Abstract
The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and body.
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Notes
Yablo characterizes “the exclusion problem for epiphenomenalism” more generally in terms of mental events; we have chosen to formulate it specifically to conscious events. Like Kim (see below) Yablo also formulates his exclusion problem in terms of properties (Yablo 1992, 247, note 5).
While the very coherence of the notion of qualia has been challenged (e.g., Dennett 1988, 2006), we use the term to simply denote the qualities of subjective experience, the visual experience of red, the taste experience of lemon, etc. It is an interesting question what, precisely, these mysterious qualities of experience are; we maintain that they are a species of neurophysiological phenomena.
Although the realism principle can be challenged (see, e.g., Chalmers 1996), we concur with Kim that, at the very least, the burden is on the epiphenomenalist to make sense of the claim that we can have intimate knowledge of phenomena which are entirely inert. Indeed, we believe that the opponent of the principle of realism would be hard pressed to identify any natural phenomena that are entirely causally inefficacious.
It is sometimes maintained that quantum mechanical effects inside the brain sustain an argument against physical closure and in favor of the causal contribution of non-physical conscious decisions (we thank an anonymous referee for raising the point). We note first, that the indeterminacy of quantum events does not entail a lack of physical closure although it may well entail a reformulation of the closure thesis to accommodate situations where quantum mechanical effects are non-negligible (for a discussion of closure responsive to such considerations see Papineau 2009). As for the view that events sensitive to quantum dynamics betray the intervention of conscious agency, let alone non-physical conscious agency, we observe that it is usually based on the Copenhagen interpretation of the collapse of the wave function, as refined by von Neumann (see, e.g., Stapp 2007), an interpretation which, despite its practical appeal to physicists, is rife with problematic philosophical assumptions.
For a recent and important critique of the multiple realization argument, see Heil 1999.
For a defense of twofold-access theory, and its use in deflating the “explanatory gap argument” for dualism, see Dempsey (2004).
For further details see Dempsey (2009).
Our focus on autonomous agency stems from the belief that this concept epitomizes much of what is important and desirable about the dynamical systems approach to life and mind and therefore, that it can serve as a useful anchor for a discussion of consciousness. In particular, we believe that it has the advantage of being more straightforwardly relevant to the explanation of various aspects of mental reality than the more general concept of self-organization which seems to play an analogous explanatory role for Ellis, as well as for other enactivists (e.g., Newton 2000, Varela et al. 1991). This being said, it ought to be emphasized that on many issues of substance our own view is in considerable agreement with enactivism and that it is not our purpose, in this paper, to highlight the differences, let alone to elaborate on them.
Notice that on the present account of autonomous agency the artificial gadgets of so-called “autonomous agents robotics” (see, e.g., Beer 1995, Brooks 1991) do not qualify as full-blown AA’s. Despite their impressive capabilities and their undeniable significance for contemporary research in AI they are not far from equilibrium systems, and they do not manifest system capacities such as autopoiesis, homeostasis, reproduction, and boundary maintenance which, on our view, are crucial for genuine autonomy. For accounts of what we take to be genuine autonomy see, e.g., Bickhard 2000b, Christensen and Hooker 2000, Kauffman 2000 chap. 3, Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004, and Varela 1979.
By “far from equilibrium thermodynamic stability” we refer to the capacity of macro-systems to resist disintegration in the face of the spontaneous evolution (dictated by the second law of thermodynamics) towards greater entropy, i.e., towards loss of energy and order, and the reaching of a maximally homogeneous internal structure and of maximal thermodynamic equilibrium with the system’s environment.
By “organization,” we refer, roughly, to the extent to which the components of a system are interrelated. The more the components of a system are interrelated, the less random is the behavior of one subsystem relative to others. A pattern of organization is the configuration of relationships (sub-organizations) that determines the system’s essential characteristics (e.g., being a radioactive system, a living system, etc.). The complexity of a pattern of organization is a function of the number of its micro-constituents, their variability, and their integration through mutual interactions (in information theoretic terms, the complexity of a system is correlated with the number of independent pieces of information required to specify it). A pattern of organization is globally integrated if its micro-components are interrelated through an intricate network of mutual interactions. In such a network every functioning part is sensitive to changes elsewhere in the network, a feature that enables the realization of coordinated activities conducive to the maintenance of the organized whole.
“Extropy” is the motivational tendency to achieve homeostasis at relatively high levels of energy expenditure. Extropy, however, may sometimes conflict with the tendency to satiate electrostatic needs as “a runner’s interest in finishing a race” conflicts with “the fatigue, thirst, and breathlessness pulling him in the opposite direction” (Ellis 2005, 89).
In other words, we reject the common assumption that type-identity precludes any meaningful notion of ontological levels. What matters for the identity, or ontological “signature,” of an entity is not just what it is made of, namely, the fact that it is physical, but also how it is organized. We maintain that what justifies a “levelled” view of reality is precisely the fact that organization matters. Cells are organized entities and they constitute a biological level, brains are even more organized entities substantiating the emergence of a psychological level, and so on. In this case, it would be a mistake to conclude that type-identity precludes downward causation. Rather, if qualia are identical with macro properties of the nervous system, then in so far as these macro properties exert downward causal influence, qualia exert downward causal influence.
As Ellis points out (Ellis 2005, 194) certain recreational drugs, e.g., ecstasy, can overwhelm the body’s ability to compensate resulting in a permanent change (for the worse!).
This claim ought not to be understood as implying that emotions provide precise directives for action but rather, that they alert us to the need to act while also providing general pointers concerning the significance of a situation by indicating whether it harbours positive, or negative, consequences as well as the gravity of such probable consequences (marked by the intensity of the emotion).
Consider again a person who consumes recreational drugs. Perhaps she craves the thrill and exaltation of the experience, or perhaps she seeks refuge from stressful life circumstances. In either case, her action is motivated by emotions and results in considerable change in the biochemistry of her brain. Higher-level self-organizational goals—stress relief, or the quest for altered forms of experience—are effective in bringing about changes at the level of cellular organization.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Ausonio Marras, two anonymous reviewers for this journal, the participants at the 2006 annual meeting of the Atlantic RegionalPhilosopher's Association (ARPA), and the participants at the 2007 annual meeting of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (PSSA).
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Dempsey, L., Shani, I. Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalism. Phenom Cogn Sci 8, 225–243 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9112-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9112-4