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The Mark of Understanding: In Defense of an Ability Account

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Abstract

Understanding is a valued trait in any epistemic practice, scientific or not. Yet, when it comes to characterizing its nature, the notion has not received the philosophical attention it deserves. We have set ourselves three tasks in this paper. First, we defend the importance of this endeavor. Second, we consider and criticize a number of proposals to this effect. Third, we defend an alternative account, focusing on abilities as the proper mark of understanding.

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Notes

  1. In the same spirit as the “mark of the cognitive” (Adams and Aizawa 2010, p. 46) in philosophy of mind.

  2. The proposed difference-maker ranges from understanding’s transparency (Zagzebski 2001) or coherence (Kvanvig 2003), its status as an intellectual achievement or cognitive ability (Pritchard 2009). If understanding is simply a type of knowledge, then the issue is a non-starter based on an unfair comparison (Brogaard 2005).

  3. A characterisation not quite as old as it is deemed to be (Dutant 2015).

  4. This makes the concept of explanation implicitly tied to the concept of understanding. Though not necessarily vice versa. Lipton (2009) argues that one can acquire understanding without an explanation. If this is true, then an account of understanding is less dependent on an implicit account of explanation than the other way around.

  5. See (Delarivière et al. 2017) for elaborations on how the exclusion of the role of understanding restricts accounts of explanation.

  6. There are exceptions, such as (Sierpinska 1990, 1994).

  7. We believe a useful theory of understanding does not come apart from a justified theory of attribution, because it makes no sense to clarify understanding separately from (justifiable) understanding attributions. The proof of the pudding must be in the eating. This does entail that characterisation of understanding needs to be able to address contextual shifts in attribution, which we believe is possible (see Delariviere 2020b).

  8. de Regt (2004) concedes that it can be “a source of motivation” (p. 104), but not an aim of science.

  9. For an exposition on third person phenomenology or heterophenomenology, see (Dennett 1993).

  10. This is also the reason that de Regt (2009) invokes a skill condition.

  11. Just to be clear: no one is denying that people can keep their abilities to themselves, but this is a radically different thing from claiming that their abilities are inherently located in the realm of the private.

  12. Unless it is inferred, in which case the premium once again shifts to abilities.

  13. See also Thurston (1998) and Davis and Hersh (1998).

  14. See Lewis Carroll’s (1895) What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.

  15. One may wish to object that glass does not have the “ability” to shatter, but is merely disposed to. We’ll address this concern later in this section.

  16. Thank you to the reviewers for pointing out this worry. .

  17. For more on the degrees of understanding, see (Delarivière 2020b, c2).

  18. For such an expansion of the ability account where we use mental properties as instrumental concepts, see (Delarivière 2020b, c4).

  19. Where one ability begins and another ends will largely depend on how wide a net one is attempting to cast. The ability “to multiply two single digit numbers” clearly casts a wider net than the ability “to multiply 5 with 6.” Some abilities don’t have an obvious net-size. Consider the ability “to prove that the square root of 2 is irrational.” Is this ability composed of the act of giving a proof in the salient circumstances along with other acts (e.g. criticizing incorrect steps, predicting outcomes of observed lapses, …) or do these other acts constitute different abilities? Providing an answer is not only difficult, but will largely depend on how you phrase the ability in question. We will not concern ourselves here with providing universal demarcation criteria for what constitutes a single ability. As long as one is with us in the claim that understanding casts a wide net, it doesn’t matter to us whether it’s because understanding captures many multiple abilities, or because abilities capture many acts.

  20. For a defense of free will that is compatible with determinism and does not rely on an inaccessible mental realm, see Delarivière (2016).

  21. “For both Kvanvig and Pritchard, “objectual” or “holistic” understanding has to do with our grasp of large chunks of information, especially as they relate to topics or subject matters. Understanding-why or atomistic understanding, by contrast, is focused on some particular state of affairs: understanding why the cup spilled, for example, or why Fred did poorly on his exam.” (Grimm 2016, p. 254).

  22. Personally, we would read CUP not as a criterion for understanding, but as a criterion for scientific adequacy. CIT, on the other hand, seems to us the true criterion of understanding: namely that the intelligibility of a theory grants us an understanding of the phenomena, provided the theory in question is scientifically adequate (passes CUP).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium

    Sven Delarivière & Bart Van Kerkhove

  2. FWO-Vlaanderen, Brussels, Belgium

    Sven Delarivière

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  1. Sven Delarivière
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Delarivière, S., Van Kerkhove, B. The Mark of Understanding: In Defense of an Ability Account. Axiomathes 31, 619–648 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09529-0

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