Abstract
In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. I then distinguish various ways in which a bare particular might be thought to have a nature and show that on none of these is it possible for a bare particular to be a constituent of a complex particular. Thus, Moreland’s attempt to resurrect bare particulars as ontologically indispensable entities is not wholly without difficulties.
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Notes
The contemporary debate at this point originates with Moreland’s robust defense of bare particulars (1998, 2001), which is endorsed to varying degrees by Oaklander and Rothstein (2000), Ten Elshof (2000), Preston (2005), Sider (2006), and Gould (2013). Criticisms of bare particular theory may be found in Mertz (2001, 2003), Davis (2003, 2004, 2013), Davis and Brown (2008), Loux (2006), Morganti (2011), Bailey (2012), and Giberman (2013). For replies to some of these criticisms, see Moreland and Pickavance (2003) and Pickavance (2009).
See Armstrong (1989, p. 38).
For the sake of convenience, I shall use the terms ‘property’ and ‘universal’ more or less interchangeably. Strictly speaking, however, it is important to distinguish between properties that are multiply exemplifiable (i.e., universals such as being human) and those that are not (e.g., being identical with Socrates). For additional discussion, see Plantinga (1974, pp. 60–62).
The ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ terminology derives from Mertz (2003, p. 15).
My remarks in this paragraph are indebted to Garcia (2009, pp. 32–36).
Wolterstorff notes, for example, that Gustav Bergmann’s classic defense of bare particulars as individuators simply ‘presupposes both that his readers have hold of the concept of being a constituent of, and that in fact there be entities in the world which stand to ordinary things in the connection of being constituents of them’ (1970, pp. 123–124, emphasis mine; see also Bergmann 1967, pp. 6–7, 24–25). The lack of any positive account of constituency has invited a certain amount of criticism. Thus, Peter van Inwagen complains: ‘I do not understand the idea of ontological structure or, indeed, any of the ideas with which one finds it entwined in the various constituent ontologies’ (2011, p. 393). In particular, he says, “‘constituent of” (said of a universal and a particular in that order)’ is a mysterious notion (ibid.). Part of van Inwagen’s worry here is that it is hard to make sense of how an abstract object (a universal) could be ‘in’ a concrete particular. Perhaps so. But I doubt that it’s any easier to see how (on van Inwagen’s Favoured Ontology, a relational ontology where particulars are internally simple blobs) an abstract property could be attached to something concrete and physical. For my part, I cannot see that attached to is any less mysterious a relation than constituent of.
For ease of expression, I shall henceforth use the terms ‘nature’ and ‘essence’ more or less interchangeably.
Here it is important to distinguish metaphysical from epistemic individuation. In the epistemic sense, to individuate merely involves ‘singling out’ an object ‘as a distinct object of perception, thought, or linguistic reference’ (Lowe 2003, p. 75). Naturally, this presupposes individuation on the metaphysical level, since there must be the ‘parts of reality which constitute single objects’ (ibid) before we can discriminate between them, or even specify criteria of identity for objects of the same kind (e.g., events). Moreland is very clear that his concern lies solely with the metaphysical problem of individuation. See Moreland (2000, p. 31).
Thus, Gustav Bergmann, the grandfather of contemporary bare particularism, remarks: ‘It is impossible for a bare particular to be “in” more than one ordinary thing’ (1967, p. 24).
Moreland (1998, p. 261) defines a transcendental property as one ‘truly predicable of all entities whatsoever’ and offers as examples being self-identical and being colored if green.
Compare also Pickavance: ‘no property is such that it is tied to every bare particular because properties are sparse and there aren’t any properties corresponding to predicates like “x is green or not green” and “x is not complex’” (2009, p. 155). Theodore Sider, another prominent defender of bare particulars, treats this commitment to sparse property theory as patent: ‘And of course, the substratum theorist’s universals are sparse’ (Sider 2006, p. 392).
See Bailey (2012, pp. 37–40) for additional remarks on bare particulars and Crowding.
Compare Moreland: ‘Indeed, I am a Platonist about uninstantiated universals but a constituent ontologist regarding the way universals are in ordinary objects’ (2013). Moreland also agrees that arch-Platonist Alvin Plantinga is ‘surely correct’ when he says that abstract properties cannot ‘have contingent beings as constituents’ (2001, p. 147). For then, of course, those properties would exist in only some worlds (just where those contingent beings existed) but not others, thereby compromising the necessary existence of properties. For details, see Plantinga (1983).
That there are natural kinds and individual essences (so defined) is perhaps controversial, but presumably not for Moreland whose assay of property-instances (in particular, Socratesn humanness) clearly commits him to both.
‘x stands in an ontological constituent-dependence relation to y just in case both the existence of x entails in the broadly logical sense the existence of y and y is a constituent of x’ (Moreland 2001, p. 145).
By contrast, a pure property is a universal that does not ‘incorporate’ or ‘involve’ a concrete particular. Thus, being conscious and being corpulent are pure properties, while being married to Bill Clinton is not. The latter incorporates Bill Clinton in the following way: in every world in which an object has this property, it bears some relation or another to Bill Clinton. For a brief but helpful discussion, see Armstrong (1997, pp. 91–93).
Compare Moreland and Pickavance: ‘Simplicity should be understood as the absence of any sort of complexity’ (2003, p. 10).
I owe this objection to an anonymous referee to whom I express my thanks.
I am grateful to Paul Gould and an anonymous referee for helpful commentary and critique.
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Davis, R.B. Are Bare Particulars Constituents?. Acta Anal 28, 395–410 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0178-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0178-9