Abstract
In response to Michael Morris, I attempt to refute the crucial second premise of the argument, which states that the formality condition cannot be satisfied “non-stipulatively” in computational systems. I defend the view of representation urged in Meaning and Mental Representation against the charge that it makes content stipulative and therefore irrelevant to the explanation of cognition. Some other reservations are expressed.
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Cummins, R. Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content: Response to Morris. Minds and Machines 1, 31–42 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00360577
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00360577