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The freak in all of us: Logical truth seeking without argumentation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

Wim De Neys
Wim De Neys
Affiliation:
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)–Université de Toulouse, Maison de la Recherche, 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9, France. Wim.deneys@univ-tlse2.frhttp://www.univ-tlse2.fr/ltc/deneys
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Abstract

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) sketch a bleak picture of logical reasoning in classic, nonargumentative tasks. I argue that recent processing data indicate that despite people's poor performance they at least seek to adhere to traditional logical norms in these tasks. This implies that classic reasoning tasks are less artificial–and logical reasoning less exceptional–than M&S's framework suggests.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 75 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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