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Nietzsche beyond correlationism: Meillassoux’s history of modern philosophy

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Abstract

Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative materialism rests on the historical claim that European philosophy since Kant is “correlationist” in its denial that thought can know being as it is in itself rather than merely for us. But though the claim is central to Meillassoux, it has not been much explored in the literature on his work. This paper argues that Nietzsche does not fit so easily into Meillassoux’s story. Though there are certain superficially correlationist elements in Nietzsche’s thought, part of his core project is an ethically motivated rejection of the issues with respect to which realism and correlationism are alternatives. Thus, rather than denying that thought can access being in itself, Nietzsche aims to leave behind ways of thinking within which the question of thought’s access or lack of access matters. This means that Meillassoux loses some of the motivation for his positive position.

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Notes

  1. Harman (2015, p. vii).

  2. Morelle (2012, p. 242).

  3. Gratton (2014, p. 14).

  4. Meillassoux (2006).

  5. Hallward (2011, pp. 137–138).

  6. Gratton (2014, p. 14).

  7. Harman (2011, pp. 80–81).

  8. Thorne (2012, p. 281).

  9. Thorne (2012, p. 288).

  10. I am aware of 30 books, book chapters, or articles published in English on Meillassoux between 2007 and early 2015, most of them critical. To my knowledge, the three I mentioned are the only ones that dispute the historical claim in any way.

  11. Meillassoux (2006, p. 6).

  12. Meillassoux (2006, p. 5).

  13. Meillassoux (2006, p. 36).

  14. Meillassoux (2006, p. 37).

  15. Meillassoux (2006, p. 5).

  16. Meillassoux (2006, p. 8).

  17. What Meillassoux calls "the primacy of the correlate" at Meillassoux (2006, p. 36).

  18. Meillassoux often seems to use these terms interchangeably, choosing the one most appropriate in a given context. I will do the same in cases where the exact valence does not seem important.

  19. Meillassoux (2006, p. 35).

  20. Meillassoux (2006, p. 5).

  21. Meillassoux (2006, p. 4).

  22. Berkeley (2002, p. 18).

  23. This circularity argument is the first part of what Meillassoux dubs "the correlationist two-step," the second part being the claim that relations constitute their relata. He also points out that an emphasis on intersubjectivity as opposed to objectivity and the "cloistered" outside as aspects of correlationism, but these seem derivative elements. See Meillassoux (2006, pp. 5, 6, and 8).

  24. For these phrases, see Meillassoux (2006, pp. 30, 25, 30, 36 and 8, and 37), respectively.

  25. Meillassoux (2006, p. 35).

  26. Meillassoux (2006, p. 36).

  27. Meillassoux (2006, p. 39).

  28. Meillassoux (2006, p. 39).

  29. Meillassoux (2006, p. 39).

  30. Meillassoux (2006, p. 5).

  31. Meillassoux (2006, p. 8).

  32. See Moore (1993, pp. 165–166) and Moore (1959, pp. 32–59).

  33. Meillassoux (2006, p. 3).

  34. Meillassoux (2006, p. 8).

  35. Those interested should refer to later chapters of Meillassoux (2006) for his own presentation.

  36. Meillassoux (2006, p. 37).

  37. Kant (2003, p. 24).

  38. For some examples, see Kant (2003, pp. 22, 24–25, 27, 29, 74, 80, 82, 87, 173–174, 264, and 270).

  39. Kant (2003, pp. 24–25) does state that.

    it is still open to us to enquire whether, in the practical knowledge of reason, data may not be found sufficient to determine reason's transcendent concept of the unconditioned, and so to enable us, in accordance with the wish of metaphysics, and by means of knowledge that is possible a priori, though only from a practical point of view, to pass beyond the limits of all possible experience.

    What Kant is describing here is a kind of non-theoretical access to the things in themselves. It is this non-theoretical access for which Kant made room by "destroying knowledge." One might perhaps claim that Kant thus goes beyond correlationism by affirming that there is some way in which we can reach the things in themselves.

    But this would not be enough for Meillassoux. As he defined correlationism, the only relevant access to the things in themselves at issue is theoretical access, as the question is whether thought can know those things and their primary qualities. In other words, for Meillassoux only theoretical access counts. Kant's practical access would not be enough to push Kant beyond correlationism. Instead, Meillassoux would probably interpret this practical access as an attempt to salvage certain ontological claims (those required to ground an ethics) from being destroyed by the critical turn. That is not an implausible understanding of Kant's ethics.

  40. Nietzsche (2011, no pagination).

  41. Nietzsche (1974, p. 34).

  42. Nietzsche (2004, p. 17).

  43. See Meillassoux (2006, pp. 9–18).

  44. This is clear from Meillassoux's description of the "codicil" that the correlationist must add to scientific results. See Meillassoux (2006, p. 13).

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  1. Philosophy Department, Vanderbilt University, 111 Furman Hall, Nashville, TN, 37240, USA

    C. J. Davies

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Davies, C.J. Nietzsche beyond correlationism: Meillassoux’s history of modern philosophy. Cont Philos Rev 51, 81–93 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-016-9407-z

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