Abstract
We sometimes decide what to do by applying moral principles to cases, but this is harder than it looks. Principles are more general than cases, and sometimes it is hard to tell whether and how a principle applies to a given case. Sometimes two conflicting principles seem to apply to the same case. To handle these problems, we use a kind of judgment to ascertain whether and how a principle applies to a given case, or which principle to follow when two principles seem to conflict. But what do we discern when we make such judgments—that is, what makes such judgments correct? The obvious answer is that they are made correct by whatever makes other moral judgments correct. However, that cannot be right, for a principle can be inconsistent with morality yet still apply in a particular way to a given case. If the principle is inconsistent with morality, then morality cannot be what we discern when we judge whether and how that principle applies to a given case. I offer an alternative account of what makes such judgments correct.
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Notes
Some writers speak of intuition, practical wisdom, or perception here. Those terms are not interchangeable, but in this context they all refer to cognizing the relationship between principles and cases in a noninferential and nonsensory way.
My discussion is not affected by the debate between particularism and generalism. If generalists are right, then principles work the way we always thought they did. If particularists are right, then principles are rough generalizations which may fit a great many cases, but not all, for the moral valence of a feature mentioned in the principle may switch in certain cases, depending on the presence of other features. However, we can still ask whether and how principles apply to cases where the moral valence of features has not switched.
My distinction between Indeterminism and Determinism is a modification of Wallace’s distinction between “rule formalism” and “intuitionism,” though his distinction concerns what guides us in applying principles, while mine concerns what determines the relation between principles and cases (Wallace 2008, pp. 84–90).
Wallace can be read as something like a Determinist, for he argues that we are guided not only by the explicit, “manifest” content of a principle, but also by the implicit, “latent” content, which includes the point or purpose of the principle and “how this principle functions in concert with other principles.” (Wallace 2008, pp. 96, 100.)
Alan Gibbard’s “norm expressivism” exploits this contrast, earning cognitivism through the application of norms that we endorse expressively (Gibbard 1990).
O’Neill’s distinguishes between cases where there is “tension” between principles and one principle is defeated by another, and cases where it is “impossible” to satisfy both principles—conflict in a stronger sense, where neither principle is defeated. I take her to mean that, when a principle is defeated by another principle, the right act need not satisfy the defeated principle (2009, pp. 226–228). In my terminology these are both conflicts, but I acknowledge the distinction.
Nor is that her project: “My question has only been whether whether if we had such arguments we would still find that norms were impotent to guide action…” (2007, pp. 403–404). In other words, her project here is to ascertain whether practical reason not only validates principles, but can also validate particular actions. Her answer: Yes.
Some see moral principles as truth-makers for particular moral verdicts, the way the natural law that copper is electrically conductive makes it true that particular bits of copper conduct electricity. Others see moral principles as generalizations made true by particular verdicts, the way “all coins in my pocket are copper” is made true by particular coins. (McKeever and Ridge (2006, p. 12).) The heuristic principles I discuss are summaries of confident considered judgments; they are generalizations. This does not preclude the possibility of moral principles that are truth-makers, or the possibility that our generalizations might closely approximate whatever truth-making moral principles may exist.
Even philosophers who seem to suggest that we can intuit principles directly, such as Ross, hold that principles must be consistent with our intuitions about particular cases, and are discerned through making many such intuitions even if we are not aware of this. This is close to the Derivation Account (Ross 1930, pp. 32–33; see also Rawls 1971, pp. 46–53).
We do not have a confident considered judgment about every case. However, I assume that moral truth is always knowable, at least under suitably idealized conditions.
I am not suggesting that only one principle can be derived from each case. I do assume that, given the considered judgment you reach about a case, you will try to derive the most useful principle you can—the one most likely to get you to the verdict in relevantly similar cases that you would reach if you had confident considered judgments about them.
I have no idea how we do this; that is a question for empirical psychology.
There is room for the possibility that applicative judgments can alter our pretheoretical considered judgments about cases and vice versa, for we sometimes revise our considered judgment about a case when it conflicts with what a principle tells us about that case, or the principle when it conflicts with the considered judgment, depending on which we have more confidence in—the considered judgment or the principle. This is a familiar aspect of reflective equilibrium. To the extent that our considered judgments about cases and our principles are both revised in the course of seeking reflective equilibrium, it may seem difficult to separate the truth-conditions for applicative judgments from those for other moral judgments. However, the fact that we seek coherence between them does not mean they have the same truth-conditions. For example, if we revise a considered judgment in light of what our applicative judgments tell us about how a principle applies to a case, we might form a false considered judgment, if the principle we apply is false.
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Acknowledgments
I thank Carl F. Cranor, Michael Cholbi, Mark LeBar, Graham McFee, Sean McKeever, Stephen R. Munzer, Michael Zimmerman, and two anonymous reviewers for comments.
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Davis, J.K. Applying Principles to Cases and the Problem of Judgment. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 563–577 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9311-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9311-x