

INVESTIGATING THE ARGUMENTS OF NECESSARY OF EXISTENCE (*WĀJIB AL-WUJŪD*) IN SUHRAWARDĪ'S PHILOSOPHY BASED ON *AL-TALWĪḤĀT* AND *ḤIKMAH AL- ISHRĀQ*

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Abstract: Suhrawardī has presented arguments to support the existence of *wājib al-wujūd* in many of his works. One of the most fundamental of these arguments, which also has a forward-looking feature, is the one he presents in his books *al-Talwīḥāt* and *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*. To prove the existence of God, Suhrawardī devised three arguments in *al-Talwīḥāt* and one argument in *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, all of which are interpretations of the *ṣiddiqīn* argument. In this article four of Suhrawardī's arguments, three of them in *al-Talwīḥāt* and one of them in *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq* are reviewed. The main aim of this study is to analyze and explain Suhrawardī's arguments, due to their importance in philosophy and theology, with the descriptive-analytical method and using library-based collecting data. The arguments presented in the *al-Talwīḥāt* are succinct, and what made these claims essential was the evaluation of their robustness and content. The significance of his first and third arguments in this book is that they do not require the denial of the vicious circle as a precondition, and by assuming the likelihood of both the vicious circle and infinite regress, the necessity of existence is demonstrated. On the other hand, his argument in *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, which, like his second argument, is based on the refutation of the vicious circle and infinite regress, includes innovative features and should be investigated thoroughly.

Keywords: *Al-Talwīḥāt, Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq, Nūr al-Anwār, Suhrawardī, Wājib al-Wujūd.*

Abstrak: Suhrawardī telah mengemukakan argumen-argumen yang mendukung keberadaan *wājib al-wujūd* dalam banyak karyanya. Salah satu argumen yang paling mendasar, yang juga memiliki ciri berwawasan ke depan, adalah argumen yang dikemukakannya dalam bukunya *al-Talwīḥāt* dan *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*. Untuk membuktikan keberadaan Tuhan, Suhrawardi menyusun tiga dalil dalam *al-Talwīḥāt* dan satu dalil dalam *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq* yang kesemuanya merupakan tafsir dalil *ṣiddiqīn*. Dalam

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artikel ini diulas empat dalil Suhrawardi, tiga di antaranya dalam *al-Talwīḥāt* dan satu di antaranya dalam *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*. Tujuan utama dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis dan menjelaskan argumentasi Suhrawardi karena signifikansinya dalam bidang filsafat dan teologi, dengan metode deskriptif-analitis dan pengumpulan data berbasis perpustakaan. Argumen-argumen yang disajikan dalam *al-Talwīḥāt* sangatlah ringkas, dan yang menjadikan klaim-klaim ini penting adalah evaluasi terhadap kekokohan dan isinya. Arti penting dari argumen pertama dan ketiganya dalam buku ini adalah bahwa argumen tersebut tidak memerlukan pengingkaran terhadap lingkaran setan sebagai prasyarat, dan dengan mengasumsikan kemungkinan terjadinya lingkaran setan dan kemunduran yang tak terbatas, maka perlunya keberadaan dapat ditunjukkan. Di sisi lain, argumennya dalam *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, yang, seperti argumennya yang kedua, didasarkan pada sanggahan terhadap lingkaran setan dan kemunduran yang tak terbatas, mencakup fitur-fitur inovatif dan harus diselidiki secara menyeluruh.

Kata-kata Kunci: *Al-Talwīḥāt*, *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, *Nūr al-Anwār*, *Suhrawardī*, *Wājib al-Wujūd*.

Introduction

One of the fundamental topics in philosophy and theology, and one that has been the subject of much philosophical discussion, is theology in particular and the discussion of how to prove the existence of God. This issue also affects Islamic philosophy, and it can be said that all Muslim philosophers have studied theology in particular and the case for the existence of God, as well as offered several arguments in favor of it. Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī is a Muslim philosopher who has made arguments in support of *wājib al-wujūd* in many of his writings (Suhrawardī 2002a; Suhrawardī 2002b; Suhrawardī 2002c; Suhrawardī 2002d).

The majority of Suhrawardī's books express the same points repeatedly. He has offered interpretations of the *ṣiddīqīn* argument that support the existence of God. Obviously, it should be noted that the definition of repetition does not imply that he has replicated the ideas of other philosophers, but rather that he has offered three arguments in the proof of *wājib al-wujūd*, each of which is an interpretation of *ṣiddīqīn's* arguments, and he has referred to the same arguments in the majority of his works.

In *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, he also offered a novel interpretation of the *ṣiddīqīn's* argument that contains several innovative aspects. According to this, the subject of the upcoming study will be the evaluation of the arguments of *wājib al-wujūd* in the books *al-Talwīḥāt* and *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*.

According to the methods of this research, the library research method was utilized in this paper. Two books, *al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawhiyyah wa al-ʿArshiyyah*, and *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, were used as primary sources in this article. Following that, the sources used in this article include other thinkers' writings and books by Suhrawardī scholars.

This research is also characterized as a descriptive article because the

proofs of necessary existence, (*wājib al-wujūd*) by Suhrawardī in these two books must be described, which is accomplished in this article. However, it can also be stated that this research qualifies as an analytical study because the aforementioned proofs do contain some content analysis. This research paper is therefore deemed to be descriptive-analytical.

Regarding research backgrounds, due to the importance of God in philosophy and theology, this topic has always been of interest to researchers. For instance, (Liu 2024, 235), (Harrison 2024, 45–78), (Arhami, Geravand, and Īmanpour 2023, 45–62), and (Novaković 2023, 464–86) investigated this subject with different aspects.

In addition, there are many challenges to proof of the existence of God and the issues related to God in Islamic Philosophy and as a result of this, these kinds of subjects have always been discussed by researchers and scholars. Much research has been conducted about God in Islamic Philosophy on different sides and aspects (Lala and Alwazzan 2023, 1016), it can be claimed that theology has been extensively studied in Suhrawardī's philosophy.

For instance, (Imanpoor 2008, 3–17) has examined the science of God in Suhrawardī's philosophy in two articles, and (Sajidi 2005, 41–73) has examined the relationship between God and the system of existence in Suhrawardī's thought. Moreover, in an article about God and the world's creation according to Suhrawardī philosophy, (Haqqi and Qazikhani 2017, 27–52) have argued and discussed. While claiming that theology in Suhrawardī's philosophical approach can be investigated from distinct viewpoints, it should be noted that the theology in Suhrawardī's philosophical system has been neglected by researchers. The study of the arguments for God's existence in Suhrawardī's philosophy is one of the dimensions that has not been well received by researchers.

Few research has been done on this matter, for example, Davar and Mohamadi (2023), in an article, have examined the arguments of God's existence from the point of view of Suhrawardī in the book *al-Talwīḥāt* and they have adapted it with the arguments of God's existence in Avicenna's *Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*. In a book, Davar and Mohamadi (2021) discuss Suhrawardī's philosophy and the *ṣiddīqīn* argument as a chapter.

Shirmohammadi (2018) also investigated the arguments for God's existence from the perspectives of Suhrawardī and Leibniz in his dissertation. Researchers have paid less attention to the analysis and expression of the strength of the arguments for God's existence in the philosophy of Suhrawardī, particularly in the books of *al-Talwīḥāt* and *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, which are also discussed in this article.

In these studies, the arguments for God's existence have been compared with other arguments put forth by other philosophers. This article differs from other studies in this field in that it fully describes and analyzes the arguments used to prove the necessity of existence in the books *al-*

Talwīḥāt and *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, as well as stating their key points and innovative aspects in the arbitration section.

Concerning the main goal of this study, it should be said that since Suhrawardī's arguments are considered to be among the *ṣiddīqīn*'s, arguments they have received less attention in philosophy, and rereading these arguments in this article will bring more attention to Suhrawardī's opinions in this regard.

Arguments to Prove the Existence of *Wājib al-Wujūd* in *al-Talwīḥāt*

Three arguments are offered in the Book of *al-Talwīḥāt* to support *wājib al-wujūd*. These points were made very concisely by Suhrawardī. In such circumstances, he emphasizes conciseness. He stated, for instance, that "few and complete rules are better than many rules that make a person feel burdened and make pointless apologies" towards the conclusion of *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq* (Suhrawardī 2002b, 2:61). "Don't waste your life because you won't find it once you are gone" he added in *al-Talwīḥāt* (Suhrawardī 2002a, 1:120–21; Maftouni and Davar 2023, 29). Accordingly, it can be claimed that Suhrawardī avoided using long words to improve the impact of his writing.

On the other hand, Suhrawardī wrote *al-Talwīḥāt* with persons interested in philosophy in mind, therefore its contents are presented in a general and condensed manner. In this work, he has independently compiled the essential philosophical guidelines for philosophy students, and he acknowledges that its contents should be read before *al-Mashārī' wa al-Muṭārahāt* and *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq* (Suhrawardī 2002a, 1:194 & 483; Maftouni and Davar 2022, 18).

According to Suhrawardī, people cannot comprehend enlightened wisdom without the proper training in the debate sciences (logic and philosophy) (Ebrahimi Dinani 2000). The first *talwīh* of the first *mawrīd* and metaphysics, the third technique of *talwīh*, both address the concerns relating to particular theology and, more importantly, the *wājib al-wujūd* argument. As previously mentioned, Suhrawardī has developed three arguments in this book to prove *wājib al-wujūd*.

The First Argument

The first argument is understood to mean that we consider every possibility and generate collections of possible entities. In other words, this group of possibilities can be formed by observing possible beings that could not have lived in the past but are present at the moment. The second assumption is more congruent with the philosophical paradigm because it assumes only possible entities rather than the accidental entities that are collected in the first instance, which also involves time. The negation of the infinite regress is not one of the components or premises of this

argument, so the range of this set may be infinite, i.e., the infinite regress of causes and effects may be assumed in this argument. Therefore, by assuming that the infinite regress of causes is probable, it is possible to prove the *wājib al-wujūd* (Suhrawardī 2002a, 1:33).

After generating this collection of possible outcomes, we declare it to be possible for two reasons. The first argument is that since all the elements in this set are possible, the set as a whole also has the feature that all of its elements are possible. If every element of this set is theoretically feasible, then the set as a whole has the property of possibility and the set itself is theoretically feasible but could not have existed, i.e., it has the same property of possible existence as possible non-existence and the same property that is equivalent to existence and non-existence.

Now, by thinking about this set, we realize that this set consists of members that are all possible, if these possibilities do not exist or are not present in the set, then this set will not exist. This set is possible being because the presumption that the set could not have existed is true for this set. This set requires its components, which is the second factor that makes it possible. We discover that the possible item in its existence needs something else to exist by focusing on the features of a possible being. This collection can exist since it also needs its constituent parts to exist.

As a result, this collection is both complex and dependent upon its components. Both combination and necessity are potential criteria of possible being. Now that all possible entities have been gathered into a single set, the result that is loaded onto this set can be loaded onto all possible entities because all possible beings share the same properties and traits, and this collection itself possesses those traits because it is a possible being.

A possible thing is equal to existence and non-existence based on its nature, and it requires an external cause to exist. Because the possible thing ceases to exist on its terms and because it does not yet exist to have an aspect that could give existence, the possible object cannot be the cause of its cessation. Because it is different from that object and is seen as the cause of that object, the object that may free the Possible being from an equal condition of existence and non-existence is believed to be that object. For the cause, there are various possibilities: 1. The Possible being of the external cause; 2. External cause is an impossible being; 3. *wājib al-wujūd* is the external cause.

Because the cause of this set is included in it if it is possible, the first assumption is incorrect. All possibilities, according to the assumptions, are contained in this set, which cannot possibly exist because it requires an outside cause to exist. The second presumption is incorrect as well. This is because if the cause is an impossible being, it cannot even exist and does not even exist. Due to the impossibility of assuming its existence

based on reason, and the fact that anything that does not exist and cannot exist at all cannot inevitably induce the creation of something else.

The third assumption is established as a result. There is only one alternative hypothesis that has a chance of being accurate, and that is the third one. Three hypotheses were considered for the cause under rational judgments, and the first and second hypotheses were discarded for the aforementioned reasons. As a result, the third assumption is true, meaning that the cause that can bring about this collection's being and lift it above the point of parity between existence and non-existence must be obligatory. By stating this reasoning, *wājib al-wujūd* was thus proven.

The Second Argument

The second argument which was clarified by Suhrawardī in this book is distinctive from the first one, and it is based on the falsification of the infinite regress (Suhrawardī 2002a, 1:33). Of course, it can be claimed that this argument is based on the distortion of the vicious circle, because the vicious circle is a kind of infinite regress that is finite and the first object depends on the last object, or it reinforces itself (Ṭūsī 1997, 27).

The interpretation of this argument is that we assume sets of cause and effect. Each effect depends on its cause, and the cause of this effect is also an effect against its cause. Since the vicious circle and infinite regress are invalid, this collection cannot, therefore, be infinite and will end up with a cause that is not the result of another cause. This cause, which is not the effect of another object, does not have the property of possibility, because this attribute is possible-existence, which needs a cause to exist. The reason that all the causes end and depend on it is *wājib al-wujūd*.

In the second argument, there are two hypotheses about the reason for this collection. The first assumption is that the cause of the entire collection is at the top of this chain and its difference with other members is that the rest of the members have a cause and this member does not have a cause.

But at the same time, it is considered a part of this series, because, unlike the first argument, the set imagined in this argument is a set of causes and effects, and it is not considered possible that the members simply exist. While in the first and third arguments of Suhrawardī in proving *wājib al-wujūd*, he observes the possible existence of the members of the set, and this attribute is extended to the whole set because every possibility needs a cause other than itself to exist.

Therefore, *wājib al-wujūd* is outside the set of possibilities. It means that the set itself is a possible entity that needs an external cause. While in this argument, we will not generalize the possibility attribute of the members to the whole set and we will only consider their causal aspect.

The second hypothesis is that the cause of causes of this set, which is the *wājib al-wujūd*, is located outside the set, that is, the chain of causes

and effects eventually ends with the cause that is outside the set.

According to the paradigm of this argument, the first assumption is more correct, but since the second assumption may come to mind and is also not a wrong assumption, it was necessary to state it. If we accept the second assumption, the second argument is similar to the first and third arguments of Suhrawardī's *al-Talwīḥāt*, with the difference that this argument is based on the refutation of vicious circle and infinite regress.

Argument of Revocation of Sequence

We consider a set of causes and effects. The common condition of this collection is neediness. That is, everyone shares the condition that every effect has a cause (the law of causality). This collection is either its cause, which is impossible, because it is impossible to create something out of its absence, and also the precedence of the object over itself is necessary, which is impossible.

Either one of the components of this set is the cause of the whole set, which is also invalid, because firstly, preference is necessary without preference, which is impossible, and secondly, all causes are common in needing to be different, or a set of causes is the cause of the whole set, which Again, it is invalid for the two stated reasons. This chain needs a cause beyond itself that has always existed, because if it did not exist, it would enter the set of causes, i.e., it did not exist and then it came into existence.

This cause has always been there, and it is not the cause of itself, because if it is the cause of itself, then a contradiction is necessary, that is, it is both the cause and the effect at the same time. Also, this cause did not come from nothing, because it is logically impossible to come from nothing. There must be a being from which something comes. This is the cause behind this collection, which does not have the properties of the causes and has always been there and created the effects. Therefore, there is a cause beyond this collection that does not have the characteristics of the ailments and has always existed and has created the effects (Davar and Salamian 2021, 19–20).

Vicious Circle

Assuming a quadruple set (A, B, C, D) and assuming that A is the cause of this set, A has created B, B has created C and C has created D, then D has created A, and in this case, A, which is assumed to be the cause of the whole set is also considered to be the effect of D, i.e. the cause of the causes, which must be in essence, is also in other, i.e. at the same time, it is also in essence, and the right is different and this leads to a contradiction and the contradiction is invalid.

If this set exists, then the cause of the set is both dependent on its essence and dependent on something else, then the sequence is invalid,

because the precedence of the object over itself is invalid (Davar and Mohamadi Salamian 2001, 21–22). In other words, the circle is a finite collection; and the regress is invalid; Therefore, the circle as a finite collection is invalid.

It should be mentioned that Avicenna did not mention the round in *Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*, because if we invalidate the regress in an infinite collection, the circle will also be invalidated as a finite collection. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī also considers the circle as a finite regress in his description of Avicenna's *Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt* (Ṭūsī 1997, 26).

The Third Argument

The interpretation of the third argument of Suhrawardī is that we imagine a collection of causes and effects; this collection can be finite or infinite. If it is finite, it has two sides and a middle, but if it is infinite, it has no end from the side of causes, and if it is also infinite from the side of causes and effects, then the side of the beginning, end, and middle cannot be imagined for it. In both cases, we can assume this collection.

In this collection of causes and effects, one part is the cause of another and it is the effect of another part. If the chain is finite, the first member does not have a superior, but it has an inferior and an effect, and the last member does not have an inferior, but it has a cause and a superior, and the middle members are effects for their superiors and are their inferior causes (Suhrawardī 2002a, 1:33–34).

This assumed collection is possible being. Because its members are all effects in some way and every effect is a possible being, because it needs others to exist, and it is also a composite collection of members, and every composite is also a possible being. Therefore, these possible collections need a cause to exist, and four states are considered for the cause of this collection. 1. The collection is its cause; The cause of the collection is a member of this collection; A group of this set is the cause of the whole set; An external cause is the cause of this collection.

The first assumption is false, because if the collection is its cause, the precedence of the object over itself is necessary, and this also requires that the object has created itself from nothing. On the other hand, this is the reverse of the presumption, because it was assumed that the collection of possible existences is possible for the reasons that were said, and the possible being is equal to existence and non-existence, and it needs a cause to remove it from this status.

The second assumption cannot be true because we assume that the collection has four members and the second member is the cause of the whole collection. This collection consists of causes and effects, and each member can only be the cause of the members after it and cannot be the cause of itself and the members before it, because it is itself the effect of the members before it. Therefore, the second member can only be the

cause of the third and fourth members and cannot be the cause of itself or the cause before itself. This situation is the same for the third and fourth members.

Now, if we assume that the first member is the cause of the whole collection, this member can also be the cause of its subsequent members, but it cannot be the cause of itself, so it must have a cause to exist. Also, all the members of this chain are possible beings, so if one of the members is the cause of the whole set, then preference is necessary, which is impossible. Therefore, the second assumption is also false.

In the third hypothesis, the situation is similar. We assume that we have a collection consisting of 30 members and members 1 to 10 are the cause of the whole collection. These members can be their posterior cause, but they cannot be their cause and they need another cause to exist.

If we assume that members 10 to 20 or members 20 to 30 are the cause of the whole collection, it can be said that these members can only be the cause after themselves and cannot be the cause before themselves and the cause of themselves, and they are also caused by the causes. They have already existed. Also, preference is necessary because all members share the attribute of possibility and have no preference over each other.

Therefore, the assumption that remains is the fourth assumption, i.e., an external cause is the cause of the whole collection, which does not have the characteristics of this chain. The property of this set was its possibility, now if the external cause itself is possible; it is included in this collection and needs another cause. The cause that is outside is *wājib al-wujūd*, which does not have the properties of this collection, and therefore it was proved to be *wājib al-wujūd*. Like the first proof, this proof is not limited to the falsification of circle and regress, and assuming that circle and regress are permissible, *wājib al-wujūd* will be proven.

The Argument to Prove *Wājib al-Wujūd (Nūr al-Anwār)* in *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*

Suhrawardī presents a new interpretation of *burhān al-ṣiddīqīn* in *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq* (Suhrawardī 2002b, 2:121–22). He has expressed certain terms to make this argument, and these terms are present everywhere in Suhrawardī’s illuminating literature. In this book, Suhrawardī has expressed most of his special philosophical opinions that distinguish him from other philosophers. Therefore, for a precise understanding of the argument presented by Suhrawardī, these terms must be understood.

The word “*nūr al-anwār*” in Suhrawardī’s illuminative literature is the same as *wājib al-wujūd*. Suhrawardī’s philosophy is based on light and the originality of light, and therefore, *wājib al-wujūd*, as an absolute existence, is also absolute light, and every being has the benefit of light according to its existential capacity. Since *wājib al-wujūd* is absolute existence, therefore the most intense light belongs to *wājib al-wujūd*, and

the abstract intellectual beings who are close to the essence of *wājib al-wujūd*, after that, have the highest intensity of light. Weak and physical beings are also known as “*qaṣīq*”, who either benefit little from light or live in darkness. It should also be said that Qutb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, the commentator of *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, considers all lights to be like radials in comparison with light (Shīrāzī 2001).

Another term that needs to be explained is the term abstract light. It can be said that abstract beings such as minds and souls are considered luminous abstracts. Human souls are also considered as part of the luminous abstracts. Although the soul is connected with the body, the nature of the soul is considered to be an abstract and immaterial being. Therefore, according to Suhrawardī’s paradigm of illumination, objects are considered part of darkness, and abstracts are part of luminous beings.

Another term that Suhrawardī has expressed in this argument is the term “*jawhar al-qaṣīq*”. According to what he means by the essence of darkness, based on what he says in *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq* in the chapter that deals with the definition of light and darkness, it is a body that is dark by its very nature and must be illuminated by lights. Also, the essence of the *qaṣīq* is sensuous, because every object can be pointed. He also expressed the word purgatory in this sense. He also mentioned the term hidden purgatory “*barzakh khāfī*” in another position (Suhrawardī 2002b, 2:118).

The explanation of the proof of the existence of light is that an abstract light is considered and this abstract light is not created by the substance of the “*qaṣīq*” or by the other abstract light, because circle and regress are necessary and because circle and regress are false, therefore all the beings finally end in an abstract light which is true in essence and was not created by another being.

All beings other than light are possible to exist and need an external cause to come into existence. The intellectual abstracts are that they are abstract lights, even though they are real in essence, but they needed a cause for their existence and survival, so need is their attribute and every need is possible. On the other hand, light beings other than light and all dark beings have existence and nature, therefore they are compound and any compound is possible. In this way, it can be said that in his other books, in the situations where he wants to prove the necessity, he starts from possibilities (Suhrawardī 2002a, 1:31–32), but his arguments in the *al-Talwīhāt* were based on the same.

The basis of *ṣiddīqīn*’s argument, which was started by Avicenna (Sīnā 1997, 97), is based on the division of existence into possible and necessary, and from the formation of the chain of possibilities, we finally find out the necessary of existence. In some proofs, this series of causes and effects consisting of possibilities based on the nullity of circle and regress ends with the necessary, and in some proofs, we unite the whole

set as a possibility and based on the principle of causality, and that a possibility is equal to existence and non-existence and needs a cause to exist, it is concluded that this collection of possible existence must be created by another existence and that existence is *wājib al-wujūd*.

Suhrawardī states two assumptions about what abstract light is created by. The first assumption is that abstract light is created by the *qaṣīq* substance. The second assumption is that abstract light is created by another abstract light. The first premise is invalid because the abstract light has no direction and is not corporeal, while the omnipresent being has direction, so it cannot be the cause of the abstract being that is void of direction. Suhrawardī also points out that the absorbed thing is dead, while abstract light is alive, and a dead thing cannot give birth to a living thing. On the other hand, the abstract light is the Supreme Being, and the essence of the inferior being is the Supreme Being, and the Supreme Being is more perfect than the inferior being, so it is not possible for the inferior being to give birth to the supreme being (Suhrawardī 2002b, 2:121–22). These last two reasons are stated in more detail by Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī in his description of *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, while Suhrawardī only mentioned them (Shīrāzī 2001).

This reason can also be expressed in the form of conditional propositions: If the cause of abstract light is the absorbed substance, then the directed thing has created the undirected thing. The apodosis is invalid because a directed object cannot create an undirected object, therefore the antecedent is also invalid, and the *qaṣīq* cannot be the cause of abstract light. In other words, If the cause of abstract light is the divine essence, then a lowly being has created a noble being. The apodosis is invalid because it is not possible for a lowly being to create a noble being.

Therefore, the assumption that the essence is the cause is impossible. In other phrases, If the cause of abstract light is the absorbed essence, then the dead thing has created the living thing. The apodosis is false because it is not possible for a dead thing to exist as a living thing, so the antecedent is also invalid, and the assumption that the absorbing substance is the cause of the abstract light is rejected.

The second assumption is that abstract light is created by another abstract light. All abstract lights, including minds and souls, are possible and need another reason to come into existence. Now, if an abstract light brings another being into being because it needed another cause to exist, then a set of lights is formed that are dependent on each other in existence, and because circle regress is false, in the end, this collection of lights must reach a being that does not need others and relies on its essence, and that being is light.

In this argument, abstract lights were assumed as members of the dynasty that eventually reached *nūr al-anwār*. But it should be pointed out that Suhrawardī means all beings, in this way that all beings, including

unattached lights and dense and material beings and their forms, will eventually reach the light (Suhrawardī 2002b, 2:121–22).

Objects and forms are also possible in existence and are created by abstract light, so they also enter this series because they need something else to exist. In other words, Abstract light exists in the outside world (for example, the rational human soul); This abstract light needs a cause to exist; Its cause cannot be the *qaṣīq* substance, because the *qaṣīq* substance is directional, and abstract light is devoid of direction; Necessarily, the cause of abstract light must be something that does not have a direction, and supreme must be separate light, and if the cause of abstract light is another abstract light, then that abstract light needs a cause to exist, and a chain of abstract lights is created.

It will be repeated this time; Circle and regress are invalid; Therefore, the collection of abstract lights and beings below abstract lights such as bodies (darkness) ultimately end up in an intrinsically upright being, has no direction, is pure and alive, and that is light.

Arbitration of Arguments

Suhrawardī has established three proofs in the book *al-Talwīḥāt* to prove *wājib al-wujūd*, and all three arguments are different interpretations of *ṣiddīqīn's* argument. The proofs presented by him in this book are very close to the proofs presented by Avicenna in the book of *Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*. His first and third proofs are not based on the refutation of circle and regress, and the advantage of these two interpretations is the same, while his second argument is based on the refutation of circle and regress.

Suhrawardī's literature in *al-Talwīḥāt* was based on the conventional philosophy of his time, while in some places he expressed his own opinions and literature in this book. But in many positions, his opinions are based on the paradigm of Avicenna's philosophy. Of course, it should be noted that Suhrawardī is indebted to Avicenna in many of his opinions in various works.

On the other hand, *burhān al-ṣiddīqīn*, which was established by Avicenna, is a strong argument and has been presented by many philosophers in different ways, and Suhrawardī is one of these philosophers. The literature of Suhrawardī's arguments in this book is based on Avicenna's literature.

Suhrawardī has presented most of his new philosophical opinions in the book *Hikmah al-Ishrāq*, and by compiling this book, he has introduced a new system of thought into Islamic philosophy. In expressing his opinions in this book, he is indebted to different intellectual traditions and has been able to put together the most specific contents of different intellectual traditions that are compatible with each other, but he has also expressed many of his own opinions in this book.

The basis of Illuminative philosophy is based on the originality of light, and it can be seen that his literature in this book revolves around the concept of light. In many positions, light corresponds to existence. In this book, Suhrawardī presents a new interpretation of *burhān al-ṣiddīqīn*, which is very special and distinguishes his argument from other arguments. This proof is considered part of the proofs of the *ṣiddīqīn* because, in the beginning, an entity is considered that needs a preference to exist, i.e., the possibility of existence.

Suhrawardī's literature in making this argument is based on illuminative philosophy, and for this reason, Suhrawardī expresses the essence of *qaṣīq* and abstract light instead of possible existence. Another premise of this argument is the refutation of circle and regress. Some interpretations of *ṣiddīqīn* argument are based on the falsification of circle and regress, such as his second proof in *al-Talwīḥāt*.

The argument that has been established in *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq* is based on the refutation of circle and regress. Finally, because abstract lights, i.e., minds, souls, and bodies (darkness) as possibilities, need a cause to exist, and the circle and regress are invalidated, there is necessarily a cause that all lights are radials of light. From the point of view of Suhrawardī, that being is the same as *nūr al-anwār*.

What makes this argument special is the presentation of new philosophical literature as illuminative literature, which has separated this argument from other arguments of the *ṣiddīqīn*. Another advantage is that Suhrawardī has stated why abstract light, as a member of this chain, cannot be created by the essence of *qaṣīq* and other abstract light, and the statement of this matter shows the importance of this proof compared to other proofs.

Conclusion

Three arguments have been established by Suhrawardī to prove the existence of *wājib al-wujūd* in the Book of *al-Talwīḥāt*. The proofs presented in this book are extremely brief. The first and third arguments of Suhrawardī are similar in the *al-Talwīḥāt*, and their difference is that in the first argument, an external cause is assumed, but in the third argument, by negating the other assumptions, it is established that the external cause is the cause of the entire set of possibilities. Therefore, the third argument is more detailed and includes the first argument.

In arguments one and three, a collection of possibilities has been imagined and finally, it has been proved that a cause from outside this set, which does not have the properties of this collection and its members, is the cause of the whole collection, and that is the necessary of existence. The advantage of these two arguments is that the falsification of the circle and regress are not prerequisites of the proof. I.e., with the assumption of the possible circle and regress, the necessary of existence is proved.

Suhrawardī's second argument in the *al-Talwīḥāt* is another interpretation of *burhān al-ṣiddīqīn* and its difference from the other two proofs is that the falsification of circle and regress is one of the premises of the proof, and also the First cause, which is the *wājib al-wujūd*, is at the top of this chain. Another assumption is that the cause of the causes is outside of this chain, so the first assumption is more correct.

Suhrawardī's third argument, which is more detailed than his first argument in *al-Talwīḥāt*, is also the assumption of the members of the collection. For this collection to come into being, either one of these members is the cause of the whole collection, or a group of members, or a cause from outside this set is the cause of the whole collection.

The first and second assumptions are rejected and the third assumption is proved. In general, the literature that Suhrawardī had in expressing these three arguments in the book of *al-Talwīḥāt* was based on the conventional philosophy of his time, although he had innovative proofs in the way he presented them. On the other side, Suhrawardī, in the book *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq*, in which he wrote his special philosophical opinions along with new philosophical literature, also used *ṣiddīqīn's* argument to prove *wājib al-wujūd*, which he calls *nūr al-anwār* in this book based on his new philosophical literature and has only provided an argument to prove *nūr al-anwār*.

His interpretation of *ṣiddīqīn's* argument in this book is an innovative result in two ways. The first direction is that he did not use the conventional and common philosophical terms of his time and he used Illuminative literature to make his argument, and the second direction is that he stated several assumptions for the causes of abstract light.

The assumptions that he raised which are also examined in this article, were a special innovation of Suhrawardī that separated his argument from other arguments. It should also be noted that his argument in *Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq* is based on the falsification of circle and regress, and in this sense, it is similar to the second argument of *al-Talwīḥāt*.

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