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Obligation and the Conditional in Stit Theory

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider two different ways in which modus-ponens type reasoning with conditional obligations may be formalized. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of each, and make some philosophical observations about the differences between the minor premises that each formalization requires. All this is done within the context of the Belnap-Perloff stit theory.

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Davey, K. Obligation and the Conditional in Stit Theory. Studia Logica 72, 339–362 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021841323244

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021841323244

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