Franciscan Studies

EA QUAE SUNTAD EINEM: REFLECTIONS ON VIRTUE AS MEANS TO MORAL EXCELLENCE IN SCOTIST THOUGHT Recent years have shown increased study on the thought of John Duns Scotus. In the area of his ethical thinking, however, the focus has been limited. With the exception of studies on the role and exercise of freedom as fundamental moral component1 and the centrality of the will for moral excellence,2 one finds few articles on the implications of the will's primacy for other ethical elements, such as the place of virtue or the exercise of right reason.5 Some of this is due to the lack of any real 1 Significant in this regard have been publications by Bernardine Bonansea "Duns Scotus" Voluntarism" inJohn Duns Scotus: 1265-1965, ed. Ryan/Bonansea , (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1965) 83-121; "The Divine Will in the Teaching of Duns Scotus," Antonianum 56 (1981): 296-335; William Frank, "Duns Scotus' Concept of Willing Freely: What Divine Freedom Beyond Choice Teaches Us," Franciscan Studies 42 (1982): 68-89; Laszlo Paskai, "Die Heutige Freiheitsproblematik im Lichte der Skotistichen Freiheitslehre" in Deus et homo ad rnentem I. Duns Scoti (Rome, 1972) 401-07; Lawrence Roberts, "A Comparison of Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas on Human Freedom of Choice" in Homo et mundus (Rome, 1984) 265-72; "The Contemporary Relevance of Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Human Freedom" in Regnum hominis et regnum Dei (Rome, 1976) 535-44 and "John Duns Scotus and the Concept of Human Freedom" in Deus et homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoti 317-25; Roberto Zavalloni, "Personal Freedom and Scotus' Voluntarism" in De Doctrina I. Duns Scoti II (Rome, 1968) 613-27. 2 On this see Walter Hoeres, Der Wille als reine Vollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus (Munich: Pustet, 1962); Anna Maria Prastaro, "Il primato della volunta in Duns Scoto" in Homo et Mundus 273-90; Allan Wolter, O.F.M., "Native Freedom of the Will as a Key to the Ethics of Scotus" in Deus et homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoti 359-70. 3 As of this writing, I am only aware of a handful of articles on the virtues and prudence in Scotist thought. See F. Schwendinger, "Metaphysik des Sittlichen nach Joh. Duns Skotus" Wissenschaft und Weisheit 1 (1934): 180-210; 2 (1935): 18-50, 112-35; 3 (1936): 93-119, 161-90; A Borak, "Liberta e prudenza nel pensiero di Duns Scoto" Laurentianum 10 (1969): 105-41; Odon Lottin, "La connexion des vertus morales acquises au dernier quart du 13e siècle" RTAM 15 (1948): 107-51; Atanasio Matanic, "Dottrina di Scoto sulla connessione délie 178MARY ELIZABETH INGHAM ethical preoccupation on the part of the Subtle Doctor.4 In addition , important texts from Book III of the Sentences (where discussion of the virtues takes place) have not yet appeared in critical edition. Until the complete Ordinatio is available, scholars must qualify statements and nuance conclusions. Despite the lack of a complete critical edition, I would like to offer here some reflections on the importance of virtue for Scotus. Too often the will is highlighted as the sole moral component within Scotus's theory, to the detriment of other important ethical elements, such as right reason and virtue. Thus, while I do not dispute the centrality of the will's freedom within Scotus's vision of reality, I would like to offer évidence that the complete and perfect operation of the will as a free faculty is strongly related to the presence of virtue within the moral agent. Scholastic thinkers referred to this relationship between virtue and the goal of moral perfection as ea quae sunt adfinem, or those aspects of human moral life intimately related to the goal of human excellence. These aspects have moral value not in themselves, but precisely as they contribute to moral excellence. Given the nuanced picture of Scotist voluntarism which has emerged from recent study, I do not intend to alter the contemporary mainstream interpretation of this Franciscan's thinking on ethical matters. I would like to see it expanded, however. What appears in Scotist texts as a fairly clear-cut distinction between the natural and free orders of causality can indeed create the impression that this...