

income, they are in competition with workers in other cooperatives for markets and with workers generally for higher income jobs.)

Another way of putting the point about the shift to solidarity and collective provision is in terms of a shift in human nature. Schweikart and Roemer want to avoid optimistic assumptions about 'socialist man'. But in doing so, they reinforce the standard Smithian assumption of 'economic man'. This makes it not just difficult to account for the transition to socialism, which demands solidarity and a commitment to communal provision, but also difficult to account for the value appealed to in blunting the sharp edge of the market socialist market. Face it! Socialism is about a vision of a changed world and changed human beings. Unless enough of this vision is realized to shift from competition to solidarity, the forum in market socialism will fail to tame the market. But, as noted, if enough is realized for this, the market won't be the basic mechanism.

If a socialist economy gives a central place to the provision of public goods, how might a market for the exchange of the remaining goods be structured? The important thing there is clarity about the socio-economic context for which this question is raised. In the aftermath of a fight with capitalism, the context is solidaristic and involves a wide range of public goods. Market socialists ignore this context, and hence end up talking about a market that is largely imported from the capitalist context. They give no attention to the way profound changes will reverberate through all aspects of the society. In tinker-toy fashion, they want to uncouple extensive structures from capitalism and start building their market socialism around them. It is more likely that in the solidaristic context of communal provision most of these imported structures will either fail to survive or else be drastically modified.

What, then, might a market look like in the context of solidarity and considerable communal provision? It would do away with the arms-length relation between producer and consumer in the capitalist market. The consumer would become active in negotiations with producers through the medium of consumer groups. Depending on the kind of commodity in question, consumer groups would range from the quite local to those representing very large populations. The democratic process would be extended to relations between producers and consumers in an economy that would have a large component of decentralized negotiation. Since consumers would also be producers, they would function, directly or indirectly, as suppliers to the producers with whom they are negotiating for a product or service. In this way consumers would have the leverage to insure serious negotiations. Such a socialized market fits into the context of solidarity and as well represents a parallel to the kind of negotiating that will go on in deciding on public goods and their delivery.

The main point here is not that the socialized market is needed but

that market socialism does not recognize the need there will be to alter fundamentally the actual market to fit the new context created by a successful struggle against capitalism. The new context will considerably reduce the competitive features of a market extracted from capitalism. Face-to-face negotiations in place of arms-length purchases will limit the intensity of competition. Moreover, efficiency considerations for a socialized market will be different from those of classical, neoclassical, or Keynesian markets. The degree to which such a market generates consumer participation and a sense of fairness on the part of both consumers and producers will be part of its efficiency. Assurances of the sort given by Schweikart and Roemer that market socialism can be efficient are beside the point since they fail to tell us about the efficiency of the socialized market we would have under socialism. The task, as I see it, is to determine the kinds of market, and their extent, compatible with the context emerging from the struggle against capitalist accumulation.

Only after such clarification about allowable kinds of market shall we be able to look for ways to make such markets as efficient and innovative as is needed for a socialist society. Schweikart and Roemer demand that we get assurances of efficiency and innovative growth ahead of time by postulating familiar market structures. But this is an empty assurance. For those market structures will be changed drastically in the process of ending the system of accumulation. Nonetheless, both for those who aren't and those who are sympathetic to the project of market socialism, these recent books, by Schweikart and Roemer, will be intellectually challenging and will provide access to the most sophisticated thinking to date on the subject.

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Democracy & Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference, GEOFFREY BRENNAN and LOREN LOMASKY. Cambridge University Press, 1993, 225 + x pages.

The thesis of this stimulating book is that voting is more like cheering than like choosing. I believe that this is half right: voting is importantly unlike choosing, though there is little reason to compare it to cheering. The book's own arguments suggest that voting is more directly morally motivated, but the authors resist this conclusion. Thus they stand in between orthodox economic and 'public choice' theories of democracy on

the one hand, and unabashedly moral interpretations characteristic of traditional political philosophy on the other.

Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky argue that economic actors choose, but voters do not. Now, the difference between voting and choosing is obvious, put in one way: no voter faces a choice between social alternatives (such as candidates or social policies). Since a majority (of some size) is necessary and sufficient for an alternative's victory, no one can expect her vote to be decisive. A voter does choose, but among *ways of voting*, not among candidates or social policies. A voter who tries to maximize her own utility will not simply vote for the most preferred candidate, but will rather vote in the most referred way. Although it is often assumed that these will always or usually be the same, Brennan and Lomasky spend two hundred and twenty-five substantial pages in the gulf.

Given that a voter doesn't face a choice among social alternatives, a vote does not reliably express a preference over social alternatives. Brennan and Lomasky are right to make much of this point; still, they exaggerate its significance. They claim that 'The one-to-one logical connection that obtains between choice and preference in idealized market settings simply does not hold in the analogous electoral setting . . . Behavior and reference diverge'. (p. 28) The connection that is normally alleged between choice and reference, however, is conceptual, not something that could vary across differing contexts of choice. To prefer (a) to (b) is to be disposed to choose (a) over (b) when these are the only choices, and one is reasonably well informed about what they are. So voting must manifest preferences after all, and of course it does: preferences over ways of voting.

Since voters don't face choices over social alternatives, their behavior won't imply any references over social alternatives. This is not, however, fundamentally different from economic trading. There one faces a choice between, and so manifests preferences over, *ways of acting* which have certain probabilities of bringing certain commodities. Only when there is enough certainty about the connection between certain actions and the receipt of certain commodities can one be said to face a choice between the commodities themselves.

The important thing is this: if candidates or social policies are the commodities of politics, voters, unlike traders, *never* face a choice between commodities, but only between ways of acting (voting). A vote for Jones doesn't entail a preference for Jones, precisely because a vote for Jones is not a choice for Jones. To say as the authors do that in electoral contexts the connection between choosing and preferring is broken, is erroneously to imply that voters choose between social policies.

The book is more careless than wrong here. The authors themselves insist earlier that '... it is misleading to describe electoral "choice" as a choice between *a* and *b*: it is, rather, a choice between expressing a

preference for *a* and expressing a preference for *b* – between a *vote* for *a* and a *vote* for *b*'. (p. 23) There is a perfectly simple point here, but again the authors have bound it up with a new and less obvious claim. Here's the simple and correct point: voting as between social policies *a* and *b* does not involve a choice between *a* and *b*, but only between a *vote* for *a* and a *vote* for *b*. This much is unobjectionable, but the authors have added that it is a choice between *expressing a preference* for *a* and *expressing a preference* for *b*. They state it as if by definition to vote for something is to express a preference for it. This is surprising since the authors grant and insist that to vote for something is not to *choose* it, and so no preference about *a* and *b* is manifested or 'revealed' in a vote. Why, then, do they keep preferences over *a* and *b* in the center of the picture, as preferences that are, if not revealed, expressed by voting? The answer lies in their expressivist rational explanation of voting.

Assuming that voters sometimes vote for policies they don't prefer,¹ why do they? Brennan and Lomasky argue that voting is like cheering, rational voting like rational cheering. Both acts express certain attitudes and affiliations, and agents derive some satisfaction from expressing these. That satisfaction looms large in a rational agent, since voting makes almost no other difference. Before raising difficulties for this suggestion, notice that there is another possibility. For example, one might vote in the way one believes is morally required, even where this requires a vote for an otherwise less preferred social alternative. What, then, is the argument for a distinctively expressive explanation for counter-preferential voting?

The first step is to show only that some expressive utility is associated with voting; after that, as we said, that utility will loom large. The argument for the humble first step is not very compelling. For example, the fact that California voters seem to vote in large numbers for president even when they know the outcome is already determined suggests only that voters have *some* reason other than expected effects on the outcome. Nothing yet follows about distinctively expressive benefits, as the authors seem to suppose (p. 35).

Consider next, the nature of political rhetoric: the authors argue that it favors issues on which voters are eager to express themselves, and that this supports their expressivist interpretation. Political parties associate themselves with some account of the 'good' (the authors use scare quotes here, p. 98). Voters then have much to gain (expressively) by associating themselves with one or another party. The point is to express one's allegiance to a certain conception, and so 'affective' rhetoric will chase 'non-affective' from the scene. This story is pretty hard to tell without supposing the voters are deeply concerned about the nature of the

¹ I mean, even when this is not recommended by strategic voting. That's a wrinkle I can't take up here.

political good. They would be unlikely to put it in scare quotes the way the authors do. If justice is important to voters, then it may be more important to them than the good feelings they can get by expressing themselves in certain ways. So we will have to decide between the view that voters vote the way they believe justice requires, for that reason, and the view that they vote against their preferences in order to obtain psychic benefits from establishing and expressing a certain affiliation (granting, of course, that some voting is simply selfish).

It is important to see that the expressive motivation would not be a moral motivation, except in a degenerate sense. For example, I do not act for a moral reason when I contribute to a charity in order to appear virtuous to myself or to others (even if that is a non-moral motive to morally correct conduct). The authors have no difficulty believing that duty pronounces on how to cast the ballot. (pp. 35–6) They apparently doubt, however, that moral reasons have any motivational effect except making it feel good to display (*vs.* live up to) one's moral convictions.

There is a 'romantic' conception of politics that the authors do not wish to be associated with, 'of politics as the quest for the morally good or the "true"' (scare quotes in original again, p. 98). So the difference between the expressive and the moral accounts of counter-preferential voting is crucial to them. To keep the expressive account from morally eviscerating the idea of democracy, they devote a chapter to nudging the expressive account 'Toward a democratic morality'. Before turning to that argument, note several difficulties for the authors' claim that voters are significantly motivated by the desire to express themselves through voting.

One obvious problem is that voting is typically secret (or, better, 'confidential'), as a matter of law. It is hard to see how any further expressive gains, beyond those available outside the voting booth, could depend on what is done in that shrouded cubicle. One could postulate expressive benefits in displaying one's character to oneself, but what reason is there to give that expressive explanation rather than a directly moral one?

A second difficulty can be seen in the alleged analogy with cheering for a sports team, a paradigm example of expressive behavior. A central feature of the paradigm case is that the most preferred cheering behavior involves cheering for the most preferred outcome. If the analogy is to work, we are compelled to see counter-preferential voting as akin to cheering for a team that one doesn't want to win. That by itself is a decent reason to suppose counter-preferential voting is *not* like expressive behavior.

Consider next the authors' account of the moral significance of expressive voting. According to Brennan and Lomasky, it is analogous to the moral significance of sympathizing with a sick friend, mourning the

irretrievably lost, and bristling at injustice (p. 188): 'What is wrong with abstention . . . inheres in the apathy thereby displayed' (p. 188); 'By the stand one takes, one displays to oneself and to others what sort of person one is' (p. 188); '[T]his is, in embryo, the strongest argument that can be made for the claim that individuals do wrong by not voting.' (p. 188)

We should grant that a person's character is subject to moral evaluation, and that a person's behavior is often evidence of their character. However, behavior that indicates bad character is not for that reason morally bad behavior. Selfishness is morally bad, but confessing selfishness is normally neutral or even partially redeeming. Paying the taxes on your winnings from the track is not morally bad just because it displays (to a few people) a vicious attachment to gambling. Behavior that displays some moral vice is not generally tainted by the vice it displays. Thus it is no moral criticism of someone's failure to vote to say that it displays the bad sort of person one is.

Sometimes non-voting is an instance, rather than an indicator, of a vice. Morally wrong behavior is a special way of displaying one's character flaws. If non-voting were held on independent grounds to be wrong, then non-voters would indicate their character flaws by instantiation. But Brennan and Lomasky do not hold non-voting to be wrong on independent grounds. They locate its moral significance in its expressive significance. Their rhetoric sometimes benefits illicitly from the reader's assumption that it is often wrong on independent grounds not to vote (or not to vote responsibly), as when they say, 'Voting responsibly is something the responsible citizen does' (p. 195). If this means that voting responsibly (and so voting) is required as an *instance* of the character trait of responsibility, Brennan and Lomasky have given us no reason to believe it, nor have they tried. If it means that voting responsibly is an *indicator* of the character trait of responsibility, and perhaps that abstention is an indicator of irresponsibility, this is no argument that voting 'responsibly' (read: 'as responsible people happen to do') is morally good or required. Behavior that indicates a vice (virtue) is not therefore vicious (virtuous).

We sometimes criticize non-voting, but perhaps we are really only criticizing the person for the character flaws this *indicates*. There are two problems with this approach: first, it fails to provide any guidance to the citizen who wonders whether she ought morally to vote. Second, it is not clear that non-voting is an indicator of vice in the way the authors contend. They argue that non-voting displays a reprehensible indifference on matters of great importance. But non-voting displays indifference only if indifference is the explanation for not voting. There are many alternative explanations, and one of them is the authors' favorite point: the futility of voting.

Brennan and Lomasky's expressive account of the moral significance

of voting is an improvement over the standard economic account, but it is vulnerable at the other flank. If voting is largely expressive in their sense, then it is largely morally irrelevant. The authors offer a few quick additional suggestions for grounding the moral significance of democracy (pp. 194–8). I can only consider one of them here.

'It seems reasonable to believe' that 'aggregation of relatively knowledgeable votes will generate outcomes better than those arrived at through random selection . . .' (p. 197). Brennan and Lomasky betray a deep ambivalence when they say that this 'cannot be established as a matter of logic'. (They oddly ignore Condorcet's Jury Theorem which establishes just this.)² On one hand, they argue in earlier chapters that the economic market has epistemic advantages over democratic decision, and this judgment is in jeopardy if democratic processes are epistemically too good. On the other hand, if they are not good at all, the moral significance of democracy has evaporated from their account entirely. Thus, they waffle: democracy might be alright even if it were no better than random, although even if that would not be alright it *may be* better than random, though not provably or by very much, certainly not more than markets.

Their argument that markets have epistemic advantages over democratic procedures turns on the fact that a vote makes no difference, and so mistaken votes have no real educative consequences for the voter. This cannot be ignored. But neither should we ignore the apparent epistemic advantages of free public deliberation on a common topic. The following sounds like a bigger educative advantage by orders of magnitude: imagine my pleasure if the U.S. were to engage in a long public discussion, including water-cooler debates, experts on news shows, and columns and debates in the press, on the question whether it makes more economic sense to trade in a Dodge Caravan with 50,000 miles, or to wait a few years longer. I'll bet in that context I could figure out the right answer, though in my present place in the real economic market, I'm quite stumped, and may well err.

The powers of intelligence and reason that are brought to bear in public political deliberation are devoted to common topics and so they are mutually reinforcing. Market actors are left largely, or at least comparatively, to their own devices. Granted, political discourse isn't great, but market discourse may be worse. False, misleading, and manipulative claims by advertisers are only likely to be challenged by

² The applicability of the Jury Theorem to democratic theory is unclear. Some have thought that its assumption of the statistical independence of voters renders it inapplicable to highly interconnected real citizens. This is incorrect, as I argue in Estlund (1994). Still, there is a question about how the average voter competence could be publicly ascertained without trampling on conscientious differences among citizens' moral views. I discuss this in Estlund (1993, pp. 92–4).

that product's consumers or competitors. Democratic choice is, at least often, addressed to issues confronted by all citizens, if only because some citizens concern themselves, in political choice, with the fates of other citizens. The issues that all citizens face in common in democratic choice have few analogues in market choice.

Brennan and Lomasky offer a penetrating critique of the (even more) economic account that treats voting like choosing. However, if, as they suggest, the moral significance of democracy comes down to the epistemic value of democratic procedures, then we might wonder what positive contribution their theory makes. They have no account of such epistemic value, or of where it might fit in an account of democratic legitimacy, and their interpretation of votes as disingenuous cheers for political parties is among the least promising if such epistemic claims are to be vindicated. An epistemic justification of democracy will be more viable if voters address some common moral topic, such as what justice permits/requires, or what best promotes our interests impartially.

This is an important book. By opposing parts of the ethical as well as the economic conceptions of democracy, it is an occasion for discussion across the boundaries of economics, political science, and philosophy. Critics and partisans of an economic approach to democracy will both appreciate the fresh and adventurous, rigorous and accessible – and debatable – arguments that pack this book.

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Economics and the Antagonism of Time: Time, Uncertainty and Choice in Economic Theory, DOUGLAS VICKERS. University of Michigan Press, 1994, x + 272 pages.

Post Keynesian economists have, for many years, emphasized the distinction between historical and logical time. Neoclassical economics, they have claimed, incorporates only logical time – variables are dated, with time appearing in many equations, but key aspects of historical time