Conclusion
A Molinist should not embrace the independence thesis. He also can defend the thesis that counterfactuals of freedom depend on a counterfactual act. Although such a move may seem illicit in the sense thatexplanandum andexplanans presuppose each other, I defend the view that counterfactuals of freedom are very deeply embedded in our metaphysics and we cannot therefore satisfactorily explain them with the help of other devices.
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Dekker, E. Explanatory priority and independence: On an argument against middle knowledge. SOPHIA 38, 1–14 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02786329
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02786329