Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism

Abstract

Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionismabout properties with a physical determination thesis in such a wayas to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful:the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enoughto ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or tooweak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I proposea distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, a distinction thanks to which we can reply to a standard objection against the ontological reductionism of strong supervenience.Second, I claim that because of "the problem of random distribution,"global supervenience needs strengthening to be an adequate relationto capture our physicalistic intuitions; and I show, in accordance withStalnaker's relevant proof, why a natural strengthening of global supervenience renders it equivalent to strong supervenience. Finally,I argue against Stalnaker about the possibility of a non-reductionistglobal supervenience. The upshot is that despite appearances, supervenience physicalism is a form of reductive physicalism.