A. Cuevas 1 Unrestricted exportation: No toying with pragmatic English as English itself. (draft #2.1., 10/15/2013. Comments welcomed!) Adam Cuevas* Abstract: “There is some disagreement about the answers to such questions and there would seem to be no obvious procedure for arriving at agreement, We may ask: "When would we say, of a thing x, that it's believed by someone to be something or other?" But an investigation of our language habits suggests two things; first that, on some occasions, we require very little of a person S in order to be able to say of a thing x that it is believed by S to be something or other; and secondly that, on other occasions, we require a considerable degree of epistemic intimacy between S and x before we will allow ourselves to say that x is the object of S's beliefs.” [Roderick Chisholms. 1976] Keywords Unrestricted exportation · Kripke · Propositional attitudes · Belief de dicto · Belief de re · Sosa · Quine · The tallest spy · Hintikka · Quantifying in · Intensions · Pragmatics · Context · Grice Introduction Saul Kripke has contributed to the lengthy topic on Exportation. Here I'm speaking of his comparative case-study on the matter written up in his paper “Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy of Language.” 1 2(Kripke; 2008, 2011). The central issue discussed in that paper had to do with Exportation: this has to do with the question under what conditions would it be logically permissible to deduce one formulation of belief ascription from a more primitive one. Originally it was W. V. Quine who affirmatively stated in his famous paper “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,” [Q&PA] that Exportation follows thusly un-prohibited for only one specific distinction of belief: what I call here Quine's second sense distinction. (Quine 1956). Quine thereafter did not utilize this notion as he mentions in a reply to David Kaplan (Quine: 1968). Disagreement and controversy over Exportation did not arise until later when Quine's other distinctions: what I call here the practical distinction and the first sense distinction, were challenged, although largely misunderstood, by various authors. Suffice it to say that Quine at the time never claimed that Exportation held for these latter distinctions. Mysteriously, in light of these challenges Quine acquiesced to the objections. He initially agreed to deny Exportation outright on their terms. (Quine; 1968). However, later he recanted on that denial. I assume that the arguments provided Quine a trove of insightful asides *A. Cuevas (*) Ucla philosophy alumnus e-mail: metaucla@ucla.edu 1 As footnoted in that paper: “The paper was delivered at the opening conference of the Saul Kripke Center at University of New York, Graduate Center on May 21-23, 2008.” 2 There is an audio recording of the aforementioned conference. In that recording Kripke mentions how he wanted to make his negative remarks about Unrestricted Exportation known for sometime, and how he has taught several graduate seminars on the subject. He goes on to say, although it's been omitted from the typescript, that during th ose seminars he had defended his position against graduate students who he described as, “A phalanx of pretty good graduate students.” A. Cuevas 2 because thereafter he reinstated Exportation but this time admissible, putatively, under contextual and epistemic restrictions (Quine 1977). Still even later Quine regretted having proposed any distinction objectively and rejects it altogether on a par with other modal devices as untenable (Quine 1982, 232).3 Now in Kripke's paper he particularly repudiates Exportation of a certain version, the view he christens as “Unrestricted Exportation.” This view harkens back to Quine's views prior to 1977. Kripke spans protestations to its variant versions held by sympathizing authors such as Ernest Sosa and one professedly unsympathetic author Dan Dennett whom Kripke thinks on the contrary really does have sympathetic views. (Sosa 1970), (Dennett 1982). The basis for these views, supposedly, rely upon the principles of pragmatics espoused in the writings of Paul Grice. For, according to Kripke, these later views of Unrestricted Exportation supposedly depend upon the notion of “conversational implicature.” Though Grice did not fully develop a substantial doctrine about this at all and yet had tentatively discussed some examples of observational sentences or perceptual utterances whereof a distinct kind of conversational implicature, supposedly thought to hold, did not apply to such contexts. I will discuss this more later on in my paper. Kripke, however, considers these supplementary views in tandem and applies sweepingly across the board a counter-argument that is supposed to show us that there are “unforeseen consequences” in such deductions. There Kripke will be appealing to his very own notion of ––“intuitive”––understanding of literal truth of a semantic of discourse. Lastly, Kripke raises the question whether or not these authors would accept his own position. In my paper I want to discuss whether we should even accept Kripke's criticism to have adequately captured both the basic Exportation view which Quine specified and the Unrestricted Exportation versions. I will primarily focus on Kripke's argumentations against what is understood as Sosa's “logically correct but rhetorically misleading,” pragmatic explanation with which Sosa utilizes as a solution for the apparent weakness in an objection (The oldest spy/tallest spy/least spy kind of objection) that had been employed supposedly as an attack to undermine Quine's first distinction of belief. At one time this main objection which had been raised by Robert Sleigh was thought to be a knockdown refutation to Quine's first distinction, but actually Quine wrote that his second sense entailed Exportation not his first sense. However, to fix the problem of what I'm calling the main objection, Sosa proposes and defends a pragmatic solution. So here are my aims and purposes of this paper; (i) start off by reviewing a few preliminaries on Exportation and going over its historical developments. (ii) Then I will attempt to piece together Sosa's own account of Exportation and later discuss the origin and problem to the main objection. (iii) Next, I will recapitulate Kripke's position and state my objections to it. (iv) Finally, in light of this, I show why none of these authors prove anything. There are no unnoticed consequences. I. Preliminaries: On Exportation. Allow me first to endeavor to propose a rough sketch of Exportation, to guide us through the rough waters: (EXP) Exportation, simpliciter, is the doctrine that given a notional report of belief, de-dicto, an inference is implied via existential generalization on a singular term α within the 'that'-clause, to a relational report of belief, de-re.4 3 Ernest Sosa wrote a brief history on this in his paper in footnote 11. and kripke notes a few comments about its history. To highlight here, Exportation was initially contested by the logician Jaakko Hintikka in his book, Knowledge and Belief, (Hintikka 1962,138). Hintikka wrote of Exportation to be dependent upon the notion of “knowing who” someone is. Hintikka subsequently thought that this relied upon his modal notion of “cross-world-identification” of an individual across possible worlds. (Hintikka 1962, 149; 1971). However, the main objection to Exportation had been first postulated by Robert Sleigh. This objection was supposed to show that if Exportation held then Quine's doctrine of Opacity amounts to a triviality. I'll write in detail in my second section why I think the objection is ungrounded. 4 Quine dwelt on a practical distinction of belief between the notional and the more informative relational report. But the distinction really comes in two very different versions. The practical distinction teased out by Quine's illustrative tale of Ralph, shown to be troublesome for the practical relational report, de-re. He thought these de-re reports were utter nonsense, unallowable and should be banned. So for the first sense distinction of belief Quine eliminates the relational de-re from the practical account and he eliminates the notional, de-dicto practical construction. All that remains of it is an odd notional report to a predicative element: that is, a belief that F, an atomic predicate. Now as regards Quine's second sense distinction of belief, a relational de-re construction is revamped but A. Cuevas 3 Here I'm keeping with the standard scholastic nomenclature applied to Quine's practical distinction of belief. To begin with I think it important to exhibit the deeper nuances to that distinction. Apparently, Quine did not only present this practical distinction of belief that is now so familiar between the notional and relational but also had rendered two variants of it. Quine had shown through an ingenious philosophical thought experiment that the practical distinction led to logical contraries in belief contexts, because of the apparent substitute failures of codesignating singular terms (non-vacuous proper names or definite descriptions) embedded in the ‘that’-clauses of the belief de-dicto. For according to Quine, an individual S believes that some determined x, under a singular term, satisfies a predicate F, and at the same time S does not believe that the same x under a co-designator satisfies the relevant predicate F. The classic illustrative story by Quine is that of Ralph who believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy and Ralph believes that the man seen at the beach is not a spy. Yet Ralph does not know that the two men are one and the same. This is Quine concludes shows that the 'that'-clauses are “sealed off” from quantification-in, i.e., resulting in the subject position of the 'that'-clauses to be not purely referential but in a word “opaque.” This began his famous regimentation on Opacity. Firstly, Quine concludes that in light of this issue, the practical de-re constructions were nonsensical. Therefore, his first sense (regiment) is one which has no de-re construction at all. He salvages something like the de-dicto iteration; yet, the predicative element F is not a “whole” about anyone. Quine did test passing the practical de-re and de-dicto constructions through without any quantificational scrutiny in which acceptably we must reject the contradictory outcome. However for this account to seemingly work, we should have to accept the seemingly contradictory nature of the de-dicto reports, whereby we “acquiesce” that S really believes what she professes not to believe. Though I will not categorize this attempt as his second sense, even though Quine mistakenly so stated. I say this because it is simply the consequent of the practical distinction allowed to fully run its course. Nevertheless Quine was reluctant to do without. He spoke of the indispensability of the de-re locution in (any) language. As against the first sense, he proposed a solution to his dilemma by supplying an intensional proviso, i.e. Quine's “more suggestive treatment,” to which he works out the apparent kinks of the de-re construction. He reasons that the suggestive apparatus restores the substantive reference de-re of an external individual y, yet denies satisfaction into some predicate F. Here we merely –name an intensional attribute, like “F.” These quotations of intensions Quine claims are referentially opaque, so no one is thought to be the nth-place of the predicate F. I take this to exhibit his actual second sense of belief. Also, Quine held that, in this second sense, the de-dicto formulation is a belief between S and a – named intensional proposition “P” (i.e., belief that 'there are spies,' […] “intensions of degree 0... without free variable” (Quine 1956)). Now there are some really good philosophers who have confused or conflated Quine’s second intensional treatment with his first sense or his practical acceptance test. As regards EXP, it should be clear that it would violate Quine's first sense and the practical acceptance test. Quine initially postulated that Exportation implicatively held within his intensional treatment. So respectively, EXP cannot be applied to these other treatments; accept within Quine's second sense, this is the “more suggestive treatment,” thereof the emphasis is in terms of names of intensions. Again, the intensional treatment is applied to the second sense of belief.5 To help make these different distinctions clearer, I suggest my own semi-logical formulation and classification written below delineating each boundary of Quine's inked iterations at that period in time (1956). Following Quine here the instances of 'Bs' serves as a now consists in terms of names of intensions. This comes to a belief about y, a particular res (object) that it has a certain property, under a named intension, vis-a-vis an attribute “F” of 'ψ(x).' Quine held this to be a multiple relation between the object, Ralph and the attributed, “F,” naming the intension “ψ(x).” So, for example, this new relational belief, de-re, is a belief of a unique object y that is believed by S to be 'a spy.' While the notional belief, de-dicto report: it is a dyadic relation between Ralph and a named proposition “P” that of '((∃y)(ψ(x)))'. So for example: Ralph believes that 'there are spies.' The practical reading of de dicto is notoriously complicated and I will not address the difficulties beset it here, doing so goes beyond the scope of this paper. 5 It has come to my attention that Sean Crawford makes this point as well in his 2008 paper. He writes of [Q&PA] “[...]Quine’s real problem with exportation is that his endorsement of its general validity is inconsistent with his doctrine of the opacity of de dicto belief because it requires de dicto belief to be relational and opacity prohibits this—then a solution is readily available” (Crawford: 2008 pp.84). A. Cuevas 4 functor which stands for “S believes that” ascriptions and 'F' stands for an atomic predicate: Practical Distinction; (a) de-re: (∃x) Bs (x is an F). [Quine thinks this is false.] (b) de-dicto: Bs (∃x) (x is an F). [Quine says this is true, if understood as (d), otherwise false.] First sense; (c) de-re: [nonsensical, banned by Quine] (d) de-dicto: Bs (F's). [Opaque in a relational aspect: relative to a context Quine ceases to ascribe, notionally, any affirmed relationship between S and x whom S thinks x to be F or not F. Rather S perceives that y and conceives quantification “within” F, wherein someone is thought to be F or not F. It is perfectly conceivable for S that there is an F, someone or something which on occasion and condition is F or has F, if not, this is an empty concept for him. Since Quine knows in this context who meets the occasion and conditions. It's transparent for Quine here under any designation. Yet for S she does not know who.] (The question over the scope of indefinite singular terms like 'someone' in de-dicto belief reports is really here the crux of the greater issue. 'Someone' is not a referential term, according to Quine. Yet if we accept that the position in a sentence to be purely referential, then on that account we know who someone is. This entails a mode of referential transparency in belief contexts for us. It is because we know who the someone is that makes the subject positions referential. But not so for S who only believes whosoever in a context is F.) Second Sense (intensions included); (1a) de-re: (∃y) Bs “F” ('ψ(x)') of y. [A multiple relation between S, an individual y and a named intensional attribute “F”: degree 1. Quine uses 'z' instead of 'F' and 'a spy' instead of the exposed intensional form here. The attributes are not to be confused with predicate F.] (2b) de-dicto: Bs “P” '(∃y)((ψ(x))' [Opaque in named intension. A binary relation between S and a named intension “P” or degree 0. Quine calls these intensions “*propositions,*” but its unlike the trivial proposition. Rather “P” imbibes no semantic meaning. We or S are free to vain quantification “within,” but the expression “there is someone” within in (2b) is utterly nonsensical. One might ask how Quine could affirm or deny such reports. Quine would later say it is merely a bet, naturally based on observable speech acts and behavioral responses. The reason fits nicely as it were here with Quine's story of Ralph who believes that 'Orcutt is a spy,' as “true,” yet his report “happens to be false.”] Now before getting here to comfortable with intensions; it is certainly well known in the philosophy of language literature that Quine demurred the status of intensions. He thought that the workings of intensions were to vague to uniquely individuate objects and in a figure of speech he said that intensions were “creatures of darkness,” desiring to cast intensions into the bottomless pit.6 6 Opacity was challenged by David Kaplan in his paper “Quantifying-in”: he presents an analysis of Quine's opaque construction for belief contexts of the first sense. Kaplan's analysis is in terms of quotations of sentences with metavariable components. These meta-variables are thought to range over definite singular terms (Kaplan 1968). But to accomplish this feat, Kaplan adopts his modus operandum from two main sources. Firstly, drawing upon Fregean semantic notions of direct and indirect belief contexts and the second from Alonzo Church’s logical apparatus of the lambda predicate. The former adaptation derives from Frege's methodology of treating the reference of an “indirect” expression, say those found in quotations marks, as denoting the term itself. Kaplan capitalizes on this idea, putting two and two together, and postulates that for certain sentences of indirect belief contexts, wherein a meta-variable such as 'α' is quoted, for example; “α is a male sibling”, here the indirect expression will make sense, if and only if, the 'α' denotes more than itself. This move is instrumental in showing to Kaplan that if quoted, the meta-variable, must make quantifiable reference, to a sense at least (perhaps a necessary one). Now with this maneuver, although I think it is somewhat of a intensionalist /functionalist parlor trick, Kaplan nevertheless postulates a similar notion of what he dubbed as “meaning marks.” Here he says illustrating this point, “The meaning of 'brother' is “male sibling,” within meaning marks (external abstract-graspers strikes back). The consequence of this is that Kaplan deduces seemingly the A. Cuevas 5 Kripke in his paper did say that the (practical) distinction really has its genesis in Russell's famous paper “On Denoting” (1905). That is correct, although the Russellian authorship perhaps is ill considered given the minutest differences between the first and second senses of belief. The first sense had no de-re locutions. And Quine's second sense, intensionally modified, freed de-re singular terms from the ambiguous syntactic maneuvers of Russell's descriptive scope permutations of complex propositions.7 Though Kripke's position is that the distinction is implausible, come what may. Thus, following Quine's way of capturing Exportation, (of course with appropriate changes in numbering) “The kind of exportation which leads from [(2)] to [(1)] should doubtless be viewed in general as implicative,” shown above and below formalized from (2b) to (1a), respectively. In other places Quine calls this move “semantic ascent” from a dyadic to a triadic construction (Quine 1956): Second Sense (intensions included); (1) There is someone such that S believes of it 'is a spy.' (de-re) (1a) (∃y) (Bs “F” ('a spy') of y). (2) S believes that 'there are spies.' (de-dicto: S believes that 'someone is a spy.') (2b) Bs “P” '((∃y)(ψ(x)))'. Now, I wish to make a point here, according to Quine, the y in (1a), the determined thing, which is relevant “under the terms of our illustrative story,” who accordingly to Quine or possibility of quantification into a meta-variable over some definite sense, in the “indirect” expression. This path led him to the second adaptation whereby Kaplan manages to tap-into the intensional dimension, because given a de-re report of α, it “represents,” a sense, for example “male sibling” to someone who believes “α is a male sibling.” Finally Kaplan's makes use of Alonzo Church's denotation predicate which is basically a predicate functor for necessity/essence which must take in its denotation. As Kaplan illustrates there is a special relationship that necessarily holds between “nine” and the number nine. For example, “is denoted: '___' to (…); 'three' to the number three.” Kaplan modifies on the logician’s device here and introduces a similar referential device for given names that he calls “standard names,” which he thinks can be “freed from empirical vicissitudes.” In short, what is teased out is basically an early theoretical semantics on direct-reference of a proper name and the casual mechanism supporting it: both Kripke and Kaplan at this time were trading ideas on this one as Kripke confirms being in communication with him at that time. Someplace tucked away in a footnote Kaplan mentions correspondence with Kripke and Charles Chastin. Now the conditions for a standard name that Kaplan extols is that, the standard name denote x and the term plays a “vivid” role (beyond really high-definition!) somehow prominently in the ordering of objects in one's “inner-story.” This entails one must be “en rapport” with the term. Now various philosophers including Quine himself deemed the notion of standard names as ad hoc. In Quine's case this is due in large part to his demurring stance against Essentialism. But more to the point, of a term's exportability, Sosa did in his paper consider Kaplan's analysis, however was dissatisfied for various reasons. For one thing he contested the condition that one must be “en rapport” with a name. Kaplan wrote of this that we all do not have access to the same full stock of terms at our disposal, implying we must only have the terms we believe we know, or really do know that we have. Sosa reckons that if one were not “en rapport” with a name, situations for a foreign tourist would be “intolerable.” How could someone entertain any beliefs about some foreign object? Secondly, Sosa likewise worries that any possible thing in the near future cannot be thought of either; because, for example, it is not possible to think that the longest length in the universe in the year 2060 is a length. Kaplan writing much later in “Afterthoughts” concedes to the objection in general (Kaplan 1989b, 605). 7 As already emphasized by Kripke in an earlier paper, he wrote that Russell never could have allowed for “Unrestricted Exportation” wholesale: since, it amounts to claiming that for definite descriptions the small scope readings always imply the large scope readings. But Kripke wrote that no two-fold distinction can exhaust Russell’s notion of scope. Scope readings are expandable creating intermediate scopes (Kripke; 1977, 2005). This is still a rather strange saying to my ears because wouldn't Russell deny existential instantiation of the outermost co-designation if it were not the original inner term expressed in the judgement? In addition, why did Russell's afterthoughts on “The Unity of a Proposition,” alter so many times? Russell had waxed and waned over it and eventually in 1923 decided on the matter. He finally thought the relation to be only a binary one. So given Russell's last thoughts on this issue, I'm a bit puzzled about how Russell would analyze the relationships of all implicit ways of taking the propositional content within the singular proposition. Although under his narrow theory of knowledge by acquaintance, the whole proposition should include, not only the objects of belief and their relations, but also the relations between the relations as explicit constituencies. That was somewhat of a troublesome task to overcome given the usual Russellian notion of judgment at that time (belief for Russell) of a singular proposition. So later Russell changed his mind about the exact number of relations that held in such judgments. Simply put the question over the number of relations amounts to wether the verb of belief is a binary relation or multiple relation. It turns out that certain logical and metaphysical problems arise as well when one includes the relevant relations themselves as constituents of the (Russellian) singular proposition. Russell's worries arose in large part due to influential remarks on the matter written to him by Wittgenstein, although the exact determining factor is still controversial. Russell finally in 1923, changed back to his 1902 view, that it was simply a binary relation after all, but that from 1910 on, he held a multiple relation. A. Cuevas 6 perhaps someone else who has read his story about Ralph indeed can maneuver to existentially instantiate on that 'y.' And as Quine states: “[(1a)] does remain true of [(Philby)] under any designation.” (Quine 1956). Thus, given knowledge of Quine's story it is possible for us, to instantiate on the 'y' of (1a) to something like these de-dicto expressions: (3) The Eiffel Tower is believed by S to be a spy. (3a) The longest length is believed by S to be a spy. (3b) The man in the brown hat is believed by S to be a spy. This lends support to the view that there are a preponderance of instantiated singular terms to choose from with which Quine could intend to employ in picking-out, appropriately, the relevant object in the context of this situation. Here it is hinted at rather loosely a stance on “Unrestricted Exportation.” Now, what Quine does reject is a cross-reference from an opaque construction (d) with a definite singular term, say, 'The Eiffel Tower,' inside the 'that'-clause, to a transparent construction (1) that has an outside indefinite singular “someone,” (Quine 1960)8. Tyler Burge once sketched this “under any designation” doctrine in his paper “Belief De Re,” although for him the Quinean de-re/de-dicto constructions at the “surface-level” require a more thorough reading to fully capture the epistemic criterion. In his own example case he mentions: Quantified cases are analogous. If we say that Alfie believes de re something to be ugly, we imply that one existential instantiation is as good as any other that picks out the same entity (Burge 1977, 341). II. Sosa qualifies exportation Let us now review Sosa's vigorous point of view on the conditions of Exportation. It should be pertinent to acknowledge here that Sosa eventually accepts account (I.) below. This he thinks exhibits the clearest, bare-bones, logical formulation of Exportation there is. As he states: “A simpler solution is account I. … A simpler reduction of de re to de dicto attitudes is hard to imagine.” (Sosa 1970, 895-896). The rules of Exportation in account (I.) is nearly rendered as the Quinean view, but for it to be rendered as an instance of EXP we should be talking about the second sense and if not de-re is false. Its criteria is; one, there being a definite term, second, it denotes x, and third, S believes as much, necessarily implies S believes of the object x that it is F. Now, this is closely in form to Kaplan's writings (1968), to which the analysis is conversely deduced, defining the de-re report in terms of the de-dicto report and Kripke makes a note of this reversal. However, Sosa does away with the criterion of representation of x, in favor of the denotation of x. As Sosa states: I. S believes about x that it is F (or believes x to be F) if and only if there is a singular term α such that S believes ⌜α is F⌝, where α denotes x. It is important to note here that Sosa remarks that at one time he was “tempted to accept something like the present view [I].” The consideration to which Sosa is mentioning here is his own account (III.): whereof its extra caveat has it that a term is exportable only if it is “distinguished.” I will delve into this later. III. S believes about x that it is F (believes x to be F) if and only if there is a singular term α such that S believes ⌜α is F⌝, where α both denotes x and is a distinguished term. The appeal to account III. pivots off Sosa's attempt to uphold a failed objection against Quine's views of the first sense: since the objection led to aporia. The story of the objection and its outcomes are swiftly recognized by Sosa (1970) and less so by Kripke. But instead of simply 8 Quine writes in his book Word and Object; "Where transparency matters in relation to indefinite singular terms is that there must not be a pronominal cross-reference from inside an opaque construction to an indefinite singular term outside the construction" (Quine 1960, 148). A. Cuevas 7 parroting their thin accounts, let us review the genesis of this main objection next. The oldest spy objection At this stage I want to first make a few comments here about this objection. I think the objection and its derivative forms all stem from a confusion. Now to be fair it was the logician Jaakko Hintikka who motivated charge against Quine's views on Opacity; but, it appears that he misunderstood the various renderings of Quine's iterations. This will be made evident shortly. Still plainly this is where later Robert Sleigh who popularized the objection closely mimics Hintikka's mistake. Hintikka as I see it mistakenly presumes that Quine's insights concerning the one allowable implication of EXP of belief ascriptions as we have seen already noted above leading from (2b) to (1a) of the second sense, is repeatable in “transparent” (i.e., non-opaque) knowledge ascriptions from (b') de-dicto to (a') de-re and that the truth values of (a') and (b') are the same as that of (a) and (b) of the practical distinction. Here are two examples that I use: (a') de-re: There is something such that S knows that it is a length (or there is someone S knows to be a spy). [Hintikka takes as false, just as Quine's (a)] (b') de-dicto: S knows that something is a length (or that someone is a spy). [Hintikka takes as true and opaque “within”, just as Quine's (b). Though possibly for Quine its only really transparent for the knower of the whosoever.] The truth prescriptions and features to which Hintikka makes use of here are stated briefly by Quine in the beginning of his 1956 paper [Q&PA]. There Quine wrote that there is a “vast” difference between (a) and (b) and that (a) is false, while (b) is true. The two authors also site Quine's book Word and Object, wherein Quine states that (a) the de-re belief conveys “urgent information” (Quine 1960, 147-148). But as I have already noted the truth values in question of (a) and (b) matter only to propositional attitudes of the verb 'believe' of the practical distinction so why it has been extrapolated to knowledge reports by Hintikka and Sleigh shows they might have confused distinctions. And, the “vast” difference comment was in regard to the oddity of the scope of indefinite singular terms in belief contexts because Quine at the time had questioned in Word and Object whether indefinite terms like 'someone' ought to be taken (b or d) as transparent or opaque. Since, considering if (b) is taken as transparent, the results show that the outcome of the practical testing follow as true. And if (d) is taken as transparent, it is because the knower now knows who the whosoever is: just as Quine thought. From one erroneous move to another, the idea that EXP could even apply to knowledge reports is inconsistent with Quine's truth prescriptions of the practical distinction. Also, the second sense is plainly a different treatment all together compared to the practical distinction or even of the first sense: theirs is just an incorrect mapping. The second sense has it that its reports imply EXP because (1a) is true and (2b) is true but happens to be false for Ralph. Now it is certainly the case that Quine had qualified his views on Opacity whereof quantification from (a) to (b) is inadmissible. Thus, it would be logically inconsistent for Quine to conclude that (b) implies (a), let alone even imagining that (d) implies anything because this collapses his distinctions. But according to Hintikka (b') implies (a'). Isn't this implausible? Eventually though, Sleigh doubted in a later paper that Hintikka's argument was a valid one. Sleigh notes that Quine never really committed himself to any thesis stating necessary truth conditions for transparent constructions of knowledge reports (Sleigh 1968, 397-398). So, his position is not univocal to that of Hintikka's. Still, later on Quine wrote on the notion of de-re knowledge as lacking clarity emphasizing among other things that its riddled with problems of the Gettier type. (Quine 1987). So, by that time and even before, Quine held that epistemic claims hang on one having a high degree of belief. The thought is that our existential posits are simply bets. Now, if we are to accept Hintikka's appropriation criterion and generalizing, (strawman) then consequently it implies something along the lines that there is a “presumed” dedicto/de-re distinction for knowledge; hence (a') and (b'), and here if we were to take the indefinite term within the de-dicto report to be construed as transparent, and whereof we presume something like EXP holding, then the resulting de-re knowledge report must express A. Cuevas 8 the “urgent information,” as well. Although as it turns out in some contexts it looks like it does not express “urgent information.” And even more problematic, as against Quine, the results must imply that knowledge de-re is true. Hence this shows (b') to be a triviality: no such dual distinction. Likewise, –we are supposed to conclude so much the worse for the practical distinction of belief and discard too its intensional derivations. Let us prejudice these assumptions on behalf of Hintikka's reasonings and consider some examples which are supposed to capture the consequences to his views of knowledge reports. Suppose for example 'knows' is taken transparently in (4) and (6), where (4) derives from (b'): (4) S knows that the length is the length (de-dicto: Transparent). [This holds given that the denotation of the first 'length' to the relevant thing in a given context, has been identified uniquely as the object y, in our world and others. (try examples: “The length of a meta-logical formula is a length,” “The interval is an interval” or “This period of time is a period of time). ] (5) The length of the universe is the length (sentential: Transparent). As a result, then (4) and (5) imply (6). (6) S knows that the length of the universe is the length (de-dicto: Transparent). Now we can move from (6) to obtain (a') or (7) by [via EXP] existentially generalizing on the relevant definite singular term within the 'that'-clause, acquiring the de-re knowledge report. This is not allowable from (b) to (a) de-re belief because as Quine (1960) says “there is a price to pay,” but we are assuming that it holds here. (7) There is a length of the universe S knows it to be a length (de-re: ?). The inference does follow if we presume that the singular term, is “purely referential” to borrow an expression from Quine, in (4) and (5). Which is not to be construed as Kripke's notion of a rigid designator. Hintikka's idea is that both knowledge ascriptions (7) and (6) are true, whereas he assumes according to what he thinks Quine meant that (7) is false, because his (a) is false. Again this is just strange to my ear, however Hintikka at first thinks this shows a clear refutation to the practical dual distinction. However under careful examination there is a discovery here about (7). We may ask about (7) is there apodeictic knowledge de-re or merely an opaque construction? It is reported by Sleigh that Hintikka acknowledges no explicit reference is being made. If we take my own example, there is no known unique particular length of the universe (even given the length of the universe) such that S knows of it to be a length. This consequently shows that the objection is weak and we cannot EXP. Hintikka concludes that (7) must be opaque and to explain this puzzle he devised and defended an alternative formulation stated in a later paper, superseding his earlier principles in his book Knowledge and Belief. Hintikka writes on this: The conditions of existential generalization are, with some qualifications which we can here forget, precisely the truth conditions of certain "who" or "what" statements. For instance, a moment's thought easily shows that a term, say 'b', picks out one and the same individual from all the possible worlds compatible with what [S] knows if and only if [S] knows who (or what) b is. Likewise, the conditions of exportation in belief contexts (say, in discussing [S]'s beliefs) are in the simplest cases the same as the truth conditions of statements of the form "[S] has a belief about who (or what) b is"-or, depending on the context, "[S] has a correct belief about who (or what) b is" - [Hintikka 1971, 493]. The remark points to an extra premise which Hintikka says is that S has an opinion who someone is. That is: (8a) (∃x)Ks(x= α) written in his own special half-symbolism of epistemic logic. Its reported by Sleigh that his reformulations show that if (6) and (8) are true, then (7) is true. A. Cuevas 9 (8) S knows (who) what/where the length of the universe is. Now (8) is construed as knowing what the ontology of a thing is. So, given my example, we must be able to identify what/where the length of the universe lay (or who the agent is if we're talking about spies). This isn't merely being told by a numerical value and description of the length of the universe. Returning now to Sleigh 1967, his aim was to broach Hintikka's “knowing who” condition (8). Sleigh claimed that Hintikka's revised epistemic interpretations were incompatible with the indiscernibility of identicals. This principle was first introduced in the writings of Leibniz who wrote of substances: that is, if x be identical to y, and Fx, then Fy. (Discourse on Metaphysics) To accomplish this feat Sleigh simply adds a new opaque construction. Let us consider the following; if (6), (8), (9), (10), and (11) are consistent, then this implies (7) and the negation of (7) as true. However in that case it would be incompatible with the aforementioned principle of identicals: and Quine's dilemma of Ralph repeats all over again. However, if these sentences are inconsistent, the “knowing who” condition becomes here superfluous. (Sleigh 1967, 29-30) (9) S does not know that the farthest apart of two ends is a length. (10) S knows what/where the farthest apart of two ends is. (11) The the length of the universe is the farthest apart of two ends. We have been reviewing Hintikka's original objection. Now, in connection let us look at Sleigh's contributions and his similar device. He introduces the “oldest spy objection,” which later is appropriated by other authors, who will use corresponding examples in their papers like the shortest spy/least spy/tallest spy, etc. This is the main objection to which Sosa wants to uphold in account (I.) Sleigh restated his findings the clearer in a footnote as the following (with change of numbering and constants to match our schema); it is assumed by Sleigh the same premises that Hintikka presumed before in his argument for transparent knowledge reports, that the same Quinean truth values of (a) as false, (b) as true, and the same claim to “vast” differences between (a) and (b) holds; and the claim of the “urgent information” to (a) holds here. Indeed well enough Sleigh does question adopting Hintikka's mistake of applying EXP to transparent knowledge reports. Let us read here what Sleigh takes to be instrumental for this argument to succeed: For example consider: [(b)] [(S)] believes that there are spies. and [(a)] There is someone [(S)] believes to be a spy. Quine calls our attention to the vast difference between [(b)] and [(a)]. Suppose [(b)] true and [(a)] false. Now suppose [(S)] believes that in any non-empty set of human beings one is older than any other. [(S)] puts this belief together with the one [(b)] ascribes to him so that the following is true: [(12)] [(S)] believes that (the oldest spy)o [o = opaque] is a spy. If we may pass from [(b')] to [(a')] then from [(12)] we have: [(13)] [(S)] believes that (the oldest spy)t [t = transparent] is a spy. Now given that there is an oldest spy we may generalize (existentially) on [(13)] obtaining [(a)]. Here the vast difference between [(b)] and [(a)] seems to have collapsed. The move from [(12)] to [(13)] seems to be the troublemaker - [Sleigh 1968, 397, ft. 9]. As he recognizes that the “troublemaker” is from (12) to (13). What this really is in our score, is moving from (b') to (a'). Sosa is highlighting Hintikka's argument but warns cautiously of the troublemaker. We know however the criticism is ungrounded since there is no valid instances from (b') to (a') if misconstrued as the EXP of the second sense from (2b) to (1a), prescribed the same truth values Quine claimed of (a) false and (b) true! Nevertheless, strictly speaking the argument of both authors rest upon false premises so neither support their conclusions. What remains here is no cogent objection against Quine's earlier views of that time. The detractors of Quine's view on exportation, who based their conclusions on similar premises are incorrect also. A. Cuevas 10 Sosa's alternative account We have diverged off topic and we should continue talking about Sosa's alternative account III. So let us now pick up where we got off track. I want to comment first that I find Sosa's philosophy here to be extremely clever yet at times terribly explained. Still as Kripke remarks, no one thus far has presented a better case. Even so, let me try to paraphrase Sosa's ideas. Recall account I., Sosa swiftly mentions that it is susceptible to something like the puzzle of (7). There Sosa is speaking about belief using 'the tallest spy' term (this is Sleigh's “oldest spy” routine: As noted above its not a cogent objection on other grounds). As Sosa remarks: “it does not necessarily follow that there is anyone he believes to be a spy, even given a tallest spy,” which is correct. Here then the same question can be raised: is de-re belief in this case transparent or opaque? Sosa calls this “the oddity,” of EXP of I. In the longest length de-re example some doubt is in fact raised, precisely “the oddity” of EXP which Sosa would be unease about. Sosa's solution tries to explain why there seems to be a failure in the objection. To accomplish this feat, he introduces a distinction. Firstly, this oddity is cashed out in terms of unrecognized contextual features; secondly he draws our attention to a moral, inasmuch as it would be misleading to say what someone believes to be true without such and such feature known to the discussants. A filling in of the surrounding discourse is a major factor for EXP. I want to comment here that the notion of contextual dependency to which Sosa invokes already had been implied before, in Quine's writings (1956, 1960), even though it had not been completely emphasized by him. Surely, Quine did not make a moral out it. Still Quine did recognize the different contextual factors between what Ralph knew and what he knew, and could report to some degree. Furthermore, this notion of properly cooperating in communication derives from Paul Grice who introduced such maxims of cooperation. In connection here Grice once dealt with a certain objection to a different thesis concerning expressions of perception out of which derives the moral used here by Sosa (Grice 1961). Though Sosa never mentions Grice by name it is assumed that's where he adopted the notion by Kripke. In any event Grice did not think that this objection was entirely correct. Some Ordinary Language philosopher, though no record of who survives, at the time argued that there is some doubt or denial implication being made when S says “it looks red to me.” Otherwise the doubt or denial condition is incomplete and the person has violated a general maxim of cooperation. Furthermore, the implication is that the statement was neither true nor false and the person ought to have made the stronger claim: “that it is red.” Well evidently, Grice should like to think that saying I believe “it looks red to me,” when seeing a red British mail box in broad daylight does not necessarily imply that in such a situation there is some doubt or denial condition which went unsatisfied by the speaker who would be liable of a misuse of the language. Even so, Grice would not agree –it's in fact devoid of plausibility. Because, in general, he concludes that there are occurrences of the utterance “it looks red” in some context whereby a doubt or denial is implied by such locutions; but, its use is not necessarily, as he puts it, attached to the meaning of the expression (Grice 1961, 124-125). At first approximation Grice surmises: “Exactly what this principle is I am uncertain, but a first shot would be the following: 'One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing.' ” (Grice 1961, 132). Sosa's moral In the following let us codify and paraphrase Sosa's understanding of the moral as: (e) It is just a fact that <P> is true & S believes <P>. [<P> = The tallest spy is a spy. (Atemporal Prop.)] (f) There is an appropriate way to ascribe (e) to hearers, in such a way that will not “mislead” them into puzzling (doubting or denying) about (e)'s logical truth. Moreover, the idea here is that whenever the moral is met, this implies that for a A. Cuevas 11 qualified salient context [account III.], non-misleading, one is not merely uttering the weaker dedicto report, that S believes <P>. Rather, one recognizes the report as conveying the stronger de-re belief report, that there is someone S believes to be F. This in turn implies the strongest claim is true, saying S knows <P>. Conversely, where there is no context [account I.], saying the weaker de-dicto report may suggest uncertainty as to whether <P> is really true. This may give us “the impression” as Kripke surmises that it implies that S does not believe <P>, nor that S know <P>. Kripke sees this as a shaky weak point, which he'll develop and attack in his paper. However, as Sosa says, even if we did mislead a hearer [account I.]; nonetheless for all intents and purposes, S still believes what S knows, <P>. So, he thinks that the de-re belief logically follows regardless because there really is a fact about the matter that <P> in which S knows of the x to be F. Sosa's construal of account I is that its logically correct (e), but rhetorically misleading as to (f). Grice would says: “its suggestio falsi is perfectly compatible with its literal truth” (1961, 125). Hence Sosa then opts for account III, wherein EXP is restored, at least most of the time, given there is an appropriate context to export the singular term found within the de-dicto report. This occurs when the term is “distinguished” in the “filled-in” context. Now, Sosa elucidates on the contextuality of exportation by giving several examples.9 Forgive me too if I don't go over every example. Let us consider five corresponding examples which Kripke would belittle as ––“toy duck examples.” Example 1: This example takes place before the makers of the toy, Mr. Potato Head, made it entirely of plastic and as the toy was newly introduced into the markets. Suppose that there is an English speaking parent who takes her child to a toy store. There the parent is puzzled by what she sees on display in the store. She asks her child: “What is that? Is that a potato? It's been pinned with plastic arms, hands and feet? Is that really a toy?” The child, knowing what it is, having seen the product's advertisements run on television, replies to her mother: “Oh yes, that's a toy! His name is Mr. Potato Head. –but it doesn't include that potato, we supply our own potatoes.” Example 2: Supposing a parent and her child are sitting outside on their front porch. The mother says to the child: “Oh look, a hummingbird.” The child notices it hoovering too. The child says: “It looks to me to be spying on us!” The parent replies: “No silly! It's just flying around.” Now, little do both of them know that the object hoovering is an animatronic sky-drone designed by their government to spy on its citizens. Now, back at ground control, the drone operator reports to his Supervisor: “The kid believes that someone is spying on them!” “No,” says the Supervisor, “She only believes that the hummingbird is watching them. She does not believe that we are spying on them.” Example 3: Suppose that an instructor gives her students a questionnaire. The instructor once was a researcher at CERN so she believes that she knows the answer. One of the questions is a very simple one. This question reads: “Which one of the following is the smallest particle; (A) Gluon, (B) Photon, (C) The smallest particle, (D) Sparticle.” Example 4: Supposing, similarly, a situation like that shown in the movie The Truman Show10. (Those of you who have seen the movie should understand which character I'm referring too) Truman is looking up at the sky and says: “I believe from the look of things it's going to rain.” One of the producers of The Truman Show says about their ignorant captive that “Truman thinks the clouds will rain.” The environmental operator of the show says “Well if he wants rain –we'll give him rain. But actually he does not have a belief about any clouds that can rain. There are no actual clouds in his doomed world. It's just all digital sky: so, it psychologically means rain.” 9 Kripke is sympathetic to some of Sosa's examples, namely those which are about beliefs of self-ascription. 10 Niccol, Andrew. The Truman Show. Film. Directed by Peter Weir. U.S: Paramount Pictures, 1998. A. Cuevas 12 Example 5: Suppose that Smith is the greatest police detective ever. Now someone has been spying on him. Smith happens to glance outside his window and notices a shadowy figure dashing away. Clumsily, the spy has dropped her spy camera in the hedge. Smith finds the camera and surmises that someone has been snooping on him. Smith then uses his police two-way radio to report his findings. Amongst other things he reports, Smith states: “The owner of this spy camera is a spy.” Then, not far away, the faceless spy and her accomplice are hiding out and are listening to Smith's radio transmissions. The accomplice remarks: “Now you've done it, Blank. Smith knows you've been spying on him!” “No,” says the faceless spy, “Smith only knows that whoever is the owner of the spy camera is a spy. He doesn't believe or know that I've been spying on him.” Taking characteristically similar examples, Sosa wants to show that it is rather indefinite to determine which terms are to be exported. Since as it turns out any designator will do if understood in the appropriate context. At times the exportability of the term is entirely dependent on the relative interests of the subjects and other contextual factors. The crucial question of what counts as a distinguished term he says "is a wholly pragmatic matter that can change radically from one occasion to the next” (Sosa 1970, 890). This is the doctrine of Unrestricted Exportation that Kripke laments over and vehemently rejects as doing violence to the ordinary ways a term is defined in the (English) dictionary; –it's literal truth. III. Kripke's position Let us review Kripke's counter-argument to Unrestricted Exportation. I take him to really have one concern which basically is the acceptance of the pragmatic condition on exportation. There the problem for Kripke is that Sosa's view is incompatible with his own treatments of modal semantic notions, such as rigid designators, or the fixing of a referent via descriptions of the necessary properties of a thing, or some such necessity of a natural kind term whereof it is necessarily the case that a lion is a lion (Naming and Necessity Kripke 1979). Furthermore, Kripke is uneasy about accepting the implication of logically correct but rhetorically misleading when saying the weaker thing may suggest the stronger is false. He thinks we should not be inclined to deny it to be the case that S knows <P>. Now, Kripke will attempt a reductio ad absurdum argument. Supposing Unrestricted Exportation to be correct given its moral of the stronger claim being implied wherein one does not believe that <P> nor know <P>. In addition, suppose says Kripke that everyone is ignorant about who Philby is. We are to take the singular term (name or definite description) in the attitudinal expression to be on par as to some object y (material object or numbers). As Kripke puts it, “Everyone, except perhaps the Deity, has a false belief.” That is everyone has a false belief about an object y that is 'Philby' that it is F, say, a spy. (g) Everyone believes Philby is a spy.11 [A literally/rhetorically false belief about the object y.] (h) If (g) is literally a false belief, any α denotes y, under which everyone thinks y to be a spy. This entails, supposedly, that no one can specify accurately who or what y is for everyone else: nor, if it is even possible to specify which y, is believed by everyone else to be F. In other words how could one tell what everyone else has meant or not meant? Kripke thinks this implies that, y drops out completely, and the only thing we can say is that everyone believes that there are F's. From the doctrine of Unrestricted Exportation we should be able to existentially generalize and export to: S believes of the Eiffel Tower that it is a spy. Kripke asks isn't it at this 11 Kripke says instead use 'The tallest spy' if one has not heard of any particular spy. Although as others have noted this will not matter much, as it does not necessarily imply that there is any one particular spy (even given one) that S believes to be a spy. Nowhere in Kripke's paper does he note Sosa's attempt to fix the main objection. Kripke only says Sosa accepted it and restated an alternative. A. Cuevas 13 surface level very misleading? The important used term might refer to any object that S can identify, even the actual Eiffel Tower. Now, Kripke stops to question whether, intuitively, the expression really is about the Eiffel Tower. Since, wasn't this the object S thought satisfies the name 'Philby'? Kripke is pointing out that he thinks our normal intuitions, the true semantics of English, is being overlooked here. What I observe in this line of questioning is that of course with no context everything is up for grabs. But, consider this example. It would be rather strange to say, out of the blue, “I have faith,” in a vacuum and just expect to be understood plainly. One could ask that person, “Faith in what?” Perhaps the person can reply, “I have faith in the Eiffel Tower.” Or perhaps a person might say, “No, I meant that I have my daughter Faith to keep me company.” In the context of the former example she might say “See, I can't use the name Yahweh so I use Eiffel Tower instead. I believe the Eiffel Tower is spying on us all.” Contextual factors do help. However, Kripke states that it is really about the person y under the singular term 'Philby' that S believes to be a spy. Kripke assumes –well of course it is! As Kripke argues it would be an absurdity or even psychotic to believe otherwise. As he wonders by noting that even if there is a context, he wants to know just what context might that be whereby any one of us says they believe about the Eiffel Tower or say, a tree in the forest, that it is a spy? I want to offer two responses to this attack. The first is what I take to be a methodological mistake being made by Kripke. If we look at the first premise Kripke clearly states “Everyone,” has a false belief. Is that correct? Since we find Kripke has excluded himself from the set of everyone. As he later reports that he clearly knows who it is that everyone else is incorrect about. ––Oh that's got to be about Philby and not about the actual Eiffel Tower. He presupposes the answer. So that cannot be correct because then there is at most one person, namely Kripke, who indubitably knows who Philby is. Hence, can Kripke even pose his own argument? To be fair he did recognize this circular move but says nothing in defense saying only that he is –intuitively correct. There is nothing wrong with this in principle as long as it is understood that there are contexts featuring the person in question, Philby, wherein he is believed by Kripke to be a spy. Perhaps in an interest relative sense in connection here to the philosophical thought experiment envisaged by Kripke, this is precisely where it is plausible. Kripke says everyone has a false belief, except perhaps the Deity. I'm not even sure what that could mean. Kripke takes this too the extreme I think ––unless we can obtain omniscience. Let us consider putting aside exporting any term and ask: have we all mistaken the very thing we thought to be the object for something else when we believed that object to be F? (––I thought I had my finger on the person but now perhaps it's just a photon. Maybe I should remeasure its length again.) Surely, Quine nor Sosa thought it common practice for everyone to be so highly skeptical about what is what. One could indeed raise that doubt no less if one desires too. Perhaps Quine does not really know who or what Orcutt is. I'm a tab bit surprised here, is this suppose to be –the big consequence? Had not Sleigh pointed out the same thing concerning Hintikka's extra premise. The price for Quine is that he would believe what he professes not to believe. Should we all henceforth lose confidence in saying that someone is correct about a Philby or the tallest spy and that they know it? In the case of Ralph, Quine has a strong degree of belief that Orcutt is known to be a spy. Sosa too is in the same ball park about the individuals in his examples. People sometimes only have a hunch and at other times clearly they profess disbelief. Nowhere, I think, has Sosa claimed to be justified to know of something absolutely. Even though in some contexts a child or even some adults may have appropriately false beliefs about inanimate objects being spies, within a context. The second thing I want to say is that Kripke presupposes that S can or should have knowledge of all things freed of such contextual vicissitudes in a pure sense. Obviously, S may attempt to identify something, but this capacity alone does not necessarily imply that she has or will ever identify everything in her known universe. And certainly she won't allow her language to do all the work for her. A. Cuevas 14 IV. Concluding remarks: No consequences. In closing what we have been discussing thus far is the issue over EXP which led Quine to eventually abandon de-re beliefs completely. The ontological commitment was too steep a price for him. Sosa's solution is nearer in theory to that of Hintikka's condition in “knowing who.” There S is sufficiently en rapport with someone. However, Kripke does not think this says all that much. Of course more questions are raised even about the nature of knowing who by Lycan and Boer (1975). It goes beyond the purpose of this paper to address their “purposive criteria” for knowing who. This is where Kripke also stops in his paper 2008, in a footnote he remarks not having a clear opinion about all the special issues raised in Lycan and Boer's paper. A. Cuevas 15 References Boer, Steven E. and Lycan, William G. (1975). “Knowing Who.” Philosophical Studies 28: 299344. Crawford, Sean. (2008). “Quantifiers and propositional attitudes: Quine revisited.” Synthese 160:75-96. Chisholm, Roderick. (1976). “Knowledge and Belief: ‘De Dicto’ and ‘De Re’.” Philosophical Studies 29: 1-20. Dennett, Dan. (1982). “Beyond belief.” Reprinted in Dennett, The intentional stance. 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