauer's proof of the very same proposition, by way of analysis. Although both demonstrations are correct, Euclid has only shown *that* the proposition is true, whereas with Schopenhauer, one understands *why* also this is the case, i.e., inasmuch as it is based upon the very nature of the triangle itself.

So Schopenhauer's method here certainly reveals a number of advantages over that of Euclid, not in the least its simplicity. The most significant result of this method, however, from the point of view of this present research, is the fact that the manner in which Schopenhauer's treatment of knowledge within mathematics serves as an analogy to his treatment of the knowledge of the Idea. Indeed, Schopenhauer will offer a very direct path to knowledge of the Idea, much as he does with respect to mathematics. On the other hand, as in Euclid's treatment of proposition 16, Plato considered knowledge of the Ideas quite similarly, that is, through the indirect approach of a logical dialectic. I discuss this in what follows, turning now to Schopenhauer's account of the perceptibility of the Ideas.

CHAPTER 3

The Perceptibility of the Ideas

3.1. Platonism turned on its head

In the previous chapter, a reopening to metaphysics was discovered on the basis of the will.[142] Even more significant, in extending the will to the entirety of the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer thereby gives ontological *primacy* to the will.[143] All manner of thought and thinking now become secondary manifestations arising on the basis of the more primordial needs, appetites, and desires of this will in nature.[144] To this extent, Schopenhauer's thought may be described metaphorically as a *Platonism turned on its*

[142] In this present chapter, I turn now to the discussion of a *specific* element inherent to Schopenhauer's epistemology, that of the Ideas themselves. The Platonic Ideas are then found to arise from the more immanent source of the will and through representation. This then becomes the essential ground of their perceptibility, as also Schopenhauer's notion of genius and the aesthetic showing of art.

[143] Thus Günter Zöller points out that: "In a move that follows the idealist privileging of the inner or mental over the outer and physical, Schopenhauer traces the duality of will and body to its origin in the will, thereby granting the will primacy over the body." (Zöller 2006, p. 28)

[144] Regarding this point Brian Magee states that: "Schopenhauer regarded the will in all its senses as more body-like than mind-like. According to him the metaphysical will has manifested itself in matter (which is the phenomenal will), and then, within the world of material objects, a few of those objects have developed minds." (Magee 1990, p. 5)

head.[145] In direct antithesis to Plato's own metaphysical and teleological underpinnings through the Good, Schopenhauer's states that:

> The will, as the thing-in-itself (*Der Wille, als das Ding an sich*), constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; yet in itself it is without consciousness (*Bewußtlos*). For consciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and the intellect is a mere accident of our being, for it is a function of the brain (*eine Funktion des Gehirns*). The brain, together with the nerves and spinal cord attached to it, is a mere fruit, a product, in fact a parasite, of the rest of the organism, in so far as it is not directly geared to the organism's inner working, but serves (*dient*) the purpose of self-

[145] Thus mirroring Friedrich Nietzsche's polemic in the *The Anti-Christ* (sec. 8) against the theologians, the priests, and all like-minded idealists and idealisms, of which he asserts that they have essentially and altogether: "stood truth on its head". Indeed the somewhat 'inverse' relationship here between Schopenhauer and Plato is not without some coincidence. Aside from what was discussed in the first chapter, another striking image which confirms this view is seen in Plato's allegorical description of the tripartite soul in both the *Phaedrus* as well as the *Republic*. In this first dialogue, using the image of a Chariot, Plato states: "Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer…To begin with, our driver is in charge of a pair of horses; second, one of the horses is beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of bloodline. This means that chariot-driving in our case is inevitably a painfully difficult business." (*Phaedrus*, 246b) What is said in the *Republic* then offers a parallel and more substantial description of what is only stated allegorically in the *Phaedrus*. Indeed, the former 'good' horse is aptly understood as the spirited part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδής), and is understood as, in general, subservient to the driver, who symbolizes the thinking and reasoning part (τὸ λογιστικόν). On the other hand, the latter 'bad' horse is akin to the appetitive part of the soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), the desires of the body, and as all such desires, having a mind and will, of its own. The relationship between these desires in Platonic thought further points out the fact that Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective toward Plato is quite naïve. In reference to book 9 of the *Republic* (580d7-8) where Plato discusses the tripartite soul, John M. Cooper relates also three kinds of desires, and further notes that: "Strikingly, the word for 'desires' here, ἐπιθυμίαι, is the word used throughout the *Republic* as the generic name for the urgent bodily appetites (thirst, hunger and sexual desire) that serve as paradigms for the third part of the soul, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, which is so named after them. The desires of reason are thus implied to be strong impulses of some kind which we experience simply and directly because we possess the power of reason, the power to figure things out (λογίζεσθαι) and know the truth." (Cooper 1998, p. 30)

> preservation (*Selbsterhaltung*) by regulating its relations with the external world.[146] (*W2*, p. 201)

Intellect is secondary, an offspring, something 'parasitic', almost unnecessary; having been born into the *service* of the will. Further echoing Plato's divided realm and the cosmological formation of the world in the *Timaeus*, Schopenhauer goes on to state that:

> [T]he intellect (*der Intellekt*) is only known to us in animal nature, consequently as an absolutely secondary and subordinate principle in the world, a product of the latest origin; it can never therefore have been the condition of the existence of the world. Nor can a *mundus intelligibilis* precede a *mundus sensibilis*; since it receives its material from the latter alone. It is not an intellect which has brought forth Nature; it is, on the contrary, Nature which has brought forth intellect. (*WN*, p. 37)

And of course, Nature *is* essentially will. But precisely what is this will and how does knowledge arise through and from it? In the first place, as thing-in-itself the will is thereby the metaphysical *ground* of being, as Schopenhauer points out:

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[146] Schopenhauer reiterates this in his essay, *On the Will in Nature*, there stating: "First of all therefore I place *the* will, *as thing in itself* and quite primary; secondly, its mere visibility, its objectification: i.e. the *body*; thirdly, the *intellect*, as a mere function of one part of the body." (*WN*, p. 20) H. Voightländer further points out the distinction between Schopenhauer's notion of will and Plato's notion of *eros*. He states that: "*Eros* und *Wille* sind dynamische Realitäten, die beide zwar in den Individuen wirken, in ihnen zur Erscheinung kommen, die aber dennoch von den Individuen unabhängig, ihnen vorgängig gedacht warden: sie entspringen einem Mangel und sind intentional, nämlich grundsätzlich gerichtet auf das, was ihnen fehlt, was aber in gewisser Weise eben zu ihnen gehört: *Eros* ist gerichtet auf das Schöne und Gute, das nach Platon die höchste Realität darstellt, der *Wille* ist gerichtet auf die Welt der Vorstellung ingesamt, damit er in ihr Lust in der Befriedigung finde; der Wille ist also gerade nicht auf ein wirklich vorhandenes Gutes und Schönes gerichtet, da es ein solches bei Schopenhauer ja nicht gibt oder doch nur in einem sehr besonderen, speziell ästhetischen Sinne in der Idee gibt, auf welche sich aber gerade nicht der Wille, sondern nur der Intellekt richtet; die Art, in der die Wesen der anschaulichen Welt Befriedigung suchen, ist allerdings verscheiden, bei den Menschen differierend nach dem jeweiligen Charakter." (Voightländer 1990, p. 161)

> Wherever explanation of the physical comes to an end, it is met by the metaphysical; and wherever this last is accessible to immediate knowledge, the result will be, as here, the will.[147] (*WN*, p. 27)

As thing-in-itself residing beyond and foundational to the phenomenal world, Schopenhauer further argues that this will can never be adequately described. In characterizing this, he therefore proceeds according to the *via negativa*, accounting for what the will is *not*. As the foundation of being, indeed, as being itself, will is "completely groundless"; as lying beyond phenomena, it is also "free from all plurality", and thus an entirely singular, monadic entity and source.[148] (*W1*, pp. 111-113)

[147] As an interesting side note, the notion of 'will' within ancient Greek thought seems to have arisen quite late. For example Albrecht Dihle states in his book, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, that: "According to Homeric anthropology, impulses toward action may originate directly from planning or deliberation as well as from emotions like anger, fear, or hatred. They can also result from both reasoning and emotion, an intensified deliberation in a crucial situation affects both the intellectual and emotional disposition…In short, the main elements of traditional Greek psychology were already fully developed in Homer, even without the aid of the concept of soul. Within the limits imposed by the divine rule, man is seen to act in accordance with his own rational and irrational forces…The twofold psychology that explains human behavior on the basis of the interaction of rational and irrational forces and has no room for the concept of will prevails throughout the Greek tradition from the time of Homer onwards." (Dihle 1982, pp. 26-27) Friedrich Nietzsche will further depart from Schopenhauer to speak of every and any distinction between reality and appearance as such (not just a *primacy* of reason or will) as an essential error. He thus states in *The Gay Science*, in reference to Schopenhauer's discussion of the 'metaphysical need' in the second book to the *WWR*, that this: "metaphysical need is not the *origin* of religions, as Schopenhauer supposed, but merely a late offshoot. Under the religious ideas, one has become accustomed to the notion of 'another world (behind, below, above)'—and when religious ideas are destroyed one is troubled by an uncomfortable emptiness and deprivation. From this feeling grows once again 'another world,' but now merely a metaphysical one that is no longer religious. But what first led to the positing of 'another world' in primeval times was not some impulse or need but an *error* in the interpretation of certain natural events, a failure of the intellect." (*The Gay Science*, sec. 151)

[148] Initially, it seems that Schopenhauer's characterization here of the dependence of the intelligible upon the volitional (through the will), is fundamentally resolvable into Spinoza's dictum (*Ethics*, Pars 2, XLIX): *voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt* (Volition and intellection are one and the same). There are essential differences, however, between these two thinkers, the first of course being the fact that for Schopenhauer volition, not intellection, is primary. Secondly, despite the unitary nature of the will as thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer argues for a kind of 'displaced' intellect. As will be seen, the knowing subject is able to isolate itself from its own ground in willing (albeit negatively) to such extent that it can either momentarily emancipate itself from willing through aesthetic contemplation of the Idea, or even achieve

The will is the "innermost kernel of our being"; it is that which is "metaphysical, incorporeal, eternal", and also:

> [T]he will never tires, never grows old, never learns, never improves by practice, is in infancy what it is in old age, eternally one and the same, and its character in each individual is unchangeable. (*WN*, p. 28)

Schopenhauer further goes on to state that the will has an: "absence of all aim, of all limits". Despite this fact, he yet characterizes it positively through *one* essential attribute, i.e., as subsisting in "endless striving (*endloses Streben*)". (*W1*, p. 164) Taken as a whole, the will itself lacks teleological aim or end. From the perspective of its striving, however, something else quite miraculous occurs. It is said that through strife it, "feasts upon itself", subsisting in: "contest, struggle, and the fluctuation of victory", seeking "higher and higher objectification"; ever yearning for, "higher power" through "*overwhelming assimilation*", up even into man wherein this is discovered as, "*homo homini lupus*". The will is thus characterized by Schopenhauer through essentially one feature: as striving with a will-to-live (*der Wille zum Leben*).[149] (*W1*, pp. 144-147)

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an inner *annihilation* of its ground in willing through self-denial and asceticism. So volition and intellection are very much linked, but yet quite independently subsisting elements, within Schopenhauer's thought. In the end, and on the order of Being itself, however, the will remains primary, and in consequence of this, the intellect becomes subservient and even enslaved to the will; and like any slave, it soon learns to despise its bonds. Consequently, the intellect begins to yearn for a freedom of its own, which, since it cannot obtain directly, on the order of Being—being a volitional will—it chooses to do so indirectly and in *opposition* to Being.

[149] Friedrich Nietzsche will later develop upon Schopenhauer's notion of the will, stating that: "life itself is *will to power* (*der Wille zur Macht*); self-preservation is only one of the indirect and more frequent *results*." (*Beyond Good and Evil*, sec. 13) Although the notion of the 'will to power' in Nietzsche's thought is certainly quite unique in its own way, there are yet obvious Schopenhauerian influences. Thus James Porter states that: "the word 'will' can never appear in Nietzsche's writings without invoking this problem of its indebtedness to what the will to power purportedly refuses…To put the point differently, Nietzsche's 'will' is legible only through the registers of meaning that the word 'will' commonly and philosophically has. And that confusion of meanings, the impossibility of 'will' to signify outside its inherited significations, is, I want to argue, crucially bound up with the meaning of Nietzsche's own writing of the will to power. Not the least of these inherited signification is the connotation of

How then does plurality arise through the striving of the will?[150] Schopenhauer goes on to state that in the first place, the will, although *one*, yet contains various degrees of 'excitability' within and through itself. One might understand this through the analogy of 'hunger'. If you cease to eat, you will soon notice, perhaps within a few hours or a day, a strange, inner, gnawing sense of *need*. As this fast continues, you will quickly find that this inner need manifests itself ever more intensely, and perhaps after a few days or weeks, what was previously need now turns into *pain*, a sharp and intense pain concerned solely with the self-satisfaction of a singular demand—*to feed*. The simple analogy of hunger, which both animals as well as human being are quite familiar with, reveals how the same singular impulse might give rise to various higher 'grades' of excitation. As a further point, one can distinguish both hunger from thirst, and these both may be distinguished from sexual desire. Regarding this 'excitability' of the will, Schopenhauer states that:

Schopenhauerianism, which Nietzsche not only cannot avoid but actively courts." (Porter 2006, p. 555) In light of this, I cannot agree with W. Kaufmann when he states that regarding Nietzsche's use of will to power: "one will yet have to admit that Nietzsche based his theory on empirical data and not on any dialectical ratiocination abut Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as is so often supposed erroneously." (Kaufmann 1974, pp. 206-207) My basic criticism of this view stems from the fact that *neither* Schopenhauer *nor* Nietzsche base the will upon any notion of 'dialectical ratiocination', and that indeed *both* philosophers argue, in one way or another, for the will on the basis of *empirical data*. Nietzsche rejects the metaphysical basis of Schopenhauer's will, yet in many innumerable ways his account of the will to power (coupled with a rejection of rationalism) foreshadows much of Schopenhauer's own thought with respect to the will-to-life. It seems to me that Christopher Janaway rightly points out the larger differences when he states the fact that Nietzsche rather rejects the metaphysical underpinnings of the will, complaining that Schopenhauer's: " 'will' is 'created only with the aid of a poetic intuition', not reached by sound argument…'Will' therefore is merely an arbitrary label attached to an unknowable… Nietzsche sees this flaw as wholly vitiating Schopenhauer's metaphysics." (Janaway 1998, pp. 18-19)

[150] Regarding this point Magee states that: "Schopenhauer took the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal over from Kant and made it central to his own philosophy. But he argued…that the very possibility of differentiation (like the possibilities of time and space and causal connection) exists only within the phenomenal world, so that the noumenal, whatever it may be, must be undifferentiated." (Magee 1990, p. 4) Magee then goes on to state regarding the same matter that: "In doing this he established a basic point of connection between Western and Eastern philosophy. Like Hindu and Buddhist thinkers, he believed the One to be unknowable and ineffable, and like many Buddhists in particular he believed it to be impersonal." (*ibid*., p. 17)

> By virtue of the simplicity belonging to the will as the thing-in-itself, as the metaphysical in the phenomenon, its *essential nature* admits of no degrees, but is always entirely itself. Only its *excitement* has degrees (*seine Erregung hat Grade*), from the feeblest inclination up to passion, and also its excitability (*Erregbarkeit*), and thus its vehemence, from the phlegmatic to the choleric temperament.[151] (*W*2, p. 206)

The will struggles with itself, and in so doing, it is stimulated and manifests itself through different degrees of excitability. This is the inner meaning of Schopenhauer's expression of a will-to-life. It furthermore serves as the foundation for both representation as well as the Platonic Idea. It is a will which endlessly strives for higher grades of excitation and self-manifestation.

Of course, this sense of manifesting is quite distinct from the Platonic sense of the formation of the world as a *mimesis* of the Good. Schopenhauer's will is much darker, devoid of teleological purpose. Any such *telos* can only be spoken of when once, through strife which gives rise to higher grades of excitability, the will now manifests consciousness and simultaneous with this, the world as representation (*Vorstellung*). Only at this point, when once representation and hence *knowledge* arises, does any kind of teleology enter into the picture. Teleology thus applies *only* to phenomena, never to the will itself:

> According to this, the will always knows, when knowledge enlightens it, what it wills here and now (*was er hier will*), but never what it wills in

[151] Schopenhauer never really repeats this anywhere within his philosophy. It seems to me that he himself only vaguely understood this point, although he certainly articulated it. Perhaps he is responding to 'silent' critics of his work, or to his own further elaboration of matters. There is an interpretive aspect to the discussion here.

> general (*überhaupt*). Every individual act has a purpose or end (*Zweck*); willing as a whole has no end in view. (*W1*, pp. 164-165)

So the will through strife gives rise to higher and higher grades of objectivity. Within the phenomenal world of representation, these grades of the will become projections of this inner need (of the will-to-live), from the most basic cause (*die Ursache*) inherent within an electromagnetic force, to the stimulus (*der Reiz*) of the plant, to determined knowing rising through the apparatus of a motive (*das Motiv*). (*PSR*, p. 53) Knowledge thus arises akin to a flower which blooms in spring:

> The medium for motives is *knowledge (Das Medium der Motive ist die Erkenntnis*): an intellect is accordingly needed for susceptibility to motives. The true characteristic of the animal is therefore the faculty of knowing, of representing (*das Vorstellen*). Animals as such, always move towards some aim and end, which therefore must have been *recognized* by them… Therefore the proper definition of the animal would be: 'That which knows (*was erkennt*);'[152] (*PSR*, p. 54)

So the faculty of knowing and hence representation arises on the basis of the primacy of the will, but to what end? The will is characterized by a will-to-life, and to that extent, all things which arise through it, are guided by this singular drive. Knowledge thereby subsists as an instrument which helps to *catalyze* this drive more efficiently. In other words, knowledge *serves* the will, helping to facilitate its needs, as Schopenhauer states:

[152] As I have noted previously, inasmuch as animals have both motives as well as a faculty of knowing and hence of representing the world, to that extent they also have (along with humans) a faculty of understanding, and hence of determining themselves according to causes. Accordingly, Schopenhauer states of animals that they have both *understanding* as well as *knowledge* of perception. For example: "Animals have understanding without the faculty of reason, and consequently they have knowledge of *perception*, but no abstract knowledge." (*W2*, p. 59)

> Thus knowledge in general, rational knowledge as well as mere knowledge from perception, proceeds originally from the will itself, belongs to the inner being of the higher grades of the will's objectification (*seiner Objektivation*) as a mere μηχανή, a means for preserving (*zur Erhaltung*) the individual and the species, just like any organ of the body. Therefore, destined originally to serve the will (*zum Dienste des Willens*) for the achievement of its aims, knowledge remains almost throughout entirely subordinate to its service… (*W1*, p. 152)

The will is the metaphysical ground of being. It is the singular thing-in-itself of the phenomenon, through which plurality, consciousness, and representation arise on the basis of strife and a will-to-life. Furthermore, all knowledge arises on the basis of representation, and since this latter form subsists through the primordial (and primary) ground of willing, to that extent must all such knowing arise in service to the will. Consequently, in direct antithesis to what was seen within Platonic thought where intellect and an intelligible world were accorded true being (οὐσία), for Schopenhauer, will becomes now the ground of knowledge, will becomes primary and indeed obtains supremacy not only over knowledge, but over the entirety of being itself.[153] It is then from this perspective, from a radical change in orientation regarding the foundation of

[153] Christopher Janaway discusses the levels of distinction within human knowledge as arising on the basis of the will, stating that for Schopenhauer: "1. We are essentially striving beings: our behaviour pervasively exhibits the 'blind purposiveness' associated with all organisms which is ultimately directed towards survival of the individual and more importantly of the species. 2. Those areas of our behaviour that are dependent on, and are guided by, objective knowledge are often explicable in terms of basic drives of which we are scarcely conscious. 3. We are essentially embodied. 4. Our capacity for objective knowledge is explained physiologically and teleologically in terms of our having organs which ensure our better adaptation to our environment. 5. Our underlying drives are frequently in conflict with the functioning of the intellect. 6. Human personality is composite, consisting of will and intellect which are distinct elements." (Janaway 1989, pp. 263-264)

being itself, that the Ideas, arise on the basis of the will, through experience, and thereby become perceptible (*anschauliche*).

3.2. Schopenhauer's Cave and the ascent into darkness

In the first chapter, I spoke of Schopenhauer's interpretive perspective in relation to Platonic thought. I now turn to a consideration of his appropriation of Plato's Ideas from the perspective of his own thought. It is helpful to discern the place in which this interpretation, particularly in relation to the Ideas, fundamentally differs from Plato's own views. This is of course discernible with respect to the primacy of the will, yet even more precisely, it is vividly seen in a section within the *WWR*, wherein Schopenhauer discusses the nature of Platonic idealism. There he states that for Plato:

> The things of this world, perceived by our senses, have no true being at all; *they are always becoming, but they never are* (*sie werden immer, sind aber nie*). They have only a relative being (*relatives Seyn*); they are together only in and through their relation to one another; hence their whole existence can just as well be called a non-being (*Nichtseyn*). Consequently, they are likewise not objects of a real knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), for there can be such a knowledge only of what exists in and for itself, and always in the same way. On the contrary, they are only the object of an opinion or way of thinking, brought about by sensation (δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου). As long as we are confined to their perception, we are like persons sitting in a dark cave, and bound so fast that they cannot even turn their heads. They see nothing but the shadowy outlines of actual things that are led between them and a fire which burns behind them; and by the light of this fire the shadows appear on the wall in front of them. Even of themselves and of

> one another they see only the shadows on the wall. Their wisdom would consist in predicting the sequence of those shadows learned from experience. On the other hand, only the real archetypes (*Urbilder*) of those shadowy outlines, the eternal Ideas (*ewigen Ideen*), the original forms (*Urformen*) of all things, can be described as truly existing (ὄντος ὄν), since they *always are but never become and never pass away. No plurality* belongs to them; for each by its nature is only one, since it is the archetype itself, of which all the particular, transitory things of the same kind and name are copies and shadows. Also *no coming into existence and no passing away* belongs to them, for they are truly being or existing, but are never becoming or vanishing like their fleeting copies. (But in these two negative definitions there is necessarily contained the presupposition that time, space, and causality have no significance for these Ideas, and do not exist in them.) Thus only of them can there be a knowledge in the proper sense, for the object of such a knowledge can be only that which always and in every respect (and hence in-itself) is, not that which is and then again is not, according as we look at it.[154] (*W1*, p. 171)

Schopenhauer's analysis here, with respect to the actual content of Plato's thought, requires some consideration. In the first place, his initial suggestion that empirical entities have a 'relative being' in relation to the Ideas as their archetypes would seem to be correct. It is however necessary to reject this account inasmuch as he further goes on to qualify these entities as having a 'nonbeing'. This is overly Schopenhauerian in

[154] Schopenhauer's statement regarding knowledge and opinion is a direct reference to Plato's remarks in the *Timaeus* 28a: "That which is apprehensible by thought (νοήσει) with a rational account (μετὰ λόγου) is the thing that is always unchangeably real (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν); whereas that which is the object of belief (δόξῃ) together with unreasoning sensation (μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου) is the thing that becomes and passes away (γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον), but never has real being (ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν).

nature, hinging upon his own idealistic interpretation and account of empirical perception, whereby appearances become the *mere appearances* of transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, for Schopenhauer, such entities would exist: "only in and through their relation to one another", hence, more akin to a nonbeing inasmuch as their ground subsists on the basis of the representation of the subject.[155]

In the second place, if the reader recalls the discussion in section 1.5, it should be evident based upon Plato's division of the world into two realms, that Schopenhauer's interpretation is quite unfounded. Indeed, 'appearances' within Plato's thought, certainly do not imply a 'nonbeing'. So for example, in his division of the world into the visible and intelligible, Plato doesn't suggest that the soul knows being and not-being. Rather, he states that the soul's knowledge proceeds from relative clarity to opacity (σαφήνεια καὶ ἀσαφεία), corresponding to the ontological character of those entities themselves, i.e., upon how close or far the soul is from knowledge of being itself.[156] (*Republic*, 509d) So even at the lowest levels of reality, among iconic images (τὰ εἰκόνα), there is yet a kind of knowledge which the soul obtains, i.e., imagination or conjecture (εἰκασία). Although Plato certainly establishes a hierarchy with respect to genuine and relative being, it is a stretch to refer to the latter as a *nonbeing* as Schopenhauer describes it.

Other references to Plato's dialogues help to confirm this fact. For example, in the *Phaedo*, echoing those views in the *Republic*, Plato speaks further of: "two kinds of

[155] In all fairness to Schopenhauer, he was perhaps quite aware of the fact that Plato never actually suggests that the visible realm of becoming is in fact a nonbeing, i.e., idealistic in the sense in which both he and Kant take this to be. In interpreting both Plato as well as Kant, Schopenhauer is attempting rather to point out the manner in which their views reflect what he considers corrections in his own philosophy. In all fairness to Plato and to Kant however, recognizing wherein Schopenhauer actually departs from and to a certain extent *misrepresents* their views is essential and will also facilitate an understanding, to be considered later, of why Schopenhauer considers and constantly makes reference to the Platonic Ideas as perceptible (*anschauliche*).

[156] There is, however, a certain amount of debate as to whether Plato's divided line represents a 1:1 correspondence between ontology and epistemology. Some argue for this view (i.e. Taylor, Copleston, etc.) others against this view. In my own opinion, there is more favorable evidence in favor of this than against it.

existences", that of the "visible and the invisible", regarding the former as, "human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble, and never consistently the same." (*Phaedo*, 79a) He then opposes this to the invisible realm, referring to it as: "divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself". (80b)

Based upon the above evidence and certainly from what was discussed in the first chapter, Schopenhauer's interpretation must be considered inaccurate, or at least highly interpretive. There is, however, a much more essential point to be made regarding Schopenhauer's discussion of the Ideas themselves, specifically by his reference to Plato's allegory of the Cave in the seventh book of the *Republic*. Although his interpretation initially seems accurate, in view of his previous statements regarding the nonbeing of the visible world, a further, albeit second look at Schopenhauer's Cave, is required.

In the first place, Plato's own views on the matter are worth some examination. According to Plato, the Cave allegory starts (514a-515a) as Schopenhauer suggests, with a dismal scene: men and women chained before a wall since childhood in an underground cave-like dwelling (ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκήσει σπηλαιώδει). Plato states that a shadow (ἡ σκιά) is cast upon the will by a fire which lies behind the prisoners, and that artifacts (τὰ σκεύη) being passed along the fire create various images of things on it. The prisoners, Plato states: "believe nothing other than that the truth is the shadow of the artifacts."[157] (515c) At a certain point however, the guards overlooking the prisoners, free one of them and force him to look at the light of the fire which is said to cause *bedazzlement* (διὰ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς) to his senses, and to inflict pain (ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ). The result of this of course is that the prisoner (515e) desires to flee (φεύγειν) from the light (the message contained herein being that the prisoners *wants* to remain in his original state of ignorance regarding reality). Throughout the dialogue as Plato relates (516a), the prisoner is further compelled to make a difficult journey out of the cave. Finally

[157] «οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς»

(516b) reaching the surface and seeing reality itself, the prisoner reasons (συλλογίζοιτο) that the Sun and the light of the Sun (τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου) is the cause of everything (τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος) that is seen in the visible world (ἐν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ).

Considering that which has been stated above, there does in fact seem to be nothing immediately obvious to suggest that Schopenhauer's interpretation is in any way unwarranted. An essential point has, however, been overlooked. In the first place, Schopenhauer alludes to the fact, although never explicitly stating it, that Plato (through the mouth of Socrates) regards the prisoners (515a) in the cave as Ὁμοίους ἡμῖν, that is to say, as *like* us. Although this would seem to further confirm Schopenhauer's account, i.e., that it deals specifically with the relativity (or even nonbeing) of the empirical world in antithesis to the *ontos on* of the Ideas, the fact of the matter is that the essential relevance of Plato's allegory has been ignored. This relevance is seen at the beginning where Plato specifically states its purpose, viz., that it deals chiefly with the effect upon our nature of both education and the lack thereof (παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας). (514a) Regarding this role, Plato further suggests that the nature of education (ἡ παιδεία) involves the art or craft (ἡ τέχνη) of turning (τῆς περιαγωγῆς) the soul to a vision of the brightest of things (τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον). (518d) Although the meaning here is certainly inclusive of the Ideas, the fact of the matter is that the Ideas aren't exhaustive of its meaning. Plato is referring to a more primordial object, foundational even to the Ideas themselves, through and as a consequence of which, the Ideas come to be known. That object of which Plato speaks is of course the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) itself, which was discussed earlier in section 1.9. The nature of education is then the primary topic of the allegory, and the Good becomes the teleological object both of education as well as of the prisoner's ascent from the cave.

So a fundamental point of Schopenhauer's interpretation of Plato is the fact that he removes the Good as teleological origin. Instead, for Schopenhauer, at the source of existence lies the immanent and striving will through which all others things are

manifested. The Ideas are now interpreted from the context of a *primordial* source of volition, and only upon this basis does anything which might be considered intellect arise. Schopenhauer's reversal of Platonism, wherein will now becomes primary, is thus seen to primarily bear an effect upon the ontology of the Ideas themselves.[158]

3.3. Parting the veil of Maya

Regarding Schopenhauer's appropriation of the Platonic Ideas, there is much contention among scholars, as I have noted in the introduction to this work, as to whether these entities follow consistently within the context of his thought, particularly wherein a *singular* will becomes now primary.[159] The general claim is that it is in no way obvious that will and Idea are connected, or that through the former, the latter should consistently result. In consequence of this, Schopenhauer's philosophy simply fails to

[158] As a final point, Schopenhauer speaks of the 'wisdom' of the prisoners within the Cave in terms of their ability to predict shadows as they pass along the cave wall. His interpretation here is in fact true to the dialogue. Plato himself states that in the Cave, among the prisoners, some were honored (τιμαὶ), praised (ἔπαινοι), or received prizes (γέρα), for being the sharpest at perceiving the passing objects (τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι τὰ παρόντα), and remembering which usually came first, which last, which simultaneously (καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτων καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι), and strongest at divining the future (δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἥξειν). (516cd) Such wisdom is here considered at most a mere form of 'cleverness' as Plato will later clarify: "Or have you never noticed this about people who are said to be vicious but clever (σοφῶν), how keen the vision of their little souls is and how sharply it distinguishes the things it is turned towards?" (519a) The point of the matter is that although Plato and Schopenhauer significantly *differ* regarding the nature and teleological aim of existence, they nonetheless fundamentally agree regarding the *aim* of philosophy itself in relation to knowledge. For both philosophers there is an essential distinction between inferior and superior kinds of knowing, as I have suggested before. Cheryl Foster further notes that: "Despite their differences, Plato and Schopenhauer stress the importance of metaphysics, of attending to truths which endure, rather than to the exigencies of everyday life. And they are not so very opposed on art as one might infer when comparing the status of images in their theories. While Schopenhauer embraces perception as a source of enlightenment, whereas Plato rejects it, they nevertheless agree on the inferiority of artistic literal-mindedness and simple copying within their respective systems." (Foster 2006, p. 232)

[159] Regarding Schopenhauer's introduction of the Platonic Ideas, Chansky notes that: "when rightly understood, the introduction of the Ideas is not 'sudden, surprising and disconcerting'; that they do indeed, and justifiably so, play a pivotal role in Schopenhauer's philosophy, as specifically the proper objects of metaphysical knowledge, and so are quite necessary to the whole". (Chansky 1988, p. 68)

explain the relationship between will (the one) and representation (the many). I hope within this section to address this concern, not however, to entirely remove it, since there are some very real problems which do become apparent. I intend rather to show that although the Ideas do follow consistently from the will, Schopenhauer's analysis yet leads him into more fundamental problems regarding knowledge itself. This latter point will be discussed thoroughly in chapter 4.

For now, the starting point of Schopenhauer's thought is of course based upon what he considers the empirical datum of the world, the matter-of-factness of experience, and hence, his project centers around a sense of observation and recording, a kind of scientific inquiry. In consequence of this approach, the first and most evident intuition about the nature of the world is that it is essentially divided into will as thing-in-itself (the metaphysical ground of being) and the mere representation of the world within the subject, through the brain. The representation is thus considered a covering, a veil of Maya. It is an intellectual ordering and organization of what is essentially and primordially undivided and whole.

The problem then for Schopenhauer is how to account for the fact that we see variation and difference within the representation based upon a singular will as source. For if the will is essentially unique (as 'one'), then how does the one account for the various (the 'many') plants and animals, trees, rocks, light, differing forces and elements, chemical reactions, the sun's heat and revolution, gravity, etc., seen on the basis of representation? Indeed, how do we account for differences in and of themselves? Although representation finds its foundation within the conscious subject, the fact remains that the conscious subject itself must also be accounted for. Schopenhauer sees the answer to this problem through introduction of what he considers to be the *only* real solution, i.e., through universal, timeless entities arising on the basis of the will.

For Schopenhauer, the world may actually be divided not only into two, but rather three separate but related parts (although in actuality there is only one, the will as thing-in-itself). The first two make up the larger metaphysical divide inherent to his system, will and representation. The third stands to mediate the two, referred to by Schopenhauer as the *objectivity* of the will *as* Idea. (*W1*, p. 110) In this sense, representation may be considered from two perspectives. There is in the first place representation as determined by the *principium individuationis*, that is to say, by the world as individuated on the basis of the forms of perception within the subject. (*W1*, p. 128) According to this sense, one encounters the empirical world of space and time united by causality. There is, however, another way of considering the representation. It may be looked at prior to this *principium*, according to the subject's inner sense of time alone (prior to space and causality).

With the Ideas, things change slightly. For now, Schopenhauer suggests that with these entities, even time itself is abandoned, further relating his own views to Plato:

> Time is merely the spread-out and piecemeal view that an individual being has of the Ideas. These are outside of time, and consequently *eternal*. Therefore Plato says that time is the moving image of eternity: αἰῶνος εἰκὼν ὁ χρόνος. (*W1*, p. 176)

From this perspective, knowledge of the Ideas would seem to offer an even more thorough knowledge of the thing-in-itself, inasmuch as in 'intuiting' these (Schopenhauer speaks of 'contemplation' of the Idea, which I will discuss later), the subject looks beyond the phenomenal form of time itself. Despite this fact, inasmuch as the Ideas become a 'known' for the subject, to that extent the primordial form of

knowledge as subject-object, and hence of representation, is implied.[160] Schopenhauer thus refers to the Ideas as the 'objectivity' of the will, and further distinguishes these from their phenomenon as scattered within causal relations:

> In order to reach a deeper insight into the nature of the world, it is absolutely necessary for us to learn to distinguish the will as thing-in-itself from its adequate objectivity (*adäquaten Objektität*) and then to distinguish the different grades (*der verschiedenen Stufen*) at which this objectivity appears more distinctly and fully, i.e., the Ideas themselves (*die Ideen selbst*) from the mere phenomenon of the Ideas (*der Bloßen Erscheinung der Ideen*) in the form of the principle of sufficient reason, the restricted method of knowledge of individuals.[161] (*W1*, p. 181)

So there are apparent 'layers' within Schopenhauer's thought. There is the (1) will as thing-in-itself, the (2) objectivity of the will as Idea, the (3) scattering, as it were, of the Idea within phenomena on the basis of causality (the forms of the subject). In this sense, the Idea as 'objectivity' of the will, serves to account for the 'many' as arising on the basis of the 'one'. The latter phenomenon of the Ideas as dispersed into causal relations, serves further to account for the plurality of things we encounter empirically.

The main point to understand here, is that inasmuch as the Ideas arise prior to and beyond the *principium individuationis*, to that extent the knowledge of the Idea entails a metaphysical knowledge of the thing-in-itself. In our knowledge of the Idea, we pass

[160] G. Neeley further confirms this point: "In fine, the Ideas relate to the thing-in-itself only indirectly. The various grades of the will's objectification have no direct bearing on the Ding-an-sich which remains entirely unaffected by the a priori forms which account for diversification. An Idea is a philosophical correlate of a natural species". (Neeley 2000, p. 131)

[161] Schopenhauer goes on in the same passage to state that: "We shall then agree with Plato, when he attributes actual being to the Ideas alone, and only an apparent, dreamlike existence to the things in space and time, to this world that is real for the individual." (*ibid*.) This again reflects his interpretation for Plato of reality as true being and the realm of appearances as a kind of 'nonbeing'.

through all formal relations of time, space, and causality, into the heart of being itself. In essence, through the Idea, we *part the veil of Maya*, opening the path to true reality. The Ideas are therefore essential to Schopenhauer's metaphysics. They serve to both establish the many arising on the basis of the primacy of the one, and to further establish the condition for unity among the plurality of phenomena.[162]

3.4. Species and genera

Given his belief that Plato confused concepts with the Ideas, it is very important that a clear understanding and distinction of these two kinds of knowledge within Schopenhauer's thought be obtained before proceeding. One of the clearest accounts of both the relationship as well as the distinction between concepts and Ideas which Schopenhauer gives, is that regarding the nature of their universality. Thus Schopenhauer states that: "we might, in the language of the scholastics, describe the Ideas as *universalia ante rem*, and the concepts as *universalia post rem*." In the first place, what does he mean by 'universal'? The nature and problem of universals, although finding roots within ancient Greek thought, was really a topic largely debated among the scholastics within Medieval thought. Although it represented a significant debate which spanned over five centuries of thought, the gist of the problem may be understood by way of a simple example.[163] Consider the notion of a 'right triangle', the figure of which is illustrated below:

[162] Thus Chansky states that: "Schopenhauer is brought quite directly to his way of considering the world metaphysically by means of the Ideas by, prior to their introduction into his system, having brought about the subversion of reason and rational metaphysics – a subversion which he accomplished, of course, through his fusion of an intensified transcendental Idealism with an empirical realism or materialism, which in turn was grounded in his identification of the thing-in-itself as will." (Chansky 1988, p. 69)

[163] I draw most of my example here from Klima (2008).



Triangle ABC is said to be 'right' inasmuch as its base angle is equal to 90°. But what is it which really makes this angle right? Is it the fact that in the above illustration I *see* a triangle having a base angle of 90°? Do I really even *see* a triangle at all? A triangle itself is understood as a figure having three straight lines connected, forming three interior angles. But are there really three straight lines here at all? Even more, is the angle formed by the triangle above really a right angle, or does it just *seem* to be so? In other words, *where* is the right triangle, and even more, for every supposed figure that I draw, if it is not the actual thing itself, then *from* where do I obtain my knowledge of the actual right triangle?

The problem of universals is something akin to that which is illustrated here regarding the simple question in geometry of the roots of my knowledge of those figures which I draw either in my mind or 'in the sand', as it were. The 'problem of universals' here stretches beyond geometry itself, into the consideration of the original nature of physical entities, including the 'maple', the 'fern', the 'human being' standing before me. Each of these entities can be multiplied within my experience to the extent that I discover a multiplicity of similar things, i.e., a 'maple forest', a 'field of ferns', a 'city of human beings'. But does the similar within the difference find a single common ground? How is it that the many maple trees are all similar and yet different? What is common to each? In other words, what and wherein lies their universal?

So a universal is understood as that which unites common properties among particulars beneath a single form. Schopenhauer's above description of concepts and Ideas as universals reveals, however, a significant difference between both. He refers to the Ideas as offering the universal before or prior to things (*ante rem*), whereas with

concepts, these are said to arise after the fact of things (*post rem*). There is then a stated difference between these, and as will be seen, this is due to the methodology by which we obtain each universal, and consequently, implies that according to each, we obtain a very distinct kind of knowledge. Regarding the method, Schopenhauer states in the same passage that:

> The original and essential unity of an Idea is dispersed (*zersplittert*) into the plurality of individual things by the sensuously and cerebrally conditioned perception of the knowing individual. But that unity is then restored (*hergestellt*) again through the reflection of the faculty of reason, yet only *in abstracto*, as concept, *universale*, which is indeed equal to the Idea in *extension* (*Umfang*), but has assumed quite a different form. In this way, however, it has lost perceptibility (*Anschaulichkeit*) and thus its general definiteness and distinctness (*Bestimmtheit*). (*W2*, pp. 365-366)

According to the above description, the Ideas are considered an original unity which is then dispersed into the plurality of phenomena, that is to say: "Through time and space the Idea multiplies itself into innumerable phenomena". (*W1*, p. 134) On the other hand, concepts are 'restored' back into unity on the basis of the plurality of phenomena. Accordingly, the Ideas are prior to or beyond phenomenal entities (*ante rem*). One might thus refer to Schopenhauer's description of the Ideas here as entities which are transcendent to the sensible world, and in this sense his account patterns that which was seen in Plato. Of course, for Plato the Ideas abided in an intelligible realm, whereas with Schopenhauer they arise on the basis of an unintelligible will as ground. So there is a certain ambiguity regarding the question of just how transcendent Schopenhauer's Ideas really are, particularly due to the fact that he refers to them as 'Platonic'. As arising on the basis of the will, and from there entering into phenomena, which itself is

primordially based upon the will, Schopenhauer's Ideas seem rather immanent in nature. Their transcendence is thus based upon perspective. In other words, from the perspective of the veil of Maya, the Ideas are transcendent, yet from the perspective of the will, they are immanent. I will discuss this ambiguity more fully in the next section.

For now, Schopenhauer further opposes concepts with Ideas, referring to these as offering the universal after the fact of things (*post rem*). He further suggests that one of the main distinguishing features of the concept is the fact that it is known in the abstract (*in abstracto*), and as such that it is imperceptible. So this is an important statement for it implies the fact that the Idea, as the antithesis of the concept, must therefore be neither abstract nor imperceptible. Another further point, is that Schopenhauer speaks of 'restoring' the concepts back into unity, whereas with the Ideas, unity was already implied. From this perspective, whereas the Ideas are unformed, original entities abiding within nature, concepts are, on the other hand, formed on the basis of mind. Thus Schopenhauer goes on to state that:

> If, after considering divers objects of perception, we drop something different belonging to each, yet retain what is the same in all, the result will be the *genus* of the species. The generic conception is accordingly always the conception of every species comprised under it, after deducting all that does not belong to *every* species. Now, as every possible conception may be thought as a *genus*, a conception is always something general, and as such, not perceptible. (*PSR*, p. 116)

Through concepts then, we *abstract* from differences among related perceptible objects, and through this, as Schopenhauer indicates, the knowledge we obtain becomes the *genus* of each thing. Here Schopenhauer is indicating that although through concepts we obtain knowledge of say the *Canis* or 'canine', we yet obtain no further knowledge

of the inner nature inherent to the distinction between such species as the *Canis lupus* 'wolf', *Canis latrans* 'coyote', and the *Canis aureus* 'golden jackal', beyond the simple ability to note these differences conceptually. So concepts offer no knowledge of the actual individual thing within perception. It offers only general abstractions based upon relations among these. Indeed, were our knowledge limited to concepts, although we would certainly obtain abstract and universal knowledge of the genus of things, that is, of their common relations and differences, we would yet remain quite ignorant as to the inner nature inherent to each thing. For this, it is necessary that we obtain a knowledge of the individual thing through perception (*ante rem*), rather than as an abstraction on the basis of perception (*post rem*). Given such a possibility, we would then obtain perceptible knowledge of the essential *species* inherent to the *genus*. This is precisely what Schopenhauer grants to knowledge through the Idea, as he goes on to state:

> In the particular thing, it knows merely the *essential* (*das Wesentliche*), and therefore its whole *species* (*Gattung*); consequently, it now has for its object the *Ideas*, in my sense, which agrees with the original Platonic meaning, of this grossly misused word. Thus it has the permanent, unchangeable *forms* (*Gestalten*), independent of the temporal existence of individual beings, the *species rerum*, which really constitute the purely objective element of phenomena. (*W2*, p. 364)

So knowledge of the Idea entails a knowledge of the individual, the essential being at heart in each thing. On the other hand, through the concept, a knowledge of the inessential within the particular is obtained, of what is merely similar among relative differences. Schopenhauer thus concludes that:

> The Idea is *species*, but not *genus*; therefore the *species* are the work of nature, the *genera* the work of man; thus they are mere concepts. There are *species naturales*, but only *genera logica*. (*W*2, p. 365)

This last description is quite significant, for it indicates a very important distinction between concepts and Ideas. The concept involves a process of rational abstraction on the basis of the plurality of particular things (*post rem*). It is therefore created, produced, generated. It is a thing of human logic (*logos*). On the other hand, the Idea is obtained through penetration into the actual *nature* of the particular thing in question. It thus lies beyond phenomenal things (*ante rem*), serving as the essential in-itself of such particulars, of the individual species inherent to them. It is thus a thing which is uncreated, eternal, and according to which all other things are patterned. To offer a metaphoric but apt distinction, for Schopenhauer—Ideas are discovered, concepts are produced.

3.5. The immanent transcendence of the Ideas

Schopenhauer's Ideas function as universal archetypes on the basis of which the particular things of the sensible world are patterned. Schopenhauer thus constantly refers to his interpretation as genuinely 'Platonic' and indeed the above description (their perceptibility aside) and distinction of these from concepts would seem to confirm his view. Yet the more deeply one enters into a consideration of the manner in which Schopenhauer *applies* the Ideas within his own thought, the more this renders their interpretation of 'Platonic' increasingly ambiguous. One important consideration is really whether or not Schopenhauer's Ideas are transcendent in the way in which they are found in Plato's thought. For Plato, the Ideas abide in an intelligible realm which extends beyond the visible and perceptible. For Schopenhauer, transcendent Ideas

taken in this originally Platonic sense of the division of the world, would really be quite imprecisely the case.

The initial problem within Schopenhauer's thought is then the manner in which the subject gains access to the Ideas, for through consideration of this, the solution to the initial question should be revealed. The real difficulty, however, is seen in the subject-object structural relationship of representation. As I have pointed out in previous sections, Schopenhauer equates the will with the one, and the Ideas with the many. The Ideas enter into the equation as a necessary component inasmuch as they serve also to *mediate* the one and the many through consciousness and the forms of perception, thus producing representation. Without this third element, all difference within Schopenhauer's thought would be impossible.

So the real starting point is the will. This serves as the metaphysical ground or principle for all being, for the subsistence of entities, and even for human existence and consciousness. As a result of its inner strife, it gives rise to various higher grades, which in essence are nothing but higher levels of its own excitability, as I have suggested. In relation to these grades of the will, the Ideas arise as the objectivity of the will, which however, are related to representation, for all forms of objectivity arise on the basis of subject, and the subject-object relationship is the essential condition for knowledge as such. Furthermore, Ideas and grades of the will, may be distinguished, depending upon the perspective from which these entities are considered. From the perspective of the subject *through* perception, they are Ideas. From the perspective of the will *as* thing-in-itself, they are grades. The will is thus neither to be identified precisely with either its grades or its Ideas, that it to say:

> Idea and thing-in-itself are not for us absolutely one and the same. On the contrary, for us the Idea is only the immediate, and therefore adequate, objectivity of the thing-in-itself, which itself, however, is the will—the will

> insofar as it is not yet objectified, has not yet become representation. (*W1*, p. 174)

At higher levels of excitability (higher grades) the will gives rise to consciousness, which alternatively gives rise to representation (through understanding and the principle of sufficient reason). These 'productions' of the will serve the purpose of fulfilling its inner needs as manifested through a will-to-live. The notion here is that a conscious organism is better able to preserve its life (to serve the will) inasmuch as it can 'see' its surroundings, adapt, (re)calculate, etc. Representation and knowledge through it, is thus fundamentally nothing more than the *formal* expression of a need. So inasmuch as its most basic and fundamental structure requires first of all something which is able to posit relations between self and other (for purposes of pursuit, flight, etc.), to that extent, representation always presupposes the relation between subject and object. The will eternally subsists together with its various grades or levels of excitability. Consequently, the most basic expression of consciousness implies will as its foundation. Through representation, however, the will's excitability appear as objectified, that is to say, as Idea, and through the subject, these appear 'scattered' within empirical perception.

A simple use of a few images will help to aid in understanding the matter. According to one sense, the relationship between will and representation may be thought of from the perspective of a coin with two faces. Each side subsists with and co-creates, so to speak, the other. Without the head there can be no tail, and vice-versa. In this sense, representation is the head of the coin, will the tail.

Consider another example: there is time, space and causality as the determination of the subject. On the other hand there is will and the excitability of its grades, from the dullest causes and urges, to the highest motives inherent to human action. One may represent the relation analogously through a mathematical function, where the will

becomes the unknown *x* and its visibility through representation, *f(x)*. Accordingly, the relationship between will and representation may be expressed functionally as, $f(x) = y^2$, thus indicating that as the grades of the will change, there is a corresponding (although quite distinct) change in their representation.

Another more 'Platonic' metaphor is to consider, in place of the Good, the will as akin to the Sun. The light of the Sun is thus akin to the will's strife with itself. Light has a spectrum—the grades of the will's excitability. One of these grades brings about consciousness. Through consciousness there arises simultaneously representation, and on account of this, light is rendered *visible*. Accordingly, the eye perceives various *colors* among objects within the world. Thus water appears blue, a rose red, etc. Color is, however, ascribable only to phenomena themselves. Through contemplation, the intellect may penetrate beyond the phenomenal appearance of blue, into its principle. In so doing, subject and object now merge once again to form Idea, and with it the realization arises that the inner nature of blue is anything *but* blue. Rather, as absorbing all other spectral degrees of light, blue is rather the manifestation of the reflection and perception of that which is never absorbed by the actual entity itself. That is to say, the 'Idea of blue' is really the flux of all light with the exception of the spectral wave which accounts for blue itself.

Of course, all of the above metaphors certainly fall short of Schopenhauer's actual account of the matter, however, the main point should be grasped: the grades of the will enter into representation simultaneously and spontaneously with the positing of representation itself, as a consequence of consciousness. Alternatively, Idea results through the subsequent removal of their 'scattering' within phenomena, as the (re)merging of subject and object through contemplation (to be later discussed). Hence, the grades of the will and the will's objectivity as Idea are distinct *only* from the perspective of representation through the conscious subject as producing a dispersion

of these grades. Through contemplation, the subject thus passes through this dispersion once again, and into subsequent unity with object. On account of such a union, even time itself is removed. Accordingly, subject and object are mutually annihilated and form the Idea. This Idea is the grade of the will itself.[164] Complicated although this may be, I have endeavored to illustrate the entire process in diagram below:



The first thing the reader may notice in the above diagram is that I have deliberately made use of the identical strategy of Plato's divided line. In doing so, I wish merely to point out the parallel here, between Schopenhauer and Plato, as well as the larger differences, viz., that the above 'divided' line in the first place, *has been reversed*.

[164] Charles S. Taylor offers a concise summary of Schopenhauer's ontology of the will, reason, and Ideas as follows: "Concepts, we have already seen, are the product of reason; they are abstracted from perception. Concepts are discursive while Ideas are, like phenomena, wholly perceptual. There is then a four-fold hierarchy in Schopenhauer. At the core of existence is the will. The will objectifies itself immediately in the Ideas. The Ideas require a special form of consciousness for their apprehension. Normal perception gives us individual phenomena in space and time. Out of ordinary perception our faculty of reason abstracts concepts which are re-presentations of perception in language." (Taylor 1988, p. 49)

Accordingly, will occupies the lowest and yet largest section of the line, whereas reason (intelligence) occupies the highest, but smallest section. The second distinction to be noted is that with Schopenhauer, although there is an initial division between conscious and unconscious life (that is, between will and representation), fundamentally this is reducible to the grades of the will which arise on the basis of will itself. Accordingly, such an initial division only holds from the perspective of consciousness. From the perspective of the will, however, there are only grades manifested through its excitability. These arise and produce a fourfold diversity of urges, impulses, motives, and decisions. From the perspective of consciousness (through representation), this fourfold diversity is correspondingly *perceived* as natural forces, vegetative life, animal life, and human reason. Through human contemplation, both subject and object, originally dispersed into phenomenon, now once again unite, annihilate, and form a single Idea, which again, is simply the grade of the will seen from the perspective of consciousness.[165] As a final point, I have deliberately left freedom of the will through art as well as the denial of the will out of the above diagram, as these represent more ethical and epistemological standpoints in antithesis to Schopenhauer's ontology—and to a certain extent as paradoxical movements (to be discussed in the final chapter). One may understand art simply as occupying any of the above Ideas, and music as simply a reproduction of the structural line of the grades of the will, from the lowest bass to the highest alto.[166]

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[165] I will discuss the nature of contemplation more fully in relation to methodology in the final chapter.

[166] It is worth noting that Schopenhauer never really seems to explicitly describe the nature and manner of the will's 'excitability', nor the manner in which this gives rise to the 'grades of the will', nor the manner in which these differ from 'Ideas' interpreted from the context of representation. He merely points these out throughout his work, in most cases within the later second volume to the WWR, and in such cases, quite briefly, and almost as a secondhand remark. My analysis here of Schopenhauer's metaphysics is thus more an interpretation of the matter. It would seem that although the basic principles of Schopenhauer's thought were laid out quite early within both the *PSR* and the first volume to the WWR, he nonetheless comes to recognize some ambiguities within his account (as those issues pointed out above), perhaps either through reflection or in response to criticism. It seems, however, that he never really and thoroughly addresses these issues.

Having thus mapped out the relationship between will, representation, and Idea, within Schopenhauer's thought, I now turn to the question of whether the Ideas are transcendent in the sense in which Plato speaks of them. The answer to this question is not at all obvious. Schopenhauer never really seems to either identify the ambiguities inherent to his own metaphysical elaboration of the will, or if he does, his attempts to resolve any such problems, are at best scattered and somewhat obscure. From the perspective of the will, the Ideas are certainly *immanent*. They are thus akin to the essences or forms inherent to Aristotle's notion of substance (to be discussed in chapter 4). Despite this fact, Schopenhauer's Ideas would be only imprecisely characterized as universals in things (*universalia in re*). Indeed, for a thousand phenomenal 'maple trees' within perception, there is only a single Idea at root. Accordingly, immanence here has a strange transcendent undertone. On the other hand, the transcendence of the Ideas in relation to phenomena and to the subject are yet deduced on the basis of their essential and primordial immanence in relation to the will. That is to say, from the perspective of being itself, all is one. Accordingly, transcendence here would also have specifically immanent undertones.

In consequence of the above points, Schopenhauer's Ideas have a kind of *immanent transcendence*, depending upon the perspective through which one considers them.[167] Yet in spite of the obvious ambiguity, Schopenhauer is always quite insistent that his Ideas are Platonic, which he repeats time and time again:

[167] There are then specific Neoplatonic overtures to Schopenhauer's Ideas worth noting, although even in this case the relationship falls short. Indeed, in relation to the will (akin to the One or Good), a kind of excitation (emanation) producing grades is said to arise. This results in consciousness (Nous) and representation (World Soul). This is not, however, a necessarily hierarchical emanation. Furthermore, the Ideas don't arise precisely from consciousness itself, nor does consciousness contemplate its *own* Ideas. Rather, Ideas are inherent to will, and the conscious subject must, through contemplation, penetrate through or beyond representation in order to gain access to them.

> Therefore with me the word is always to be understood in its genuine (*ächten*) and original (*ursprünglichen*) meaning, given to it by Plato; and in using it we must assuredly not think of those abstract productions of scholastic dogmatizing reason, to describe which Kant used the word wrongly as well as illegitimately, although Plato had already taken possession of it, and used it most appropriately. (*W1*, pp. 129-130)

He even goes on to quote a passage from the *Lives* of Diogenes Laertius (III, 12) as exemplary of Plato's view. There it is stated that according to Plato the Ideas exist in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει τὰς ἰδέας ἑστάναι), are patterns or prototypes (παραδείγματα), and that all other things resemble (ἐοικέναι) and are copies (ὁμοιώματα) of them. I do not wish to enter into the particularities of Diogenes' interpretation, however, it is worth noting that even here there is in fact some ambiguity regarding the expression ἐν τῇ φύσει. For precisely what *kind* of nature is spoken of here? A transcendent intelligible realm in Plato's sense? A more Aristotelian nature wherein essences are immanent to substances? The ambiguity is thereby retained.

3.6. Manufacturing concepts and other 'absurd' things

In view of the discussion in the previous sections, a number of consequences arise regarding what Schopenhauer understands to actually *be* an Idea, and incidentally, of that which only *seems* to be, but is not. Seeing wherein this is the case will help to shed light upon Plato's own confusion of the matter, coupled with Schopenhauer's interpretation. In some cases, concepts seem almost to *mimic* Ideas. Two such examples of this are found in relation to (1) manufactured things and (2) 'absurd' Ideas. I will consider the latter first inasmuch as the former leads directly into the discussion of art (*die Kunst*).

The discussion of 'absurd' Ideas is found in Plato's *Parmenides*, in relation to a specific question posed there. In general it is asked whether there are Ideas for: "Things that might seem absurd (γελοῖα), like hair and mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless?".[168] (130c) Although the answer for Platonic philosophy isn't at all evident, for Schopenhauer the answer is simple: absurd things such as these are *not* Ideas at all. The very basic reason for arriving at such a conclusion is that such things as 'dirt' and 'mud' are not species, but represent rather concepts *produced* on the basis of an abstraction.

Dirt and mud are, strictly speaking, nothing more than combinations of water and soil, the latter being reduced even further to various and distinct organisms, chemical compounds, minerals, etc. Such a *synthesis* of 'elements' in combination would thus lack an Idea as their basis. Mud and soil in themselves do not represent *species* of things, nor even to a certain extent their *genera*. Rather, such things are concepts formed on the basis of the 'scattering' of the Ideas within perception, as determined by the principle of sufficient reason.[169] In this instance, however, the concept confuses space-time relations with the specified properties inherent to particular things. One might consider the example of a straight stick which appears bent when submerged halfway within water. Forming an abstraction, we might refer to this phenomenon conceptually as a 'twong'. Such a concept in this case, doesn't even represent the *genera* of the thing in question. This is due to the fact that the concept of a 'twong' is really the combination of two quite distinct phenomena, that of a 'twig' and the space-time 'refraction of light' within water. So properly separating space-time relations from particular things is in the first

[168] Though of course the older Parmenides suggests to the younger Socrates that someday he won't take such objections so seriously, viz., "That's because you are still young, Socrates…and philosophy has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to consider none of the cases beneath your notice. Now though, you still care about what people think, because of your youth." (*Parmenides*, 130de)

[169] Although in such cases as mud, the actual process by which dirt and water mix, is itself an Idea, i.e. the Idea of solubility.

place necessary in order to get at their *genera*. Penetrating through the particular to the *species* is then of course necessary for the Idea.

This further points to the fact that any single organism, although of itself subsisting upon the basis of a single Idea (as a specific grade of the will), actually contains within itself a multiplicity of Ideas. Matter forms into organized matter (organic), which forms into higher and more complex organisms, and the pattern continues. The human being, an Idea itself as species, encompasses also (in virtue of having both mind and body) various Ideas from chemical composition and biological functioning, found within the lowest organisms and most dull physical forces of nature. The relationship between these various grades has already been discussed in terms of the will-to-life, i.e., the will's striving for higher and higher objectification, in consequence of which, each grade or Idea, subsequently feeds off the other. It is akin to a man who stands upon the head of another in order to reach the surface of water. Schopenhauer further indicates:

> For the one will, that objectifies itself in all Ideas, strives for the highest possible objectification (*zur höchstmöglichen Objektivation strebt*), and in this case gives up the low grades (*Stufen*) of its phenomenon after a conflict, in order to appear in a higher grade that is so much more powerful. No victory without struggle; since the higher Idea (*die höhere Idee*) or objectification of will (*Willensobjektivation*) can appear only by subduing (*Ueberwältigun*) the lower Ideas (*der niedrigeren*), it endures the opposition of these.[170] (*W1*, pp. 145-146)

[170] It is to be noted here that Schopenhauer's sense of the 'highest possible objectification' of the Ideas, would seem to present a hierarchy beyond the mere sense of the will as striving for life. Indeed, why should an amoeba be any more or less superior than a human being? Despite such questions, Schopenhauer really never explains this. Schopenhauer's rhetoric here, however, seems quite reminiscent of the later Nietzsche.

This explains why from the basic and lowest forces of nature, i.e. gravity, electricity, magnetism, light, etc., higher Ideas are formed up unto conscious life and the expression of the will in human motives and rational determination.[171] As the inner striving force prevalent within all things, the will is identifiable at every level of its objectification. At the lowest levels, the graded excitability of the will revealed as inner causal forces is almost identical to its phenomenal manifestation, giving rise to physical fundamental forces, i.e. gravity, magnetic attraction, electrical current, chemical combustion, etc. At higher levels, when brought into the organic kingdom, will is manifested in the form of stimuli, i.e. as a plant tending toward the sun or stretching its roots for better contact with the soil and water. At even higher levels, among animals bearing conscious life, the will appears through motives, wherein sensation, knowledge, and the capacity to determine one's actions (through Reason within the human being) become essential manifestations.

So the problem presented within Plato's *Parmenides* of Ideas for 'absurd' things such as hair, dirt, skin, etc., is answerable from the perspective of Schopenhauer's thought in terms of the distinction between Idea and concept which, incidentally, Schopenhauer believed Plato to have confused. Accordingly, an Idea is the *species* of a thing, a *concept*

[171] As an interesting side note, Schopenhauer rejected the atomistic theories of Leucippus, Democritus, and inevitably of its application in Newtonian physics (particularly Optics). Interestingly, although this theory gained ground in early modern physics, e.g. with the rise of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and Quantum Mechanics, the atomistic theory was shown to be inadequate at certain physical points, giving ground to the more developed wave-particle theory. Schopenhauer's view of the physical world from the 19th century point of view, in my own opinion, represents a much more correct analysis of the world from the 21st century perspective—although certainly the rise of Newtonian mechanics and the atomistic theory facilitated a necessary step in scientific development. Regarding these points, Raymond Marcin in his book, *In Search of Schopenhauer's Cat*, first quotes a very interesting passage from Schopenhauer's WWR which finds a parallel to the Uncertainty principle. Thus Schopenhauer states that: "I know quite well that anyone would regard me as mad if I seriously assured him that the cat, playing just now in the yard, is still the same one that did the same jumps and tricks three hundred years ago; but I also know that it is much more absurd to believe that the cat of today is through and through and fundamentally an entirely different one from the cat of three hundred years ago." (*W2*, p. 482) Playing upon the interesting implications of this, Marcin goes on to state that: "…if we accept the main tenet of his philosophy, that is, that the world is both 'will' and 're-presentation,' the cat indeed both *is* and *is not* the same cat that frolicked in Schopenhauer's yard three hundred years ago." (Marcin 2006, p. xii)

represents the *genera*. An 'absurd' thing such as mud is just an abstraction on the basis of the scattering of phenomena within time, space, and causality. Mud is thus a concept of something more fundamental which has yet to be *distinctly* observed. In this sense then, the real aim of science is to first overcome our 'absurd' notion of things through observation and experimentation, whereby the underlying phenomena are distinctly separated and clearly analyzed (i.e., abstracted) into their *genera*.

Absurd Ideas aside, there is a second confusion regarding concepts and Ideas which requires discussion. This second point finds relevance once again in relation to Plato's thought. In this case, the discussion turns to manufactured articles, which are quite significant inasmuch as Schopenhauer believed that art, being a kind of 'manufactured' thing, can yet adequately express an Idea. But what of mere manufactured articles such as beds and chairs and tools, etc.? Do these things express Ideas as well? According to Plato in the *Republic*, the argument would seem to be that they do, as he states:

> Then let's now take any of the many you like. For example, there are many beds and tables.
>
> Of course.
>
> But there are only two forms (ἰδέαι) of such furniture, one of the bed and one of the table.
>
> Yes.
>
> And don't we customarily say that their makers look towards the appropriate form in making the beds or tables we use, and similarly in other cases? Surely no craftsman makes the forms himself? How could he? (596b)

For Plato then, at least in the above passage from the *Republic*, manufactured articles such as chairs, tables, houses, wagons, etc., would seem to actually express an Idea

inherent in nature. On the other hand (as will be seen in the next section), Plato believed that the plastic (or fine) arts were generally mimetic and imitative of actual Ideas, and hence quite distinct form them. These considerations are then of interest in relation to Schopenhauer, since in fact, he holds the precise *opposite* view on the matter in relation to both points. For him, there are Ideas for objects of (genuine) art, but none for manufactured articles.

This strange opposition requires some consideration. In the first place, from the previous discussion of 'absurd' things, it should be evident enough why Schopenhauer thinks that manufactured entities have essentially no direct Idea as their foundation. A chair and table are essentially human productions within matter. These articles therefore have no direct correlation with natural phenomena, nor even more fundamentally, with the will in its objectification, wherein the grades or Ideas are said to subsist. Despite this fact, in some cases, manufactured articles can and do point toward a deeper relationship between *art* and nature, and through the former, the distinction between genuine and non-genuine forms of art arise. As will be seen in the next chapter, for Schopenhauer the inner essence of art serves to facilitate contemplation of the Idea, drawing the observer in, as beauty in a flower or the rising sun at dawn. For on the one hand, when a manufactured article displays some level of brilliance in relation to beauty, it may actually display and lead the observer into perception of an Idea. Such an object would thus be considered art, although it could certainly serve also a practical 'manufactured' purpose (such as a 'throne'). When however the presence of beauty is obscure, a manufactured article becomes an article and nothing more, for indeed here, the contemplating-provoking power of the object, so to speak, is frustrated, and what remains is simply akin to an 'absurd' entity such as hair and mud, serving in this case, a functional purpose according to the concept (e.g. for sitting or eating). Schopenhauer himself offers a few remarks regarding the matter.

Affirming first of all his opposition to the above quoted passage in the *Republic*, he states that like art:

> Manufactured articles (*Artefakta*) also help the expression (*Ausdruck*) of the Ideas, though here it is not the Idea of the manufactured articles that speaks from them, but the Idea of the material (*die Idee des Materials*) to which this artificial form has been given. In the language of the scholastics this can be very conveniently expressed in two words; thus in the manufactured article is expressed the Idea of its *forma substantialis*, not that of its *forma accidentalis*; the latter leads to no Idea, but only to a human conception from which it has come. It goes without saying that by manufactured article we expressly do not mean any work of plastic art (*der bildenden Kunst*).[172] (*W1*, p. 211)

So for Schopenhauer, as a manufactured article in and of itself, the Idea of a bronze statue would be identifiable *solely* in relation to the material cause, i.e. the bronze itself, the actual form (in this case a man), being quite secondary to it. On the other hand, from the perspective of the plastic arts, as a *beautiful* object, that same statue might also lead

[172] Schopenhauer further states, "Consequently, from our point of view, we cannot agree with Plato when he asserts (*Republic*, X [596 ff.], pp. 284-285, and *Parmenides* [130ff], p. 79 *ed. Bip.*) that table and chair express the Ideas of table and chair, but we say that they express the Ideas already expressed in their mere material as such. However, according to Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, xii, chap. 3), Plato himself would have allowed Ideas only of natural beings and entities: ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη, ὅτι εἴδη ἐστὶν ὁπόσα φύσει…and in chapter 5 it is said that, according to the Platonists, there are no Ideas of house and ring…We take this opportunity to mention yet another point which our theory of Ideas differs widely from that of Plato. Thus he teaches (*Republic*, X [601], p. 288) that the object which art aims at expressing, the prototype of painting and poetry, is not the Idea, but the individual thing. The whole of our discussion so far maintains the opposite, and Plato's opinion is…a source of one of the greatest and best known errors of that great man, namely of his disdain and rejection of art, especially of poetry." (*W1*, pp. 211-212) Despite this fact, Schopenhauer yet states that: "Plato therefore attributed real and true being only to the *Ideas*, i.e., to the species; but to the individuals he attributed only a restless arising and passing away." (*W1*, p. 483)

to contemplation of the Idea of 'man' as species, and in this case something entirely different occurs. Remove, however, this 'aesthetic' determinant of the article, and you remove the art from it, which means, you essentially remove what now appears as an *aesthetic showing* of the Idea. Interestingly, the precise answer to the nature of manufactured articles within Schopenhauer's thought also points to his understanding and characterization of the Ideas as perceptible. In a word, the Ideas are perceptible as *aesthetic* entities, which I will discuss more fully in the next sections.

For now, to state the matter more clearly, a 'bed' or a 'chair', inasmuch as the aesthetic quality is omitted from it (it serves merely a functional nature), to that extent an Idea is only expressed on the basis of the *forma substantialis* of the wood or stone, or whatever else has been used to produce it. Indeed, the generic concept of 'wood' is fundamentally linked to an Idea in nature (i.e., a specific tree from which the wood has been obtained). One who perceives the beauty of the wood or stone, will thus be able to contemplate even the stone in the throne of the pauper-King. On the other hand, for the common man, the stone throne is essentially seen from the perspective of its concept, i.e., "A place for the King to sit". One therefore produces the 'throne' to rest in, a 'table' to eat at, a 'house' to live in.[173] Such productions represent mental concepts abstracted for the human mind and then formed into physical things. For Schopenhauer such productions radically differ from works of art wherein what is now produced is rather created or, to use Michelangelo's notion, is essentially drawn out from the marble itself.

[173] In consequence of this, as Ian Hammermeister points out: "Schopenhauer would not agree with Plato that an empirical bed has bed-Ideas as its model according to which it can be fabricated and used, because for him, only levels of empirical reality correspond to Ideas. Ideas do not refer to objects in their entirety, but only to their ontological essence as determined by the will that manifests itself as mere persistence and heaviness in inorganic nature, dependence on the interchange with the environment in plants, movements in animals, and self-consciousness in human beings." (Hammermeister 2002, p. 116)

3.7. Idea as aesthetic intuition

An important question arises within Schopenhauer's thought in relation to knowledge of the Ideas. Although Schopenhauer refers to these as perceptible, he yet interprets the Ideas as standing beyond the principle of sufficient reason, and hence beyond all time, space, and causality. Despite this fact, he states that the Ideas are objects, for otherwise they cannot be known. They are therefore also phenomena, as Schopenhauer states, distinguishing the Ideas from the thing-in-itself:

> [T]he Platonic Idea is necessarily object, something known, a representation (*Vorstellung*), and precisely, but only, in this respect is it different from the thing-in-itself. It has laid aside merely the subordinate forms of the phenomenon (*Erscheinung*), all of which we include under the principle of sufficient reason; or rather it has not yet entered into them. But it has retained the first and most universal form, namely that of representation in general, that of being object for a subject (*des Objektseyns für ein Subjekt*). (*W1*, p. 175)

So the Ideas are neither intuitive in the way in which intuitions are through the formal and empirical representations, nor are they abstractions in the sense of concepts arising on the basis of reason. Yet the Ideas are *perceptible* representations. They are objects which can be known. There are thus certainly a *kind* of intuition which we obtain

through knowledge, although distinct from formal and empirical intuitions.[174] Schopenhauer spells out the precise difference between the Ideas as follows:

> We can therefore define it accurately as *the way of considering things* (*die Betrachtungsart*) *independently of the principle of sufficient reason*, in contrast to the way of considering them which proceeds in exact accordance with this principle, and is the way of science and experience. (*W1*, p. 179)

The Ideas are thus intuited independent of the principle of sufficient reason. But how can such a thing be possible? How does the subject, bound to a *principle*, penetrate through this beyond and into the Ideas, that is, into an intuition of the most pure form of representation as being-object-for-a-subject? In response to this Schopenhauer offers such a possibility through what he refers to as contemplation (*Kontemplation*).[175]

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[174] David Hamlyn offers a very lucid description of the matter: "In Schopenhauer's view Ideas are representations, though not perceptual representations, whether or not knowledge of them is independent of knowledge of perceptual representations. While a *Vorstellung* need not be a representation in the literal sense, it is clear from Schopenhauer's treatment of the individual arts that he sees forms of art as somehow representing Ideas even when they also represent concrete objects or states of affairs. Indeed, he argues (*W1* 212/H. 2, 250–1), paradoxically it might at first seem, that the actual grade of the will's objectivity that the Idea constitutes affects the nature of the aesthetic experience, so that where a low grade is involved 'the enjoyment of pure will-less knowing will predominate', while in the case of Ideas of a high grade, the aesthetic enjoyment 'will consist rather in the objective apprehension of these Ideas that are the most distinct revelations of the will'. That may seem paradoxical because one might have expected objects which are a reflection of a high-grade Idea to be more likely to bring about a more detached state of knowing. On reflection, however, it seems evident that a higher grade of Idea is more likely to bring about an involvement in *it*, though it is less than clear what moral this might have for one who wants to emphasize the point, as Schopenhauer does, that aesthetic experience is a way of escaping the demands of the will by the will denying itself. However that may be, it *is* clear that in apprehending a perceptual representation in an aesthetic context one *eo ipso* apprehends a representation of an Idea, whether or not that second apprehension brings about the predominance of a state of pure will-less knowing. Hence the relationship between knowledge of an Idea in an aesthetic context and knowledge of some perceptual representation is even more direct than I suggested earlier when considering how, if at all, knowledge of Ideas in general is dependent on perceptual knowledge. But in that case it must be the aesthetic attitude which somehow makes the difference." (Hamlyn 1999, pp. 58-59)

[175] Schopenhauer also uses the term 'die Auffasung' or the apprehension of an Idea. He thus speaks of art which, "repeats the eternal Ideas apprehended (*aufgefaßten*) through pure contemplation (*reine*

Although he offers separate descriptions of the many components of contemplation throughout the two books of the *WWR*, he summarizes the entire process within a single passage in section §34 of the first book. I therefore quote the entire passage here, in three separate parts, offering a short commentary following each. Regarding contemplation, the first part of the passage states the following:

> Raised up by the power of the mind, we relinquish the ordinary way of considering things (*die gewöhnliche Betrachtungsart*), and cease to follow under the guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason merely their relations to one another, whose final goal is always the relation to our own will. Thus we no longer consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, but simply and solely the *what* (*das Was*). Further, we do not let abstract thought, the concepts of reason, take possession of our consciousness (*Bewußtseyn*), but, instead of all this, devote the whole power of our mind to perception (*Anschauung*), sink ourselves completely therein, and let our whole consciousness be filled by the calm contemplation (*die ruhige Kontemplation*) of the natural object actually present, whether it be a landscape, a tree, a rock, a crag, a building, or anything else. (*W1*, p. 178)

Kontemplation)" (*W1*, p. 184); of the, "Apprehension (*Zur Auffasung*) of an Idea" (*W2*, p. 367); and also of, "aesthetic apprehension (*die ästhetische Auffasung*), i.e., a knowledge of the Ideas". (*W2*, p. 369) In some cases the term 'Beobachtung' or observation, figures into the discussion of the Ideas, i.e., "Then we shall also distinguish the Idea itself from the way in which its phenomenon comes into the observation (*Beobachtung*) of the individual" (*W1*, p. 181); and also, "The figures in each case are only for the individual observer (*den individuellen Beobachter*)." (*W1*, p. 182) This latter sense seems to refer, however, to the observation (*Beobachtung*) of the Ideas as dispersed within perceptible phenomena—on the basis of which contemplation (*Kontemplation*) and the subsequent apprehension (*Auffasung*) for knowledge, of the Ideas, becomes possible. In other cases, he also uses the term 'Beschauung', meaning introspection, contemplation. (*W1*, p. 250)

The first part describes the manner in which the subject departs from the 'ordinary' way of looking at things, on the basis of the forms of perception, wherein the world is perceived in causal relations as determined spatially and temporally. Evidently, when such forms are removed, questions of where, when, and whither certainly become insignificant. Interestingly, however, Schopenhauer suggests that even questions of 'why' are removed and only the 'what' remains. The point here is that in the removal of causality, questions of 'why' such and such a thing is, become unimportant, for now we are looking precisely at the ground of the phenomenon itself. Thus, in the previous chapter it was seen that on the basis of sufficient reason, the 'why' of each thing was supplied—hence for geometrical demonstration, for science, and even for ethical motives (through the root of the will). With the Ideas, however, the what which is given through knowledge of the species of each thing, to a certain extent, *is* the why itself. There is no division between what and why.

The second interesting point in the above passage is that Schopenhauer states that in contemplation we do not allow concepts to 'take possession of our consciousness'. Concepts aside, the reference here to consciousness is quite strange. The term has really only been confronted in the *PSR* in relation to the subject's self-conscious knowledge of the will as thing-in-itself, and also in terms of the inner and outer sense. Yet neither in his previous discussion nor in this present one, does Schopenhauer really ever explain precisely what consciousness is.[176] So without further explanation, Schopenhauer states that the subject's consciousness devotes itself to perception and is filled with contemplation of the Idea which it perceives. In this sense, he emphasizes the fact that what we are dealing with is something entirely perceptible, yet quite removed from the forms of perception. Moving to the second part of the passage, Schopenhauer goes on:

[176] The most detailed discussion of the relationship between knowledge and consciousness is actually found in Schopenhauer's brief, *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will*. Yet even there, Schopenhauer merely *assumes* consciousness without entering into a detailed description of it.

> We *lose* (*verliert*) ourselves entirely in this object, to use a pregnant expression; in other words, we forget (*vergißt*) our individuality, our will (*seinen Willen*), and continue to exist only as pure subject (*reines Subjekt*), as clear mirror of the object, so that it is as though the object alone existed without anyone to perceive it, and thus we are no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one, since the entire consciousness is filled and occupied by a single image of perception (*eine einzigen anschaulichen Bilde*). (*W1*, pp. 178-179)

So following the process whereby consciousness sinks itself into perception, the subject is now said to 'lose' itself within the perception, to forget its individuality and even its own will. In doing so the subject exists as 'pure' subject, through which subject and object somehow merge. In this sense then, consciousness is filled with the 'image of perception'. Now this is an important description, for indeed what does it mean to speak of such an image? What precisely is this? I will discuss this point more fully in the next chapter in terms of the 'abstract-intuition', there pointing out the fact that Schopenhauer's description here creates deep inconsistencies with respect to his earlier distinctions between abstract and intuitive knowledge. For now, I pass over this ambiguity. It is sufficient to note that any doubt as to whether the Idea is perceptible is to be withdrawn. The 'image of perception' as union of pure subject and object, of perceiver and perception, fills consciousness, and Schopenhauer goes on in the third part to explain that:

> If, therefore, the object has to such an extent passed out of all relation to something outside it, and the subject has passed out of all relation to the will, what is thus known is no longer the individual thing as such, but the *Idea* (*die Idee*), the eternal form (*die ewige Form*), the immediate objectivity

> of the will at this grade (*die unmittelbare Objektität des Willens auf dieser Stufe)*. Thus at the same time, the person who is involved in this perception is no longer an individual, for in such perception the individual has lost himself; he is *pure* will-less, painless, timeless *subject of knowledge* (*Subjekt der Erkenntniss*). (*W1*, p. 179)

So the 'image of consciousness' is precisely the Idea, which of course, Schopenhauer relates to some grade of the will, depending upon that which is contemplated. The knowledge of the Idea here and the method of contemplation is certainly quite distinct from what was seen in terms of Platonic methodology, whereby the dialectician is said to proceed through form to form, and only eventually achieve a kind of 'insight' into the unhypothetical principle lying at the end of the dialectical trail. Schopenhauer's Ideas are strictly 'intuited', having no relationship with reason, logic, or dialectical progression.[177]

A further point to be ascertained from the above and final passage is that in passing into the Idea, the subject passes out of 'all relation to the will'. Schopenhauer thus

[177] Chansky states of contemplation of the Ideas in Schopenhauer's thought that: "What is grasped in this extraordinary kind of perception – and it is a perceiving – which stops at the object rather than passing over it and proceeding to a consideration of its relations, is no longer a particular empirical object, for it is just the spatial, temporal, and causal relations, drawn out in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason and of individuation, which distinguishes objects as individual, merely particular things. Nor does reason at all play its role here by casting its net over the object in order to transcend particularity on this level and transform the object into a concept. Rather, by resisting the intellect's natural tendency in the service of the will to locate a particular object in a particular place at a particular time, to ask after its causes and seek out its effects, or to make it into a concept in order to be able to handle it more easily – all of which activities, again, function directly or indirectly to satisfy the needs of the will – the world as constituted by will-ful fleeting perceptions, as well as all concepts drawn from and tied to these perceptions, may be said to have been to this extent left behind: What remains not for pure thought but rather still for perception is simply the object as such, the representation, free of the influences of both a co-opting reason and a hungry will, free of all those considerations which render it this or that particular thing, yet which is still a determinate object with specific characteristics and qualities. The object is, when perceived in this way, Schopenhauer argues, perceived as *what it is in itself*, as a *pure* representation, by all means a thing of perception, and what Schopenhauer has designated by the term 'Platonic Idea'." (Chansky 1988, pp. 71-72)

describes the subject as 'pure' and in this sense it means free from will, 'will-less', 'painless'. This of course harkens back to what has been said of the will in section 3.1. There the will was described in terms of a will-to-life, and in accordance with this, the various grades of the will were further said to strive against one another (even up to the human being), and in doing so, this inevitably leads to suffering.

Schopenhauer is now indicating that through the process of contemplation of the Idea, the subject is removed from its relation to the will, indeed, is freed from it, which thereby points to a redemptive quality regarding knowledge of the Idea itself. There is then something much more significant to the Ideas than just knowledge *per se*. Knowledge of the Idea has almost an ethical, almost religious, and more specifically, ascetic (not to mention aesthetic) dimension to it. Thus Schopenhauer states of contemplation and the Ideas in general that:

> In this state pure knowing (*reinen Erkennen*) comes to us, so to speak, in order to deliver us (*zu erlösen*) from willing and its stress. We follow, yet only for a few moments; willing, desire, the recollection of our own personal aims, always tears us anew from peaceful contemplation (*die ruhigen Beschauung*); but yet again and again the next beautiful environment, in which pure, will-less knowledge presents itself to us, entices (*darbietet*) us away from willing. (*W1*, p. 250)

So the Ideas offer a certain freedom from the striving of the will, but there is yet a tragic element to this freedom.[178] As Schopenhauer suggests above, no matter how many times

[178] One evident problem with Schopenhauer's analysis here is that it leads to a paradoxical tension between 'truth' (knowledge of the idea) and the 'desire' for truth. Thus Friedrich Nietzsche, in drawing out the consequences of Schopenhauer's 'will' in nature, will go on to state in, *Beyond Good and Evil*, that: "I do not believe that a 'drive to knowledge' is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has, here as elsewhere, employed understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere instrument." (*Beyond Good and Evil*, sec. 6) In other words, when anything like the 'Good' is removed and willing replaces it,

we enter into contemplation, desire and will yet 'tear us' away from it. We can again seek freedom through yet another contemplation, but again and again we must fall back and face our willing and the suffering of existence through it. So either contemplation of the Ideas represents the only escape for humanity, and thus life is really tragic or even comic, since there is a certain humor to this seesaw of freedom and slavery; otherwise, there must be some other form of escape. I will describe this latter possibility in the next chapter with respect to the denial and subsequent annihilation of the will, revealing a number of very significant problems which this creates for knowledge within Schopenhauer's thought.

At present, in the above passage, Schopenhauer states something quite interesting and new. He refers to contemplation there, not just to objects in perception, but even more, to the 'beautiful' environment. This is certainly different, and was nowhere presented in his description of the nature of contemplation itself in the previous passages. Schopenhauer is nonetheless insistent upon the relationship between contemplation and beauty, and it is seen through further consideration of his comments regarding the matter, that in the end, very much akin to Platonic eros for the beauty of wisdom, the beauty of the Ideas is really what entices the subject into contemplation. Indeed the Ideas, according to Schopenhauer, are neither based upon the intuitive nor the abstract representation. Yet they are perceptible. They are perceptible in the manner in which one perceives something peculiar, something enchanting and noble about the horse, or the sea, or the sun, or the moon. They are perceptible in the same manner in which one perceives the knights upon their horses engaged in battle in Leonardo de

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the very notion of 'truth' and the 'desire' for truth changes completely. Nietzsche will further speak in the same passage rather of the "will to truth", which is essentially desire for knowledge arising through the will, and indeed in service to it. So this is interesting because Schopenhauer basically speaks of knowledge of the Ideas as arising through genius who is first attracted and compelled by beauty (which is really will), but yet through contemplation all such 'desire' is now removed. So in effect, genius seeks through a desire which annihilates its own desire. In essence, will as source leads to a desire which annihilates its own source. There is then a strange tension here, a kind of suicidal tendency within the will itself.

Vinci's famous depiction of the Battle of Anghiari (1505). Something other to the horse is there perceived. Even more, the 'horse' that I perceive in reality is akin to the 'horse' that I perceive in de Vinci's painting. But how? The answer to this question is that what I essentially perceive is in essence *beauty*. In fact, beauty is considered by Schopenhauer to be an inherent part of the perceptible world itself, as arising on the basis of the will and its objectively through the Idea, as he states:

> Now since, on the one hand, every existing thing can be observed purely objectively and outside all relation, and, on the other, the will appears in everything at some grade of its objectivity, and this thing is accordingly the expression of an Idea, everything is also *beautiful* (*schön*). (*W1*, p. 210)

In effect, the Ideas are perceptible *on the basis of beauty*. In this sense, it is understandable that Schopenhauer should interpret (or rather misinterpret) Plato as literally considering the Ideas as perceptible according to his views regarding the beauty of wisdom in the *Symposium* and the 'light of the sun' in the *Republic*.[179] For Schopenhauer, the heart of the empirical visible world is also an aesthetic phenomenon akin to a theatrical drama, a painting, the noble horse, and the sublime dawn. Like the green of the leaves which I see, akin to the soft touch which I feel, or the noise heard of a passing car, beauty is something equally sensuous, something seen, something perceptible, yet in quite a distinct way. It is aesthetic. I experience beauty. I 'see' it. The Idea is thus akin to all of these senses, and yet different. But how does beauty arise through the will? Is it something experienced through perception (*a posteriori*), or something inherent to the

[179] Despite this fact, Schopenhauer's notion of beauty is still radically different from what is seen in Plato. Thus William Desmond points out that: "beauty for Plato is the *natural* culmination of properly unfolding desire: it offers desire's fulfillment, not its extirpation. Beauty crowns the full unfolding of human desire." (Desmond 2003, p. 151)

experience of perception itself (a *priori*)? Schopenhauer confirms the latter position, as he states:

> No knowledge of the beautiful is at all possible purely *a posteriori* and from mere experience. It is always at least partly, *a priori*, though of quite a different kind from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason of which we are *a priori* conscious...that other kind of knowledge *a priori*, which makes it possible to present the beautiful, concerns the content of phenomenon instead of the form, the *what* (*das Was*) of the appearance instead of the *how* (*des Wie*). (*W1*, p. 222)

In this sense, the beautiful is much more akin to the intuitive formal representation of the *a priori* forms of space and time. Indeed, the formal representation arises and is 'perceived' with every complete and empirical representation. Likewise, beauty arises and becomes perceptible as inherent to the *a priori* primordial form of being-object-for-a-subject, which is nothing other than representing itself.[180]

With beauty, there is furthermore, a Platonic *erotic* determination to the Ideas according to Schopenhauer's description. Within this context, the Ideas themselves appear as perceptible, as an *aesthetic showing*.[181] The Idea as *known*, may furthermore be likened to an 'aesthetic intuition'. Although Schopenhauer never explicitly suggests that the Ideas are intuitions, the evidence seems compelling for such a description. Indeed,

[180] Cheryl Foster further points out the relationship between the Ideas and the will on the level of the body and in terms of aesthetic pleasure, viz.: "What the individual perceives, representationally, through the Idea in art, she also experiences, immediately, as pain, pleasure, force, joy through her body. In this spirit Schopenhauer appears to link his epistemological aesthetic of Ideas with the immediacy of will as experienced and recognized in the individual body. Recognition of will in the ordinary self is ostensibly related to will appearing under the aspect of the Idea through art." (Foster 2006, p. 222)

[181] Thus G. Neeley states: "Of course, it is only through the fixed, detached aesthetic contemplation of an object that Ideas can be perceived. During such moments of contemplation, a transitory preponderance of intellect over will occurs in which conscious attention is devoted entirely to the object of perception." (Neeley 2000, p. 133)

the Ideas are representations, yet not comprehended by either abstract or formally and empirically intuitive representations. On the other hand, they are perceptible, but not determined by space, time, and causality. They are objects for knowledge, hence they are representations. Beauty is the direct correlation of the Idea, indeed, through beauty we are *enticed* into contemplation, as Schopenhauer states echoing Aristotle: "A beautiful view (*schöne Aussicht*) is therefore cathartic of the mind (*Kathartikon des Geistes*)". (*W2*, p. 404) As such, through beauty we are enchanted by the Idea on the basis of aesthetic enjoyment. Regarding this point, Schopenhauer states that:

> Now if wholly objective, intuitive apprehension (*intuitive Auffasung*), purified of all willing, is the condition for the *enjoyment* of aesthetic objects (*des Genusses ästhetischer Gegenstände*), even more so is it for their *production* (*Gemüthsverfassung*). (*W2*, p. 371)

What is to be understood as the intuitive apprehension of an aesthetic object, other than an *aesthetic intuition*? A further point which corroborates this view is that Schopenhauer relates the Ideas to works of art, as he states above—such aesthetic objects are intuited in both the *enjoyment* of them, as well as in their *production*. Inasmuch as Schopenhauer here directly relates the Ideas to art, to that extent, the interpretation of the *knowledge* of the Ideas as aesthetic intuitions is more thoroughly grounded. For here, the artist takes what has been intuited on an aesthetic basis, and *carries that over* into the marble or upon the canvas.

3.8. The work of art

A preliminary question arises in relation to what has been seen in terms of the 'contemplation' of the Ideas. According to Schopenhauer's above description, it would

seem that *all* human beings are equally endowed with the capacity to contemplate the Ideas, particularly inasmuch as these Ideas are perceptible. Indeed, let he who has eyes —see. This seems further corroborated in Schopenhauer's relating the Ideas to beauty, aesthetic enjoyment, the productions of art, etc. Everyone would seem to have the capacity to *enjoy* art, and so, everyone must therefore have access to the Ideas. In view of the above points, Schopenhauer admits just as much, suggesting that: "We must therefore assume as existing in all men that power (*Vermögen*) of recognizing in things their Ideas". (*W1*, p. 195) Despite this fact, Schopenhauer establishes a kind of hierarchy regarding the inner capacity of each individual to achieve such contemplation. So although all human beings, as having reason and understanding, are certainly able to achieve some level of contemplation of the Idea, only genius (*der Genius*) is really able to *fully* comprehend the Idea, as Schopenhauer states:

> The man of genius (*Genius*) excels them only in the far higher degree (*Grad*) and more continuous duration (*Dauer*) of this kind of knowledge. These enable him to retain that thoughtful contemplation (*die Besonnenheit*) necessary for him to repeat what is thus known in a voluntary and intentional work, such repetition being the work of art (*das Kunstwerk*). Through this he communicates to others the Idea he has grasped (*die aufgefaßte Idee*). Therefore this Idea remains unchanged and the same, and hence aesthetic pleasure (*das ästhetische Wohlgefallen*) is essentially one and the same, whether it be called forth by a work of art, or is merely a means of facilitating that knowledge in which this pleasure consists. (*W1*, p. 195)

Schopenhauer furthermore describes the advantage that this select group has over the common person. He states that such an ability to fully comprehend the Idea entails the,

"gift of genius (*Genialität*)", which provides a heightened "objective tendency of mind (*objektive Richtung des Geistes*)" (*W1*, p. 185); that he will have the "expression of genius (*geniale Ausdruck*)", as also a, "decided predominance of knowing over willing (*ein entschiedenes Uebergewicht des Erkennens über das Wollen*)". (*W1*, p. 188) So the genius is really able to comprehend the Ideas in their entirety, and this ability is the result of a kind of *enhancement* of the intellect. Genius then, quite akin to intellect, is thus something of an accident. Like intellect, genius arises on the basis of the will, as a manifestation of struggle and the will-to-life, and yet paradoxically, rather than serving the will from which it first received existence, it now serves its own purpose, it contemplates the Idea, unites with it and becomes free from will, at least momentarily. So in effect, not everyone is able to achieve such an 'objective' tendency of mind, and thus most people unavoidably fall back into self and the ego centered around its own interests, wants, and desires. Only the genius can *truly* be free from self.

The genius is furthermore said to be responsible for really genuine works of art. In this sense, the genius who contemplates the Idea (for enjoyment and freedom) in nature, now enters into the production of that very same Idea given to his knowledge (as aesthetic intuition), and creates the work of art. Art in Schopenhauer's thought thus receives a favorable interpretation, which certainly stands to contrast Plato, wherein art is generally unfavorably discussed within the context of imitation.[182] For Schopenhauer,

[182] Ironically Schopenhauer states that: "It follows…from my whole view of art that its object is to facilitate knowledge of the *Ideas* of the world (in the Platonic sense, the only one which I recognize for the word *Idea*). (*W2*, p. 408) This must certainly be a misrepresentation. For Plato, the Idea and art *essentially* differ and are even at times considered antithetical. Hence, in the second book of the *Republic*, Plato states that: "we must first of all, it seems, supervise the storytellers. We'll select their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and reject them when they aren't". (377cd) Initially, it seems that Plato's account here may perhaps be quite on par with Schopenhauer. For if the Idea is beautiful and the artist is somehow able to 'depict' the Idea, then through truly beautiful works (whether in poetry or painting), the Idea is thereby revealed. Schopenhauer might thus have agreed with Plato on this point: all false artists incapable of portraying the Idea should be removed from the city. Despite the seeming relation, however, Plato further along states that: "We won't admit stories into our cities—whether allegorical or not", the reason for which is given that: "The young can't distinguish what is allegorical from what isn't, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable". (378d) It is to be

only those 'artistic' productions which *fail* to express the Idea are 'imitative', reflecting an impoverishment of the artist rather than the Idea itself. Such an imitative artist would be far removed from genius, and in his productions, although he attempts to reveal the Idea (as genius does) he merely imitates this by revealing some one or more concepts of things, as Schopenhauer suggest: "For art the concept always remains unproductive; in art it can guide only technique; its province is science." (*W1*, p. 57) True and genuine art through genius, on the other hand, never imitates, but rather reveals reality in its production, as Schopenhauer states:

> It repeats the eternal Ideas apprehended through pure contemplation (*durch reine Kontemplation aufgefaßten*), the essential and abiding element in

recalled from the discussion of beauty in the *Symposium* and of the Idea of the Good in the *Republic*, that for Plato beauty, wisdom, and the Good are integrally related. Hence when he speaks of 'fine or beautiful' stories, he means more than something mere beauty, indeed, something which speaks also of truth. This point is more fully elaborated in the tenth book of the *Republic* in relation to the discussion there of the plastic arts. Plato first considers the question of precisely what it is that painting does or achieves in each case, stating essentially that it involves: "an imitation of appearances". (598b) From this, the conclusion is made that in relation to such arts: "imitation is far removed from the truth, for it touches only a small part of each thing and a part that is itself only an image. And that, it seems, is why it can produce everything. For example, we say that a painter can paint a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other craftsmen, even though he knows nothing of these crafts. (598bc) From this he concludes that: "all poetic imitators, beginning with Homer, imitate images of virtue and all the other things they write about and have no grasp of the truth". (*Republic*, 600e) So for Plato, art is essentially imitative, offering but a mirror of truth, but never (or perhaps rarely) offering truth itself. In consequence of this, Plato concludes that it is right that storytellers and poets, like painters, should be removed from a city, further stating of such imitators: "Therefore, we'd be right to take him and put him beside a painter as his counterpart. Like a painter, he produces work that is inferior with respect to truth and that appeals to a part of the soul that is similarly inferior rather than to the best part. So we were right not to admit him into a city that is to be well-governed, for he arouses, nourishes, and strengthens this part of the soul and so destroys the rational one, in just the way that someone destroys the better sort of citizens when he strengthens the vicious ones and surrenders the city to them." So Plato's main objection, as indicated above, is that art seems to "destroy the rational" part of the soul, a quite interesting remark, given Schopenhauer's emphasis upon intuitive knowledge as such. Indeed, in light of the these remarks, Schopenhauer's interpretation of knowledge through art and aesthetic Ideas is seen to take essentially the opposite view on the matter. For him, volition takes primacy over the reason and the intellect through the will, and as such, the more 'inferior' parts of the soul seen in Plato, become now superior and primary within Schopenhauer. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Ideas are seen as essential manifestations or expressions of the will, and art is now interpreted as expressing the Idea, to that extent does art serve to express the 'truth', as it were, the metaphysical truth, of phenomena.

> all the phenomena of the world. According to the material in which it repeats, it is sculpture, painting, poetry, or music. Its only source is knowledge of the Ideas; its sole aim is communication of this knowledge. (*W1*, p. 184-185)

So art 'repeats' the Ideas, and it does so on the basis of contemplation. In accordance with this, the several arts from painting and sculpture, to architecture and poetry find various Ideas at their source, contemplated originally by genius, and as displayed within the work itself.

There is of course the famous exception of music, a few remarks regarding the knowledge and 'universality' of which, are in order here. Indeed, Schopenhauer explains that music is the *direct* expression of the will itself:

> As our world is nothing but the phenomenon or appearance of the Ideas in plurality through entrance into the *principium individuationis* (the form of knowledge possible to the individual as such), music (*die Musik*), since it passes over (*übergeht*) the Ideas, is also quite independent of the phenomenal world, positively ignores it, and, to a certain extent, could still exist even if there were no world at all, which cannot be said of the other arts. Thus music is as *immediate* an objectification and copy (*unmittelbare Objektivation und Abbild*) of the whole will as the world itself is.[183] (*W1*, p. 257)

[183] Christopher Janaway states this succinctly: "Whereas all the other art forms present us with Ideas which are the experienceable manifestation of the will, music bypasses these Ideas…The will expresses itself once as the whole world of particular phenomena and universal kinds into which they fall; it expresses itself over again as music." (Janaway 1994, p. 70)

As the direct expression of the will, music thus becomes the most powerful of all the arts, as Schopenhauer goes on to note:

> Because music does not, like all the other arts, exhibit the Ideas or grades (*Stufen*) of the will's objectification, but directly the will *itself* (*unmittelbar den Willen selbst*), we can also explain that it acts directly on the will, i.e., the feelings, passions, and emotions of the hearer, so that it quickly raises these or even alters them. (*W2*, p. 448)

The various differences in terms of sounds, tones, harmony, etc., within music directly correspond to the will at its various grades, the deepest tones akin to the ground bass as: "the lowest grades of the will's objectification, inorganic nature, the mass of the planet". (*W1*, p. 258) Higher tones therefore correspond to the higher grades of the will's objectification and the higher phenomenal expressions of nature respectively. Music is then essentially a copy of nature itself—a copy of the will.

Schopenhauer will further go on to refer to the knowledge of music. This is, however, quite puzzling in view of the fact that he states that music is "independent of the phenomenal world" and further argued that all knowledge requires the subject-object relation and hence phenomenal representation. Schopenhauer thus states rather quizzically that:

> [M]usic, apart from its aesthetic or inner significance, is nothing but the means of grasping (*betrachtet*), immediately and in the concrete, larger numbers and more complex numerical ratios that we can otherwise know only indirectly by comprehension in concepts (*durch Auffassung in Begriffen*)." (*W1*, p. 265)

How this actually comes to be in relation to will and representation, and how it is that the relation between music and mathematics (via space and time as conceptualized within reason) arises, is left quite unexplained, indeed, as something of a Pythagorean mystery. Despite this fact, Schopenhauer refers to the manifestations of music as universals, of which he states, referring to this and the other kinds of knowledge, that their relationship: "could very well be expressed in the language of the scholastics by saying that the concepts are the *universalia post rem*, but music gives the *universalia ante rem*, and reality the *universalia in re*." (*W1*, p. 263)

How it is that music becomes a universal *for* knowledge, as distinct from will, is furthermore left unexplained. Schopenhauer merely suggests a difference, describes music as a 'copy' of the will, and leaves things at that. Yet evidently, there is some contradiction here regarding Schopenhauer's characterization of knowledge as fundamentally *tied* to representation, and of music as known, and yet fundamentally *outside* of representation.

Returning then to the present discussion, it is seen that what further renders the Ideas in art so exceptional, as opposed to their existence in or at heart within natural things, is the fact that since genius is able to fully comprehend the Ideas in nature (which most people are incapable of), he is therefore able to display this more fully in his own productions of art. In consequence of this fact, those who are unable to obtain access to the Ideas in nature will find that through art, contemplation (or perhaps simply enjoyment) of the Ideas has been much facilitated. The genius is then to be thanked for this, as Schopenhauer states:

> That the Idea comes to us more easily (*uns leichter entgegentritt*) from the work of art than directly from nature and from reality, arises solely from the fact that the artist, who knew only the Idea and not reality, clearly

> repeated (*rein wiederholt*) in his work only the Idea, separated it out from reality, and omitted all disturbing contingencies.[184] (*W1*, p. 195)

Beyond art, one further consequence of the contemplation of genius is that metaphysical knowledge and philosophy become possible. Before turning to a description of philosophy, it is worth noting here that art itself offers also a kind of metaphysical knowing. Indeed, through contemplation, the Ideas are directly intuited, and through art, these same Ideas are more directly manifested than they are *even* in nature. Consequently, the production and aesthetic enjoyment of the Idea through and in art, entails also an enjoyment of the metaphysical knowledge of the in-itself of nature, as a direct manifestation of will. This is precisely what Schopenhauer indicates, stating in the first place that: "the fine arts work at bottom towards the solution to the problem of existence." (*W2*, p. 406) He then goes on to state that:

> For this reason the result of every purely objective, and so of every artistic, apprehension (*Auffassung*) of things is an expression more of the true

[184] Regarding this Point, William Caldwell states rather pointedly that: "Schopenhauer's notion of the Ideas as representing the grades of the will, and the artist as simply 'lending us his eyes,' makes us almost suspect that he is dealing or ought to be dealing chiefly with natural beauty, and only indirectly with artistic or created beauty. And then the whole passive-live character that artistic appreciation has in his eyes, makes us feel that his treatment of beauty is too easy and superficial—he thinks of it far too much as something already made (instead of to be made) by the co-operation or creative activity of the percipient. All who truly understand the perception of the beautiful must feel that beauty has in a sense to be *made* in order to be understood." (Caldwell 1896, p. 270) In light of these remarks, I must side with Schopenhauer on the matter. I don't agree that beauty is something at all 'made', and I very much disagree with Caldwell's general vision of beauty here. The artist doesn't create beauty, anymore than he creates the paint which he applies to the canvas or the canvas itself. He or she merely 'brings outs' the beautiful within an object, as Michelangelo 'brought out' the image within the sculpture. Beauty is an essential manifestation of the natural world. It is akin to the life inherent to the species, the happy buzzing of the bee, the sprightly eyes of a young animal. Beauty is akin to life, though in a very different way. The parent does not 'make' life in the animal or the child. The parent rather gives birth to it. The *giving* and *taking* of life is the power of nature alone. So too with beauty. In this sense, I agree with Schopenhauer when he suggests that artists really help to unfold this beauty more adequately within the artwork, than that which is seen within nature herself. Caldwell's vision of beauty here seems entirely too conceptual.

> nature of life and of existence, more an answer to the question, "What is life?" (*W2*, p. 406)

Within this context then, it would seem that philosophy is *almost unnecessary*. Given genius and the contemplation of the Idea, certainly from the above description, it seems that art in itself is sufficient to express the nature and questions inherent to life and existence. Still, Schopenhauer believes that although art certainly does work toward such an answer, the answer that it is able to give is yet insufficient. He thus goes on to state that:

> But all the arts speak only the naïve and childlike language of *perception* (*Anschauung*), not the abstract and serious language of *reflection* (*Reflexion*); their answer is thus a fleeting image (*flüchtiges Bild*), not a permanent universal knowledge (*allgemeine Erkenntniß*)…For they always given only a fragment (*ein Fragment*), an example instead of the rule, not the whole (*das Ganze*) which can be given only in the universality of the *concept* (*des Begriffes*). Therefore it is the task of philosophy to give for the concept, and hence for reflection and in the abstract, a reply to the question… (*W2*, p. 406)

This is an odd result. Indeed, are not the Ideas the eternal character of the thing-in-itself? Yet here Schopenhauer states that art (which expresses the Idea) is but a 'fleeting image', a 'fragment'. Furthermore, is not the concept a rather impoverished form of knowledge, imbedded within abstractions, offering the mere reflection upon the more richer basis of experience? In having first rejected abstract knowledge, Schopenhauer now seems to place the concept back upon the throne where Plato originally crowned it. Schopenhauer seems to further confuse matters in his statements which follow. He

states of the knowledge obtained through both art and philosophy, relating the two, that:

> Everyone has to stand before a picture as before a prince, waiting to see whether it will speak and what it will say to him; and, as with the prince, so he himself must not address it, for then he would hear only himself. It follows from all this that all wisdom is certainly contained in the works of the pictorial or graphic arts, yet only *virtualiter* or *implicite*. Philosophy, on the other hand, endeavors to furnish the same wisdom *actualiter* and *explicite*; in this sense philosophy is related to these arts as wine is to grapes. (*W*2, p. 407)

So the real quality of genius, and indeed the entirety of Schopenhauer's thought as finding a basis in and through empirical perception, now extends itself beyond art, into the concept, and hence paradoxically, *back* into rational ground. The implication here is that knowledge through perception is really *inferior* to knowledge through the concept. What I know implicitly as inner knowledge based upon experience, intuition, feeling, is now rendered *inferior* on the basis of true and universal knowledge, explicitly through concepts and abstractions. There is thus a very real and serious problem here regarding Schopenhauer's final analysis of philosophy as the highest expression of knowledge. Indeed, on the basis of almost every other point within his thought, this seems a blatant contradiction. I will explore this last point once again and more fully in the last chapter. For now, I turn to a final consideration of the nature of philosophy itself.

3.9. Philosophy and the conceptual throne of knowledge

Turning now to the discussion of the nature of philosophy, it is first of all important to distinguish philosophy from the sciences and second, from art itself. So for Schopenhauer, what distinguishes philosophy from science (strictly speaking) is essentially summed up in his remark within the *WWR* that: "Therefore aptitude for philosophy consists precisely in what Plato put it in, namely in knowing the one in the many and the many in the one."[185] (*W1*, p. 82) From what has been stated above regarding the nature and universality of the abstract-concept, one might initially be led to the conclusion that Schopenhauer is identifying philosophy with the sciences. Such a view is perhaps even further confirmed in Schopenhauer's statement that philosophical knowledge entails precisely the:

> [S]um of very universal judgments, whose ground of knowledge is immediately the world itself in its entirety…a *complete recapitulation* (*vollständige Wiederholung*), *so to speak, a reflection of the world in abstract concepts*.[186] (*W1*, p. 83)

Or again, that: "philosophy is nothing but a complete and accurate repetition and expression of the inner nature of the world in very general concepts". (*W1*, p. 264) Perhaps the separation between the disciplines of the formal and empirical sciences and that of philosophy is not quite so distinct at all? Perhaps whereas these former sciences are more 'specialized' in nature (i.e., physics deals with fundamental objects in relations of cause and effect, logic deals with mental objects in formal arrangement), philosophy

[185] "*im erkennen des Einen im Vielen und des Vielen im Einen*"

[186] He further states that: "Moreover, the philosophical disposition properly speaking consists especially in our being capable of wondering at the commonplace thing of daily occurrence, whereby we are induced to make the *universal* of the phenomenon our problem." (*W2*, p. 161)

has a more 'generalized' approach; that it looks to the broadest and widest concepts which encompass all other things beneath it, i.e., such as 'absolute reason', 'divinity', 'virtue', etc.? From what has been seen in the previous chapter regarding the impoverishment of knowledge and concepts *in abstracta*, such an interpretation must certainly be rejected. Schopenhauer must therefore be referring to some other kind of universal. This is, of course, the Idea.

Before turning to an account of how the Idea figures into philosophy, however, the relationship between this discipline and the formal and empirical sciences should first of all be considered. Indeed, akin to these latter sciences, philosophy, if it is to be *communicable*, must also formulate and express its meaning on the basis of concepts and hence, through words. Accordingly, dependent upon language as its medium of expression, the philosopher is thereby dependent upon concepts, and to this extent, there is a limitation to philosophy (like the sciences), i.e., the necessity to communicate through the concept, as I have discussed. The task of philosophy then, at least on the surface, would seem quite indistinct from the sciences.

There is, however, a very sharp distinction between science and philosophy. That difference is summed up simply in terms of the Ideas. Whereas the sciences analyze relations *between* or among phenomena and then express these through concepts, the philosopher always looks *beyond* such relations. In so doing, the philosopher penetrates to the ground of phenomena, and comes into contact with the Ideas on the basis of which the many and particular phenomenal entities (such as the various trees, birds, electromagnetic forces, etc.) find their *essential* unity. Such knowledge then, from what was seen in the previous section, must only be accessible to genius and the power of contemplation.

Philosophy seems then to take up something of the middle ground between art and science. For whereas the scientist departs from relations among phenomena and develops conceptual laws (*post rem*) on the basis of these, the genuine artist always

starts from Ideas beyond phenomena (*ante rem*), creating a 'pattern' of them within the work itself. On the other hand, the philosopher acts both akin to the artist as well as the scientist. In the first place, like the artist, the philosopher looks first to the nature of the Ideas in his attempt to obtain an understanding of the inner nature of each thing.[187] In the second place, like the scientist, once he or she has grasped the Idea, the philosopher must now render this individual knowledge of the species obtained through it universal and generically *communicable* to others. In doing so, the philosopher makes use of the concept to accomplish this.[188] Although Schopenhauer's description of knowledge of the Ideas generally relates to art, it is useful to consider one particular statement wherein he compares art to science, for indeed philosophy is easily ascertained in relation to the middle ground between these. Thus in the *WWR* Schopenhauer compares the way of genius with the way of science stating that:

> The method of consideration that follows the principle of sufficient reason is the rational method, and it alone is valid and useful in practical life and in science. The method of consideration that looks away from the content of this principle is the method of genius, which is valid and useful in art alone.[189] (*W1*, p. 185)

[187] To be more precise, the philosopher actually starts first with the will, since it is the metaphysical ground of being itself. Accordingly Schopenhauer states that the knowledge of the will (as a will-to-live): "is not a consequence of the knowledge of life, is in no way a *conclusio ex praemissis*, and in general is nothing secondary. On the contrary, it is that which is first and unconditioned, the premiss of all premisses, and for this reason that from which philosophy has to *start*, since the will-to-live does not appear in consequence of the world, but the world appears in consequence of the will-to-live." (*W2*, p. 360)

[188] There is an interesting ascetic character identifiable here in relation to philosophy, simply in terms of its communication. Indeed, why should the philosopher communicate his knowledge? Why not simply remain satisfied in the knowledge of the Idea itself? Like the Buddha who attains enlightenment, it would seem that the philosopher, after attaining his own kind of enlightenment (redemption) through the Idea, now descends and 'enlightens' those who are unable to reach such heights. I will take up this point later in the discussion of Gnosticism and the ascetic in Schopenhauer's thought.

[189] Schopenhauer goes in the same passage to state that: "The first is Aristotle's method; the second is, on the whole, Plato's." (*W1*, p. 185) This is certainly an interesting point. Schopenhauer is here pointing out

So philosophy stands between the method of the sciences and art, first looking beyond the principle of sufficient reason, and then attempting to explain what it has seen according to it. A further helpful point may be obtained in terms of the analogy between the logician, the poet, and the philosopher. Again, the philosopher is found to be similar but different from both the logician and the poet. He or she occupies, rather, something of the middle ground between them.[190] So in the first place, the logician would essentially be a thinker who deals strictly with concepts and abstractions. He looks to a formal science, obtaining all of his knowledge of its objects entirely on an *a priori* basis. He is thus unconcerned with experience, or with its content. He is essentially interested in the functionality of reason itself. The logician looks to general rules, principles, and the various applications of logic within itself. He further formulates his science in the most *comprehensive* way possible.

There is on the other hand the philosopher. Like the logician he makes use of concepts and abstractions for the purpose of communication. He formulates general rules and principles in the most comprehensive way possible. He is thus akin to the logician in every way with the exception of one essential point: the primary content of his concepts are derived on the basis of his knowledge of the Idea (as well as the will). The philosopher therefore must be both genius (which the logician needn't be), and he must further look primarily and first to the content of experience, wherein the Ideas

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that in the first place, Aristotle who certainly rejects the transcendence of Plato's Ideas, follows the way of reason and science. On the other hand, he believes that Plato, renowned for rejecting many of the artists from his ideal city, follows the way of genius (and hence of art). Even more important, Schopenhauer further suggests that genius itself involves: "the capacity to remain in a state of pure perception", and, "to lose oneself in perception". (*ibid*.) Given then this twofold path of genius and science, of Idea and reason, and furthermore, of Schopenhauer's description of the nature of genius itself, there can be no doubt that he is definitively ascribing his interpretation of the perceptibility of the Ideas to Plato himself.

[190] Cheryl Foster further clarifies this difference: "How one *preserves* the intuition of totality is what differentiates philosophy from art. Philosophers encode their impressions in inadequate concepts… Artists create a legacy through productive imagination." (Foster 2006, pp. 230-231)

reside and can be contemplated.[191] So in this sense, the philosopher differs from the logician, and indeed from all other scientists.

On the other hand, the philosopher is both akin to and yet distinct from the poet. In the first place, poetry being an art, the true poet always looks first to the Ideas. In this respect, he is similar to the philosopher, and also in another. For indeed, unlike the painter who may rest content in knowledge of the Ideas which he then expresses *pictorially* upon a canvas, the poet now must make use of concepts for the expression of those Ideas which he perceives, as Schopenhauer states:

> For in plastic and pictorial art allegory leads away from what is given in perception (*Anschaulichen*); but in poetry the relation is reversed (*umgekehrt*). Here the concept (*Begriff*) is what is directly given in words (*Worten*), and the first aim is to lead from this to the perceptive, the depiction (*Darstellung*) of which must be undertaken by the imagination (*die Phantasie*) of the hearer. (*W1*, p. 240)

Thus in pictorial art, the artist attempts to 'capture' the Idea on the basis of a perceptual image. He paints the image of a landscape, or a cathedral, or a man. Through this, he attempts to lead the observer from the perceptual image to the Idea underlying it. On the other hand, in poetry, the poet must make use of concepts to express the Idea in his knowledge. Indeed, he must utilize these as cleverly as possible in his attempt to now

[191] The logician and scientist can only be skilled in the use of universal concepts. Thus Schopenhauer states that: "Scientific talent in general, therefore, is the ability to subordinate the concept-spheres according to their different determinations, so that, as Plato repeatedly recommends, science may not be formed merely by something universal and an immense variety of things placed side by side directly under it, but that knowledge may step down gradually from the most universal to the particular through intermediate concepts and divisions, made according to closer and closer definitions." (*W1*, p. 63) Schopenhauer further reiterates this difference throughout his works, e.g.: "the material of art is the *Idea*, and the material of science is the *concept*" (*W2*, p. 442)

lead the listener from these concepts into 'depictions', that is, perceptual images; and through these latter, to the Ideas underlying them.

Like the poet, the philosopher too must make use of concepts for the communication of his knowledge of the Ideas, yet in doing so he differs quite radically from the poet, for now he attempts to lead the listener (or reader) not to an image and through it to an Idea, but rather, from knowledge of the Idea to the expression of *universal abstractions of the Ideas*. This is precisely what Schopenhauer was seen to state regarding the difference between art and philosophy. The philosopher, in obtaining implicit knowledge of the Idea of the individual species of a thing within perception, which is yet a kind of universal (*ante rem*), now makes it *explicit* through the universally abstract concept (*post rem*).

So there is a strange and noticeably circular progression within Schopenhauer's thought from empirical perception to the contemplation of the Idea, and from the contemplated Idea into universal concepts. Evidently, given the limitations of conceptual knowledge and communicability, true knowledge of the world, is really limited to genius and genius alone. For although the genius may desire to express his knowledge (of the Ideas) to others, either through art, or more perfectly through concepts, he is yet limited by communicability—as such. In art he can only express this implicitly, and although through concepts he may express this explicitly, he is yet limited to the impoverishments inherent to conceptual and abstract knowledge. In effect, Schopenhauer's interpretation of the perceptibility of the Ideas create very significant problems regarding knowledge itself. True knowledge is in the first place limited to certain 'privileged' geniuses. In the second place, whereas Schopenhauer condemns Plato and Kant for starting with indirect abstract knowledge, for giving primacy to the intellect, to reason, to mind, etc.; through his own analysis of the Ideas within perception, he yet passes over into the consequence that concepts, initially deposed, are now *reinstated* upon the throne of knowledge. In the chapter which

follows, I turn to an examination of these consequences as well as other significant points in relation to the consummating thought within Schopenhauer's philosophy: that indeed the highest acquisition of knowledge requires an annihilation of will and through it, the Ideas themselves.

CHAPTER 4

Critical Discussion of Schopenhauer's Ideas

4.1. From unity into plurality and back into unity

The will is One and the plurality of phenomena are the Many. What serves to mediate the One and the Many, and how does this come about? Schopenhauer's answer to this is the Platonic Ideas. In the previous chapter, I showed the manner in which the Ideas arose on the basis of the will and became perceptible through the phenomenal representation of the world. In this present chapter, I now consider a number of problems regarding the mediation of will and representation through Idea. In particular, there are two consequences. The first is that although the Ideas arise consistently within Schopenhauer's thought, the way he characterizes their mediation of the One and the Many, does not. As will be seen, this is ultimately due to a problem regarding their immanently transcendent status, as I have previously discussed. In other words, in consequence of Schopenhauer's transcendental divide, 'grades' according to the will, become a *singular* Idea according to representation.[192] The second point follows from the first. Inasmuch as a plurality of Ideas becomes an impossibility, to that extent, there can only be one Idea, that is to say, the 'Idea of the will'. The

[192] To offer one example, at times, Schopenhauer seems to distinguish 'grades' from 'Ideas', and at other times he seems to equate the two. He suggests that: "Therefore every universal, original force of nature is, in its inner essence, nothing but the objectification of the will at a low grade, and we call every such grade an eternal *Idea* in Plato's sense." (*W1*, p. 134) The most consistent explanation would seem to be that such forms are 'grades' from the perspective of their immanent rising from the will. Alternatively, they are 'Ideas' from the perspective of their transcendence to phenomenal entities, and hence through representation. I discuss this point more thoroughly in the sections which follow.

unfortunate consequence of this is, however, that the entire apparatus of Schopenhauer's metaphysics descends into nominalism, as I will soon discuss.

In order to understand the above problems, it is necessary to consider first the contextual nature of the Ideas within Schopenhauer's thought. In the previous chapter, I considered Schopenhauer's own analysis of the Ideas, in other words, such questions as, "What does Schopenhauer believe the Ideas to be?" And further, "Why and how does he consider these entities as perceptible?" In answering this question, the Ideas were seen to arise primordially on the basis of the excitability of a singular will. The will gave rise to a plurality of grades, including consciousness. Consciousness manifested representation. The grades of the will, from the perspective of representation, became then Ideas. The Ideas are thus perceptible as arising through the intuitive representation. They were also seen to be aesthetic inasmuch as they arose in a beautiful way. I therefore characterized the Ideas according to Schopenhauer's interpretation, as *aesthetic intuitions*, and in this way, I attempted to get at the heart of his notion of the matter.

As will be seen in this present chapter, the main problem with the Ideas, is that they are not *exactly* intuitions. Rather, through a number of noticeable contextual ambiguities regarding Schopenhauer's analysis of the Ideas, it becomes more and more evident, that these entities have also an *abstract* character to them. In consequence of this, Schopenhauer, who originally distinguishes concepts from intuitions, now seems to bring these two kinds of knowledge together through the Idea. In order to see how this is the case, I turn to a brief consideration of Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic *transcendent* Ideas in favor of forms *immanent* within substances. As will be seen, although Schopenhauer refers to the Ideas as 'Platonic', in actuality, they are much more akin to Aristotle's interpretation than that of Plato himself. The main reason for this is the fact that Schopenhauer, in antithesis to Plato but yet quite akin to Aristotle,

places the Ideas *immanent* within and through the will. Their transcendence thus becomes *relative* to phenomena which are yet mere appearances.

So in the *Parmenides*, Plato there discusses the mediation of Ideas and sensible things. He thus states that:

> These forms (τὰ εἴδη) are like patterns (παραδείγματα) set in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει), and other things resemble (ἐοικέναι) them and are likenesses (ὁμοιώματα); and this partaking (ἡ μέθεξις) of the forms is, for other things, simply being modeled (εἰκασθῆναι) on them. (132d)

Accordingly, a visible and concrete 'tree' would resemble and participate in the form of 'treeness'; the number '2' would resemble and participate in '2-ness', and so on. Both Aristotle (as well as Plato himself) would come to criticize this theory, the most interesting criticism being that of the 'third-man argument'.[193] Regarding Plato's above theory in the *Parmenides*, Aristotle points out that:

> [W]hile the theory presents difficulties (δυσχολίαν) in many ways, the most paradoxical thing of all is the statement that there are certain things besides those in the material universe (ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ), and that these are

[193] The 'third-man argument' and the 'problem of universals' are practically the same problems. The former is simply more specific, the latter more general. However, both deal with the problem of mediating the one and the many. The former deals with the problem of mediating a universal *transcendent* to things in nature. The later deals with universals as such, whether transcendent, immanent, or after the fact of things. So the peculiar problem which transcendent universals face, for example, in Plato's positing two distinct realms, is that this creates a chasm or divide (χωρισμός) between the sensible and the supersensible. [Cf. Taylor (2003), Vlastos (2000), Copleston (1993), Jaspers (1962); For example: "The fundamental form of this Platonic thinking is the cleavage (*tmēma*) between the changing world of temporal things and the eternal world of enduring things…From this fundamental separation (*chōrismos*), this cleavage that runs through being, the question follows: How are the two worlds related?" (Jaspers 1962, p. 30)]

> the same as sensible things (τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς) except that they are eternal (ἀΐδια) while the latter are perishable (φθαρτά). (*Metaphysics*, 997b6-8)

Simply stated, the problem is that in order for a sensible particular (for instance, a tree) to share in the intelligible Idea (as *universale ante rem*), it is necessary that a *third* entity be posited between them, i.e. a shared-tree or a shared-two. Continuing in the same passage, Aristotle concludes that in placing the *Ideas* within a supersensible realm, but yet making these accessible to knowledge, Plato and the Platonists thereby render the forms: "eternal sensible entities (αἰσθητά ἀΐδια)". (998b12) A very interesting interpretation on Aristotle's part, inasmuch as such a conclusion is precisely what Schopenhauer arrives at, albeit in a positive way, through his own treatment of the perceptibility of the Ideas.

But how does one now *mediate* such a divide? For the more scientifically minded Aristotle, such mediation is impossible, and indeed the very notion of supersensible entities is nonsense, as he suggests, echoing the *Parmenides*: "to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors." (991a20-22) For Aristotle, the world as we see it is largely accountable on the basis of itself. Looking to an alternative, he identifies the solution through 'Ideas' placed immanently within sensible entities themselves. Aristotle therefore rejects the transcendence of Plato's Ideas, although he retains their essential *functionality* as both patterns and universals. He argues that all sensible things are in fact substances (οὐσία) formed through the combination of form (τὸ εἶδος) and matter (ἡ ὕλη).[194] Accordingly, the oak tree which I see is a combination of matter (the scholastics referred to this as *materia prima*) together with the form of 'oakness'. The universal is then, not something separate from the individual entity (*ante rem*), but is rather *instantiated* within each

[194] Aristotle thus states in the *Metaphysics* that: "when I speak of substance (οὐσίαν) without matter (ἄνευ ὕλης) I mean the form (τὸ εἶδος)."(1032b14)

particular sensible thing itself (*in re*). Aristotle's solution to the problem of universals is thus generally considered an account of *universalia in re*, and this stands to contrast Plato's transcendent Ideas understood as *universalia ante rem*.[195]

How do we obtain knowledge of the universal within things? Among others, this becomes one of the larger problems which Aristotle must deal with. For Plato, the Idea within the intelligible realm is really identical to the Idea within the mind. In consequence of this, the Ideas are ultimately 'intuited' in a passive way, and indeed Aristotle's criticism points to the *ontological* problem inherent to Plato's Ideas as transcendent. Having now placed the Ideas as forms within sensible substances, Aristotle must now deal with the *epistemological* problem of knowledge of such universals. In consequence of this, Aristotle argues for a more active intellectual faculty, which he refers to as the active intellect (νοῦς ποητικός).[196] On the basis of this, we obtain knowledge of the forms within substances, through a process of abstraction. Abstraction here, however, doesn't mean that we 'pull' the forms out of substances, as a magician pulls a rabbit out of a hat. For Aristotle, the entire process is *inductive*, linked to our formation of memories and experiences on the basis of sense-perception. We obtain knowledge of the forms through consideration of the interconnections among related experiences, from which we induce the principle inherent within things. Aristotle discusses this in the first book to his *Metaphysics*:

> Now from memory experience (ἐμπειρία) is produced in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. And experience seems pretty much like science and art

[195] James M. Watson points out that: "Aristotle's solution that Idea and phenomenon are composed of the same elements (στοιχεῖα)—really cuts away the ground from under the whole Ideal theory. It renders the Ideas a superfluous second world, and makes easy Aristotle's criticisms of the transcendence of the Ideas and the Mathematical (τὰ μεταξύ)." (Watson 1909, p. 14)

[196] The scholastic, *intellectus agens*. (cf. Klima 2008)

> (ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ), but really science and art come to men *through* experience…Now art arises when from many notions (ἐννοημάτων) gained by experience one universal judgment (καθόλου) about a class of objects is produced. (980b25-981a10)

Through the active intellect, we abstract the form within the substance, through a process of induction. We thereby arrive at a single notion inherent to all (καθόλου) manifold and separate notions obtained within experience. In doing so, we define the horizon—the concept (ὅρος), of the substance in question.[197] Such a concept is, of course, quite distinct from the forms within substances themselves. This is necessary in order to avoid the problem of the third-man. The intellect arrives at its concept for each thing on the basis of induction, that is, it is *synthesized*. Accordingly, our knowledge of the thing is quite generalized, that is to say, our concepts offer a *generic* knowledge of the form or *species* contained within each thing.[198]

From what has been seen, it should be evident that Schopenhauer's Ideas are actually quite similar to Aristotle's notion of forms. Indeed, like Aristotle, Schopenhauer's Ideas arise through will, and are thus primordially universals immanent within things (*universalia in re*).[199] Furthermore, like Aristotle, Schopenhauer argues for the necessity of a separate more 'active' intellectual faculty (which he calls

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[197] Regarding such a 'concept', E.M. Michelakis in his book, *Aristotle's Theory of Practical Principles*, notes that: "We find also the first principle in the sense of ὅρος and it is clear from Ch. 19, Book II of the *Posterior Analytics*, where the universal (καθόλου) is a first principle, 100a,6-9, and the first things (πρῶτα) are universals and first principles, 100b3-5. These first things can be understood only as a concept (ὅρος) not as a combination of concepts". (Michelakis, p. 14) Also M. Cohen (2003) states that: "A substantial form is the essence of a substance, and it corresponds to a species. Since it is an essence, a substantial form is what is denoted by the *definiens* of a definition. Since only universals are definable, substantial forms are universals."

[198] Aristotle thus states in the *Metaphysics* that: "form will belong to nothing but the species of a genus (οὐκ ἔσται ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶν μὴ γένους εἰδῶν ὑπάρχον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι)". (1030a11)

[199] Schopenhauer even appropriates Aristotle's notion of substance, though differently, referring to it as the permanence of matter. (cf. *W1*, pp. 8-12)

reason or *Vernunft*), which involves the abstraction of concepts as *genera*.[200] In antithesis to these, the forms or Ideas themselves are understood as the *species* of things.

The larger difference between these two philosophers however is the fact according to Schopenhauer, the empirical world which we perceive is essentially an *ideality*, whereas for Aristotle, it is quite *real*. The second point which follows from this, is that for Schopenhauer, similar substances within the visible world (e.g. all 'maple trees'), have only *one* underlying form or Idea. On the other hand, for Aristotle, every individual substance (e.g. *each* 'maple tree') has a form inherent to it, for otherwise a singular form would be transcendent to a plurality of substances. To that extent, Schopenhauer retains a sense of transcendence regarding the Ideas, however, in an idealistic way. The final point is that for Schopenhauer (with the exception of philosophy), concepts are formed primarily on the basis of relations among phenomena, and thus have no direct relation with actual forms or Ideas.[201] Our knowledge of things according to concepts is thus at best derived and somewhat impoverished. For Aristotle, inasmuch as substances are beings which we really perceive within nature, to

[200] Schopenhauer's initial distinction between understanding and reason, wherein he placed *dianoia* within the context of the understanding, seems to be the heart of the matter here. Schopenhauer is really taking Aristotle's conception of *dianoia* as standard. Thus Aristotle states in *De Anima* (433a9-20), that there are in general two sources of movement with respect to knowledge, which he refers to as appetite and mind (ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς). He then goes on to attribute the latter to practical thought (διάνοια πρακτική). E. Michelakis further explains that: "Διάνοια produces movement because the object of desire produces movement, for the object of desire is the starting point of διάνοια." (Michelakis 1961, p. 35) So in this sense, *dianoia* would be linked to a kind of distinct faculty of *Practical* (as opposed to purely *Theoretical*) Reason—which Schopenhauer explicitly rejects (cf. *W1*, p. 518)

[201] Schopenhauer's notion of contemplation (*Kontemplation*), however, has evident Aristotelian undertones, as David Hamlyn points out: "What is involved in contemplation of an Idea is very similar to what Aristotle seems to have had in mind in speaking of *theoria* (a term which is usually translated as 'contemplation' or perhaps 'philosophical contemplation'). Aristotle sometimes represents this as the intellectual or scientific ideal and as what divine thought consists in. It is the actualization of a form of knowledge which is dispositional (a *hexis*), as indeed knowledge might generally be supposed to be." (Hamlyn 1999, p. 56) William Desmond further points out: "We sense that for Schopenhauer aesthetic disinterestedness has some overtones of ancient *theoria*: a noninterfering contemplating, a nonviolating seeing of universality more than our finite selves to which we are abandoned, or set free. This implies not only a liberation of subjectivity from exclusive particularity but also its release into its own possible universality, towards what is universal in being itself. This mingling in Schopenhauer, not without tension, of Platonic and Kantian strains, raises problems". (Desmond 2003, p. 140)

that extent, our concepts relate directly to the inner nature of the being of things themselves.

So on the one hand, Aristotle places the Ideas within sensible things, and then argues for an active intellect which induces concepts on the basis of forms known directly within experience. On the other hand, Schopenhauer tosses the Ideas into sensible things, but yet argues that what we perceive of the world is essentially ideal. But how then does one now part the veil of Maya, and gain access to the Ideas? Is it as simple as penetrating into the primordial form of representation prior to the *principium individuationis*, as Schopenhauer suggests? Indeed, what really is this 'purified' representation of being-object-for-a-subject? Although I have discussed this in previous sections, a few further remarks are necessary. In a separate passage, Schopenhauer will further go on to point out the explicit relationship between this primordial form of representation and the Ideas, stating that:

> [T]he Platonic Idea (*Platonische Idee*) is necessarily object (*Objekt*), something known, a representation (*Vorstellung*), and precisely, but only, in this respect is it different from the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*). It has laid aside merely the subordinate forms of the phenomenon (*Erscheinung*), all of which we include under the principle of sufficient reason (*Satz vom Grunde*); or rather it has not yet entered into them. But it has retained the first and most universal form (*allgemeinste Form*), namely that of the representation in general, that of being object for a subject (*Objektseyns für ein Subjekt*). (*W1*, p. 175)

So the Ideas really are phenomena, since they arise through representation. Yet what does it mean to speak of these as arising prior to individuation? It would seem that in effect, when once representation is so 'purified' into the formal relation between subject

and object, not only is the plurality of the phenomenal world removed, but so too all differentiation among Ideas. This is simply the necessary consequence of Schopenhauer's characterization of the Ideas as a manifold of transcendent (*ante rem*) entities arising immanently (*in re*) on the basis of a singular will. Indeed, through contemplation one seems to come to a vision of a manifold of Ideas rising through singularity. Contemplation thus leads to a stated paradox wherein the subject receives a vision of the one and the many in unison. This would be akin to the vision of a 'square-circle'. Schopenhauer thus once again reopens the *ontological* problem of the third-man, that is, of mediating the divide (χωρισμός) between the sensible and the supersensible —which Aristotle had sought to close. Schopenhauer's distinction between the will as thing-in-itself and the phenomenon or objectivity of the will through Ideas, would thus seem to be here nothing more than a nuanced play with words.

4.2. Immanence and conceptualism

One of the fundamental consequences of Schopenhauer's reopening of the problem of the third-man argument, is the fact that knowledge of the Ideas now becomes impossible. In effect, Schopenhauer's thought descends into the kind of conceptualism encountered within Stoic thought, minus of course, their tendency toward realism. This is an important point which will shed further light into an even more fundamental problem regarding knowledge of the will. I thus turn now to a brief discussion of Stoic thought and its relation to Schopenhauer.

According to the Stoics then, the human mind was a *tabula rasa* from birth, and hence all knowledge of the world was understood as arising first and foremost on the basis of empirical experience. For them, through the stimulation of the sense organs due to external objects within the environment, a current was said to pass through the body

into the soul, resulting in an imprint or seal upon it—an impression (φαντασία).[202] The Stoics further argued that through analysis of these impressions, the soul is able to identify what is similar among different things, and different among similar things. Accordingly, knowledge becomes possible, as Aetius suggests:

> When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding-part (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions (τῶν ἐννοιῶν). The first method of inscription is through the senses (τῶν αἰσθήσεων). For by perceiving something, e.g. white, they have a memory (μνήμην) of it when it has departed. And when many memories of a similar kind have occurred, we then say we have experience (ἐμπειρίαν). For the plurality of similar impressions (τῶν φαντασιῶν) is experience. (Long and Sedley 1987, p. 238)

So the above account is, in fact, quite similar to what was seen in the second chapter in terms of Schopenhauer's account of empirical perception. For Schopenhauer, through the senses, the raw datum of the world is collected and passed into the brain where it is intuited within the understanding. Although the end result of this process is certainly different, the representation (*Vorstellung*) of the world is actually quite similar to the

[202] According to Diogenes Laertius: "A *phantasia* is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax." (*Lives*, 45) It was further argued that among animals a direct and spontaneous response followed from this impression, that is, a "movement of the soul towards something", which the Stoics referred to as an impulse. (Kerferd 1978, p. 487) At any rate, inasmuch as human beings are endowed with a ruling principle (ἡγεμόνικον), to that extent are we able to accept or reject certain impressions of things, and thus to assent or dissent to impulses. In assenting to an impression, we are said to apprehend it (φαντασία καταληπτική). (Long and Sedley 1978, p. 250)

Stoic sense of an impression (φαντασία).[203] Thus regarding knowledge of the world itself, Aetius goes on to suggest that according to the Stoics:

> Some conceptions (τῶν ἐννοιῶν) arise naturally in the aforesaid ways and undesignedly, others through our own instruction and attention. The latter are called 'conceptions' (ἔννοιαι) only, the former are called 'preconceptions' (προλήψεις) as well." (*ibid*.)

Evidently, there is no discussion here of either forms or Ideas, or essential entities of any kind. Rather, the Stoics simply point out that on the basis of our experience of multiple impressions of similar things within sense-perception, we form natural preconceptions (προλήψεις), such as the concept of 'white' and 'maple tree'. In antithesis to these original perceptions, the Stoics further distinguish concepts as such (ἔννοιαι), obtained through instruction, that is to say, solely on the basis of thought itself (having no direct ground within sense-perception).

So in effect, the Stoics *reject* all notions of a universal as referring to a being itself, a form or Idea, whether in sensible things or transcendent to them. Rather, all such notions of universality are to be ascribed to the apparatus of our empirical perception of the world through impressions, as well as our rational conceptualization of these.[204] As

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[203] The Stoics may even be considered as the first who really point out the larger difference between sensation and the impression or representation of this for the subject.

[204] Regarding this point, Jacques Brunschwig points out in his article "Stoic Metaphysics" that: "[T]he Stoics are standardly credited with entertaining the queer notion of 'not-somethings' (*outina*), supposed to describe the ontological status of universal concepts. On the basis of an admittedly small number of controversial texts, the Stoics are thought to identify Platonic Forms with concepts, while denying that concepts are 'somethings', thus putting them outside their supreme genus, and granting them the status of 'not-somethings'…They say that concepts are neither somethings nor qualified somethings…These, they say, are what the old philosophers called Ideas; for the Ideas are of the things which fall under the concepts, such as men, horses, and in general all the animals and as many other things of which they say that there are Ideas. But the Stoic philosophers say that the latter have no reality (*anhuparktous einai*), and that while we *participate* in concepts, we *bear* those cases which they call appellative, i.e., common nouns… (Brunschwig 2003, p. 223)

R.J. Hankinson points out, the Stoic account is thereby, "broadly empiricist in flavor", since for them:

> Concepts are not acquired by some rational process of inductive inference; rather, they are simply built up in the soul by a suitable accretion of perceptual impressions.[205] (Hankinson 2003, p. 63)

Returning then to Schopenhauer it is seen that in the first place, in reopening the divide between the locality of the Ideas and our capacity to obtain knowledge of them, knowledge in Schopenhauer's thought, is thereby limited to the mere accretion of concepts (*Begriffe*), akin to the Stoics, through reason on the basis of empirical experience. In effect, although Schopenhauer attempts to retain a solid metaphysical grounding for our knowledge on the basis of the Ideas, through mediation of Idea and transcendental idealism, he yet descends into conceptualism. [206]

On the other hand, and as a result of such mediation, Schopenhauer encounters an even more vitiating problem, particularly regarding his metaphysics. Indeed, the major difference between his form of conceptualism and that of the Stoics is the fact that whereas for them, my knowledge of things is obtained through an impression (φαντασία) arising on the basis of an actual and *real* entity abiding within the world, for Schopenhauer, knowledge of things is limited to their *phenomenal* representation (*Vorstellung*), as preformatted on the basis of the subject's forms of perception. If one

[205] John Sellars goes on to state regarding the Stoic notion of concepts that according to Chrysippus: "The qualities in any *particular* physical entity will themselves by physical…Indeed, a *particular* entity will be both 'commonly qualified' (*koinōs poion*) and 'peculiarly qualified' (*idiōs poion*)…When we talk about the concept of 'human being' or 'man' all we are really talking about is a mental construction that we have created in order to describe a certain physical quality of being 'commonly qualified' that exists in a number of different particular entities (see e.g. DL 7.61)." (Sellars 2006, p. 86)

[206] As was seen in section 2.8, Schopenhauer even speaks of concepts *in concrete* and *in abstracta* which is quite reminiscent of what was seen above in terms of Stoic preconceptions (προλήψεις) and conceptions (ἔννοιαι), though having a characteristically idealistic flavor.

now recalls the fact that Schopenhauer speaks of knowledge of the will as only a piecemeal knowledge of its phenomenal appearance through time, then it soon becomes evident that the actual status of metaphysics within his thought stands upon very shaky grounds.

4.3. Idea as abstract-intuition

Before turning to the direct consequence of this, I would like to first consider a more derivative problem regarding the relationship between concepts and intuitions, wherein, in consequence of Schopenhauer's sharp distinction between the two, yet another 'third-man argument' is created. What serves to mediate and hence to resolve this divide? Interestingly and in some strange way—the Platonic Ideas. Ironically, Schopenhauer seems to have himself recognized the ambiguities inherent to his distinction between intuitions and concepts, and further implied that somehow, the Ideas serve as the solution.[207]

In order to understand how this is the case, it is necessary to take a step backward, and to reconsider more fully Schopenhauer's notion of the 'power of judgment' (*Urteilskraft*), which was seen to mediate abstract and intuitive knowledge. Evidently, in delving more deeply into his description of this, it is only natural that matters should become quite ambiguous. For in speaking of this power, he brings in yet another power over and above it, i.e., the imagination. Schopenhauer thus states that:

[207] Such ambiguities have been noted by other scholars. For example, David Hamlyn writes: "Whether it also implies that our knowledge of Ideas depends on a kind of abstraction from perceptual phenomena is another matter…Nevertheless, it does seem to be his view that, as things are, our knowledge of Ideas is in one way or another dependent on knowledge of perceptual representations, and this holds true in the case of art, the main source of knowledge of Ideas on his view." (Hamlyn 1999, p. 54)

> Conceptions must not be confounded with pictures of the imagination (*das Phantasma*), these being intuitive (*anschauliche*) and complete, therefore individual representations (*Vorstellung*), although they are not called forth by sensuous impressions (*auf die Sinne*) and do not therefore belong to the complex of experiences (*Komplex der Erfahrung*). Even when used to *represent a conception* (*Repräsentant eines Begriffs*), a picture of the imagination ought to be distinguished from a conception (*Begriff*). (*PSR*, p. 120)

So 'phantasms' according to the imagination may be said to offer a complete representation of things, akin to empirical intuitions, and yet they are not sensuously determined as the latter are. Such phantasms are also said to often function as 'representatives of conceptions'. Schopenhauer further goes on to offer an example of how this might occur, pointing out the fact that when we think of the concept of say, a dog in general, we raise an image of some specific or simply fictional dog within the imagination. The main point is that with the imagination, Schopenhauer seems here to first offer that so-looked for mediating link between intuition and abstraction. Yet this doesn't explain precisely how it is that we mediate the concept with the image, and the image with the intuitive ground. He merely goes on to state that:

> All thinking (Denken), in a wider sense: that is, all inner activity of the mind in general necessitates either words (*Worter*) or pictures of the imagination (*Phantasiebilder*): without the one or other of these it has nothing to hold by…Now, thinking in a narrower sense—that is, abstract reflection by means of words—is either purely logical reasoning (*logisches Räsonnement*), in which case it keeps strictly to its own sphere; or it touches upon the limits of perceptible representations (*anschaulichen*

> *Vorstellungen*) in order to come to an understanding with them, so as to bring that which is given by experience and grasped by perception into connection with abstract conceptions (*abstrakten Begriffen*) resulting from clear reflection, and thus to gain complete possession of it. (*PSR*, p. 121)

Schopenhauer is here discussing the nature of thought as such, which he says involves the use of concepts (through words) as well as images (through pictures or phantasms in the imagination). He further suggests that through the former we reside essentially within reason and logic, but through the latter we somehow 'touch' upon the limits of perceptible things. He then goes on to conclude that:

> In thinking therefore, we seek either for the conception or rule to which a given perception belongs, or for the particular case which proves a given conception or rule. (*PSR*, p. 121)

He then refers to this 'seeking' for a rule as the power of judgment (*Urteilskraft*). But what is actually happening here? In the above statement, Schopenhauer is simply pointing out that among concepts and intuitions, the imagination serves as the middle ground, as it were, the 'third-man' between the two. I can therefore look either for the universal within the particular, or the particular within the universal. In the first case, I am essentially looking for a concept ('maple tree') on the basis of many similar particular things within perception (*those* trees). In the latter case, I seek some particular within perception (*this* tree) to which my concept ('maple tree') corresponds. This is then certainly a judging here, however, in doing this I make use of images within the imagination as 'representatives of conceptions'. I therefore relate my concept through an image to an intuition, or I relate my intuition through an image to a concept. Of course, the solution here would seem to merely duplicate the same problem implied

regarding concepts and intuitions. For what serves to mediate my image? In effect, my *knowledge of the Ideas* is the answer. But how is this the case? Understanding this point requires considering more deeply the question of precisely what the Ideas are, beyond Schopenhauer's description of these as kinds of aesthetic intuitions. For indeed, although intuitive, they seem strangely abstracted according to other accounts within Schopenhauer's work.

In the first place, if the Ideas are perceptible, then they must be intuitions. Yet, they are certainly not perceptible in the way in which a tree or stone is. They are rather more akin to the *a priori* perception of the being of time and space, yet as aesthetically and sensuously given. But how do I bring my intuitive knowledge of the Idea into abstraction as a concept? In other words, if judging is necessary to any such mediation, and if this is based upon our capacity to form images as 'representatives of conceptions', then what would it mean to speak of the 'image of the Idea'? I perceive a particular dog and I may thus imagine this as well. On other hand, my perception of the species of the dog, of its Idea, what possible image could I have of it? It would seem rather, that such an image would be in fact no different from my image of a particular dog. My image of the Idea and my image of the particular dog are thus undifferentiated, and consequently, philosophical knowledge in the abstract becomes impossible.

This conclusion would certainly follow, were it not for a very strange relation which Schopenhauer draws between the imagination and the Ideas themselves. He thus goes on to state in the *WWR* that the: "Imagination (*Phantasie*) has been rightly recognized as an essential element of genius", since it, "extends the mental horizon (*Horizont*) of the genius beyond the objects that actually present themselves to his person".[208] (*W1*, pp.

[208] Schopenhauer's sense and notion of the 'Genius' is certainly characteristic of the Romantic spirit of the time, identifiable in Kant as well as the German Idealists. Thus Kai Hammermeister notes of Kant (echoing Schopenhauer) that: "For Kant, there is only one way to create artistic products that look like natural ones, namely through genius…We should think of a genius as an outstandingly talented person

186-187) According to this account, the imagination now becomes responsible not only for making judgments possible, as leading to images and 'representatives of conceptions', but also, it would seem to be that which accounts for the capacity of genius itself, and thus the contemplation of the Ideas.

In light of the above relationship between genius and imagination, Schopenhauer will go on to further mix matters up. Thus in another section he refers to the imagination as: "The faculty of original conception (*das Vermögen ursprünglicher Konception*)". (*W2*, p. 234) In yet another section, he refers rather offhandedly to the: "The Platonic Idea that becomes possible through the union of imagination and reason (*den Verein von Phantasie und Vernunft*)". (*W1*, p. 40) Finally, in what accounts for one of the most descriptive statements regarding the actual nature of the Ideas, Schopenhauer states within the context of a *footnote* (likely added in subsequent editions) to the *PSR* that the:

> Platonic Ideas may, after all, be described as normal intuitions (*Normalanschauungen*), which would hold good not only for what is formal, but also for what is material in complete representations—therefore as complete representations (*vollständige Vorstellungen*) which, as such, would be determined throughout, while comprehending things at once, like conceptions (*Begriffe*): that is to say, as representatives of conceptions (*Repräsentanten der Begriffe*), but which are quite adequate (*adäquat*) to those conceptions. (*PSR*, p. 158)

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brought forth by nature so that he or she can in turn produce works of art." Hammermeister then goes on to quote a very interesting statement from Kant's Critique of Judgment: "Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Because talent as an innate productive ability of the artist belongs itself to nature, one could also say: Genius is the innate, mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art. (CJ, §46)" (Hammermeister 2002, p. 35)

This is certainly a baffling statement. The Platonic Ideas are now seen to be akin to intuitions as complete representations, and yet they lie beyond both formal and empirical representations. They are also akin to images and 'representatives of concepts' within the imagination inasmuch as they are thought in a similarly sensuous manner. Yet Schopenhauer further refers to the Ideas as 'adequate to those conceptions' and even as the union of reason and imagination.

What then are the Ideas? They *must* be something of an amalgamation of intuitions and concepts, serving thus to resolve the problem of the third-man, though of course leading to a further, more fundamental problem. Indeed, taken together with the discussion from previous sections, there is definite and compelling evidence that Schopenhauer *unwittingly* characterizes the Ideas as *abstract intuitions*, i.e., as precisely that which he criticized in the philosophy of Kant and Plato. In other words, he seems to be have recognized the dilemma first pointed out by Kant that: "Concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." Of course Schopenhauer's rationale behind the distinction between concepts and intuitions was that in bringing these together, thinking seems therefore to take on the character of perceiving, and perceiving that of thinking. Yet this seems precisely what he now implies in having described the Idea simultaneously as perceptible, aesthetic, as representation, as universal and yet the species of things, as arising through will and yet transcendent to phenomena, as image and thus 'representative of conceptions', as union of subject and object and hence, as the 'union of reason and imagination'.

One of the odd implications of this interpretation however is the fact that Ideas and images of the imagination are now almost identical. For what distinguishes images from Ideas? This is then a very important problem which results from Schopenhauer's attempt to mediate very different kinds of appearances on the basis of transcendental idealism and the transcendent Ideas. In effect, thinking must necessarily become confused as to the actual source of images or 'representatives of conceptions' for its

judgments. Indeed, it now seems unable to really distinguish between mere images of particular things (the 'grey wolf' that I once saw) and the Ideas as images themselves (the species 'grey wolf' itself).

4.4. Mediating semblances and *mere* appearances

Schopenhauer's characterization of the Ideas now leads to a problem regarding the nature of knowledge. Indeed, how do I distinguish between Ideas and mere images through the imagination? This problem may be observed more clearly through consideration of a distinction made by Martin Heidegger in his work, *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*). There he discusses and distinguishes various meanings and historical interpretations of the originally Greek expression for phenomenon as 'φαινόμενον', in terms of appearances. He states that: "The Greek expression φαινόμενον is derived from the verb φαίνεσθαι, which essentially means 'to show itself'." (Heidegger 1962, p. 51) In later passages which follow, he further goes on to distinguish various ways in which such a φαινόμενον may be understood and interpreted as an 'appearance'. An 'appearance' may be said to refer to (1) something which announces itself but does not show itself; (2) something which in actually showing itself, indicates something other to it which is not shown; and also (3) something which simply shows itself. (*ibid*., pp. 53-54)

Heidegger then goes on to suggest that Kant's φαινόμενον entails something of a *combination* of the first and third senses for the interpretation of appearances. This follows from the fact that for Kant, φαινόμενα are things which appear, in the sense of showing themselves (third sense), but yet in doing so, the actual being of that which brings these forth (first sense) remains hidden. Heidegger thus states of this that: "here we have an appearance in the sense of a 'mere appearance'." (*ibid*.) He further goes on to state that, on the other hand, the ancient Greek interpretation of φαινόμενα was

quite different, following more the second sense of appearances as described above. For them, a φαινόμενον entailed an entity which in showing itself: "looks like something or other", and is therefore, "what we call 'seeming' (*Scheinen*)". (*ibid*., p. 51) The expression φαινόμενον is then properly described among the ancient Greeks as a 'semblant' (*das Scheinbare*) or 'semblance' (*der Schein*). It is a something which appears, indeed, but in yet doing so, carries with it the countenance, the reflection and copy of that which is other and parent to it. Whether or not Heidegger's interpretation applies to the entirety of Greek thought is a question which falls outside of the scope of this investigation. At present, what is more significant is the fact that this latter Greek sense of the phenomenon or appearance as a 'semblance' certainly seems to follow Plato's own sense of the division of the world into two realms, whereby the visible is said to be a likeness, that is, a semblance of the intelligible.

So with Kant, the distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon thereby changes the *essential* nature of that which appears within the visible world. For him, the visible world becomes now a representation (*Vorstellung*) conditioned by the subject. Such appearances within it are then not semblances at all, since indeed the thing-in-itself remains entirely outside of the realm of appearing. They are rather *mere* appearances, i.e., an appearing which in showing itself, simultaneously announces the noumenon or thing-in-itself concealed beneath.

Given then these two interpretations of appearing as 'semblances' and '*mere* appearances', one is left to ponder how it is possible, if at all, that Schopenhauer is able to mediate these two perspectives.[209] In bringing these two kinds of appearances

[209] The initial difficulty regarding such a meditation in terms of the Ideas, is pointed out by Ivan Soll: "Schopenhauer's Platonism, in combination with his pragmatic version of Kantianism, forms the conceptual matrix for his claim that aesthetic experience furnishes us with a privileged type of knowledge, with a cognitive reward as well as the hedonistic reward of suspending the pain of willing… But is it really plausible to think that the visual forms we aesthetically (i.e. non-pragmatically) contemplate are not in any way spatial, the musical forms not at all temporal, and the narratives and dramas of literature free of any sort of causality and individuality? Rather than the simple disappearance of these structures in aesthetic experiences suggested by Schopenhauer, they seem to persist, albeit with

together, things within the world now take on a strange sense of being *both* semblances as well as *mere* appearances. So on the one hand, what I see is first of all determined on the basis of my cognitive forms of time, space, and causality. Accordingly, my perception of trees, rocks, people, animals, etc., are really perceptions of a scattering of original things into phenomena. In this sense, what I see is actually a mere appearance on the basis of something much more primordial to it.

Yet simultaneously, the plurality of phenomena, of mere appearances within the world, are originally tied to Ideas as their species. To this extent, what I see of these must also bear a semblance to these original Ideas. This is perhaps substantiated on the basis of Schopenhauer's analysis of the Ideas as perceptible (*anschauliche*). The 'maple tree' and the 'rose bush' differ from each other in having different Ideas at root. There must then be something peculiar to my perception of each which both differentiates them from each other, while yet drawing out their similarity from, e.g., another rose bush or maple tree, as relating primordially to their Idea. In effect, the reason that I am able to account for differences and similarities among things is due to the fact that I see a kind of semblance or 'trace', as Schopenhauer will suggest, of the Ideas transcendent and yet inherent to phenomena. Thus Schopenhauer states that in our inner knowledge of the will through time we infer the will within things, and he further states that from this we discover that:

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some alteration." (Soll 1998, pp. 94-95) Charles S. Taylor further points out that such a mediation certainly runs counter to the spirit of Kant—of which Schopenhauer was well aware of, that is: "One way to see the connection made in Schopenhauer's mind is to notice that he accepts Plato's assertion that knowledge is only possible of true being and never of that which is becoming. He then superimposes it upon the Kantian framework and thereby gets into trouble. Kant, of course, says knowledge of phenomena, of that which is in a constant state of flux, is possible – as are the conditions of possibility of that knowing. Kant expressly denies knowledge of the thing-in-itself, and that would include knowing that thing-in-itself is not spatial, temporal, causal, etc. There are places in Schopenhauer where he openly faces his difference with Kant on this issue. Indeed, Schopenhauer says we know the will better than we know anything else." (Taylor 1988, p. 48)

> [I]t is the same will that in the plant forms the bud, in order to develop from it leaf or flower; in fact the regular form of the crystal is only the trace (*Spur*) of its momentary striving (*Streiben*) left behind. (*W2*, p. 293)

Of course, at each distinct level of the will's striving, there is an Idea, so in effect, this trace of the will left through its momentary striving is really the semblance of the Ideas through the will.

This is an important point for it certainly offers yet another indication of the manner in which, according to Schopenhauer, the Ideas become perceptible. In this sense, among phenomena themselves, we perceive traces of the will at its various grades, and thus something quite akin to semblances within things of the original Ideas inherent to them. Yet all is not said and done, for now it is necessary to explain how my knowledge of the Idea differs from what I imagine of things.

The problem, however, is that it is really impossible to distinguish these two kinds of images for knowledge. For although the Ideas are said to be perceptible, they are certainly not 'seen' in the way in which I see a tree or a rock within the imagination. The Ideas are akin to both formal and empirical intuitions. In consequence of this, how do I distinguish my image of a particular maple from that which is the Idea of its species? In effect, my image and the Idea seem to be one and the same—and yet different. The problem here and the difficulty in distinguishing these two kinds of images seems to be based upon the fact that within perception, I perceive both *mere* appearances through phenomena as well as semblances through Ideas.

Accordingly, any attempt to differentiate between these must somehow be arrived at on the basis of an abstract element inherent to the Ideas themselves. For through the intuitive alone, it seems impossible that I should find any firm ground for making a solid distinction. At the level of the abstract, however, a dividing line is perhaps presented. In this sense, an 'image 'of an Idea would be akin to that which I know

through the formal representation of space and time. Hence, my image of the concept of 'two' could be alternatively imagined as 'two sticks' or 'two rocks', etc. The Ideas then, as related images, would be quite akin to this. Yet precisely what kind of image such an Idea would be for the mind, is never really considered by Schopenhauer, nor, in my opinion, could such a thing be possible.

Schopenhauer's mediation of transcendental Idealism and transcendence through the Ideas, would seem then to leave knowledge in the peculiar predicament of having to sort out the nature of a 'square-circle'. Yet without the Ideas, neither the will nor representation, nor concept nor intuition, seem capable of being properly mediated. So there would seem to be a fundamental error inherent to Schopenhauer's analysis of the world from the ground up—the least of which being his appropriation of the Ideas themselves. In the sections which follow, I turn to the discussion of knowledge of the will as thing-in-itself, and how on account of Schopenhauer's analysis of this through the phenomenon of time, even such metaphysical knowledge is now rendered impossible.

4.5. The illuminative genius

In order to understand how this is the case, however, it is important to first consider the privileged status of genius, in light of freedom and redemption from the will, through contemplation of the Ideas. From the perspective of the conscious subject, the Ideas were seen to stand transcendent to things within the world. They lie beyond the world. They subsist furthermore as the in-itself of the plurality of things, the universal which unites these differences within themselves. Yet as Schopenhauer points out time and time again, things within the world are nothing but appearances, phenomena which arise on the basis of the representation of perception through the subject. It is therefore only a veil of Maya which covers the real and separates it from the Ideal. This is

furthermore quite distinct from what was seen in Plato's thought, wherein the Ideas stood transcendent to the visible world as lying in an entirely different realm of the intelligible.

Accordingly, from the perspective of being itself (through the Good), the Ideas within Platonic thought are *still* transcendent to the relative being of appearances. On the other hand, with Schopenhauer, from the perspective of being itself (through will), the Ideas now become *entirely* immanent. The Ideas are the *objectivity* of the will. In this sense, Schopenhauer's interpretation is much more akin to Aristotle's view of forms within substances, as I have discussed, or even of the Neoplatonic view wherein the Ideas are understood as the result of the emanation from the One.[210] With Schopenhauer, however, immanence becomes even more pronounced. This is due to the fact that in opposition to Plato's emphasis (as well as Aristotle and the Neoplatonists) upon the primacy of intellect, with Schopenhauer the will now becomes primary. As such, an irrational, unconscious volitional ground becomes the inner source and well-spring of all existence. The Good as teleological origin of being is thereby removed.

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[210] In Plato, Idea and Divine intellect are actually quite distinct. Thus in the *Timaeus*, Plato there (29d-30c) distinctly separates the formative power of the universe, the Demiurge, both from its model in the Good or Living Creature, as well as from the chaotic matter which it forms as a craftsman; and finally, from the Ideas themselves, which it uses as patterns or archetypes in its creative formulation of matter. In his commentary on the *Timaeus*, Cornford states first that: "Plato is introducing into philosophy for the first time the image of a creator god." (Cornford 1997, p. 34) He then goes on to state of this Demiurge that: "Here, then we may conclude that Plato's Demiurge, like the human craftsmen in whose image he is conceived, operates upon materials which he does not create…The Forms, again, he does not create; they are not made or generated, but eternally real and self-subsisting." (*ibid*., p. 37) Among later Neoplatonic thinkers such as Plotinus, this separation between Creator and the Ideas would essentially change. Thus Plotinus considered the universe as subsisting of three essential principles, the One, Nous, and the World Soul. Rather than being completely distinct, he links these together through a process of emanation from the One. Accordingly, from the One emanates Nous (and alternatively World Soul from Nous), which he relates metaphorically to Plato's Demiurge. It is then in relation to Nous that the Forms or Ideas are identified, and indeed Nous is said to contemplate its own Ideas. Avoiding the particularities of this, the important point here is that with Plotinus, the original independence of Plato's Ideas as self-subsisting entities are now relegated to Nous itself, as the emanation from the One.

In placing the Ideas immanent within the will, the methodology of knowledge of the Ideas within Schopenhauer's thought changes. The most characteristic point is that contemplation of the Ideas becomes strangely akin to the early Christian sense, according to Augustine of Hippo, of Ideas, "contained within the divine understanding".[211] (Klima 2003) In this sense, the soul is said to obtain knowledge through an *illuminatio* of the Ideas. It is an interesting analogy, for indeed Augustine will speak of the soul through illumination as 'seeing' the Ideas, much as Schopenhauer speaks of their perceptibility. Augustine will further argue that since the Ideas are in the mind of God, only in special cases can the soul see them. He thus states that:

> Now it is denied that the soul can look upon them, unless it is a rational one, [and even then it can do so] only by that part of itself by which it surpasses [other things] — that is, by its mind and reason, as if by a certain "face", or by an inner and intelligible "eye". To be sure, not each and every rational soul in itself, but [only] the one that is holy and pure, that [is the one that] is claimed to be fit for such a vision, that is, the one that keeps that very eye, by which these things are seen, healthy and pure and fair and like the things it means to see.[212] (*ibid*.)

[211] Originally from Augustine's *On Eighty-Three Different Questions*. Regarding this point, Gyula Klima goes on to state that: "Augustine could in fact claim to be reconciling Plato and Aristotle, for, in terms of Boethius's formulation, he held that universality resided in an understanding, the divine understanding. Nevertheless, this conception can still do justice to the Platonic intuition that what accounts for the necessary, intelligible features of the ephemeral particulars of the visible world is the presence of some universal exemplars in the source of their being; for, existing in the *divine* mind, the Ideas serve as archetypes of creation, by which God preconceives his creation in eternity." (Klima 2003, p. 197)

[212] Accordingly, Augustine also rejects Plato's theory of recollection inasmuch as for him the Ideas are not recollected by the soul, but rather the soul is illumined by Ideas innate to God. Regarding this point, Roland Teske states that: "Clearly Augustine does not find Plato's claim that learning is remembering from a previous existence to be the correct explanation of our being able to respond correctly to questions about geometry and such intellectual disciplines. He clearly attributes such an ability to our natural order under the intelligible realities and to the illumination by the incorporeal light." (Teske 1984, pp. 230-231)

So then, only a rational, pure, and holy soul can be illuminated by the Ideas originating within the mind of God. Such an interpretation thus begins to sound quite akin to Schopenhauer's notion of genius as contemplating the Ideas originally within the will. Genius is said to 'see' the Ideas, and really, to be purified, freed in his knowledge. Indeed, genius itself is a kind of 'holiness' of a natural aberration of power. It was said to entail a *predominance* of the intellect over willing, and a *gift* only given and available to the few. Contemplation thus carries a sense of illumination by the 'divine' Ideas primordially within and through the will.[213]

The larger difference here is of course the fact that for Schopenhauer, genius now becomes a kind of 'god' himself. In the first place, inasmuch as he considers all things as primordially and fundamentally will, the consequence of this is that genius, in contemplating the Ideas of the will, really contemplates himself, since he is fundamentally will in his innermost being.[214] In the second place, there is the almost

[213] William Desmond further points out that: "Schopenhauer suggests that the excess of genius is more than a mere excrescence of unruly will but bears a *surplus* of intellect and of disinterested contemplativeness. How can such an intimately murky blindness turn into such a lucid visionary power? It is not clear if Schopenhauer can satisfactorily explain this…Through the surplus of contemplative intellect, the genius *sees* the will in the form of its *universality*, prior to the subject-object split and the dispersion of the will into the multiplicity of phenomena…Will, as the dark origin, becomes *self-conscious* in the genius, and so no longer is simply dark to itself. In fact, this self-recognition can produce in us the will to self-annihilation, that is, a will to do away with the will. We witness here, I believe, a striking dualism in Schopenhauer between darkness and enlightenment which the excessive intellect of the genius is thought to bridge and invert. Will drives forward, darkly, blindly; but in the excessive intellect of the genius, it produces an enigmatic reversal of itself into will-less knowing." (Desmond 2003, pp. 141-142)

[214] It is worth mentioning the fact that Schopenhauer attempts to avoid this charge (albeit unsuccessfully in my opinion), in the second book to the *Parerga and Paralipomena*: "Directed essentially *inwards*, illuminism has as its organon inner illumination, intellectual intuition, higher consciousness, immediately knowing reason, divine consciousness, unification, and the like, and disparages rationalism as the 'light of nature'…but its fundamental defect is that its knowledge is *not communicable*. This is due partly to the fact that for *inner* perception there is no criterion of identity of the object of different subjects, and partly to the fact that such knowledge would nevertheless have to be communicated by means of language… *Illuminism* can be traced even in certain passage of Plato; but it makes a more definite appearance in the philosophy of the Neo-Platonists, the Gnostics…But philosophy should be *communicable* knowledge and must, therefore, be rationalism. Accordingly, at the end of my philosophy I have indicated the sphere of illuminism as something that exists but I have guarded against setting even one foot thereon. For I have not undertaken to give an ultimate explanation of the world's existence, but have only gone as far as

'divine' privileged status of genius. That is, genius is the privileged bearer of knowledge. It is genius and only genius, who has access to the inner true nature of things. It is genius who chooses whether or not to make this knowledge more accessible to others through artistic production. It is also genius who decides whether to render his implicit knowledge of the Ideas explicitly available to others through concepts, and thus as philosophy. The entire foundation of knowledge within Schopenhauer's thought is thus based deeply upon a kind of *Gnosticism*, for now knowledge becomes the privileged access of genius alone.[215]

A further and final point is that even if the genius desired to share his knowledge, then he could only do so in a limited way. Art can never make the Idea explicitly known. Philosophy, in doing so explicitly, is yet limited to the impoverishment of concepts themselves. Yet Schopenhauer never really states *why* genius should ever consider sharing his knowledge. There is perhaps a certain pleasure in creating, yet contemplation is always interpreted as a rather personalized event. Freedom from the will is possible *only* for the genius which is able to persist in his contemplation.

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possible on the path of rationalism." (*PP2*, pp. 9-10) Still, it is really questionable as to whether Schopenhauer is able to avoid any charge of illuminism, or Gnosticism as I have here pointed out. For in the end, he certainly leaves open the possibility that the thing-in-itself in its entirety may extend beyond the will, that will is therefore only the empirical part—yet in identifying it he must resort to naming it in its unity (as the 'will') or ascribing superior, Gnostic, knowledge to its plurality (through the Platonic Ideas).

[215] Regarding this point, M.S. Mudragei points out in his article, *The Rational and the Irrational*: "Thus, Schopenhauer tirelessly reiterates, philosophy must be *communicable* cognition, that is, rationalism. But rationalism is only the external form of philosophy. It uses concepts and universal categories to express a general knowledge in order to convey this knowledge to another. But to convey something, that something must be received. In philosophy, this 'something' is a true knowledge of an authentic world. We already know how mysticism obtains this knowledge; we know why mystical knowledge cannot be conveyed. But philosophy also obtains this knowledge, says Schopenhauer, but not bookish, secondary philosophy, rather in-depth, primary philosophy born of *genius*. Unlike the ordinary person, a genius possesses such an excess of cognitive power, is capable of such a great exertion of spiritual forces, that he is freed for a time from serving the will and penetrates into the depths of the true world. Whereas for the ordinary person, Schopenhauer tells us, cognition serves as a lantern that lights the way for him, for a genius it is a sun that illuminates the world." (Mudragei 1995, pp. 56-57)

What then if pleasure is removed? Perhaps then genius may be said to share his knowledge out of a kind of Buddhist compassion? In this sense, the genius, as witnessing and subsequently pitying all lesser unenlightened beings, now descends from the heights of his redemptive visions, and produces works of art and philosophy for the freedom of the common people. Still, even the basis for such a 'compassion' is removed inasmuch as the foundation of Schopenhauer's ethics rests upon the fact that we are all primordially united through the will. Accordingly, in bearing witness to another's suffering, we recognize the suffering of the will within ourselves. But through contemplation, the genius is said to become *free* from will, and hence free from suffering. So then, what would lead the genius, now free from will, to pity those subjected to it? Essentially, nothing, for the will has been removed, and indeed all teleology with it. There is neither 'good' which attaches to this will, nor 'love' which might stretch out indiscriminately and for the sake of the other. There is only will and the redemption from the will, either through the privileged state of having been born with an accidental gift of genius, or as I will discuss, through asceticism and the annihilation of the will itself. Yet according to this latter sense and coupled with what has already been seen in terms of a number of ambiguities regarding the Ideas, fundamental problems with respect to the foundation of knowledge through the will, and hence of metaphysics itself, become discernible.

4.6. The abandonment into concept

So the essential impetus for contemplation was seen to arise from a number of various grounds. There is the beauty of the Ideas, the heightened intellect of genius, yet above and beyond all of these, there is servitude to the will which all of existence is caught in, the endless striving and strife for life, which brings with it deep suffering. Thus Schopenhauer states that:

> For this reason, we wish to consider in *human existence* the inner and essential destiny (*Schicksal*) of the will. Everyone will readily find the same thing once more in the life of the animal, only more feely expressed in various degrees. He can also sufficiently convince himself in the suffering animal world how essentially *all life is suffering* (*alles Leben leiden ist*).[216] (*W1*, p. 310)

In an attempt to escape from this, genius looks first to art and redemption through knowledge of the Ideas.[217] Discovering, however, only brief moments of tranquility after which he must fall back into servitude again and again, genius now confronts a dilemma, as Schopenhauer states, further relating his own views to eastern thought:

> Firstly, powerful and vehement willing (*Leidenschaften*), the great passions (Raja-Guna); it appears in great historical characters, and is described in the epic and the drama…Then secondly, pure knowing (*reine Erkennen*), the comprehension of the Ideas, conditioned by freeing knowledge from the service of the will: the life of the genius (Sattva-Guna). Thirdly and lastly, the greatest lethargy (*Lethargie*) of the Will and also of the knowledge attached to it, namely, empty longing, life-benumbing boredom (Tama-Guna). (*W1*, p. 321)

[216] Schopenhauer further points out that: "This world is the battle-ground of tormented and agonized beings who continue to exist only by each devouring the other…Then in this world the capacity to feel pain increases with knowledge, and therefore reaches its highest degree in man, a degree that is the higher, the more intelligent the man. To this world the attempt has been made to adapt the system of *optimism*, and to demonstrate to us that it is the best of all possible worlds. The absurdity is glaring." (*W2*, p. 581)

[217] In consequence of this, the Ideas have functionally different ends within both Plato and Schopenhauer's thought, particularly in relation to their ground. Thus William Desmond points out the fact that: "For Plato the Idea allows eros to be made whole; for Schopenhauer the Idea is our savior or escape from eros". (Desmond 2003, p. 154)

The genius thus encounters a deep longing in life, an essential boredom, but also a suffering. He wishes to obtain something more, which life simply does not offer. Even further, he wishes to be free from the striving of life itself, and hence free from the will as its source. In consequence of this, genius attempts to find inner tranquility, but since he cannot achieve this through will, which is also being, he therefore attempts to find this in antithesis to will and all being. He thus asserts his complete freedom from suffering through annihilation of the will, and thus annihilation of self and all Being with it. Schopenhauer's thought thus ends in a very peculiar form of *ascetic pessimism*, that is, an annihilation of the will as source and end of all existence.[218] In doing so, the

[218] Schopenhauer thus states that: "For the rest, I cannot here withhold the statement that *optimism*, where it is not merely the thoughtless talk of those who harbor nothing but words under their shallow foreheads, seems to me to be not merely an absurd, but also a really *wicked*, way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of mankind. Let no one imagine that the Christian teaching is favorable to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels world and evil are used almost as synonymous expressions." (*W1*, p. 326) This is in an interesting point inasmuch as Schopenhauer will constantly make reference to Christianity with respect to his own notion of the 'ascetic-saint' and the denial of the will. Friedrich Nietzsche will go a further step and equate not only Christianity with Platonism, but even Schopenhauer and metaphysical thinking itself *through pessimism*. In this sense, pessimism really refers to all philosophies which look at life negatively, nihilistically, as something to be rejected. He thus suggests that: "Life itself is to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for *power*: where the will to power is lacking there is decline. It is my contention that all supreme values of mankind *lack* this will—that the values which are symptomatic of decline, *nihilistic* values, are lording under the holiest names." (*The AntiChrist*, sec. 6) Thus Nietzsche will refer to: "that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that the truth is divine." (*The Gay Science*, sec. 344) In light of this, he reinterprets Socrates' final words: "O Crito, I owe Asclepius a rooster," to mean, "O Crito, *life is a disease*", thus concluding that Socrates himself was a *pessimist* and that, "Alas, my friends, we must overcome even the Greeks!" (*The Gay Science*, sec. 340) He then goes on to speak of Schopenhauer as one who: "preached salvation from being," (*Human, All Too Human*, sec. 16) Accordingly, Schopenhauer and his annihilation of the will must also be overcome. So in likening Plato, Christianity, Schopenhauer, and indeed the entire metaphysical tradition through pessimism and nihilism, the end result is that the 'death of God' as he refers to it within modern civilization, represents the death of these old 'nihilistic' values. He spells this out in a number of texts: "The greatest recent event—that 'God is dead,' that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable—is already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe". (*The Gay Science*, 343) Also, "Whither is God? he cried; I will tell you. *We have killed him*—you and I…Do we not feel the breath of empty space?...God is dead." (*The Gay Science*, 126) And again, "But when Zarathustra was alone he spoke thus to his heart: 'Could it be possible? This old saint in the forest has not yet heard anything of this, that *God is dead*!' " (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Prol., 2) The death of God further spells the death and end of metaphysics as such, that is, of all *pessimistic* thinking.

genius becomes something of an ascetic-saint who achieves nihilistic enlightenment. As Schopenhauer goes on to state:

> [T]he inner nature of holiness, of self-renunciation, of mortification of one's own will, of asceticism (*Askesis*), is here for the first time expressed in abstract terms and free from everything mythical, as *denial of the will-to-live* (*Verneinung des Willens zum Leben*), which appears after complete knowledge of its own inner being has become for it the quieter (*Quietiv*) of all willing.[219] (*W1*, p. 383)

In direct contradistinction to what was seen in Platonic thought, wherein eros served to guide knowledge to its transcendent and teleological end within the Good, Schopenhauer's will now acts as the inspiration for self-destruction and even the obliteration of all knowledge. Thus Schopenhauer goes on to state that:

> If, therefore, we have recognized the inner nature of the world as will, and have seen in all its phenomena only the objectivity of the will; and if we have followed these from the unconscious impulse of the obscure natural forces up to the most conscious action of man, we shall by no means evade the consequence that, with the free denial, the surrender, of the will, all those phenomena also are now abolished. (*W1*, p. 410)

[219] Christopher Janaway describes Schopenhauer's pessimism, further opposing Nietzsche's own more optimistic vision to this, viz.: "Schopenhauer's view is that each suffering drains away some (or even all) of the potential value from life, which nothing can restore. But Nietzsche's attitude to the same description, which he arguably accepts, is diametrically opposed. In clear allusion to his 'teacher' Schopenhauer (as he calls him), Nietzsche ask whether suffering is an objection to life and firmly answers No: it is a sign of strength and greatness of character to affirm one's sufferings as an integral and in some sense desirable element in one's life…A pessimistic description of life is compatible with an affirmation of it." (Janaway 2006b, p. 335)

He then goes on to suggest that in consequence of such an annihilation there is now: "No will; no representation, no world."[220] Yet despite this, he concludes that: "Only knowledge remains; the will has vanished."[221] (*ibid*.) This is in fact a quite paradoxical statement. For how can knowledge remain if will and world have been removed? Furthermore, what is the nature of this knowledge which remains? Is it abstract or conceptual? Is it a knowledge of 'some' or 'no' thing? Regarding the last point, Schopenhauer first of all notes the fact that from: "the standpoint of philosophy, we must be satisfied with negative (*nur negativ*) knowledge".[222] (*W1*, p. 410) So the knowledge which remains following annihilation is to be understood negatively, as referring to that which is not, i.e. the nothingness is not will, is not world, is not subject, is not representation. This would seem to point to an abstract basis for such knowledge which, however, Schopenhauer rejects. Thus in a separate passage he goes on to state that:

> As the knowledge from which results the denial of the will is intuitive and not abstract, it finds its complete expression not in abstract concepts, but only in the deed and in conduct. (*W1*, p. 384)

So only intuitive knowledge is said to remain, though it is questionable how this is possible given Schopenhauer's identification of intuition as arising on the basis of the will itself. It would seem rather, that Schopenhauer is denying the very consequences of

[220] "Kein Wille: keine Vorstellung, keine Welt."

[221] "nur die Erkenntniß ist geblieben, der Wille ist verschwunden"

[222] David Hamlyn seems to recognize a similar problem when he writes: "Schopenhauer's claim that the will cannot be abolished by anything else except knowledge is of a piece with the point that nothing that one can do via representations alone can affect the thing-in-itself. For knowledge is a state of the subject, and although in Schopenhauer's view there can be no subject without an object, the subject itself does not consist of anything at the level of representations. Nevertheless, that alone does not justify the claims for the practical consequences of the knowledge in question. For that reason, if for no other, the view that the will can deny itself remains a paradox." (Hamlyn 2006, pp. 60-61)

his own conclusions. For indeed the final result of the annihilation of the will would seem to be the fact that in the end really, nothing remains at all, not even knowledge. Indeed, Schopenhauer himself recognizes this problem, for in the conclusion to the *WWR* he remarks that one objection is that:

> [A]fter our observations have finally brought us to the point where we have before our eyes in perfect saintliness the denial and surrender of all willing, and thus a deliverance from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering, this now appears to us as a transition into empty *nothingness* (*Nichts*). (*W1*, p. 408)

Schopenhauer then attempts to resolve this through his originally nuanced distinction between the will as thing-in-itself and our knowledge of the phenomenon of the will through time. According to this, knowledge of the will is always relative to the subject's formal capacity for knowing, which was seen to imply the primordial form of being-object-for-a-subject. What we know of the will is thus the phenomenon of the will. Schopenhauer then goes on to state that the above described 'nothing' as a concept, thereby refers only to *relative* annihilation. Furthermore, inasmuch as the will is imprecisely identified with the thing-in-itself, to that extent:

> But considered more closely, an absolute nothing, a really proper *nihil negativum*, is not even conceivable, but everything of this kind, considered from a higher standpoint or subsumed (*subsumirt*) under a wider concept, is always only a *nihil privativum*. (*W1*, p. 409)

So in the annihilation of will, only a relative nothingness has been removed—and thus the knowing subject remains. Given the above descriptions, however, this seems

completely impossible. For in the first place, although Schopenhauer argues that the knowledge which remains for the subject is intuitive, this is actually impossible since, as I have noted briefly, when once the will is removed, so too the ground for such knowledge as arising through the will, is thereby removed with it. So in consequence of this annihilation, either abstract knowledge remains or no knowledge at all. In the second place, given that the subject finds its entire foundation in and through the will, how then could anything akin to a 'subject of knowledge' remain when once this will has been removed?

The only possible solution to this is that in the end, what remains here is mere abstraction, mere concept.[223] In effect, Schopenhauer, who first affirms knowledge through perception, criticizing both Plato and Kant for affirming the antithesis, now through annihilation and the knowing subject, makes an abandonment into concept. The final *telos* of Schopenhauer's thought thus stands as a strange mirror image to the *arche* of Hegelian 'absolute reason'. Here absolute reason becomes nothing other than the 'knowing subject'. The more fundamental point, however, is that in opening a space

[223] Indeed, that would seem to be the implied consequence in Schopenhauer's statements throughout his works regarding the matter, e.g., "The kind of knowledge of the genius is essentially purified of all willing and of references to the will; and it also follows from this that the works of genius do not result from intention or arbitrary choice, but that genius is here guided by a kind of instinctive necessity…The intellect is then of the greatest purity, and becomes the clear mirror of the world; for, wholly separated from its origin, that is, from the will, it is now the world as representation itself concentrated in *one* consciousness." (*W2*, p. 380) Christopher Janaway further notes that Schopenhauer seems: "prepared to concede that strictly speaking it is impossible to have knowledge of the will as thing in itself—to try for such knowledge is to demand something contradictory. If the thing in itself is as such unknowable, what can be the status of the claim that in the inner experience of our own actions we have the 'most immediate' access to the thing in itself which is possible? If the thing in itself is unknowable, we must always be ignorant about the closeness of resemblance between it and any phenomenon. Even if a clear account can be given of that inner experience of the will which is supposedly mediated only by time, there can in principle be no guarantee that a smaller number of subjective forms of the understanding takes us 'nearer' the thing in itself than a larger number does. Our experience of willing may be 'immediate' in some other sense—incorrigibly known, non-inferential, without observation (for example) —but to say that it gives us our 'most immediate' access to the thing in itself is to make nonsense of the concept *thing in itself*." (Janaway 1989, p. 197)

for the continued existence of the knowing subject as following upon the annihilation of the will, Schopenhauer thereby lends his thought into a deeper opening of being into a thing-in-itself which subsists *beyond the will*.

4.7. Knowledge of the will and nominalism

This is then the surprising result of Schopenhauer's thought. His nuanced distinction of thing-in-itself and the phenomenon of the thing-in-itself leaves only two possibilities. Either Schopenhauer must affirm a deeper principle upon which even the will is based, or he must concede that metaphysics is impossible through the will, and hence, that his entire account of existence is really nothing more than a nominalism. As it turns out, Schopenhauer seems to have addressed this issue rather early, and indeed sided with the latter view. Schopenhauer thus states in his early doctoral dissertation that:

> Should others, however, see this in a different light and opine that *a reason in general* (*Grund überhaupt*) is anything but a conception (*Begriff*), derived from the four kinds of reasons, which expresses what they all have in common, we might revive the controversy of the Realists and Nominalists, and then I should side with the latter. (*PSR*, p. 180)

Although he is certainly referring to his account of the principle of sufficient reason and its fourfold roots, the analogy here is quite significant. Schopenhauer is willing to abandon his philosophy of will and representation, and side with nominalism, before he would ever concede to Realism.[224] Yet Schopenhauer really has no choice when it

[224] In another interesting passage, Schopenhauer further states that: "The realism of the scholastics has certainly arisen from the confusion of the Platonic Ideas, to which an objective, real existence can of course be attributed, as they are at the same time the species, with the mere concepts, to which the Realists wished to attribute such an existence, and thereby brought about the triumphant opposition of

comes to the will. These results become even more clear when taken into consideration with what has been discussed in the previous sections.

It has thus far been seen that on account of Schopenhauer's description of contemplation, the subject-object relationship implied both the will and the totality of its Ideas. From the perspective of annihilation of the will, however, Schopenhauer further pointed out the difference between the phenomenon of the will for knowledge and the thing-in-itself. But if I can only know the will as phenomenon, what then becomes of my knowledge of the will itself? The fact of the matter is that, according to Schopenhauer's description of it, I can really only *point* to the will and give it a name. I can never actually come to a knowledge of its inner nature. My knowledge of the will is thus nothing more than a 'sign'. Indeed, when I bring this into conceptual knowledge, I obtain nothing more than a kind of Stoic accretion of concepts. I really obtain no knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Coincidentally, John Sellars in his book, *Stoicism*, offers analogous remarks regarding the final outcome of such a conceptualism:

> The Stoics thus explicitly reject universals conceived as Platonic Ideas. Every entity that falls under their highest genus of 'something' must be something particular; only individual particulars exist…Consequently, they have often been presented as the first nominalists, rejecting the existence of universal concepts altogether. (Sellars 2006, p. 84)

A few remarks about the nature of nominalism are here in order, for this will help to point out both how Schopenhauer falls into this, and indeed, wherein the possibility of overcoming it might arise.

Nominalism." (*W2*, p. 366)

Thus the notion of 'nominalism' arose within the context of a new conceptual *turn* made within the thought of William of Ockham, regarding the historical debate over the nature of universals in Medieval thought. In view of this, Gyula Klima states that:

> The Aristotelian project of explaining universality in human cognition without illumination from a transcendent source generated questions of its own. For in this approach it is natural to ask exactly what the abstracted universals in the mind are, what it is for them to exist in the mind, how they are related to their particulars, what their real foundation in those particulars is, what their role is in the constitution of our universal knowledge, and how they contribute to the encoding and communication of this knowledge in the various human languages. These questions give a new aspect to the problem of universals, namely, a *semantic* aspect. (Klima 2003, p. 201)

This new account followed along semantic lines and would later be referred to as 'nominalism'. It became so revolutionary among the medieval philosophers and indeed so detrimental to the traditional way of doing philosophy according to the Platonic and Aristotelian 'realist' approach to universals as Ideas and Forms, that later scholastics would come to refer to this as the *via antiqua* or "old way" in contradistinction to the *via moderna* or "modern way" of Ockham's nominalism. This "new way" would eventually lead to the collapse of medieval philosophy and discussion as it was then practiced, paving the way to the modern turn toward the subjective. (Klima 2003, p. 204) In the words of William of Ockham himself, the problem according to traditional accounts through forms was that they inevitably fell into the following repetitions:

> God is creating by creation, is good by goodness, just by justice, mighty by might, an accident inheres by inherence, a subject is subjected by subjection, the apt is apt by aptitude, a chimera is nothing by nothingness, someone blind is blind by blindness, a body is mobile by mobility, and so on for other, innumerable cases.[225] (*ibid*.)

The evident difficulty here, traceable back to both Plato and Aristotle, is that there seems to be an unjust *multiplication* of entities for the sake of explanation. This is also seen in Schopenhauer's thought wherein Ideas for phenomenal entities are posited alongside universal abstractions of them. Ockham thus proposed removing or shaving off the inessential while retaining the essential, referred to famously as "Ockham's razor".[226] Inasmuch as the entire apparatus through which we come to a knowledge of the many individual things within nature may be explained on the basis of language, to that extent the conclusion was reached that: "universals, such as *man* and *red*, are names

[225] David Luscombe states of this that: "Ockham turns the universal into an act of understanding; a natural sign is an intellection. Unlike Scotus he does not speak of the universal as a common nature formally distinct from the individual which it encompasses. It is not 'something common' nor is there something extra, such as participation in an essence, that makes Socrates resemble Plato more than, say, a donkey. The resemblance is in themselves, and the universal noun 'man' is its sign. Universals are thus as external to things as words to their subjects." (Luscombe 1997, p. 148)

[226] Regarding this 'shaving' off of the superfluous, David Luscombe goes on to state that according to Ockham's view: "Reality is absolutely singular and undivided. A thing cannot be simultaneously singular and universal. If reality included universals, a universal would be a thing, and the individual in which it is realized would be another thing, so that there would be a real distinction between the universal and the individual. The universal does not, therefore, exist outside the mind (*extra animam*)… Ockham called universals signs. Signs in the mind, or significant general concepts pointing out a plurality, are themselves singular." (Luscombe 1997, p. 148)

(*nomina*), not things (*res*)."[227] (Marrone 2003, p. 37) As merely 'names', such universals must be considered signs which points to things (i.e., naming) and nothing more.

From this perspective then, Schopenhauer's account of the will is nominalistic inasmuch as knowledge of the will is reduced to mere phenomena. Accordingly, applying Ockham's razor to Schopenhauer's thought, it seems that the proper thing to do would be to throw out the Ideas entirely and affirm that my knowledge of willing is merely a phenomenal knowledge on the basis of an unknown, a noumenon, a thing-in-itself. Of course, Schopenhauer denies this for obvious reasons, affirming rather that the will is the metaphysical ground of being itself.

Perhaps then the reverse of the matter should follow? Perhaps in limiting knowledge of the will to the phenomenon, it is not the Ideas which become problematic, not the Ideas which are inconsistent and should be removed, but rather Schopenhauer's Idealism? Indeed, perhaps Schopenhauer must, for the sake of consistency, actually profess a materialism and realism which he so expressly denies? Regarding this last point, Schopenhauer seems to render the final judgment upon his own thought when he writes:

[227] This is of course a simplification of the matter, since indeed various kinds of nominalism were developed and often differed from the manner in which Ockham first describes it. For example, in the writings of Jean Buridan, universals are strictly identified with semantic articulations, as E.J. Ashworth states: "The terms of the debate were to change completely in the fourteenth century with the rise of nominalism, the doctrine that all that exists are individual things, and that only concepts can be common. The question now became one of priority: does a word signify an individual thing in the world directly, or does it signify first the general concept which is a necessary condition for signification? Buridan and Ockham differed on this issue. Buridan held that words first signify concepts, because only then can we explain why terms such as *being* and *one* which have the same extension nonetheless differ in signification. Ockham preferred to say that words signified individual things while being subordinated to concepts. Both thinkers are also noteworthy for their new insistence that the concept itself was a representative sign." (Ashworth 2003, p. 83). For this present discussion, it is sufficient to understand nominalism in the most naïve sense, i.e., as the identification of universals with proper words or names, since this seems to be the way in which Schopenhauer himself understood and interpreted the matter.

> Nominalism really leads to materialism; for, after the elimination of all qualities, only matter in the last resort is left. Now if concepts are mere names, but individual things are real, their qualities being individually transient, then matter alone remains as that which continues to exist, and consequently as real.[228] (*PP1*, p. 65)

4.8. The 'Idea of the will'

The final alternative then is to consider the possibility that my knowledge of the will is really akin to that which Plato expresses positively for the Good. In section 1.9, Socrates was there seen to refuse any attempt to account for knowledge of the Good itself. In

[228] F.C. White thus points out that: "Schopenhauer's assertions threaten his own metaphysics. For if all concepts and all words are derived from representations, if all that is material in our knowledge comes from perception of the corporeal world and has its origin in sensation, and if reason cannot take us beyond representations, then we cannot reason of the Will, nor can we meaningfully talk or think about it. Still less can we acquire conceptual knowledge of it." (White 2006, p. 79) William Caldwell further offers a number of remarks regarding this point and in relation to the German Idealists. He states that: "Fichte and Schelling and Hegel were doubtless guilty of beginning in philosophy with conceptions which it required a 'very high effort of thought' to grasp: the '*Ego* positing itself,' the 'I as a principle of philosophy,' 'pure being' which was the same as 'pure nothing,' and so on. Descartes even began philosophy with an abstraction—*Cogito* instead of *Ego sum cogitans*, as has been said. Kant, too, suffered from his tendency to assimilate the categories to conceptions, as we have seen. In face of all this, Schopenhauer thought that his will, while in a sense a conception, was yet a real conception—a conception that was also a perception—a phase of reality that one could actually see and be immediately conscious of in himself; whereas the conceptions of most other philosophers—such as 'substance,' 'monads,' 'absolute reason,' 'idea,' etc.—were for him the 'merest *abstracta* of thought.' " (Caldwell 1896, p. 156) I do agree with Caldwell's remarks here. The notion of the 'will' is certainly not known in the same way in which I know 'absolute reason', or 'pure being', etc., as I have pointed out. I therefore agree with Schopenhauer that we have an *immediate* knowledge of myself as willing. My argument within this section is then based upon Schopenhauer's mediation of the will through transcendental idealism and the transcendent idea. I point out that although he affirms what seems a correct ground of metaphysical knowledge (through immediate awareness of the will in nature), he yet removes this ground and transforms it into a mere pointing, a naming, a nominalism, on the basis of idealism and concept. This is necessary for now will is only known *as* phenomenon (through the subject-object relationship). Although I feel it within, I can only *call* that which I feel by a name, and nothing more. In this sense, 'force', 'energy', 'the pull', 'the inner tug', 'desire', or even 'Bob' would all be equally attributable to the inner immediate awareness of this thing which Schopenhauer calls 'will'.

place of this, he suggested that he speak of that which is: "apparently (φαίνεται) an offspring (ἔκγονός) of the good (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) and most like that (ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ)."

This is a wonderful description for it figures well into what might analogously be considered in terms of the 'Idea of the will'. Indeed, such an Idea wouldn't be the will itself, but rather an offspring (ἔκγονός) of it. On the other hand, inasmuch as knowledge of this Idea arises through the primordial form of representation as being-object-for-a-subject, to that extent is it only phenomenal knowledge, that is of what is merely apparent (φαίνεται), like the will itself, though isn't precisely the same, indeed, of that which is most like unto it (ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ).

Such a description would first all pair well with what Schopenhauer states of our limited knowledge of the will itself. Knowledge of the will according to the subject is determined *phenomenally* through time.[229] I can only obtain 'glimpses' of the will within each successive moment. Indeed, even in opening metaphysics through the will, Schopenhauer yet affirms that he does so in a limited way, offering only a narrow gateway to truth. He further suggests that through his analysis of the will:

> In this way, Kant's doctrine of the inability to know the thing-in-itself (*Unerkennbarkeit des Dinges an sich*) is modified to the extent that the thing-in-itself is merely not absolutely and completely knowable; that nevertheless by far the most immediate of its phenomena (*Erscheinungen*), distinguished *toto genere* from all the rest by this immediateness (*Unmittelbarkeit*), is its representative for us. (*W*2, p. 197)

[229] Brian Magee points out that in general, most critics and interpreters of Schopenhauer tend to miss this point, as he suggests: "Now the basic and important misunderstanding of Schopenhauer's philosophy that is also at the same time widespread is twofold: it is that he taught, contradicting Kant, that we *can* have direct knowledge of the noumenon, and that what we directly apprehend the noumenon to be is will – will as we experience it in the form of the will to live, and also, some say, in the form of ordinary willing activity, our normal actions as human agents." (Magee 1990, p. 4)

Accordingly, the will as identified with the thing-in-itself, is yet not equated with it. It represents rather the inherent possibilities of that which we can know about the will. In effect, there is an essential unknowable character which Schopenhauer retains with respect to the thing-in-itself and indeed to knowledge through the Ideas.[230]

The interesting although quite speculative point is then the fact that the 'Idea of the will' would remove the gaps and to a certain extent, some of the more grave inconsistencies, noted here, within Schopenhauer's thought. In the first place, when Schopenhauer speaks of contemplation as the pure union of subject and object, one may now speak of the 'Idea of the will' as arising in consequence of this union. This therefore resolves the problem of what was originally seen in this vision as an objectified singular will coupled with the manifold of Ideas. What now remains is merely one singular insight into the 'Idea of the will'. This is objective. It is furthermore phenomenal, as determined by the subject-object relationship.

On the other hand, regarding knowledge of the manifold of Ideas, one might actually argue for a more rational 'Platonic' approach. So in this sense, after having discerned, on an intuitive basis, the inner Idea inherent within nature, one would now proceed dialectically into abstract concepts into a consideration of the 'Forms' inherent to things themselves. In this sense then only the 'Idea of the will' would be perceptible, and the forms of things within perception would really be deducible on the basis of this primordial Idea. Accordingly, the 'Idea of the will' functions as an unhypothetical through which dialectic may ascend or descend to, in determining the true principles inherent to being. One may furthermore retain the ideality of the world, for now *mere appearances* are never confounded with semblances inasmuch as the principles inherent

[230] Magee further points out that: "Schopenhauer is always aware of the distinction between will as his name for the noumenon and will as his name for its appearance or manifestation in the world of phenomena. Whenever he talks of the will 'appearing', or of 'the phenomena of the will', it is the latter, not the former, that he is talking about." (Magee 1990, p. 5)

to the former are entirely abstract. Indeed, only the unhypothetical first principle is *semblant* in the actual Platonic sense of the word. The last point is then the fact that through annihilation of the will, what is really annihilated is the 'Idea of the will', and thus, what remains is nothing more than Will itself, as the in-itself, transcendent entity inherent to all being and existence.[231] Although I cannot obtain knowledge of this directly, I can yet rest content in my negative *abstract* knowledge which points to this more primordial ground.

In effect, it would seem as though something of a transcendent entity, such as a 'One' or 'Good' actually resolves the inherent inconsistencies which I have here pointed out within Schopenhauer's thought. I do not state such matters as a point of favoritism for Plato in opposition to Schopenhauer. Indeed, it is my personal view that Schopenhauer's own merit as a philosopher was to have seen the 'will in nature' whether or not nature itself is real or ideal. In consequence of this, he points out the right ground of our knowledge, as arising through sense perception. He thus shows that a certain degree of our true knowledge of the world must be perceptible (i.e. the Idea). He further points out the distinction between intuitions and concepts, and further concepts from Ideas. Finally, in reading and indeed learning from Schopenhauer, one grasps the essential meaning inherent to the title of Friedrich Nietzsche's essay, *Schopenhauer as Educator*.

In spite of this, I see no reason for denying a transcendent existence beyond the will as thing-in-itself, understood phenomenally through time; nor in fact do I see any particular reason to affirm the transcendental nature of empirical reality. I have in this chapter attempted rather, to point out that both Idea and Idealism would in fact receive a more consistent grounding and mediation had Schopenhauer retained and further affirmed a more transcendent principle beyond both. From this perspective the 'Idea of

[231] Of course, Schopenhauer's entire approach resembles the kind of via negativa found among the scholastic determinations of God. Thus akin to God, the Will cannot be positively described, but can only be given negative determinations, i.e., of what it is *not*.

the will' certainly helps to accomplish this, albeit in a naïve manner. Of course, this would radically alter the nature of empirical reality as we see it. At any rate, as to precisely what matters are, indeed as to what this existence really is—who can say. This question will perhaps forever remain for us a mystery.

Conclusion

There is a certain wealth and profundity to Schopenhauer's thought which is often missing among many of the thinkers of yesterday and today. He stretched his imagination broad and deep. He permitted himself to consider such manifold phenomena as music, architecture, logic, mathematics, biology, physics, human motivation, ethics, love, death, and desire. He was a true *renaissance* thinker. Indeed, whatever this philosopher turned his attention to and to whichever topic, an abundance of insight flowed as if from an open spring. Schopenhauer is to be congratulated for the fact that, living within a time of rationalistic Idealism, he looked instead to the mystery of the world which stood in its majesty before the naked eye. In consequence of this, he was able to recognize and to yet 'let be' those spaces of paradox and incongruity which would otherwise perplex and confound reason and rational thinking. He thus states of his own thought in the *WWR* that:

> I regard it as a great merit of my philosophy that all its truths have been found independently of one another, through a consideration of the real world; but their unity and agreement, about which I did not concern myself, have always appeared subsequently of themselves. For this reason also it is rich, and has wide-spreading roots in the soil of the reality of perception from which all the nourishment of abstract truth springs. (*W2*, p. 185)

In consequence of this, and to a certain extent, a shroud of mystery inevitably hovers over almost the entirety of Schopenhauer's account of the world. To offer a few examples: there is first the unitary and solitary will and there is its manifestation through a plurality of 'grades' or Ideas. There is the phenomenal representation of the world according to the subjective forms of perception and also the thing-in-itself for knowledge beyond these forms, though *still* according to the subject. Such ambiguities reveal themselves throughout Schopenhauer's thought, at the most central as well as peripheral levels.

So indeed a number of problems results from this, as I have attempted to show, and yet a more fundamental point takes precedence over all: it is that Schopenhauer philosophized with *open* eyes. He was a thinker who sought first to look to the content of *experience*, and only then to attempt to offer an account of it. He further accomplishes this with a clarity of expression equaled to by only a very few thinkers within the history of philosophy.

Yet Schopenhauer's true merit as a philosopher, as I see it, lies neither in his notion of will and representation. Indeed, I have found it hard to accept Schopenhauer's avowal of Kantian philosophy, on either faith or evidence, particularly in view of modern science wherein advances in Relativity theory, Quantum mechanics, and beyond, have shed new light upon our understanding of the nature of space, time, and the perception of reality. There certainly is a relationship between *what* I see and *how* I see the world, but philosophy has still much work to do before it discerns wherein that relation lies.

So on the one hand, it seems to me that although the sciences must forever be in Schopenhauer's debt, on the other hand, philosophy must now *learn* from science what the latter first learned from philosophy. Indeed, looking to the empirical world, we see various phenomena from nuclear forces, to vegetative impulses, to the strange almost innate and 'intentioned' behavior inherent to the construction of nests among birds and

the intricate webs of spiders, to the strange almost inner consciousness inherent to the evolution of the species throughout the ages. There is a *will in nature*. This Schopenhauer reveals time and again throughout his works and in the many long digressions which he makes on the inner source of these various phenomena. Yet as the metaphysical ground of being, as the thing-in-itself, I there pause before accepting his solution. Transcendental Idealism no longer finds a place within the context of modern science—or it does so only *imprecisely* in the manner in which both Kant and Schopenhauer understood it. Toady, science teaches us that *reality* doesn't require the covering of a subjective veil. Perhaps it is reality which veils the subject and not vice-versa. In its own true being, reality reveals itself as paradoxical. There is something more than will itself—will is but part and parcel to nature.

Were I to therefore reject every aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy and to retain only one singular element, it would be his insight into the fact that true knowledge is offered to us directly, intuitively, almost perceptibly through experience on the basis of *principle*, and that what we refer to as reason, logic, concepts, *words*, are but secondary and quite indirect reflections upon its basis.[232] The main element here becomes then the manner in which Ideas, or Forms, or essences, or whatever one wishes to refer to these, arise almost 'perceptibly' through experience. Transcendental idealism removed, 'perceptible' becomes a metaphor for a much more primordial contact which the human mind makes through a kind of inner sight into the contents of reality. In this sense,

[232] David Hamlyn seems to have arrived at a similar conclusion when he writes that: "In effect, this distinction between direct and abstract knowledge is the only contribution that Schopenhauer makes to the discussion of the issue which has so dominated recent epistemological concerns—the nature of knowledge." (Hamlyn 2006, p. 44) Furthermore, William Caldwell, although in general quite critical of Schopenhauer's thought, yet offers a number of positive remarks, as he states: "Schopenhauer ought to have revised his ideas about knowledge so as to bring them into harmony with his doctrine of will. His idea that all concepts have primarily a practical value is a step in this direction, although he does not work it out fully. What he teaches about the relation of the concept to the percept, while to a certain extent almost truistic, is something that philosophy has always to learn anew. Locke long ago told us to relate our conceptions to perceptions, to reality; and Comte and others have told us the same thing in the present century. Schopenhauer has shown us how hard a thing it is to grasp the unity of the knowing and the willing self." (Caldwell 1896, p. 168)

Plato's simile of the sun becomes much more appropriate. Indeed, there seems to be a sense in which we grasp things in a much more immediate way, a way which requires no further reflection, nor necessary application of rational dialectic.

Such a direct contact with the nature of things would then lie quite beyond the happy confines of rational confirmation, and to this extent, it seems to me obvious why it is that throughout the ages knowledge through 'insight' or 'intuition' in general has always been looked upon rather suspiciously. For indeed, what and how are we to separate true insight from mere belief? This seems to have been Plato's major concern. For Schopenhauer, the answer was simply that some people have and others don't have, the inner capacity and genius to 'see' this. Convincing those who do not and cannot see such principles is then akin to convincing a blind man that the rose is red and its leaves are green. You can explain to him this difference, but he can never really *know* it directly in the way in which you are able to *see* this.

The derivative point in relation to this initial insight becomes then Schopenhauer's further distinction of knowledge into intuitions, concepts, and Ideas. So although such an insight certainly isn't novel, the manner in which Schopenhauer yet clarifies this insight is. Indeed, one of the main applications of this is that what before seemed ambiguous or obscure is now brought out more brilliantly and clearly. So in this sense, for example, prior to Schopenhauer's clarification, it would be quite difficult to unravel the question of whether there is or isn't an 'Idea of a bed'. Given the distinction between concepts and Ideas, it seems now quite evident why it is that such an Idea is actually only a concept. A 'bed' is an abstraction, that is, a mere production of the human mind and reason. On the other hand, an Idea is a principle of *nature*. To add a second example, when Kant speaks of the understanding as spontaneously giving rise to concepts, one begins to see the contradiction inherent there on the basis of Schopenhauer's distinction between concepts and intuitions. Consequently, one doesn't *conceptualize* the causal relationship inherent to an apple falling from a tree, but rather

intuits, that is, 'sees' this directly within experience. Although I can generalize this and say that *for every case*, given the same conditions, the apple will fall to the ground, there is yet something sensuous to my knowledge *for each specific case*, which is quite resilient to any such generalization. I can only 'point out' what is specific, or show it by way of example. There is then something entirely intuitive to the process which has nothing to do with the concepts, or reason, or abstractions.

So although I have shown within this work that even Schopenhauer tends at times to posit the Idea as a kind of abstract-intuition, this only applies to his attempt to *rationalize* and *communicate* (for his reader) what he understands much more directly, sensuously, aesthetically, on an intuitive and perceptible basis. In actual application, the Ideas really *are* perceptible in some strange, paradoxical, analogous, or metaphorical way. They *are* different from both concepts and intuitions and yet similar to both. The Ideas can really be known only if one has the *genius* to see them.

I would, however, slightly alter this last statement. It is my personal opinion that if something *can* be seen, then those who have eyes, and we all do, will be able to see it. In light of this, I suggest that it is not the capacity or genius to see such principles, but rather the *openness* or, dare I say, the *will* to see them. I don't mean to imply that *I* see the Ideas, although I must admit that Schopenhauer has certainly turned my mind toward *something*. What I do mean to suggest is that philosophy loses something essential when it begins to set borders upon its knowledge, or from the perspective of the times, to look upon certain *kinds* of knowledge as outmoded. It then easily loses itself within petty concerns, focusing upon the abstract meaning of language and words, and of their relation to *mere* abstractions. Yet before it stands an open door to the world. Discovery awaits for those willing to look.

Schopenhauer's analysis of the perceptibility of the Platonic Ideas teaches one essential lesson—philosophers cannot rest content with abstractions, but must ever seek to: "Put out into the deep and let down your nets for a catch." (Luke 5:4) This insight is

particularly relevant in this present age of philosophy caught between *concepts* and the *word*. Philosophy has lost its foothold upon reality.

As a final point which I leave to the reader's own reflection, Schopenhauer's 'will in nature', his distinction between intuitions, concepts, and Ideas, has led me to the firm conviction that the future of philosophy will find this foothold, indeed its grounding once again, through a thorough *metaphysical* reconsideration of the insights, advances, and developments arrived at on the basis of the modern sciences. This is a path which has hitherto been left unexplored. Philosophy will touch ground when it once again looks beyond the word, beyond the concept, through the open door of perception, and into the deep drumming bass of experience, wherein lies the dwelling place of the *Idea*.

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