Abstract
This essay is broadly conceived as a study of how the emotional experience of shame can play an important role in the construction of personal identity. It considers, on the one hand, the way in which Greek culture conceives the social meaning of this emotion and, on the other, the double representation that Plato provides in the Symposium of two very different forms of pedagogy of shame. Using the Platonic text as a phenomenological source, the author discusses the general validity and relevance to the Greek world of the anthropological scheme that opposes «shame cultures» to «guilt cultures» (Benedict, Dodds, Adkins), attributing evolutionary primacy to the latter in terms of the acquisition of individual moral autonomy.
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- 1.
For the Homeric theme of the “beautiful death” cf. Vernant (1989): his analysis highlights the link established in Greek culture between honour and memory, on the one hand, infamy and oblivion, on the other, underlining how Achilles himself is represented while singing to pay homage to other ancient heroes through remembering their deeds.
- 2.
- 3.
The power of strong passions to make someone passive, by carrying thought away, is raw material for tragic representations and is an object of reflection in Greek poetry, rhetoric and medicine, apart from philosophy. The descriptive and theoretical value of this ancient body of reflections finds correspondence in most recent studies on emotions, allowing us to re-evaluate this precious heritage. See Konstan for his analysis of the relationship between the ancient definition of pathos and the contemporary meaning of passion (Konstan 2006, 3–40), followed by a study of each emotion. On broad-spectrum passions raised in competitive and conflictual situations, see Fussi and Fiorino (2016).
- 4.
On the anomalous model of «Medea’s syndrome» and on the sinister effects of vengeful emotions in women, see Sassi (2017).
- 5.
For a wider perspective on this criterion in the study of ancient moral thought, see Vegetti (1989), especially chapter II.
- 6.
In the Laches, the question of courage as a virtue occupies the whole dialogue between Socrates and two army generals. In the Gorgias, Socrates discusses it with Callicles (488b3–492e5). In book IV of the Republic (429a8–430c7), a political solution is envisaged in the framework of the kallipolis project.
- 7.
See Laws I 644c8–d3, where a pattern of the four basic passional motives of human action appears: pleasure and pain as criteria for what to do in the present time; fear and hope as projections of the same motives into the future. On this theoretical basis, an increasingly complex taxonomy of the passions was developed: from their definition as pathological states – on which see Vegetti (1995, 54–58) – to the refined classificatory models of the Stoics, preserved by Diogenes Laertius (Lives of the Philosophers VII, 111) and Pseudo-Andronicus – ap. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta III, 391–397, ed. von Arnim (1903–1905).
- 8.
The importance of this passage as an expression of a new educational model is convincingly asserted by Palumbo, who writes: «On the basis of this text it is finally possible to observe how education to courage occurs in the planning of the new city. It consists in the transformation of phobos into aischyne, of fear into shame. It is a radical transformation: what is proposed is the transformation not only of a whole into one of its part, − all fear must be reduced to that specific fear the lack of which is dangerous for the city - but also the transformation of a thing into its opposite» (Palunbo 2007, 322, in Italian edition).
- 9.
This epithet appears in the Hesiodic tale of the creation of the first woman (Pandora), who was sent by Zeus to men as the source of all evil, but also as a creature full of seductive charms: beneath her beautiful appearance, she conceals «a dog’s mind» (kyneon noon) and «a fickle way of doing» (epiklepon hethos)» (Hesiod, Works and Days, v. 67). Transl. by Most (2006, 93).
- 10.
On this symbolic link between the woman and the dog, see the important book by Franco (2003).
- 11.
This tale appears in Phaedrus’ speech in Plato’s Symposium (179b4–d3). The character uses it in his paradoxical encomium of Eros as a teacher of courage, even for those individuals who are not expected to possess this virtue. Phaedrus’ discourse will be analysed infra, § 4.
- 12.
On honour and shame in the speeches of Phaedrus and Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium, see Fussi (2008).
- 13.
The translation of all the passages from Plato’s Symposium (including this one) is by Bloom and Benardete 2001
- 14.
See especially 217a2–d2 and 218b9–219d2. Alcibiades’ seductive strategy – namely, his intention to exchange erotic gifts and educational care with Socrates – fully expresses the logic governing the relationships between lovers and their beloved, codified in ethical terms by the Athenian culture of the fifth century BC, as a means to preserve the young. On this topic, see Dover (1978), Calame (1988), Foucault (1984). Nussbaum (1986), chap. VI, presents a different interpretation, while assuming authentic erotic involvement on Alcibiades’ part and cold rationalism on that of Socrates (who, in turn, is an emblem of Platonic idealism).
- 15.
This section partially draws upon the analysis developed in de Luise (2013), although it has been revised, integrated and adapted to the goals of the present essay.
- 16.
In de Luise (2014) I have already emphasized the importance of the education that Socrates received from the stranger Diotima.
- 17.
The concept of endeia is key for understanding the notion of eros proposed by Socrates in the Symposium. As the desire for what one lacks, love brings the subject into relation with something different from him/her and makes him/her aware of being in a condition of weakness. The individual is then led to search for the means and the resources necessary to bridge the rift between what he/she does (not) have and what he/she wants. Cf. 199c3–201c8 and 201e8–202d11 for the twofold confutation of the idea that eros consists in the complete possession of divine qualities and the association of erotic desire with a state of «neediness», typical of the human condition.
- 18.
The specific action that distinguishes the erotic impulse is defined by the expression tokos en kalo (206b7–8, 206e2–3), «bringing birth in the beautiful». The formula introduces the metaphorical area of generation and birth, which is expressed by specifically feminine words such as tiktein, kuesis and gennesis (cf. Symposium 206b1–e3).
- 19.
Diotima thinks that «mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be everlasting and immortal» (207d1–3) and therefore resorts to the metaphor of procreation, which consists in making the individual endure by generating new beings similar to him/her. The priestess describes in detail the constant renovation of each living being, which is forced to change in order to reproduce the condition of its existence (207d3-208b4). Each individual appears to be engaged, in both body and mind, in governing the metamorphic processes that flow within it and in guiding them towards the best available form of conservation.
- 20.
See Symposium 214e9–215a2, where Alcibiades professes his will to tell the whole truth about Socrates by assuring his audience that he will not lie about anything, or at least not voluntarily.
- 21.
The effect of Socrates’ discourses stems from the practice of confutation (elenchos), which shows Alcibiades’ need for self-care (215e8–216c3).
- 22.
See Symposium 217e5–218b5. In popular culture, the bite of the viper (that Alcibiades uses as a metaphor for the suffering he has experienced in his close relationship with Socrates) is described as a pain that is incomprehensible for those who have not had the same experience.
- 23.
The passage mentions all the participants of Plato’s symposium. They share the same condition: they have all been victim of Socrates’ pedagogic treatment and bear the marks of this experience.
- 24.
- 25.
See Republic X, 617d2-618b6 and its moral interpretation in de Luise (2007).
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de Luise, F. (2021). Shame and Self-Consciousness in Plato’s Symposium: Reversals of Meaning of a Social Emotion. In: Giacomoni, P., Valentini, N., Dellantonio, S. (eds) The Dark Side: Philosophical Reflections on the “Negative Emotions”. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55123-0_3
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