

either make drastic changes in the underlying logic, or lay down a separate contextual definition to govern identity contexts. The second point is that Mr. Bacon considers it a virtue of his solution that it does not go to the opposite extreme of making "The so-and-so is such-and-such" meaningless when its subject term does not refer. I assume that with "meaningless" he means "neither true nor false." But, to return to Bacon's example, we find that on Russell's proposal, truth is assigned to a sentence usually understood to mean that the mother *did not* carry out her decision, while on Bacon's, truth is assigned to a sentence which would normally be taken to mean that she *did* carry out her decision. The proposal that these sentences be assigned neither *true* nor *false* would avoid both pitfalls, and we could then say that the conditions presupposed for the possibility of her carrying out her decision did not obtain. This, it would seem to me, is the correct conclusion pointed to by the example, which therefore calls into question the very approach (common to Bacon and Russell) of dealing with sentences containing non-referring terms by means of some wholesale assignment of truth-values.

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#### NOTE

<sup>1</sup> John Bacon, "An Alternative Contextual Definition for Descriptions," *Philosophical Studies*, 16:75 (1965).

#### Corrigendum

The key references in Theodore Drange's article "The Paradox Defended," *Philosophical Studies*, 18:1-12 (January-February 1967), were accidentally omitted. They are as follows: Robert W. Beard, "Semantic Theory and the Paradox of the Non-Communicator," *Philosophical Studies*, 17:44-45 (1966); Karel Lambert, "On the Non-Communicator," *Philosophical Studies*, 17:27-30 (1966). Both of these are replies to Theodore Drange, "The Paradox of the Non-Communicator," *Philosophical Studies*, 15:92-96 (1964).

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