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Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing

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Abstract

By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14627, USA

    Andrew Cullison

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  1. Andrew Cullison
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Correspondence to Andrew Cullison.

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Cullison, A. Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing. Philos Stud 136, 305–318 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3255-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3255-8

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