Abstract
This paper is concerned with two specific aspects of Professor Rawls' conception of distributive justice. In Section I Rawls' controversial difference principle is discussed in the context of individual decision under uncertainty, as well as the problem of interpersonal comparison of utilities. It is noted that, contrary to some recent accounts, Rawls' conception of the original position is considerably different from that to be found in the works of Harsanyi. In Section II an attempt is made to articulate in a precise way Rawls' intergenerational savings principle. While it is noted that the Rawlsian savings rule possesses a number of attractive properties, it is demonstrated that it conflicts with the principle of intertemporal Pareto efficiency.
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This is a revised and expanded version of the text of a lecture delivered at the Moral Sciences Club of the University of Cambridge in February, 1973. I would like to acknowledge the many instructions that I have received on the matters discussed in this paper from Kenneth Arrow, Simon Blackburn, Frank Hahn, Philip Pettit, John Rawls, Abhijit Sen, Amartya Sen, and Robert Solow. While I doubt very much if any of these gentlemen would agree with all that I assert in this paper, I hope that each agrees with some of the propositions madehere.
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Dasgupta, P. On some problems arising from Professor Rawls' conception of distributive justice. Theor Decis 4, 325–344 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136653
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136653