This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
REFERENCES
Churchland, P.M. (1979): Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. NewYork: Cambridge University Press.
Crane, T. (1990): 'An Alleged Analogy Between Numbers and Propositions', Analysis 50, 224–30.
Davidson, D. (1987): 'Knowing One's Own Mind', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, pp. 441–458.
Davidson, D. (1989): 'What is Present to the Mind', in J. Brandl and W. Gombecz (eds.),The Mind of Donald Davidson, pp. 3–18. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Davies, D. (1992): 'Le béhaviorisme méthodologique et le réalisme intentionnel chez Dennett', in Denis Fisette (ed.) Daniel C. Dennett et les strategies intentionnelles: Lekton II-1, pp. 69–88. Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec.
Davies, D. (1995): 'Dennett's Stance on Intentional Realism', Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, 299–312.
Dennett, D. (1987): The Intentional Stance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. (1991): 'Real Patterns', The Journal of Philosophy, 27–51.
Field, H. (1980): 'Mental Representation', in Ned Block (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology vol. 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Matthews, R. (1994): 'The Measure of Mind', Mind 104, 1–16.
Schiffer, S. (1987): Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Searle, J. (1980): 'Author's Response' to Open Peer Commentary on 'Minds, Brains, and Programs', The Behavioural and Brain Sciences III, 3, pp. 450–456.
Stalnaker, R. (1987): Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Suppes, P. and Zinnes, J. (1967): 'Basic Measurement Theory', in R.D. Luce (ed.) Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. New York: Wiley & Sons.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Davies, D. On Gauging Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 90, 129–154 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004297614972
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004297614972