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The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model

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An Erratum to this article was published on 01 December 2012

Abstract

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different “degrees of contingency”. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model.

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Notes

  1. See for example, Bechtel and Richardson (1993), Machamer et al. (2000), Darden (2002) and Darden and Craver (2002).

  2. The idea of considering idealizations as being statements goes back to Nowak (1980), although the idea already appears in Barr (1971), who speaks about idealized laws as “ideal cases” that are essentially understood as counterfactual statements with ideal conditions as their antecedents. In Barr’s approach, theories become classes of ideal cases (statements). As the statement view of scientific theories (for which theories are classes of statements) was abandoned by most philosophers of science in favor of the semantic view, idealizations were understood as the process of model construction or as the product of that process (see, for example, Suppe 1989 and Balzer et al. 1987). In the present article, we don’t want to favor any particular view about scientific theories. We just want to defend a certain account of idealization without committing us to any philosophically charged approach to scientific theories. Our proposal that idealizations are certain kind of statements is an idealization itself that is intended to help better understand their functioning in scientific reasoning.

  3. See Niiniluoto (1987, 1998, 1999). See also Kuipers (1987).

  4. See, for example, Bennett and Fine (1975), Nute (1976), Schlossberger (1978), Kvart (1992), Krasner and Heller (1994), Fogelin (1998), Bennett (2003), Tooley (2003) and Pruss (2007).

  5. As, for example, has been argued by Cleland and Copley (2005).

  6. Compare this with Barr (1971, 261ff). These distinctions are very similar to Barr’s own terminology, although our analysis is different from his.

  7. An analysis of this example in terms of idealization can be found in Nowak (2000). See Nowakowa and Nowak (2000, chap. 2, 82ff) and ff. We have taken the example from Nowak’s article.

  8. For a detailed account of this process of idealization-concretization see Nowak (1980, Chap. 2), Laymon (1982) and (1985), Cartwright (1989), and Nowakowa and Nowak (2000).

  9. Laymon (1982, 115). Compare Niiniluoto (1999, 141–143).

  10. Authors such as Laymon (1982), Kuipers (1992a) and Kuipers (1992b) and Niiniluoto (1999) invoke the process of idealization-concretization in their different attempts to argue in favor of a convergent realism and method of approaching the truth. We do not want to commit ourselves to any form of scientific realism. The process of idealization-concretization may well serve to justify the use of idealizations, but not a substantive philosophical answer to the problem of scientific realism. See also Strevens’s (2008) take on this issue.

  11. To keep things tidy, just remember that i = i t and j = i+1.

  12. Also known as the mean of the binomial distribution.

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Acknowledgments

This paper has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (Research Project Ref.: FFI2009-08828/FISO). A postdoctoral fellowship was awarded to Alfonso Arroyo Santos by the CONACyT (“Programa de Estancias posdoctorales vinculadas al fortalecimiento de la calidad del posgrado nacional” 2010). Previous versions of this article were presented at different conferences, including the PSA Biennial Meeting held on November 6–8, 2008 in Pittsburgh. The authors would like to thank the audiences on those occasions, and specially Mark E. Olson and two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful comments.

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  1. Department of Logic and Moral Philosophy, University of Santiago de Compostela, Plaza Mazarelos s/n., 15782, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

    Xavier de Donato Rodríguez

  2. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Posgrado en Filosofía de la Ciencia, UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico

    Alfonso Arroyo Santos

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  1. Xavier de Donato Rodríguez
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Correspondence to Xavier de Donato Rodríguez or Alfonso Arroyo Santos.

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de Donato Rodríguez, X., Arroyo Santos, A. The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model. J Gen Philos Sci 43, 11–27 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-012-9185-1

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