Removing an Inconsistency from Jago’s Theory of Truth

Rok, strany: 2023, 339 - 349

I identify an inconsistency in Jago’s theory of truth. I show that Jago is committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A. I show that Jago is committed to the proposition that A being true because A if the proposition that A is true. I show that these two commitments, given the rest of Jago’s theory, entail a contradiction. I show that while the latter commitment follows from Jago’s theory of truth, even by Jago’s own lights he should not be committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A.

ISO 690:

Davies, N. 2023. Removing an Inconsistency from Jago’s Theory of Truth. In Organon F, vol. 30, no.4, pp. 339-349. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30403

APA:

Davies, N. (2023). Removing an Inconsistency from Jago’s Theory of Truth. Organon F, 30(4), 339-349. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30403

Vydavateľ: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR

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