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Are Hate Speech Laws Useless? An Appraisal of Eric Heinze’s Arguments

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Abstract

Most Western democracies and international institutions have currently adopted a range of policies aimed at regulating hate speech. However, the kinds of target groups that hate speech regulations seek to protect have not been clearly defined yet. In a series of publications, Eric Heinze has challenged the coherence of such regulations. His core thesis is that hate speech laws have simply no place in longstanding, stable, and prosperous democracies. In this paper, I examine the three main charges Heinze raises against hate speech laws—namely, discriminatory selectivity, impermissible censorship, and arbitrariness—and I seek to demonstrate that none of them can withstand critical analysis.

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Notes

  1. For an overview of these policies, see Brown (2015, pp. 46–92).

  2. ‘Public Order Act 1986’, Act No. 1986 c. 64 of 7 November 1986. The British government has subsequently extended protection to other groups. The Religious and Racial Hatred Act 2006 amended Section 18(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 by adding Section 3(A), which extends protection to religious groups. Part 3(A) of the Religious and Racial Hatred Act 2006 was itself amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 by adding sexual orientation to the list of hateful offenses providing a legitimate ground for prosecution.

  3. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195. Entry into force: 4 January 1969.

  4. Unites Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p.171. Entry into force: 23 March 1976.

  5. Recommendation No. R (97) 20. Adopted on 30 October 1997.

  6. ‘An Act Respecting the Criminal Law’, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

  7. Scanlon (1972, 1979), Dworkin (1991, 1992), Richard (1986, 1988), Strauss (1991), Nagel (1995), and Baker (1989, 1997, 2009).

  8. Dworkin (2009, 2012), Post (1991, 2009), and Weinstein (1999, 2001, 2009).

  9. See notes 2, 3, and 4.

  10. The most influential proponent of the doctrine of proportionality today is probably Alexy (2002).

  11. For an analysis of the US free speech doctrine, see the following landmark studies: Waluchow (1994); Greenawalt (1996: Chap. 2), Sunstein (1995: Chap. 5) and Weinstein (2009).

  12. Some regulations are modeled on many non-discrimination provisions and are explicitly formulated in an open-ended way. See, for instance, the 1997 resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (n. 5) or article 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force 2 September 1953.

  13. The case of the ‘Public Order Act 1986’ (n. 2) in the United Kingdom is a good example.

  14. See n. 6.

  15. See the following bills: Bill C-250, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda), 3rd Session, 37th Parliament (S.C. 2004, c.14);Bill C-13, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 2nd Session, 41st Parliament (S.C. 2014, c. 31); and Bill C-16, An Act to Amend the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament (S.C. 2017, c.13).

  16. For instance, the European Convention on Human Rights contains such a limitation clause. While Section 10(1) provides the right to freedom of expression, Section 10(2) stipulates: ‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary’.

  17. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Scheduled B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11.

  18. Ibid., s. 2(b).

  19. Section 15 of the Charter related to nondiscrimination or equality rights, or Section 27 related to the multicultural heritage of Canadians are examples.

  20. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C, 1985, c H-6. Section 13 was repealed by Bill C-304 in June 2013.

  21. See n. 6.

  22. Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, (1990) 3 R.C.S. 892.

  23. R. v. Keegstra, (1990) 3 S.C.R. 697.

  24. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 CSC 11, (2013) 1 R.C.S. 467.

  25. R. v. Zundel, (1992) 2 R.C.S. 731.

  26. Criminal Code (n. 6), s. 181 (Spreading False News). Clause 7 of Bill C-39 repealed this section in 2019.

  27. Sumner (2004, p. 78) and Greenawalt (1996, p. 14) believe that Canadian courts tend to defer to the judgment of the legislature, in sharp contrast with the American example. Whether this is true or not, this remark expresses only empirical, factual observations limited to the Canadian case, not a conceptual objection applying to all courts. There is, in other words, no logical link between the balancing procedures used by courts and the tendency to defer to the judgments of lower jurisdictions.

  28. For an analysis of these two kinds of rights, see Sumner (2004, pp. 4–9).

  29. See notes 22, 23, 24, and 25.

  30. See n. 19.

  31. See n. 8.

  32. R. v. Oakes (1986) 1 S.C.R. 103, pp. 138–40.

  33. See: Taylor (n. 22), pp. 918–19; Keegstra (n. 23), pp. 745–49; Zundel (n. 26), pp. 763–64; Whatcott (n. 24), para. 72–77.

  34. Keegstra (n. 23), p. 746.

  35. Ibid., p. 747.

  36. Oakes (n. 33), p. 136.

  37. In her dissenting voice in Keegstra, Justice McLachlin recommended the provincial human rights legislation as an alternative to criminalization that might possibly impair freedom of expression to a lesser degree. See Keegstra (n. 23), pp. 861–62.

  38. Nationalist Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 379 (1992).

  39. We are astonished to learn that, for some democratic societies, the repeal has been rather recent. The United Kingdom repealed its blasphemy legislation in 2008 with The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s. 79. Canada did the same only ten years later, in 2018, with its Bill C-51: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act, December 13, 2018. In both cases, the legislator has simply come to the conclusion that the crime of blasphemous libel has become anachronistic over time.

  40. Things are different for public and political personalities, as we know since the Sullivan case. See: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

  41. Wingrove v. UK (1997) 24 EHRR 1.

  42. Murphy v. Ireland (2004) 38 EHRR 13.

  43. Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria (1995) 19 EHRR 34.

  44. I. A. v. Turkey (2007) 45 EHRR 30.

  45. For an analysis of this doctrine, see Cram (2009, pp. 317–319).

  46. See n. 16.

  47. A/HRC/RES/16/18, p. 2. My emphasis.

  48. For an analysis of these pieces of legislation, see Waldron (2012, pp. 118–120) and Hare (2009).

  49. See n. 39.

  50. Public Order Act 1986, Section 29A, as amended by The Religious and Racial Hatred Act 2006. (My emphasis).

  51. Public Order Act 1986, Section 29J, as amended by The Religious and Racial Hatred Act 2006.

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    Stéphane Courtois

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Courtois, S. Are Hate Speech Laws Useless? An Appraisal of Eric Heinze’s Arguments. Res Publica 28, 249–269 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-021-09508-1

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