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In defence of error theory

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Abstract

Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general argument against error theories.

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Notes

  1. Let us give two examples from recent textbooks of metaphysics. According to Jubien (1997, p. 25), nominalists all agree that sentences like ‘Seven is less than nine’ are true: they undertake to explain how they can be true if there are no numbers. Loux (2002, pp. 15–16) assumes that all philosophers debating the existence of somersaults will agree that sentences like ‘George performed five somersaults between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on Thursday’ are true: he says that their disagreement concerns what makes these sentences true. This example is meant to illustrate ‘the nature of metaphysical disputes’ (p. 15).

  2. Our definition of ‘error theory’ does not exclude expressivist theories from counting as error theories. We are happy to contribute to the defence of any such expressivist theories. (Expressivists might truly deny that they are error theorists on some other definition of ‘error theory’.)

  3. Miller (2002) has shown that, in the case of ethics at least, Wright’s response to error theory suffers from a further weakness.

  4. Colour discourse is a case in point. The error theory about colour advanced by Hardin (1988) is philosophically controversial, but all parties appear to agree that the scientific basis that it draws upon is impressively rich and detailed.

  5. We are very grateful to Tom Smith and an anonymous referee for this journal for extremely helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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  1. Philosophy Department, Manchester University, Manchester, UK

    Chris Daly & David Liggins

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  1. Chris Daly
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Daly, C., Liggins, D. In defence of error theory. Philos Stud 149, 209–230 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9346-1

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