Origins of the Belief in Good True Selves

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.05.009

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Volume 21, Issue 9, September 2017, Pages 634-636

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.05.009 Get rights and content

Despite differences in beliefs about the self across cultures and relevant individual differences, recent evidence suggests that people universally believe in a ‘true self’ that is morally good. We propose that this belief arises from a general tendency: psychological essentialism (PE).

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Origins of the Belief in Good True Selves