Abstract
The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. Later, the paper investigates some implications of the new principle of indifference. To conclude, a re-examination of the foundations of the so-called objective Bayesian inference is called for.
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de Cristofaro, R. A new formulation of the Principle of Indifference. Synthese 163, 329–339 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9301-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9301-7