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An Operational Perspective on the Ethics of the Use of Autonomous Weapons
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 December 2023
Abstract
Rapid technological change is resulting in the development of ever increasingly capable autonomous weapon systems. As they become more sophisticated, the calls for developing restrictions on their use, up to and including their complete prohibition, are growing. Not unlike the call for restrictions on the sale and use of drones, most proposed restrictions are well-intentioned but are often ill-informed, with a high likelihood of degrading national security and putting additional lives at risk. Employed by experienced operators well-versed in the laws of armed conflict, autonomous weapons can advance the objectives of those who would prohibit their use. This essay takes an operational perspective to examine the role that autonomous weapon systems can play while complying with the laws of armed conflict. With responsible design and incorporation of applicable control measures, autonomous weapons will be able not just to comply but also to enhance the ethical use of force. This essay contends that efforts by the international community to use international legal means and/or institutions to over-regulate or even ban lethal autonomous weapons are counterproductive. It considers and describes the end-game results of the use of autonomous weapons in enhancing the application of both international law and human ethical values.
- Type
- Roundtable: Global Governance and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
References
Notes
1 Department of Defense, United States of America, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” DoD Directive 3000.09, January 25, 2023, p. 21, www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf.
2 Ibid., p. 3.
3 Ibid., p. 4.
4 United Nations General Assembly, “Joint Statement on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems First Committee, 77th United Nations General Assembly Thematic Debate—Conventional Weapons,” October 21, 2022, p. 1.
5 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, “Memorandum for Senior Pentagon Leadership Commanders of the Combatant Commands Defense Agency and DoD Field Activity Directors,” May 26, 2021, p. 1.
6 DOD Responsible AI Working Council, U.S. Department of Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 2022), media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003022604/-1/-1/0/Department-of-Defense-Responsible-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-and-Implementation-Pathway.PDF.
7 Lise Morjé Howard, “A Look at the Laws of War—and How Russia Is Violating Them: Upholding International Law Makes Peace Possible, Which Means Russia's Leader Must Be Held to Account,” United States Institute of Peace, September 29, 2022, www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/look-laws-war-and-how-russia-violating-them.
8 “China Responsible for ‘Serious Human Rights Violations’ in Xinjiang Province: UN Human Rights Report,” UN News, August 31, 2022, news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1125932.
9 Department of the Army, United States of America, and Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “General Background and Basic Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict,” ch. 1 in The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, August 2019, armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19354_FM%206-27%20_C1_FINAL_WEB_v2.pdf.
10 It is of interest to highlight that if such property is used for military purposes, it loses its protection against attacks.
11 Ray Reeves, “The Ethical Upside of Artificial Intelligence,” War on the Rocks, January 20, 2020, warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-ethical-upside-to-artificial-intelligence/.
12 U.S. Air Force, Targeting, Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-60, November 12, 2021, www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-60/3-60-AFDP-TARGETING.pdf.
13 Emery Winter, “Yes, Russia Promised in 1994 to Never Attack Ukraine If It Gave Up Its Nuclear Weapons,” VERIFY, updated March 10, 2022, www.verifythis.com/article/news/verify/global-conflicts/ukraine-agreed-to-give-up-nukes-in-exchange-for-safety-from-russia-invasion-attack-budapest-memorandum-treaty/536-8748a51f-10ee-47f0-be30-b4088750ee44.
14 For more on the deterrence and war-fighting potential of the Air Force's new autonomous collaborative platforms, see Caitlin Lee and Mark Gunzinger, “Penetrating Strike,” part 1 in The Next Frontier: UAVs for Great Power Conflict (Arlington, Va.: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, December 2022), mitchellaerospacepower.org/event/research-paper-release-the-next-frontier-uavs-for-great-power-conflict-part-i-penetrating-strike/.
15 Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,” October 10, 1980, treaties.unoda.org/t/ccwc.
16 Charles Trumbull, “U.S. Statement on LAWS: Potential Military Applications of Advanced Technology” (statement, First Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems [LAWS], March 25, 2019).
17 Department of Defense, United States of America, “DoD Law of War Program,” DoD Directive 2311.01, July 2, 2020, www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/231101p.pdf?ver=2020-07-02-143157-007.