Volume 13, Issue 2, 2022
Elliott R. Crozat
Pages 143-150
Why Fallibilistic Evidence is Insufficient for Propositional Knowledge
In this article, I argue that fallibilistic justification is insufficient for propositional knowledge if veritic luck is involved. I provide a thought experiment to demonstrate that even very strong non-factive evidence is insufficient for knowledge if veritic luck is present. I then distinguish between precise justification (PJ), which I suggest is required for knowledge in cases of veritic luck, and loose justification (LJ), which is sufficient for practical cases in which beliefs are reasonable to hold even if they fall short of being items of knowledge. In addition, I provide a reason for holding that PJ is required for all items of propositional knowledge, and not only for cases of veritic luck. Lastly, I propose that Gettier-style cases pertain to an ambiguity between PJ and LJ.