

THE MĪMĀMSAKAS ON YOGAJA PRATYAKṢA : A CRITIQUE

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The Naiyāyika is the propounder of *yogaja pratyakṣa* (yogic perception). This perception has been admitted by each and every system of Indian Philosophy excepting the Mimāmsaka and the Cārvāka. The Mimāmsakas do not admit the existence of *yogaja pratyakṣa*. To them yogic perception is non-existent like horns of a hare. They give some arguments for not accepting *yogaja pratyakṣa*. The Naiyāyikas logically refute these arguments to defend their position. An attempt has been made to provide some evaluative remarks from my own standpoint.

I

Yogaja pratyakṣa (transcendental perception) is one of the three types of supernormal perception. The word 'yogaja' comes from the word 'yoga'. *Yoga* is defined as the cessation of the modifications of *citta* (*Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ*)¹. One who follows the prescribed method of *yoga* is generally called a *yogin*. The view of 'yogaja pratyakṣa' is mentioned in Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtra* (3.2.43) and this theory is elaborated by Vātsyāyana² and Uddyotakāra³. The Naiyāyikas hold that the supernormal perception of an individual i.e., a *yogin* is also as real as any other perception. They call such a perception as supernormal one, for such perceptions are beyond the range of normal perception. They can perceive the subtle objects, atoms, the minds of others, air, space, time etc. through this perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa describes yogic perception as the perception of subtle, hidden, remote, past and future objects and considers it to be the highest excellence of human perception⁴. And he rejoins that the *yogins* perceive all objects in all places through cognition simultaneously⁵.

The supernormal state of the mind acts as the supernormal sense-object contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*). This type of contact is known as *yogaja sannikarṣa* which causes *yogaja pratyakṣa*.

According to Viśvanātha, *yogins* are of two kinds : *Yukta* (conjoined) and *Yuñjāna* (occasionally conjoined)⁶. So *yogaja pratyakṣa* is also of two kinds : *yukta pratyakṣa* and *yuñjāna pratyakṣa*. These are the perceptions of *yukta* and *yuñjāna* *yogins* respectively. A *yukta-yogin* is one who has attained spiritual perfection and such intuitive knowledge of all objects is constant and spontaneous to him. The *yogins* acquire the power of perceiving all objects with their pure minds free from all taints and one-pointed by constant concentration⁷.

A *Yuñjāna-yogin* is one who is on the way to perfection and he requires the help of concentration for occasional intuitive cognition of all things. Here a *yogin* requires *dhyāna*, *dhārnā* etc. as additional subsidiary factors for the supernormal perception⁸. A *yogin* is endowed with a mind having two types of properties : a particular method of thinking (*cintāviśeṣaḥ*) and a power generated through the practice of yoga (*yogābhyāsajanitaḥ*). Both the methods are accessory to the attainment of transcendental perception⁹.

The power of the sense-organs of the ordinary man like us is limited. The Naiyāyikas hold that there can be natural or inborn variation in the capacity of sense-organs. For example, the cat can perceive in darkness also and the vultures can see an object from a very far distance from the sky. And Sampāti, the king of vultures, saw Sitā from a distance of a hundred *yojanas*¹⁰. But human eye cannot see after a certain distance. The superior quality of perception varies in degrees like the superior quality of the colour white, etc. A section of men attains the highest degree of perception if they develop in quality of the same. Those whose perception reaches the highest degree of perfection are called sages. So we cannot deny the possibility of higher degree of functioning of the sense-organs of a living being. The most excellent perfection of perception is constituted by the apprehension of subtle, remote, past and future objects¹¹.

The Mīmāṃsaka has a strong objection against the possibility of yogic perception^{11a}. He holds that even if it were possible, it would be

illusory. The perception of a *yogin* is said to be the consequence of the constant practice of meditation. Here, there is a flash of presentative intuition as the result of meditation. This doctrine of intuition, the Mīmāṃsaka says, is peculiar to Indian thinkers. But though the cognition produced by the constant meditation is manifested as a distinct presentative cognition, does it cognize a thing as apprehended in the past or more than that? If it apprehends exactly the same thing as apprehended in the past, then the cognition generated by intense meditation is nothing but memory. But, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, memory is invalid. And if it apprehends more than that which was perceived in the past then it is illusory since it apprehends something which has no real existence. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that if supernormal perception called yogic perception is possible at all, it is invalid.

More grounds forwarded by the Mīmāṃsaka for not accepting a yogic perception are as under :

(a) Sense-organs have limitations. Although the power of functioning of senses is increased by practice, still it has limitation. One can jump over a wall by the regular practice but how can one jump over an ocean or the Hiamalayas¹².

(b) Though it is pointed out that by practice the power of a particular sense-organ can be increased, it cannot be said that a *yogin* can see anything and everything with his eyes, In fact, the eyes cannot reveal sound and ears cannot reveal colour¹³.

(c) The Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila etc. state that a man, possessed of superior power of vision perceives only visible objects. But nobody comes across such superiority of sense-perception apprehending the transcendental objects like *dharma* etc. *Dharma* is known from the vedic texts only. It can never be the object of perception¹⁴.

This type of criticism is not fair. It is true that though *dharma* is transcendental to normal sight, yet it is perceived by the sages or seers. We have seen above that though a very distant object and an object covered by darkness, are beyond the reach of our normal eyes, yet they are perceived by Sampātti and a cat respectively¹⁵.

In response to this sort of defence, Kumārila may say that if a sage

perceives a transcendental object then he should also perceive smell, taste etc with his eyes. If someone imagines that an omniscient sage grasps every object of the universe by means of a single source of knowledge then he should admit that the sage perceives taste, smell etc. with his visual organs. Kumārila's objection is not based on facts. The other sense-organs of the sage have super-excellent powers like eyes. So, the peculiar hypothesis that a sage perceives taste, etc. with eyes is not to be conjectured. The Mīmāṃsaka may point out that the Naiyāyikas should not imagine that a sage perceives *dharma* is not invisible like taste etc. The argument of the Mīmāṃsaka is based upon the misrepresentation of the above sentence. And it is known that taste and similar qualities other than colour are always imperceptible.

The Naiyāyika reacts on the Mīmāṃsaka arguments and contends that the latter cannot say from his experience that a sage though possessed of super-eyes cannot perceive *dharma*. For *dharma* and the excellent power of the eyes of a sage are imperceptible to him. So, Kumārila should not point out that *dharma* is not an object which is capable of being perceived with eyes.

The knowledge of eternal *dharma* is only derived from the vedic injunction such as 'should sacrifice' *yajeta* etc. *Dharma* is the eternal fulfilment of duty. It has no limitation in past, present and future. It will be rash for us to think that *dharma* is perceived with our mortal eyes. But it is not at all difficult for the omniscient sages to perceive it¹⁶. A sage intuits *dharma* with his internal organ through the practice of constant meditation on it. Likewise, a love-sick man beholds his beloved lady with the help of meditation alone¹⁷.

The justification of such intuition is that the internal organ is competent to comprehend all objects without an exception and there is no such thing in the universe which disturbs its penetration. There is a lot of examples to show that persons, have clear and vivid vision of objects which are beyond the reach of our sense-organs. Such visual perception is possible only through the constant practice of meditation.

We find that persons, affected by lust, or excessive grief, disease, insanity, a dream of thieves etc. possess clear, distinct, vivid vision of

imaginary objects as if they are in front of them.

When we repeatedly concentrate upon an object, each act of concentration leaves an impression behind it. These impressions accumulate on our self. They constitute the permanent (stable) basis of our knowledge. They generate the highest form of knowledge provided they are arranged in a perfect order.¹⁸

We can take an instance which shows the acquisition of proficiency in learning. A young student follows a prescribed course of discipline such as the strict observation of the vow of celibacy, the regular revision of the old subject matter learnt by him etc. He acquires permanent impressions thereby. They become stable as they are and they help him to recall the matters read by him in memory with perfect facility.

In case of another instance, we know that gold acquires matchless beauty if it is slowly purified in a closed vessel. In like manner, the inner organ of a sage is capable of perceiving all knowable objects by the constant practice of meditation.¹⁹

On the contrary, the inner organ of worldly men like ourselves is covered by the veil of passions and so we do not acquire the highest stage of knowledge, that is, omniscience. Any object is directly apprehended by the pure inner organ of the sages. The reason of this direct awareness lies in the fact that all the impurities of their mind are consumed by the daily practice of meditation. When the sages consume all the inner drosses and acquire high proficiency in the art of concentration by the constant practice of meditation, they attain the property of being omniscient.²⁰

Future events are foreseen sometimes by us. An illustration of the true judgement or foresight is that my brother will come tomorrow. This type of foresight is called as *Pratibhā Pramāṇa*. This kind of valid knowledge is not hallucinatory. It is not a doubt. It is not even negated by its contradictory judgement. Its source is not a defective sense-organ. Thus, it should be treated as a piece of valid knowledge.²¹

Pratibhā Pramāṇa. is one kind of Extra-Sensory Perception (ESP). ESP is another special type of perception through which senses can perceive distant objects, actions, minds of others etc. without being in contact with them. It is one kind of paranormal phenomena. Its validity is doubted

by the critics as it, according to them, is purely accidental and a possible event. In this connection, it is said that the knowledge in the form, 'My brother will come tomorrow is certain, though the object is totoally accidental or unexpected²². But now the existence of ESP is almost a certainty, not a conjecture or mere a delusion of the mind²³.

This kind of valid knowledge (i.e. *pratibhā-jñāna*) is direct but not indirect. It may be objected that it cannot be direct since it is non-sensuous. This type of objection does not stand because the inner organ determines it. But, if the inner organ would independently grasp external objects, there would be no blind person in the world. The answer to this objection is that the external object which has been perceived with eyes is only intuited by the inner organ. Thus, the objection that there would be no blind person does not occur.

According to the critics, the direct awareness of a sage is not a perceptual one because it is not determined by a definite set of conditions like the normal perception. In response to this charge it is said that the transcendental knowledge of a sage is always perceptual. If it is not direct it is not the knowledge of a sage. Some opine that the knowledge of a sage is exactly the same derived from the scriptures. This implies that it cannot be direct.

Here another objection is that foresight is non-perceptual for perception refers only to a present object. Kumārila points out that an object which is present and comes in contact with our sense-organ is only perceived. Besides, perception differs from transcendental peception in the point that it apprehends a present object. Such an objection is not tenable. The objectors themselves have said in another place that an object with its future property is grasped. At the time of perceiving silver it is also perceived that it will last long. Thus, it is also established that the perception that my brother will come tomorrow presents a future object. Here the perception of an ordinary man refers to a future object, hence the supernormal perception of a sage refers to future *dharma*.

If the sages are pioneer to know the true nature of *dharma* from the Vedas then the wellestablished proposition that Vedas are the only source of *dharma* is never contradicted. It is the final argument of the

objector, e.g. the Mīmāṃsaka. A reply to the above objection is given below: There is a truth in the above objection that the sages are initiated into *dharma* by the Vedas. Later on when they attain the fruit of meditation the transcendental perception of *dharma* flashes in their mind. As a result of it, we can say that the ascertainment of the truth of the thesis that the Vedas are the only source of the *dharma* becomes doubtful or shaky. Besides, the eternal perception of *dharma* belongs to God and this perception is the source of *dharma*. God is the author of the Vedas for He perceives it (Veda). God's eternal perception is already proved in Indian Tradition. If God's eternal perception is proved then the above thesis that the Vedas are the only source of *dharma* is not conclusively proved. Thus, the argument offered by the Mīmāṃsaka, against the possibility of the transcendental perception of *dharma* by the sages, is not justifiable i.e. convincing. According to the Mīmāṃsaka perception arises only from the contact of the senseorgans with an existent object and *dharma* cannot be perceived by the sages since an existent object is only perceived.

Dharma is the merit arising from the performance of the acts directed by the Śāstras (scriptures). The view that the scriptures are the only source of *dharma* has been refuted by the following argument: Every word informs us only of known facts. The Vedas are nothing but the sum-total of words. So, they possess the character of words. Each of the words cannot give us piece of knowledge of an object not known before. In other words, words do not denote novel objects. The Vedas which are words do not signify novel *dharma*. *Dharma* is grasped by some other means of proof. Thus, the Vedas are not only the source of *dharma*. A jar is a knowable object, so it is to be perceived by somebody in the universe. All these counter-arguments are easily available in order to silence of the objectors.

Hence, the *sūtra* on perception, put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka (i.e., Jaimini) thus interpreted (i.e. meant for the refutation of transcendental perception) is really irrelevant.²⁴

II

Now, a problem could be raised on the justifiability of the transcendental perception, (*yogaja pratyakṣa*) rather one could describe it as a metaphysical experience but not epistemological in the true sense of

the term. Though it is a kind of direct knowledge, yet we may consider whether it is really a case of perception or not. One could know some object existing in remote future or in remote place transcendently. It is very difficult to verify the truth, hence the question of transcendental knowledge is not beyond question. As such knowledge is purely personal, secret and non-communicable, one may challenge the truth of the same. If this be the case, the perceptuality of such knowledge is very difficult to establish as the principle of verifiability fails here. If somehow it is taken as perception by virtue of being a direct awareness, by which definition it can be taken as perceptual? The standard definition which is given in Nyāya is as follows:

The knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense-organ with an object is called perception (*indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam Jñānam pratyakṣam*). For being a perceptual knowledge there should be a contact between a sense-organ and an object. In this particular knowledge there should be a contact between a sense-organ and an object. In this particular case mind acts as a sense-organ and object existing in remote time and place is taken as *artha*. The question remains unsolved regarding the contact between them. As such contact is not easily conceivable the question of its validity may crop up. If this contact is beyond the range of our intelligence or direct awareness, it may not be accepted as perception. It is quite rational to describe it something belonging to metaphysical world.

In reply to such criticism one point could be forwarded in favour of the perceptuality of transcendental knowledge. In broader sense perception should be taken as a direct awareness (*sākṣāt psatīti*). This directness (*sākṣāt tva*) may be defined as something not arising from the instrumentality of other knowledge (*Jñānākaraṇam Jñānam*). If this broader definition of perception is taken into account, the transcendental knowledge should be put under this due to having the form of direct or immediate apprehension (*aparokṣānubhūti*). Though this feeling is non-communicable, secret and personal, yet it cannot be denied as an experience. It is not also correct to say that the impersonal and communicable knowledge is always perceptual. We can know many things intuitively in our daily life but these are not always communicable. From this it is not proved that our experience is not true or direct. Hence, the reality of transcendental perception occupies a

place in Indian epistemology.

It may be argued that yogic experience is beyond the reach of ordinary human being. Now the question is: How is it accepted by the Naiāyikas as a form of supernormal perception?

In reply, it can be said that there are many things in the world, which are not capable of being known by ordinary sense-organ.

The inadequacy of the intellectual power points to the existence of the world which is beyond the reach of sense-organs. There is some faculty in a man that is capable of revealing that world. This faculty is known as *Pratibhā* (intuition)^{24a}. This point will find justification in the fact that there are many things like God, self etc. which cannot be known through senseorgans but the existence of them is already accepted in Indian Tradition. *Pratibhā* is a flash of light which reveals the objects. The light is the wisdom characterised by immediacy and freshness²⁵. Besides, it has been described as 'supersensuous and suprarational apperception'²⁶. As this suprasensuous knowledge has no spatio-temporal limit, it is considered as transcendental having capacity of revealing past, present and future by a single flash.²⁷

The English rendering of the term '*Rṣī* is seer which means one who sees past, present and future through one's transcendental vision. He can know the truth manifested in all objects. That is to say, '*Rṣī* is described as *Kavi* in the Upanisad, which means *Krāntadarśi* or omniscient i.e., knower of all objects existing in the past, present and future.

There is a sharp distinction between poetic intuition or *pratibhā* operating in the case of attaining a property generated through *yoga* (*yogaja dharma*) and normal intuition or that operating in ordinary behaviour. It is known from the fact that the former is mysterious while the latter is not. Had *Pratibhā* been same in both cases there would be no difference between them. Hence, the difference at least in the degree of *Pratibhā* is to be admitted. In the case of the former the degree of *Pratibhā* is stronger than the latter.

It has been said that *Pratibhā* is one in its essence, but differing in kind according as (i) it is developed by a steady and continuous effort or (ii) produced automatically by virtue of *Adrṣṭa* (unseen factors). Gopinath

Kaviraj does not want to give much importance to this type of *Pratibhā* because in the case of aesthetic it can give temporary spiritual pleasure to one individual. That is why, his stress is laid on that *Pratibhā* which can give rise to a permanent vision and which can make a man *yogin*. According to Gopinath Kaviraj, telepathy etc. (Extra-Sensory Perception) are included under the second category of intuition while the supreme wisdom of the saints belongs to the first one²⁸. Therefore, yogic perception (*Yogaja Pratibhā*) will belong to the first category of intuition. Hence, telepathic knowledge is not produced from *yoga* (i.e. *yogaja*). And poetic intuition also will not be regarded as normal intuition.

In response to the objections forwarded by the Mīmāṃsakas for not accepting a yogic perception the Naiyāyikas meet the objections one by one.

Their first objection is that sense-organs have limitations.

The second objection of the Mīmāṃsakas is that it cannot be explained that a *yogin* can see anything and everything with his eyes though the power of the senses can be increased by practice.

The responses of these two objections have already been given.

The third objection is as follows: By practice one can jump over a wall but how can one jump over the Himalayas or an ocean? With regard to this objection the Naiyāyikas point out that if the opponents find our above answers regarding the operation of external senses as unsatisfactory to common sense, we would opine that a *yogin* would see anything and everything with his mind which is the internal sense. This is possible by practice of meditation. There is nothing which cannot be the object of mind.

The fourth objection is that *dharma* which is known from the vedic text only can never be the object of perception. In reply to this objection, it is said that *dharma*, though *atindriya* can be the object of mental perception, let it not be the object of eyes but there is no hindrance, with respect to its being the object of mind, since there is nothing which cannot be the object of mind.

It is a fact that by practice, one can jump over a wall but not a mountain or ocean since it is a property of the body and body consists of

Kapha, Vāta etc. By practice a person brings a balance of these properties and makes his body comparatively lighter and so he can achieve the power of jumping over a certain height. But in each case, there is a limitation due to the properties of the body. But there is no such impediment with regard to a cognition caused by mind, because it is already stated that a *yogin* can acquire such a capacity of mind through the constant practice of *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇā* etc.

The mind of an average man is affected by the dirt namely *rāga*, *dveṣa* etc. and hence it cannot overcome a certain range or limit, and so we are not *yogins*²⁹. *Rāga dveṣa* etc. are the products of ignorance (*mithyā Jñāna*). A cognition in which 'a' is cognised as 'b' and not as 'a' is called ignorance. By constant and rigorous practice of *yoga* the *yogins* can attain a stage in which they cognise 'a' as 'a' and not as 'b'. When they are in this stage there is nothing which they cannot perceive.³⁰

Both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas take the Vedic knowledge or text as authoritative and there is clear expression of a yogic realisation in the vedic literature. Then the question arises: Why do the Mīmāṃsakas not want to accept any yogic perception?

According to Jaimini, perhaps *dharma* is *atindriya* and is cognised by vedic injunction only. It can never be the object of perception and all the other sources of valid knowledge except vedic injunctions are inactive or non-functioning in case of *dharma*. Now if this stand of Jaimini is to be accepted then there is no other alternative to the Mīmāṃsakas than to deny the reality of yogic perception. If they admit the reality of yogic perception then *dharma* becomes directly the object of perception, which will contradict Jaimini's statement. This goes against the thesis of the Mīmāṃsakas and hence they do not accept yogic perception.

Now if a deduction is a logical one, then it does not matter much whether same deduction contradicts someone's statement or not. The Mīmāṃsakas Naiyāyikas argue in this way. Therefore, even though the acceptance of a yogic perception goes against Jaimini, one has to accept it because it is established by expressions of such experiences of sages or *yogins*.

If the Mīmāṃsakas argue that it is accepted that *yogins* can realise

anything and everything simultaneously, then they become the knower of all things (*sarvjña*), so how will they show the difference between *yogins* and Naiyāyikas Īśvara who is also omniscient?³¹

In reply the Naiyāyikas say that the very definition of *Īśvara* or God would distinguish a *yogin* from God. According to Nyāya, the definition of God is as follows: God is the substratum of permanent or eternal cognition. On the other hand, a *yogin* is the substratum of an acquired or produced cognition.³²

But Jayanta Bhaṭṭa points out for the sake of argument that the Naiyāyika does not know whether the Mīmāṃsakas cannot perceive *dharma*. 'Both of them do not know that others cannot perceive *dharma*. Even then, if the Mīmāṃsaka avers that he knows that there is no perceiver of *dharma*, then he himself is a *yogin* because he perceives everyone's perception, that Naiyāyikas do not perceive *dharma*.³³

Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no argument which can refute the thesis of the Naiyāyikas regarding the acceptance of the reality of yogic perception.³⁴

It has already been discussed that the Mīmāṃsakas have a strong objection against the reality of yogic perception. To them if yogic perception apprehends exactly the same thing in the past, the cognition generated by intense meditation is nothing but memory which is nothing but invalid. If it apprehends more than that which was perceived in the past, it is illusory because what is apprehended has no existence.

In response to the above mentioned objection, it can be said that we can perceive the past through yogic perception, but it is not only a recollective knowledge. It may be said that memory is nothing but generated by impression of a particular entity alone.³⁵ The impression of an object existing in the past can give rise to memory of the object if it (i.e., impression) is generated through experience. That which is not at all experienced cannot be the object of memory. In the case of yogic perception not only the previously experienced objects come to our awareness but the objects not experienced earlier are also apprehended by us. The historical facts in which our normal sense-organs cannot reveal may be revealed to us by our super-normal means of knowing i.e., transcendental perception. Should

we call it mere memory? Obviously not. for, many incidents occurred in the remote past in our life or in the life of somebody else may come to our awareness through the flash attained during meditation. The value of such experience cannot be ignored merely by saying that it comes under memory and hence invalid. It is not also fair to say that if something more than memory is apprehended during meditation is nothing but invalid. There are many saints (even in this modern age) who have experienced many past and future events through *yoga*. It is not also correct to say that sense-organs have limitation. For, the sense-organs which we possess can reveal only those objects that are in proximity with them. This is true in the case of external perception which is normal one. But behind each and every sense organ there is a power which is described by Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath as *Racit* and *surplus* respectively. This power cannot be shown, but have to be experienced. The Upanisadic seers have referred to this power as '*Śrotrasya śrotram manaso mano yad*' (ear of the ear and mind of the mind). The first '*śrotrā*' (ear) refers to our normal ear while another '*śrotrā*' stands for that power which can take us to the supernormal world which is beyond the reach of our ordinary sense organs. If the '*surplus*' existing in each and every sense organ is generated through meditation, one can have an infallible experience of something existing in the remote past and remote future.

An ordinary sense-organ like eye can reveal colour existing in past and future, but not sounds. In the same way ear can reveal those existing in past and future, but not colour. In this way, the '*surplus*' existing in a sense-organ as pointed out by Rabindranath in his '*Religion of Man*' can reveal the objects existing in past and future having the particular quality.

NOTES

1. 'Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ - *Patañjal Yoga- sūtra*, 1/2
2. Vātsyāyana-*Nyāya-Bhāṣya* (3, 2, 40)
3. Uddyotakara-*Nyāya-Vārtika* (3.2, 40)
4. Darśanasya paro' tiśayaḥ aukṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-bhūta-bhaviśyadādi viśayatvam. *Nyāyamañjari*, (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), Vizianagram

- Sanskrit series, Benares, 1895, p:103.
5. Yugapad ekaiva buddhyā sarvatra sarvān arthān drakṣyanti yoginaḥ. *Ibid*, p.107.
 6. *Bhāṣā-Paricchedaḥ*, Verse No. 65.
 7. *Nyāyamañjari*, (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895, p:106.
 8. Cintāśahakṛtaḥ-aparaḥ Cintā anya dhyānam dhāraṇā ca. *Kraṇāvalī* on Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Samsthān, Varanasi, 1972, p.216.
 9. Cintāviśeṣayogābhyāsajanita-dharmaviśeṣobhayasahakṛtamanasā Yuñjānasya ākāśaparamāṇvādisakalapadārthaviśayakamānasapartyakṣarṇ bhavatītyarthaḥ *Prabhā* commentary on Verse No. 65, *Kārikāvalī* with Muktāvalī, Ed. Sri C. Sankarram Shastri, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1988, p. 470.
 10. Sampātīnāmā Cagrḍhrarājo Yojanaśata-vyavahitamapi daśarathanandana-sundarīm dadarśeti śruyate rāmāyane... *Nyāyamañjari*, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series office, Benares, 1936, p.95.
 11. Darśanasya ca parotīśayaḥ sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭabhūta-bhaviśyadśayatvam, *Ibid*, p.96.
 - 11 a. Dr. V. N. Jha - *Studies in Language, Logic and Epistemology*, *Pratibha Prakāshan, Delhi, 1986, p. 157.*
 12. Abhyāso pi kriyamāno nātyantamapūrvamatisayamavahati langhanāsavat, yo'pi hi pratidinamananyakarmā langhanamabhyasyati so'pi katipayapadarimitamavanitalamabhilaṅghayati na tu parvatam amvudhirṇ veti. *Nyāyamañjari*, Ed. Pandit Śre Sūrya Nārāyana Śukla, the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City. 1936, p.97.
 13. Yatrapī atīśayo dr̥ṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatīlanghanāt. Dūrasūkṣmādīdr̥ṣṭau syānna rūpe śrotavṛtītā. *Slokavārtika* (Śiva), Codanāsūtra, Verse No. 114.
 14. Dharmastu cakṣuso na viśaya eva. *Nyāyamañjari* Ed. Pandit Śir Sūrya Nārāyana Śukla, the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City. 1936, p.96.
 15. Yato yadyapi nāsmadadinayana-viśaya dharmāḥ tathāpi yogīndriya-gamyo bhaviśyati, tathāhi yojana-śatavyavahitamandhakārāntaritam

- vānāsmadādilocanagocaratāmupayāti sampāti-vṛṣadaṃsa dṛṣostu Viṣayo bhavatyeva,...*Ibid.* p.96.
16. Nanu kartavyatārūpaḥ trikālasparśa-varjitah. Cakṣurviṣayatāmeti dharmaityatisāhasam. Satyaṃ sāhasametatyē mama vā carmacakṣuṣaḥ. Na tyesa durgamaḥ panthā yoginām sarvadarśinām. *Ibid.* p.96.1
17. Manaḥkaraṇakam jñanam bhāvanābhyāśasambhavam. Bhavati Dhyāyatām dharme Kāntādaviva Kāminām. *Ibid.* p. 97.
18. Tatra Kevalamabhyāsātpṛakṣaye Kaphamedasoḥ. Śarīralāghavam labdhvā laṅghayanti yothocitam. Iha vijñānakamuasti saṃskāro vyavatiṣṭhate. Kramopacīyamāno sau parātiśayakāraṇam. The *Nyāymāñjari* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa Ed. Pt. Śrī Sūrya Nārāyana śukla, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares city, 1936, p.97.
19. Yathānūvākagrahaṇe Saṃsthā bhyasanakalpitaḥ. Sthiraḥ karoti Saṃskāraḥ pāṭhasmṛtyādīpāṭavam. Yathā vā puṭapākena śodhyamānam śanaiḥ. Hemaṇṣpratīkṛm tadyāti kalyāṃ parām. *Ibid.*
20. Tathaiva bhāvanābhyāsād yogināmapi mānasam.
.....
Tadevaṃ Kṣīṇadosānām. dh yānāvahitacetasām. Nirmalaṃ sarvaviṣayam jñānam bhavati yoginām *Ibid.* P.98.
21. Api cānāgataṃ jñānamasmadāderapi ka cit. pramāṇam prātibhaṃ śvo me bhrāta aganteti dṛśyyate. Nānārthajam na saṃdigdham na bādhavidhurīkṛtam. Na duṣṭakāraṇam ceti pramāṇamidamiṣyatām *Ibid.* P.98.
22. Ka cidvādhakayogaścedastutasyāpramāṇatā yatrāparedyurabhyeti bhrāta tatra kimucyatām. kākatāliyamiti cenna pramāṇapradarśitam Vastu tat kākatāliyamiti bhavitumarhati. *Ibid.*
23. T. R. Sharma - Extra-Sensory Perception, *Darshana International*, Vol. XXXV, January, 1995, No.1, P.34

Not less than one hundred scientists of England, the USA and Canada have been working for years on data supplied by men and women from all over the world in the field of Extra-Sensory Perception or Paranormal Phenomena, for example, telepathy, psychokinesis, precognition, clairvoyance, intuition, deep meditation etc.

24. The *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Ed. Pt. Śre Sūrya Nārāyana Śukla, The Cowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City, 1936, PP. 98-100.
- 24a. Gopināth Kaviraj : *Aspects of Indian Thought*, University of Burdwan, 1984, p.1.
25. Jadunath Sinha-*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, Sinha Publishing House, Calcutta 26, p.281.
26. *Nyāyabindutīkī* (Vinitadeva) on Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti), Kāśī Sanskrit Series, Benares, p. 15.
27. Yogi-pratyakṣam tvabāhyam alaukikaṁca. Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti (Aniruddha) on Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra (kapila), 1/90, Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta), 1888.
28. Naṣtamapi svakāraṇe līnam bhūtatvenāsti, bhaviṣyadapi svakāraṇe nagtatvenāsti-Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti (Aniruddha) on Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra (kapila), Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta), p.49.
29. Asmadādeśca rāgādimalāvaraṇadhūsaram. Mano na labhate Jñānaprakarṣapadvīm parām. The *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Ed. Pandit Śukla, The Cowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City, 1936, pp. 98.
30. Pratyūhabhāvanā bhyāsakṣapitāśeṣakalmaṣam Yoginām tu manaḥ śuddhm kāmivārtham na paśyati *Ibid*, p. 98.
31. Nanvekena Jñānena sarvānarthān bhūtabhāvinah parokṣānapi paśyanto yoginah kathamakhilatrailokya vṛttāntadarśinah sakalajagadgurorīśvvarādviśiṣyeran. *Ibid*, p.99.
32. Asti Viśeṣaḥ īśvarasya tathāvidham nityameva jñānam yoginām tu yogabhāvanābhyāsa prabhavamiti. *Ibid*, p.99.
33. Matpratyakṣam akṣamaṁ dharmagrahane iti bhavān na jānīte tvatpratyakṣamapi na dharmagrāhīti nāham jāne, anyasya pratyakṣamīdrśamevetyubhāvvyāpāvaṁ na jānīvahe. Tvayā tu uado sarvesām pratyakṣam jñātamīdrśam. Tarhi tvameva yogīti yogino dvekṣi kim vṛthā. *Ibid*, p.95
34. Tadevaṁ kṣīṇadoṣāṇam dhyānā-vahitacetāsām. Nirmalam sarvaviśayam jñānam bhavati yoginām. *Ibid*, p98.
35. Saṁskāramātrajanyaṁ jñānam smṛtiḥ- *Tarkasamgraha, Sūtra No. 35.*