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Excluded middle and bivalence

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Abstract

I consider two related objections to the claim that the law of excluded middle does not imply bivalence. One objection claims that the truth predicate captured by supervaluation semantics is not properly motivated. The second objection says that even if it is, LEM still implies bivalence. I show that LEM does not imply bivalence in a supervaluational language. I also argue that considering supertruth as truth can be reasonably motivated.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 35294, Birmingham, Alabama, USA

    Timothy J. Day

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  1. Timothy J. Day
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Day, T.J. Excluded middle and bivalence. Erkenntnis 37, 93–97 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00220634

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00220634

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