Abstract
The age old conflict between logical analysis and phenomenological study revealed by different philosophical treatments of our experience of temporal passage are discussed in the present paper. Temporal passage is found to be problematic because philosophers entertain conflicting views regarding the status of the passage of time. As logical analyses prove temporal passage as unreal or illusory and phenomenological study of our experience of temporal passage considers it to be a fundamental structure of our life, the conflict regarding the status of the passage of time emerges. In this paper our aim will be to explore gradually different logical analyses of our experience of temporal passage provided by philosophers of both classical India and the West on the one hand and also to discuss some of the phenomenological treatments of our experience of temporal passage provided by some continental philosophers to show the conflict between the results of these two philosophical treatments. Finally, we would like to state that since this conflict culminates into the conflict between reason and experience, it is not possible to resolve the conflict in the present life form in which both these categories have their distinctive roles to play.
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Notes
St. Augustine, Confessions, Book XI, Sec. 18.24.
Mc Taggart (1908, p. 470).
Ibid, p. 468.
Ibid, p. 468.
Hoy (1994, p. 581).
Pratyutpannonāgatas ca yady atitam apeksya hi;
pratyutpannonāgatas ca kālotite bhavisyatah. MK.XIX, I
Yasmāt, yasya hi asatvam, tat tena nāpekşyate. Madhyamakaśāstram, p. 183.
Tadatra yadi atite kāle vartamānānāgatau kālau isyete, apekşasidhyarthamevam sati atite kāle vidyamānatvāt atitakālatmavat tayorapyatitvam syāt. Madhyamakaśāstra, p. 183.
Pratyutpannonāgatas ca na stas tatra punar yadi;
pratyutpannonāgatas ca syatam katham apeksya tam. M.K. XIX, II.
Anapekşya punah siddhir nātitam vidyate tayoh;
pratyutpannonāgatas ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate. M.K. XIX, III.
Prior (1970).
Morisson (1978, p. 190).
Ibid, p. 194.
Ibid, p. 189.
Ibid, p. 194.
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Datta, M. Does a Philosophical Probe into Our Experience of Temporal Passage Determine Its Status?. Axiomathes 29, 5–16 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-017-9363-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-017-9363-1