Skip to main content
Log in

Why is there anything except physics?

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Cartwright N. (1999) The dappled world: A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge University Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  2. Fodor J. (1974) Disunity of science as a working hypothesis. Synthese 28(2): 97–115

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Fodor J. (1989) Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics 17: 59–80

    Google Scholar 

  4. Fodor J. (1991) You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation. Mind 100(397): 19–34

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Fodor J. (1997) Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years. Philosophical Perspectives 11: 149–163

    Google Scholar 

  6. Fodor, J. (2007). Against Darwinism (ms).

  7. Goodman N. (1983) Fact, fiction, and forecast. (4th ed.). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  8. Kim, J. (1997). The mind-body problem: Taking stock after forty years. Noûs, 31, 185–207 (Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World, 1997).

  9. Kim J. (2005) Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ

    Google Scholar 

  10. Kim J. (2007) Causation and mental causation. In: McLaughlin B., Cohen J. (eds) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. London/Oxford, Wiley/Blackwell

    Google Scholar 

  11. Kitcher P. (2001) Science, truth, and democracy. Oxford University Press, NY, USA (paperback 2003)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  12. Loewer B. (2007a) Mental causation; or something near enough. In: McLaughlin B.P., Cohen J.D. (eds) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  13. Loewer B. (2007b) Counterfactuals and the second law. In: Price H., Corry R. (eds) Russell’s republic: The place of causation in the constitution of reality. Oxford University Press, NY, USA

    Google Scholar 

  14. Loewer B. (2008) Why there is thing except physics. In: Kallestrup J., Hohwy J. (eds) Being reduced: New essays on reduction, explanation, and causation. Oxford University Press, NY, USA

    Google Scholar 

  15. Papineau D. (2001) The rise of physicalism. In: Gilette C., Loewer B. (eds) Physicalism and its discontents. Cambridge University Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  16. Pietoski P., Rey G. (1995) When other things aren’t equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus laws from vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46(1): 81–110

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Warfield T. (1993) Folk-psychological Ceteris-Paribus laws. Philosophical Studies 71(1): 99–112

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Barry Loewer.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Loewer, B. Why is there anything except physics?. Synthese 170, 217–233 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9580-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9580-2

Keywords

Navigation