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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter 2016

Destabilizing the Error Theory

From the book Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals

  • Terence Cuneo
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110496765-005
© 2016 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston
From the book
Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals
Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals

Chapters in this book (25)

Frontmatter
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction: Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals
I. Epistemic Reasons
In Defense of Psychologism About Reasons
Learning from Learning from our Mistakes
Destabilizing the Error Theory
Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against
II. Epistemic Norms
Belief, Truth and Radical Disagreement
Assertion, Knowledge and Rational Credibility: The Scoreboard
Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards
Epistemic Standards: High Hopes and Low Expectations
What do I care About Epistemic Norms?
III Epistemic Consequentialism
Epistemic Normativity: From Direct to Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism
Tradeoffs, Self-Promotion, and Epistemic Teleology
Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle
How to Overstretch the Ethics-Epistemology Analogy: Berker’s Critique of Epistemic Consequentialism
IV. Epistemic Goals and Values
External Goals and Inherent Norms – A Cluster-Conception of Epistemic Normativity
The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg
Ought to Believe, Evidential Understanding and the Pursuit of Wisdom
Epistemic Axiology
Objectual Understanding, Factivity and Belief
Contributors
Author Index
Subject Index
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