Deriving Collingwood's Metaethics: Absolute Presuppositions as Fundamental Principles of Morality

In this paper I argue that although it has been largely overlooked, Collingwood believed that absolute presuppositions are at work in the context of practical reason and that the role they play there is as important as the role they play in theoretical reason. I explain that in theoretical reason, absolute presuppositions form the framework of scientific thinking; in practical reason, absolute presuppositions form the framework of morality and civilization. Once we fully recognize the role that absolute presuppositions play in practical reason, Collingwood's metaethics becomes apparent. Further, I suggest that the scale of forms analysis of action, which Collingwood offers in the Essay on Philosophical Method, is correlated with the absolute presuppositions that we make in practical reason concerning morality, and I indicate what I take to be the nature of that correlation. Finally, I offer an explanation of constellation shifts of absolute presuppositions in the context of practical reason that is consistent with Collingwood's view of constellation shifts of absolute presuppositions in the context of theoretical reason.