

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Journal of Philosophical Studies*.

DEAR SIR,

May I draw your attention to an error of fact in your review of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, with an introductory preface by the late Viscount Haldane of Cloan.

Your reviewer states in at least two places that this translation was edited by Viscount Haldane. To say that a person has edited a book implies that he read it through and made (or at least suggested) corrections and alterations in the matter and arrangement of the contents. The fact is that Haldane did none of these things. Beyond writing the preface, he read but two or three chapters, on which his only comment was that they were admirable.

It is perhaps also of interest to refer to your reviewer's statement that the preface must have been one of Haldane's "latest utterances." As a matter of fact it was written some three years before his death. Whether he wrote for publication anything about philosophy later than this I do not know; it was certainly one of his last-published utterances, and probably, on philosophy, his very last.

This latter point is perhaps trivial, but the former, I think, ought to be corrected.

Yours faithfully,

R. AINSCOUGH.

c/o THE MIDLAND BANK, LTD., CAMBRIDGE,

November 2, 1929.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Journal of Philosophical Studies*.

SIR,

I regret to find that there were some errors in my references to Lord Haldane in the review of the two translations from Hegel's larger *Logic* that appeared in the July number of this *Journal*. He wrote a Preface for the complete translation, but was not otherwise responsible for the editing of it; and I find that it was also a mistake to refer to the Preface as one of the latest of his writings. I am informed that it was written several years before the publication of the translation.

Yours faithfully,

J. S. MACKENZIE.

2 ADELAIDE ROAD, N.W. 3.

November 10, 1929.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Journal of Philosophical Studies*.

FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM.

SIR,

As a result of reading Professor B. M. Laing's excellent article on "Freedom and Determinism," in the October number, and after some further reasoning in my own mind, I have arrived at a view of this subject that seems largely satisfactory, and now I am unable to understand why there has always been so much controversy. All schools of thinkers hold or admit that within rather wide limits individuals make decisions and act in the light of their knowledge of various prospective values and detriments. This is all that the doctrine of partial freedom requires—the ability in some degree to decide and act. It is true that the decisions and actions are largely determined by heredity, custom, and other influences; but this is another

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problem. Freedom is not concerned with the origin of the dispositions and desires, but only with the ability to exercise and satisfy them, or at least to seek the most desirable ends under the circumstances.

The chief practical bearing of the controversy has been upon the infliction of punishments. It has been contended that if all actions are determined there should be no punishment of the offender. But the fact is that fear of punishment operates as a determinant no less than does the knowledge of other prospective pains or losses. The possible offender is thus assisted in choosing the right alternatives and in leaving unmolested the pursuit by others of their desired ends. Education and exhortation, also, are determinants and are more desirable, being less difficult and less violent. But where desires are strongly anti-social these methods do not avail, and punishments are specified and enforced and are in large degree effective. Both exhortation and coercion, thus, are determinants in the most rigid sense.

Determinism, I would admit, is universal in its scope and operation, even in the cognitive processes where Professor Laing seems to think there may be an element of arbitrariness. But the determining causes are not the complete and sole causes, as several writers in this *Journal* have correctly maintained. Along with the principle of determinism exists the principle of freedom, which also is universal, though not strictly parallel with determinism, as is also the case with mind and body. In some degree we are propelled by extraneous influences, but in some degree also we are free, as parcels of a self-active universe or cosmos. Could not all schools agree upon this somewhat commonplace view?

Yours faithfully,
CYRUS H. ESHLEMAN.

LUDINGTON, MICHIGAN, U.S.A.,
October 25, 1929.