When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification
Introduction
Having a distinct sense of self at the phenomenological level does not mean that there is such a thing as a self, or a specific brain region dedicated to it. However, many aspects of human behavior seem inexplicable without the notion that each person has a self. We are aware that such a concept has many definitions and that there is no consensual framework for conceptualizing the various aspects of the self (for an exploration of various dimensions of the self from a diverse set of disciplines, see Gallagher, 2000). This complexity exists because self-processes operate at multiple levels, and different research camps have emerged to address the role of the self at these levels, but without attempting to integrate them (Robins, Norem, & Cheek, 1999). Instead of opposing a naturalistic perspective of the self to a social construction, we shall suggest that the sense of self emerges from the activity of the brain in interaction with other selves. Our formulation will be grounded in empirical evidence ranging from developmental psychology to cognitive neuroscience and clinical neuropsychology. We will suggest that self–other connectedness is underpinned by a shared representations network, which enables the self to represent the other, project thoughts and feelings to the other, feel sympathy for the other, and may also account for psychological identification with others. We will propose that the inferior parietal cortex, in conjunction with the prefrontal cortex, plays a crucial function in both self-awareness and in relating the self to others.
There is a long-standing philosophical position arguing that self and other are interconnected. For instance, in his Treatise of Human Nature David Hume (1739), observed that our minds are mirrors to one another: They reflect one another’s passions, sentiments, and opinions. This “sympathy” or “propensity we have to sympathize with others, to receive by communication [the] inclinations and sentiments [of others], however different from, or even contrary to our own,” he held to be the chief source of moral distinctions.
Contemporary research in developmental science, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience provides cumulative evidence for a view of similarities in the construction of representations of the self and others.
Section snippets
Development of self and other representations
Recent empirical studies in developmental psychology suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for early intersubjective transactions between the self and the other. Current empirical evidence radically challenges the traditional views that considered infants as social isolates, devoid of any intersubjective link between self and other, or as being in a “normal autism” state until the age of 18 months because they confuse the self and the other (e.g., Freud, 1911).
For instance,
Shared neural representations between self and other
The old ideomotor theory (Greenwald, 1970; James, 1890), which states that the perceptual image or idea of an action initiates performance of the action (or “thinking is for doing”), has received considerable support from various sources, including social facilitation (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001), speech perception (Liberman & Mattingley, 1985), motor mimicry (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), motor priming (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000), and emotional contagion (Sullins,
The effect of the intention (or to be an agent)
To investigate the role of intention on the activation of the neural network that is activated during the observation of action, a series of studies performed by our group manipulated the cognitive strategy of the subjects while watching human actions. In the studies, participants were instructed to either memorize the action for later imitation or for later recognition (Decety et al., 1997; Grèzes, Costes, & Decety, 1998; Grèzes, Costes, & Decety, 1999). When subjects observed actions for
Self-awareness as an essential component for navigating within the shared representations
Even if others are apparently like us, they are never exactly like us, and under normal circumstances, we do not confuse others with ourselves. The idea of a common mental code involved in self-initiated (performed or imagined) actions and in perceiving the behavior of others does not mean an overlap between the two signals. Without a sense of self-awareness (and perhaps self-consciousness), we will just resonate with one another, become distressed by the distress of others, and certainly will
Reciprocal imitation as a natural paradigm to explore self–other connectedness
One way to empirically investigate both the similarities and differences in the hemodynamic response in ecologically valid social interactions is to use mutual imitation paradigms. Mutual imitation is acknowledged to play a central role in infant development of intersubjectivity and shared motivational states (Hobson, 1989; Nadel & Baudonnière, 1982). Role-taking during early social interactions between infant and mother are frequent and considered a milestone in the linkage between their
The inferior parietal cortex and the sense of agency
There is plenty of evidence from clinical neuropsychology that lesions to the inferior parietal cortex in the language-dominant hemisphere are associated with apraxia and aphasia (Freund, 2001). Several authors argued that the different types of apraxia could be ascribed to lesions in the two systems of motor control, a conceptual system and a production system (e.g., Leiguarda & Marsden, 2000). The inferior parietal cortex in the dominant hemisphere is part of the conceptual system. Rothi,
Psychological identification with others
The capacity to identify with other conspecifics, considered a prerequisite to feeling sympathy and empathy (Decety, 2002; Hobson, 1989, Hobson, 2002; Tomasello, 1999), is a distinctive characteristic of human beings that other primates apparently do not possess (Povinelli & Giambrone, 1999). Newborns are innately highly attuned to other people and motivated to socially interact with others. From the earliest months of their lives, infants are engaged with other people and with the actions and
Conclusion
In this article we attempted to review functional neuroimaging studies that investigate the brain mechanisms involved in understanding actions performed by others, imitation, and in sharing mental states such as intentions and emotions. Mental states that are in essence private to the self may be shared between individuals. The similarity of activated areas (in premotor and posterior parietal cortices) between observation of action, mental simulation, and imitation accounts for a shared neural
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