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Presentism and the Non-Present

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that presentism has a problem accounting forthe truth of statements whose truth conditions seem to require therebe relations that hold between present and non-present objects. Imotivate the problem and then examine several strategies for dealingwith the problem. I argue that no solution is forthcoming, and thispresents a prima facie problem for presentism.

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Davidson, M. Presentism and the Non-Present. Philosophical Studies 113, 77–92 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023071410620

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023071410620

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