Abstract
An underpinning assumption of modern legal positivism isthat the question of how legal standards differ fromnormative standards in other spheres of human thoughtis resolved via the concept of a legal system and thenotion of internal logic, through use of contextualdefinition. This approach is seen to lead to anuntenable form of structuralism altogether atodds with the positivist's intentions. An alternativestrategy is offered which allows the positivists toretain their deepest insights, though at a price.
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Coyle, S. Hart, Raz and the Concept of a Legal System. Law and Philosophy 21, 275–304 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015596412545
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015596412545