Abstract
Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism’s resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds similar to our own. By committing themselves to true propositions of these sorts, nonnaturalists can fashion a view that is highly attractive in its own right, and resistant to the most prominent objections that have been pressed against it.
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Notes
Citations for each of these objections (and several others) can be found in the relevant discussions in the second half of the paper.
A word about the notational conventions that we employ: phrases that refer to propositions are put in corner brackets (e.g., 〈that killing is wrong〉); phrases that refer to properties or facts are italicized (e.g., being wrong, that killing is wrong); phrases that refer to concepts are put in single quotes (‘wrong’).
What if someone rejected only some, rather than all, of the moral fixed points? Our view is that this person would be to that extent an incompetent moral thinker, and that anyone who rejects a large number of the fixed points is not really thinking about morality at all. In what follows, we won’t try to settle the issue of where to set the threshold for when a person is not thinking moral thoughts, noting that the issue here is no different in kind from demarcation questions elsewhere. We say more about the conceptual skills of those who reject the moral fixed points in Sects. 3 and 7.
Some, such as McPherson (2012), want to distinguish the category of the nonnatural from the supernatural. For our purposes, nothing hangs on drawing this finer-grained distinction; we will understand the category of the nonnatural broadly enough that it encompasses the supernatural. Some have also expressed bafflement at the notion of a nonnatural concept, as opposed to a nonnatural object or property. We are unsure why. Concepts no less than properties can play explanatory roles in the usual sciences (or be the objects of study of these sciences), helping us to understand what there is. If, moreover, concepts are the constituents of propositions, some of which are principles that play explanatory roles in the usual sciences, then these concepts could also play important explanatory roles. Concepts that do not play these roles (or are not reducible to ones that do) would be good candidates for being nonnatural.
We recognize that one could attempt to categorize concepts differently, say, by denominating those that refer to natural properties as natural and those that refer to nonnatural properties as nonnatural (or, perhaps, in cases of concepts that fail to refer, by appeal to the nature of the referents they would have, were they to refer). Under this way of classifying concepts, if naturalism as a general philosophical thesis were true, then all referring concepts would be natural; if it were false, then many would be nonnatural. We prefer to employ an approach that does not imply this nearly all-or-nothing result, subjecting concepts to a categorization similar to that applied to properties, especially since some philosophers (e.g., Aune 1985) identify the two.
This lack of disagreement might be attributable to the fact that the discussion of non-reductionism in ethics has largely been conducted by asking whether moral terms are reducible to nonmoral ones. In one place, for example, Sturgeon expresses pessimism about the prospects for a “naturalistic reduction of moral discourse,” indicating that by “non-moral” he has in mind “natural” (Sturgeon 1988, p. 240; cf. also p. 242). We suspect, however, that this question about whether moral terms can be reduced to natural ones can be translated into one concerning whether moral concepts can be reduced to natural ones. That noted, Jackson (1998, Chap. 6) may be an outlier in this regard, since he maintains that moral terms are “descriptive.” A closer look at what Jackson writes about concepts on p. 34, however, indicates that he may not hold that moral and descriptive concepts are identical. We are, then, unsure whether to attribute the view to him. At any rate, we see no good arguments for this position. The fact that, as Jackson argues, we can construct so-called Ramsey sentences that replace all occurrences of moral predicates with free variables strikes us as falling far short of establishing that moral and descriptive concepts are identical.
If Gibbard (2003, p. 25) is right, the test this: see whether concepts A and B offer (in their application) non-equivalent possibilities of coherent acceptance or rejection. If they do, then they are distinct. As Gibbard sees things, moral and natural concepts plainly satisfy this criterion for concept distinctness.
Jackson and Petit (1996). Jackson and Pettit also maintain that platitudes of “substance,” which are similar to what we call the moral fixed points, are essential to determining the extension of the moral domain. On this score, the difference between their view and ours might best viewed as a matter of emphasis (although see Footnote 37).
Joyce (2001). Joyce believes that there are no categorical reasons, thereby endorsing an error theory about morality.
Cf. Nozick (1974, p. 49).
By indexing the truth of these propositions to creatures such as us in worlds such as ours, we wish to protect against bizarre possibilities in which there may be nothing at all (say) wrong with recreational slaughter. This doesn’t in fact strike us as a real possibility, but we want to be cautious about relying on modal intuitions that may not be shared by our critics. Imagine a world, for instance, in which, upon being killed, we spontaneously regenerate after a short period of time. Perhaps being killed in such circumstances is not even pro tanto wrong.
We are not sure whether there are any distant possible worlds in which there is nothing at all wrong with (say) recreational slaughter or humiliating others just for fun. If there are no such exceptions to our candidate fixed points, then we can safely omit the qualifications to do with beings like us and worlds like our own. But since we are uncertain on this matter, we will proceed on the assumption that these implicit qualifications should appear in a full statement of the fixed points.
See Reid (2010) and Cuneo (forthcoming a).
Foot (2002, Chaps. 7, 8).
Shafer-Landau (2009) offers an explanation that fits with the position developed here.
Street (forthcoming, p. 32).
A proposition’s bearing the second mark does not imply that it bears the third. There could be propositions that have framework status that are not crazy to reject. Moral error theorists might concede, for example, that the moral fixed points have framework status but also maintain that it is not crazy to reject them, since they could be true only if they implied categorical reasons, which (in their judgment) they fail to do.
We hasten to add that we do not hold that a priori propositions are immune from empirical defeat. Nor do we deny that a proposition can be a priori warranted even though acquisition of its constituent concepts is a posteriori. Does all a priori knowledge concern conceptual truths? About this matter we remain agnostic, although we do have sympathy for it, at least when the truths in question are not contingent. Cf. Jackson and Petit (1996), who defend the a priority of their analogue to the moral fixed points.
Our talk of types of conceptual truth indicates our commitment to the view that there are different species of such truths. We explain this commitment and offer some defense of it in the last section of the paper.
Though we do not offer an argument for the traditional view, it is worth noting that when it comes to the realm of what Frege called cognitive significance, we must account not only for what is represented but also for how it is represented, for there are different ways of having things in mind. The traditional view accounts for this, while the identification of singular thoughts with singular propositions does not. On this score, see Kaplan (2011), who argues that singular propositions are better thought of as the objects of propositions—what is represented—rather than propositions themselves.
Exceptions would have to be made for indexical concepts such as ‘now’ or demonstrative concepts such as ‘that’ and other tensed concepts such as ‘the president.’ See Burge (2007, p. 292). We leave it open whether all concepts are such that they determine what they are about relative to a context.
For a dissenting view, see Kaplan (1990).
Fine (1994) offers a similar gloss regarding the nature of conceptual truths. The formulation above offers only a sufficient condition for being a conceptual truth. Does it also express a necessary condition? That would depend on resolving the delicate issue of whether a proposition of the form 〈that x is F〉 could be a conceptual truth in virtue of the essence of the value of ‘x’ alone, or whether the essences of the values of both ‘x’ and ‘F’ are required. As best we can see, our view is compatible with different answers to this question.
Does accepting the Embellished Core Claim make it too easy to qualify as a nonnaturalist, allowing expressivists such as Gibbard (2003) and nonreductionist naturalist realists such as Boyd (1988), Brink (1989), and Sturgeon (2006) into the nonnaturalist camp? Not necessarily. Consider Gibbard’s view. In one place, Gibbard (2003) claims not only that our moral concepts are nonnatural, but also that these concepts might constitute moral truths (p. 182). While this might render his view a version of nonnaturalism, it would not imply that his is a version of nonnaturalist realism. Whether Gibbard’s view is a version of nonnaturalist realism would depend, in part, on whether what he calls expressive or “planning” concepts, such as ‘being the thing to do,’ could be the constituents of truths. If Gibbard is correct in regarding such concepts as something other than referential devices, then we cannot see how they could be such constituents and, thus, how his view could qualify as a form of realism. As for nonreductionist naturalists, these philosophers agree that moral terms are not naturalistic (see Sturgeon 2006). But, to our knowledge, they do not commit themselves to the further theses that moral concepts and, more importantly, moral truths, are nonnatural. Were they to embrace such commitments, their view would indeed be a version of Minimal nonnaturalism. This strikes us as a welcome implication, indicating the degree to which moral nonnaturalists and nonreductionist naturalists agree on much more than is sometimes supposed.
See Zangwill (2000, p. 281). Central to Zangwill’s argument is the claim that someone who rejects the moral fixed points, such as Göring, needn’t be conceptually confused or “abusing concepts.” We agree, for reasons that will become clear momentarily.
In what does this evidentness consist? We have no well-worked out view on this matter. However, one approach, which we offer in a speculative spirit, is to attend to the phenomenal experience that attends the consideration of propositions of certain types. Take, for example, the phenomenal experience that accompanies the consideration of the proposition 〈that no dogs are bathtubs〉. Now compare that experience to that which accompanies the consideration of the proposition 〈that all dogs are bathtubs〉. The difference is striking. The first proposition seems true, indeed, necessarily true. Accordingly, its acceptance seems correct, fitting, natural, at least to ordinary agents. The second proposition, by contrast, does not seem true at all; considering it does not evoke anything like the experience prompted by attention to the first proposition. Following Plantinga (1992), call the phenomenal experience that attends the consideration of propositions of the former sort impulsional evidence. And call a proposition that evokes phenomenal experiences of this sort impulsionally evident. One way, then, to understand the claim that a proposition p is a good candidate for being a conceptual truth is this: suppose that p, if true, is necessarily true. If p is impulsionally evident to the degree that its rejection would tend to evoke bafflement among those competent with its constituent concepts—thoughts to the effect that its denial would be almost crazy—then that is evidence that that proposition is a conceptual truth. The moral fixed points, we have claimed, bear this mark.
Streumer (2013).
Copp (2007, Chap. 4) offers three arguments for thinking that the moral fixed points are not true of conceptual necessity. The first two hinge on the claim that it is not incoherent to deny them. Since our view does not imply that it is incoherent to deny the fixed points, these two arguments do not make contact with our position. Copp’s third argument depends on the claim that the error theory is not conceptually false: it is not a conceptual truth that the property being wrong exists (pp. 126, 127). Our view, however, does not imply that it is a conceptual truth that the property of wrongness exists. Rather, it states that it is a conceptual truth that, in worlds like ours and for creatures such as us, the concept ‘being wrong’ is such that, if anything satisfies a concept such as ‘recreational slaughter,’ then it also satisfies the concept ‘being wrong.’ This truth does not itself imply that there is a property of wrongness, let alone that such a property exists as a matter of conceptual necessity.
Gibbard (2003, p. 192).
Jackson (2012, p. 73).
See Boyd (1988). Burge (2007) makes the important observation that some have rejected the traditional view of concepts on the assumption that it is tied to a descriptivist theory of reference according to which meanings are “in the head”—where what is “in the head” is reducible to what an agent believes or knows about its meaning or referents. As we argue above, the traditional view is compatible with a descriptivist position, but it does not imply it. And it certainly denies that concepts are “in the head” in the sense of being identical with what an agent believes or knows about meanings or referents. As Burge points out, the traditional view is compatible with a thoroughly externalist, anti-individualist account of reference, according to which our grasp of a concept is often incomplete and inaccurate.
Some philosophers, such as Dancy (2004), distinguish conditions that make a fact obtain from those that enable it to obtain. Although we know of no principled way to draw this distinction, one could read the Reversal Argument in such a way that it concerns not fact-makers but fact-enablers. Nothing of substance, so far that we can see, hangs on the issue.
See, e.g., Dancy (2004).
FitzPatrick (2008).
FitzPatrick (2008, p. 186).
FitzPatrick alludes to this point on p. 188. FitzPatrick argues that, in the moral case, the standards are nonnatural, but his argument for this claim and his understanding of the standards are rather different from ours.
This is a thesis about when particulars have moral properties; it does not directly address the issue of the conditions under which properties exist. About this latter issue we have no considered view. Further, the thesis under consideration does not claim that particulars exemplify the moral features they do simply or exclusively in virtue of having satisfied (or failed to satisfy) moral standards; for all that we have claimed, the (lack of) satisfaction of such standards may only partially grounds moral facts. Finally, while it is our view that moral propositions are fact-makers, we do not assume that they are fact-makers in virtue of their representational function.
We assume (with FitzPatrick) that a fact’s having a nonnatural moral component is sufficient for making it a nonnatural moral fact. It is worth noting that the wide account of facts alone would not imply Robust nonnaturalism. For Robust nonnaturalism also says that moral properties are nonnatural. When paired with the wide account of facts, however, the Reversal Argument does not imply that wrongness is a nonnatural property. It implies only that the fact that your colleague’s behavior is wrong has a nonnatural element, namely, a moral fixed point.
As we point out in Sect. 7, this claim is compatible with there being significant stretches of actual disagreement about how we should act that may look at first blush like moral disagreement—say, between Nietzscheans and Kantians—although such differences do not, in fact, qualify as moral disagreement.
Whether this expectation is appropriate is a subject of some debate; McGrath (n.d.) and Shafer-Landau (1994, 2003, Chap. 9) argue that realism may not require convergence, even among idealized inquirers.
See, e.g., Enoch (2011, Chap. 8), and cites therein.
The importance of the comparative implausibility of anti-realist premises is contested (see, e.g., McPherson 2009; Olson forthcoming, Chap. 7.1). In the present context, however, invoking the greater initial plausibility of the fixed points is meant to augment a defensive argument on our part rather than to serve as the basis of a positive Moorean argument for nonnaturalism.
Compare a similar list as given by Street (2006, pp. 115, 116), who relies on these very widely endorsed views to establish the evolutionary origins of our moral faculties.
Street (2006, p. 114).
Important debunking efforts include those of Bedke (2009, 2014), Greene (2008), Joyce (2006), Kitcher (2005, 2011), Ruse (1998, Chap. 6), and Street (2006, 2008a). Some of these arguments are directed not simply at nonnaturalism, but moral realism more generally. In what follows, we focus on the argument’s bearing upon nonnaturalism in particular.
There are certainly other ways to develop evolutionary debunking arguments. Shafer-Landau (2012) identifies five different arguments advanced by debunkers; Wielenberg (2010) identifies four. Though debunkers have rarely laid out their master arguments explicitly, we believe that our reconstruction is a fair depiction of a (perhaps the) central debunking worry. We also believe that if our position is correct, then it suffices to nullify any power that different versions of the debunking argument might otherwise possess. Consider, in this regard, versions of the debunking argument that appeal to claims such as if recreational slaughter of a fellow person were not wrong, then we would still believe that it is wrong (e. g., Clarke-Doane 2012). These arguments appeal to counterpossibles whose truth is supposed to tell against the reliability of our moral doxastic faculties. In our view, however, such counterpossibles fail to undermine any such reliability. This is because the status of the moral fixed points as a species of conceptual truth—combined with the general reliability of our faculties of conceptual appraisal—give us excellent reason to think that our beliefs in the moral fixed points have reliable origins and, hence, that we would be sensitive to the truth of the fixed points in circumstances such as those we presently occupy. See our discussion below regarding reliability and the discussion of objection #4 in the next section.
Notably, the debunkers themselves have not tended to endorse sweeping claims about the extent to which evolutionary influences have saturated and distorted our tendencies to classify certain propositions as conceptual truths. Street (2008b, pp. 228, 229), for example, maintains not only that we can recognize certain conceptual truths, but also that some of them are normative, such as the so-called means-end rule. According to Street, someone who “judges” that she has conclusive reason to Y, but who (at the same time in full consciousness) “judges” that she has no reason whatsoever to take what she recognizes to be the necessary means to Y, is not in fact making a normative judgment at all. She has simply failed to engage in practical reasoning, since it is constitutive of practical reasoning to adhere to the means-end rule. If that is so, then evolutionary debunkers themselves are not well-positioned to criticize the nonnaturalists’ assumption that we are often competent at classifying and recognizing conceptual truths, including the moral ones.
McPherson (2012, p. 217).
Ibid., p. 218.
Ibid., p. 209. For present purposes, we bracket our suspicions about the notion of metaphysical continuity.
Ibid., p. 218.
Ibid., p. 218.
deRosset (2009) articulates some of these suspicions. Wielenberg (n.d., Chap. 3) charges that the MODEST HUMEAN thesis is close to self-undermining, as it posits a brute necessary connection between discontinuous properties: the higher-order metaphysical property of entailing a brute necessary connection between discontinuous properties, and the epistemic property of being unreasonable to believe.
We add to this the following related point: naturalists such as Jackson (1998) have argued that since moral properties are metaphysically equivalent with natural ones, they are identical—metaphysical equivalence between properties, in Jackson’s view, being sufficient for property identity. (See Brown 2011 and Streumer 2008 for variations of this argument.) We think that this criterion for property identity is far too coarse, yielding the wrong results in too many cases. See, for example, Majors (2005), Plantinga (2010), Shafer-Landau (2003), Suikkanen (2010), and Wedgwood (2007). However that may be, even if it were correct, it would fail to gain traction against the view we defend, as our view concerns not moral properties but moral truths (and perhaps some moral facts).
McPherson (2012, pp. 221, 222).
Our actual view is that this claim about grounding is false. For the reasons, see deRosset’s (forthcoming) discussion of “Stevenson’s Constraint.”
See, for example, McPherson’s (2012) discussion of what he calls “bruteness revenge” (p. 223). There he addresses a position that explains supervenience by appeal to the essences not of concepts but of properties.
In its essentials, we borrow this premise from Miller (1996, p. 14).
Fine (1995, p. 281).
The phrase is from McNaughton (1996), which offers a fine defense of Rossian pluralism against charges of this type.
For a recent effort to systematize the Rossian prima facie duties (plus a few more) under a single supreme moral principle (Kant’s principle of humanity), see Audi (2004). If there were such a supreme principle, must it also be a moral fixed point? Not so far that we can see. It might, for example, be such that were competent moral agents to reject it, this would not constitute evidence that they suffer from a conceptual deficiency, such as lacking the relevant moral concepts, having a confused grasp of them, or failing to see that moral concepts apply when this ought to be manifest.
Cf. Cuneo (2006) and Shafer-Landau (2012, pp. 27, 28) for discussion regarding the compatibility of nonnaturalism and the claim that moral properties are causally efficacious; also see Oddie (2005) and Wedgwood (2007). While we have argued for a position in the spirit of Robust nonnaturalism, it is worth noting that Minimal nonnaturalists see moral facts and properties as natural ones, and so presumably as possessed of causal powers. This is reason enough to reject the claim that nonnaturalism per se is committed to the causal impotence of moral facts and properties.
See, for instance, Olson (2013, Chaps. 6, 7.1), which argues in both of these ways.
Another possibility is that the disagreement is metalinguistic, concerning how we should apply moral or non-moral normative concepts. Plunkett and Sundell (2013) pursue this strategy.
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Acknowledgments
The authors thank all who provided helpful feedback on earlier versions of this essay: Matt Bedke, John Bengson, Mary Clayton Coleman, Louis deRosset, Tyler Doggett, David Enoch, Bill FitzPatrick, Chris Heathwood, Tristram McPherson, Jonas Olson, Katia Vavova, the University of Vermont Ethics Group, Shafer-Landau’s Spring 2013 graduate seminar, and audiences at Tulane University and the Action, Reason, and Belief conference in Saarbrücken, Germany.
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Cuneo, T., Shafer-Landau, R. The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism. Philos Stud 171, 399–443 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5